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NEW YORK
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THE WORK OF THE CENTURY

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ORATIONS

VOLUME ONE
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PERICLES

PERICLES, one of the foremost of Athenian orators, and, unquestionably, the greatest of Athenian statesmen, was the son of Xanthippus, who commanded the Greeks at the Battle of Mycale, B.C. 379. On his mother’s side he was a great-nephew of Cleisthenes, who reformed the democracy at Athens after the expulsion of the sons of Pisistratus; he was thus connected both with the old princely line of Sicyon and with the great but unfortunate house of the Alcmeonidae. The date of his birth is unknown, but he grew up amid the stirring times of the Persian War. He received the best education which the age could supply. From the philosopher Anaxagoras he is thought to have acquired the intellectual breadth, the elevated tone and the superiority to superstitions by which he was distinguished. In his personal appearance he bore a striking resemblance to Pisistratus, and he possessed a grandeur of manner which, even more than his eloquence, gained for him the name of the Olympian Zeus. His rise to power must be attributed conjointly to his wisdom and to his oratory. His public speeches were fraught with extraordinary power, coupled with artistic finish. The range and compass of his rhetoric were wonderful, and even the contemporary writers of comedies who disliked him spoke of his eloquence with admiration. Three of his speeches are reported by Thucydides, and the one which we here reproduce, a funeral oration, delivered in honor of the Athenians who first fell in the Peloponnesian War, is probably a close report of what Pericles actually uttered. His first public appearance seems to have been made about B.C. 463. He came forward as the champion of the Democratic or Progressive party, in opposition to Timon, the leader of the Aristocratic or Conservative party. After Timon’s death he virtually guided the destinies of Athens alone. It was probably he who suggested the transference of the treasury of the league against Persea from Belos to Athens which converted the Athenian headship into an empire; at all events, he managed the fund after its transfer. It was he who introduced the payment of jurors, and also the payment of citizens for military service. Vast sums were spent by him in adornning the city with the memorable buildings which made it the wonder of the world. Among these were the Parthenon, the Erechtheum, the Propylea or Vestibule to the Acropolis, and the Odéon or music hall. It is also probably by his advice that the Long Walls were built, which, connecting Athens with the Piraeus, converted Athens and its seaport into one vast fortress. Moreover, in order to train the Athenians in seamanship, he kept a fleet of sixty ships at sea eight months out of every year. The cost of all these things was defrayed by the

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annual tribute levied on the members of the Athenian Confederacy. It is not true that the Peloponnesian War was brought about by Pericles for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution. That war was inevitable, being due to Sparta’s jealousy of the growing power of Athens. He did, however, advise the Athenians to reject Sparta’s demand that Athens should renounce her empire, and he added the wise counsel that they should confine their land operations to the defence of their own city, and should attack the Peloponnesians by sea. Unfortunately for the Peloponnesians, he died in B.C. 439. Had he lived, the Peloponnesian War would probably have had a different conclusion; at all events, the calamitous expedition against Sicily would never have been undertaken.

FUNERAL ORATION ON THE ATHENIANS WHO FIRST FELL IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The greater part of those who ere now have spoken in this place, have been accustomed to praise the man who introduced this oration into the law; considering it a right thing that it should be delivered over those who are buried after falling in battle. To me, however, it would have appeared sufficient, that when men had shown themselves brave by deeds, their honors also should be displayed by deeds—as you now see in the case of this burial, prepared at the public expense—and not that the virtues of many should be perilled in one individual, for credit to be given him according as he expresses himself well or ill. For it is difficult to speak with propriety on a subject on which even the impression of one’s truthfulness is with difficulty established. For the hearer who is acquainted [with the facts], and kindly disposed [toward those who performed them], might perhaps think them somewhat imperfectly set forth, compared with what he both wishes and knows; while he who is unacquainted with them might think that some points were even exaggerated, being led to this conclusion by envy, should he hear anything surpassing his own natural
powers. For praises spoken of others are only endured so far as each one thinks that he is himself also capable of doing any of the things he hears; but that which exceeds their own capacity men at once envy and disbelieve. Since, however, our ancestors judged this to be a right custom, I too, in obedience to the law, must endeavor to meet the wishes and views of every one, as far as possible.

I will begin then with our ancestors first: for it is just, and becoming too at the same time, that on such an occasion the honor of being thus mentioned should be paid them. For always inhabiting the country without change, through a long succession of posterity, by their valor they transmitted it free to this very time. Justly then may they claim to be commended; and more justly still may our own fathers. For in addition to what they inherited, they acquired the great empire which we possess, and by painful exertions bequeathed it to us of the present day: though to most part of it have additions been made by ourselves here, who are still, generally speaking, in the vigor of life; and we have furnished our city with everything, so as to be most self-sufficient both for peace and for war. Now with regard to our military achievements, by which each possession was gained, whether in any case it were ourselves, or our fathers, that repelled with spirit hostilities brought against us by barbarian or Greek; as I do not wish to enlarge on the subject before you who are well acquainted with it, I will pass them over. But by what a mode of life we attained to our power, and by what form of government and owing to what habits it became so great, I will explain these points first, and then proceed to the eulogy of these men; as I consider that on the present occasion they will not be inappropriately mentioned, and that it is profitable
for the whole assembly, both citizens and strangers, to listen to them.

For we enjoy a form of government which does not copy the laws of our neighbors; but we are ourselves rather a pattern to others than imitators of them. In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the few, but of the many, it is called a democracy; but with regard to its laws, all enjoy equality, as concerns their private differences; while with regard to public rank, according as each man has reputation for anything, he is preferred for public honors, not so much from consideration of party, as of merit; nor, again, on the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good service, is he prevented by the obscurity of his position. We are liberal then in our public administration; and with regard to mutual jealousy of our daily pursuits, we are not angry with our neighbor, if he does anything to please himself; nor wear on our countenance offensive looks, which, though harmless, are yet unpleasant. While, however, in private matters we live together agreeably, in public matters, under the influence of fear, we most carefully abstain from transgression, through our obedience to those who are from time to time in office, and to the laws; especially such of them as are enacted for the benefit of the injured, and such as, though unwritten, bring acknowledged disgrace [on those who break them].

Moreover, we have provided for our spirits the most numerous recreations from labors, by celebrating games and sacrifices through the whole year, and by maintaining elegant private establishments, of which the daily gratification drives away sadness. Owing to the greatness too of our city, everything from every land is imported into it; and it is our lot to reap with no more peculiar enjoyment
the good things which are produced here, than those of the rest of the world likewise.

In the studies of war also we differ from our enemies in the following respects. We throw our city open to all, and never, by the expulsion of strangers, exclude any one from either learning or observing things, by seeing which unconcealed any of our enemies might gain an advantage; for we trust not so much to preparations and stratagems as to our own valor for daring deeds. Again, as to our modes of education, they aim at the acquisition of a manly character, by laborious training from their very youth; while we, though living at our ease, no less boldly advance to meet equal dangers. As a proof of this, the Lacedæmonians never march against our country singly, but with all [their confederates] together: while we, generally speaking, have no difficulty in conquering in battle upon hostile ground those who are standing up in defence of their own. And no enemy ever yet encountered our whole united force, through our attending at the same time to our navy, and sending our troops by land on so many different services: but wherever they have engaged with any part of it, if they conquer only some of us, they boast that we were all routed by them; and if they are conquered, they say it was by all that they were beaten. And yet if with careless ease rather than with laborious practice, and with a courage which is the result not so much of laws as of natural disposition, we are willing to face danger, we have the advantage of not suffering beforehand from coming troubles, and of proving ourselves, when we are involved in them, no less bold than those who are always toiling; so that our country is worthy of admiration in these respects, and in others besides.

For we study taste with economy, and philosophy with-
out effeminacy; and employ wealth rather for opportunity of action than for boastfulness of talking; while poverty is nothing disgraceful for a man to confess, but not to escape it by exertion is more disgraceful. Again, the same men can attend at the same time to domestic as well as to public affairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still form a sufficient judgment on political questions. For we are the only people that consider the man who takes no part in these things, not as unofficious, but as useless; and we ourselves judge rightly of measures, at any rate, if we do not originate them; while we do not regard words as any hindrance to deeds, but rather [consider it a hindrance] not to have been previously instructed by word, before undertaking in deed what we have to do. For we have this characteristic also in a remarkable degree, that we are at the same time most daring and most calculating in what we take in hand; whereas to other men it is ignorance that brings daring, while calculation brings fear. Those, however, would deservedly be deemed most courageous, who know most fully what is terrible and what is pleasant, and yet do not on this account shrink from dangers. As regards beneficence also we differ from the generality of men; for we make friends, not by receiving, but by conferring kindness. Now he who has conferred the favor is the firmer friend, in order that he may keep alive the obligation by good will toward the man on whom he has conferred it; whereas he who owes it in return feels less keenly, knowing that it is not as a favor, but as a debt, that he will repay the kindness. Nay, we are the only men who fearlessly benefit any one, not so much from calculations of expediency, as with the confidence of liberality.

In short, I say that both the whole city is a school for
Greece, and that, in my opinion, the same individual would among us prove himself qualified for the most varied kinds of action, and with the most graceful versatility. And that this is not mere vaunting language for the occasion, so much as actual truth, the very power of the state, which we have won by such habits, affords a proof. For it is the only country at the present time that, when brought to the test, proves superior to its fame; and the only one that neither gives to the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at being worsted by such opponents, nor to him who is subject to us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are worthy of empire. But we shall be admired both by present and future generations as having exhibited our power with great proofs, and by no means without evidence; and as having no further need, either of Homer to praise us, or any one else who might charm for the moment by his verses, while the truth of the facts would mar the idea formed of them; but as having compelled every sea and land to become accessible to our daring, and everywhere established everlasting records, whether of evil or of good. It was for such a country then that these men, nobly resolving not to have it taken from them, fell fighting; and every one of their survivors may well be willing to suffer in its behalf.

For this reason, indeed, it is that I have enlarged on the characteristics of the state; both to prove that the struggle is not for the same object in our case as in that of men who have none of these advantages in an equal degree; and at the same time clearly to establish by proofs [the truth of] the eulogy of those men over whom I am now speaking. And now the chief points of it have been mentioned; for with regard to the things for which I have
COMMENDED THE CITY, IT WAS THE VIRTUES OF THESE MEN, AND SUCH AS THESE, THAT ADORNED HER WITH THEM; AND FEW OF THE GREEKS ARE THERE WHOSE FAME, LIKE THESE MEN'S, WOULD APPEAR BUT THE JUST COUNTERPOISE OF THEIR DEEDS. AGAIN, THE CLOSING SCENE OF THESE MEN APPEARS TO ME TO SUPPLY AN ILLUSTRATION OF HUMAN WORTH, WHETHER AS AFFORDING US THE FIRST INFORMATION RESPECTING IT, OR ITS FINAL CONFIRMATION. FOR EVEN IN THE CASE OF MEN WHO HAVE BEEN IN OTHER RESPECTS OF AN INFERIOR CHARACTER, IT IS BUT FAIR FOR THEM TO HOLD FORTH AS A SCREEN THEIR MILITARY COURAGE IN THEIR COUNTRY'S BEHALF; FOR, HAVING WIPED OUT THEIR EVIL BY THEIR GOOD, THEY DID MORE SERVICE COLLECTIVELY, THAN HARM BY THEIR INDIVIDUAL OFFENCES. BUT OF THESE MEN THERE WAS NONE THAT EITHER WAS MADE A COWARD BY HIS WEALTH, FROM PREFERRING THE CONTINUED ENJOYMENT OF IT; OR SHRANK FROM DANGER THROUGH A HOPE SUGGESTED BY POVERTY, NAMELY, THAT HE MIGHT YET ESCAPE IT, AND GROW RICH; BUT CONCEIVING THAT VENGEANCE ON THEIR FOES WAS MORE TO BE DESIRED THAN THESE OBJECTS, AND AT THE SAME TIME REGARDING THIS AS THE MOST GLORIOUS OF HAZARDS, THEY WISHED BY RISKING IT TO BE AVENGED ON THEIR ENemies, AND SO TO AIM AT PROCURING THOSE ADVANTAGES; COMMITTING TO HOPE THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUCCESS, BUT RESOLVING TO TRUST TO ACTION, WITH REGARD TO WHAT WAS VISIBLE TO THEMSELVES; AND IN THAT ACTION, BEING MINDED RATHER TO RESIST AND DIE, THAN BY SURRENDERING TO ESCAPE, THEY FLED FROM THE SHAME OF [A DISCREETIBLE] REPORT, WHILE THEY ENDUREd THE BRUNT OF THE BATTLE WITH THEIR BODIES; AND AFTER THE SHORTEST CRISIS, WHEN AT THE VERY HEIGHT OF THEIR FORTUNE, WERE TAKEN AWAY FROM THEIR GLORY RATHER THAN THEIR FEAR.

SUCH DID THESE MEN PROVE THEMSELVES, AS BECAME THE CHARACTER OF THEIR COUNTRY. FOR YOU THAT REMAIN, YOU MUST
pray that you may have a more successful resolution, but
must determine not to have one less bold against your
enemies; not in word alone considering the benefit [of
such a spirit] (on which one might descant to you at
great length—though you know it yourselves quite as well
—telling you how many advantages are contained in re-
pelling your foes); but rather day by day beholding the
power of the city as it appears in fact, and growing
enamored of it, and reflecting, when you think it great,
that it was by being bold, and knowing their duty, and
being alive to shame in action, that men acquired these
things; and because, if they ever failed in their attempt
at anything, they did not on that account think it right
to deprive their country also of their valor, but conferred
upon her a most glorious joint-offering. For while col-
lectively they gave her their lives, individually they re-
ceived that renown which never grows old, and the most
distinguished tomb they could have; not so much that in
which they are laid, as that in which their glory is left
behind them, to be everlastingly recorded on every occa-
sion for doing so, either by word or deed, that may from
time to time present itself. For of illustrious men the
whole earth is the sepulchre; and not only does the in-
scription upon columns in their own land point it out,
but in that also which is not their own there dwells with
every one an unwritten memorial of the heart, rather than
of a material monument. Vying then with these men in
your turn, and deeming happiness to consist in freedom,
and freedom in valor, do not think lightly of the hazards
of war. For it is not the unfortunate [and those] who
have no hope of any good, that would with most reason
be unsparing of their lives; but those who, while they
live, still incur the risk of a change to the opposite condition, and to whom the difference would be the greatest, should they meet with any reverse. For more grievous, to a man of high spirit at least, is the misery which accompanies cowardice, than the unfelt death which comes upon him at once, in the time of his strength and of his hope for the common welfare.

Wherefore to the parents of the dead—as many of them as are here among you—I will not offer condolence, so much as consolation. For they know that they have been brought up subject to manifold misfortunes; but that happy is their lot who have gained the most glorious—death, as these have—sorrow, as you have; and to whom life has been so exactly measured, that they were both happy in it, and died in [that happiness]. Difficult, indeed, I know it is to persuade you of this, with regard to those of whom you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others, in which you yourselves also once rejoiced; and sorrow is felt, not for the blessings of which one is bereft without full experience of them, but of that which one loses after becoming accustomed to it. But you must bear up in the hope of other children, those of you whose age yet allows you to have them. For to yourselves individually those who are subsequently born will be a reason for your forgetting those who are no more; and to the state it will be beneficial in two ways, by its not being depopulated, and by the enjoyment of security; for it is not possible that those should offer any fair and just advice, who do not incur equal risk with their neighbors by having children at stake. Those of you, however, who are past that age, must consider that the longer period of your life during which you have been prosperous is so
much gain, and that what remains will be but a short one; and you must cheer yourselves with the fair fame of these [your lost ones]. For the love of honor is the only feeling that never grows old; and in the helplessness of age it is not the acquisition of gain, as some assert, that gives greatest pleasure, but the enjoyment of honor.

For those of you, on the other hand, who are sons or brothers of the dead, great, I see, will be the struggle of competition. For every one is accustomed to praise the man who is no more; and scarcely, though even for an excess of worth, would you be esteemed, I do not say equal to them, but only slightly inferior. For the living are exposed to envy in their rivalry; but those who are in no one's way are honored with a good will free from all opposition. If, again, I must say anything on the subject of woman's excellence also, with reference to those of you who will now be in widowhood, I will express it all in a brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of the natural character that belongs to you; and great is hers, who is least talked of among the men, either for good or evil.

I have now expressed in word, as the law required, what I had to say befitting the occasion; and, in deed, those who are here interred, have already received part of their honors; while, for the remaining part, the state will bring up their sons at the public expense, from this time to their manhood; thus offering both to these and to their posterity a beneficial reward for such contests; for where the greatest prizes for virtue are given, there also the most virtuous men are found among the citizens. And now, having finished your lamentations for your several relatives, depart.
ÆSCHINES

ÆSCHINES, who, among Athenian orators, stands second to Demosthenes alone, was born in B.C. 389, five years earlier than his great rival. As to the rank and character of his parents, different statements are made by himself and by his opponents. That he must have received a good education is evident from the works which he has left behind him. Being gifted with a handsome person and sonorous voice, he first tried his fortune as an actor; but in this profession, which was by no means dishonorable at Athens, he appears for one cause or another not to have succeeded. Like other Athenian citizens he was called upon to perform military service for his country, and he acquitted himself with honor in several campaigns. The laurels which he earned as a speaker, however, soon threw into the shade those of the battlefield. Having secured the position of clerk to the popular assembly, he gradually acquired an intimate acquaintance with the laws, the politics and the public business of his country. This knowledge he found of immense advantage when he came himself to take a part in the debates, and it is no wonder that, with his powerful voice and impressive delivery, his literary acquirements and copious vocabulary, he quickly attained an eminent place among the orators of the day.

The circumstances attending the peace which followed the so-called Social War first created hostility between Æschines and Demosthenes. An accusation levelled by the latter against the former brought them into an antagonism both political and personal which never ceased till Æschines finally quitted his native land. In B.C. 338, not many months after the Battle of Cherrones, in which the united forces of Thebes and Athens had been disastrously beaten by Philip of Macedon, Ctesiphon, a member of the anti-Macedonian party at Athens, brought forward a proposal that the people should confer a crown upon Demosthenes for his patriotism and public virtue, and that the bestowal of the honor should be proclaimed in the theatre at the coming Dionysiac Festival, when a multitude of auditors from all parts of Greece were certain to be present. This proposal was adopted by the popular assembly, but the execution of it was suspended for some eight years because Æschines brought an indictment against Ctesiphon on three grounds, two of which were of a legal nature, while the third went to the merits of the question, being a denial of the public services and public virtue attributed to Demosthenes. At least one of the legal points was well taken, and, had Æschines confined himself to these, a verdict could scarcely have been denied to him. But he had seen fit to dispute the merits of Demosthenes, and it was the deliberate will and the highest
interest of the people to sweep aside technicalities, and show that it still
honored the man who had not despaired of the commonwealth. Thus it came
about that Ctesiphon was acquitted by an overwhelming vote.

As Ἀσχίνης on the trial of Ctesiphon, which did not take place till B.C.
330, failed to obtain even a fifth part of the votes, he was by law obliged to
quit Athens. Thenceforth he lived as an exile in Asia Minor and the adjacent
islands, earning his livelihood by teaching rhetoric. At Rhodes he founded a
school which acquired considerable celebrity. It was there that his scholars,
hearing him recite his own oration against Ctesiphon, expressed astonishment
at his having failed to get a verdict. "You will cease to wonder," said he,
"when you have heard the speech of the opposing orator." On another oc-
cassion, when he read both of the speeches to a Rhodian assembly, that of
Demosthenes, which he delivered with great energy, excited the admiration
of all: "What would you have thought," said Ἀσχίνης, "could you have
heard the man himself?"

AGAInst CROWNING DEMOSTHENES

O

UR DAYS have not fallen on the common chances
of mortal life. We have been set to bequeath a
story of marvels to posterity. Is not the king of
Persia, he who cut through Athos, and bridged the Helles-
pont, he who demands earth and water from the Greeks,
he who in his letters presumes to style himself lord of all
men from the sunrise to the sunset, is he not struggling
at this hour, no longer for authority over others, but for
his own life? Do you not see the men who delivered the
Delphian temple invested not only with that glory but with
the leadership against Persia? While Thebes—Thebes, our
neighbor city—has been in one day swept from the face of
Greece—justly it may be in so far as her general policy was
erroneous, yet in consequence of a folly which was no acci-
dent, but the judgment of Heaven. The unfortunate Laced-
demonians, though they did but touch this affair in its first
phase by the occupation of the temple—they who once
claimed the leadership of Greece—are now to be sent to
Alexander in Asia to give hostages, to parade their disasters, and to hear their own and their country's doom from his lips, when they have been judged by the clemency of the master they provoked. Our city, the common asylum of the Greeks, from which, of old, embassies used to come from all Greece to obtain deliverance for their several cities at our hands, is now battling, no more for the leadership of Greece, but for the ground on which it stands. And these things have befallen us since Demosthenes took the direction of our policy. The poet Hesiod will interpret such a case. There is a passage meant to educate democracies and to counsel cities generally, in which he warns us not to accept dishonest leaders. I will recite the lines myself, the reason, I think, for our learning the maxims of the poets in boyhood being that we may use them as men:

"Oft hath the bad man been the city's bane;
Oft hath his sin brought to the sinless pain;
Oft hath all-seeing Heaven sore vexed the town
With dearth and death and brought the people down;
Cast down their walls and their most valiant slain,
And on the seas made all their navies vain!"

Strip these lines of their poetic garb, look at them closely, and I think you will say these are no mere verses of Hesiod—that they are a prophecy of the administration of Demosthenes, for by the agency of that administration our ships, our armies, our cities have been swept from the earth. . . . "Oh yes," it will be replied, "but then he is a friend of the constitution." If, indeed, you have a regard only to his delicacy you will be deceived as you were before, but not if you look at his character and at the facts. I will help you to estimate the characteristics which ought to be found in a friend of the constitution; in a sober-
minded citizen. I will oppose to them the character that may be looked for in an unprincipled revolutionist. Then you shall draw your comparison and consider on which part he stands—not in his language, remember, but in his life. Now all, I think, will allow that these attributes should belong to a friend of the constitution: First, that he should be of free descent by both parents, so that the disadvantage of birth may not imbitter him against those laws which preserve the democracy. Second, that he should be able to show that some benefit has been done to the people by his ancestors; or, at the worst, that there had been no enmity between them which would prompt him to revenge the misfortunes of his fathers on the state. Third, he should be virtuous and temperate in his private life, so that no profligate expense may lead him into taking bribes to the hurt of the people. Next, he should be sagacious and able to speak—since our ideal is that the best course should be chosen by the intelligence and then commended to his hearers by the trained eloquence of the orator—though, if we cannot have both, sagacity must needs take rank before eloquence. Lastly, he must have a stout heart or he may play the country false in the crisis of danger or of war. The friend of oligarchy must be the opposite of all this. I need not repeat the points. Now, consider: How does Demosthenes answer to these conditions?

[After accusing Demosthenes of being by parentage half a Scythian, Greek in nothing but language, the orator proceeds]—

In his private life, what is he? The tetrarch sank to rise a pettifogger, a spendthrift, ruined by his own fol-
lies. Then having got a bad name in this trade, too, by showing his speeches to the other side, he bounded on the stage of public life, where his profits out of the city were as enormous as his savings were small. Now, however, the flood of royal gold has floated his extravagance. But not even this will suffice. No wealth could ever hold out long against vice. In a word, he draws his livelihood not from his own resources but from your dangers. What, however, are his qualifications in respect to sagacity and to power of speech? A clever speaker, an evil liver! And what is the result to Athens? The speeches are fair; the deeds are vile! Then as to courage I have a word to say. If he denied his cowardice, or if you were not aware of it, the topic might have called for discussion, but since he himself admits in the assemblies and you know it, it remains only to remind you of the laws on the subject. Solon, our ancient lawgiver, thought the coward should be liable to the same penalties as the man who refuses to serve or who has quitted his post. Cowardice, like other offences, is indictable.

Some of you will, perhaps, ask in amazement: Is a man to be indicted for his temperament? He is. And why? In order that every one of us, fearing the penalties of the law more than the enemy, may be the better champion of his country. Accordingly, the lawgiver excludes alike the man who declines service, the coward, and the deserter of his post, from the lustral limits in the marketplace, and suffers no such person to receive a wreath of honor or to enter places of public worship. But you, Ctesiphon, exhort us to set a crown on the head to which the laws refuse it. You by your private edict call a forbidden guest into the forefront of our solemn festival, and invite into the tem-
ple of Dionysos that dastard by whom all temples have been betrayed. ... Remember then, Athenians, that the city whose fate rests with you is no alien city, but your own. Give the prizes of ambition by merit, not by chance. Reserve your rewards for those whose manhood is truer, whose characters are worthier. Look at each other and judge not only with your ears but with your eyes who of your number are likely to support Demosthenes. His young companions in the chase or the gymnasion? No, by the Olympian Zeus! He has not spent his life in hunting or in any healthful exercise, but in cultivating rhetoric to be used against men of property. Think of his boastfulness when he claims by his embassy to have snatched Byzantium out of the hands of Philip, to have thrown the Acharnians into revolt, to have astonished the Thebians with his harangue! He thinks that you have reached the point of fatuity at which you can be made to believe even this—as if your citizen were the deity of persuasion instead of a pettifogging mortal! And when, at the end of his speech, he calls as his advocates those who shared his bribes, imagine that you see upon this platform, where I now speak before you, an array drawn up to confront their profligacy—the benefactors of Athens: Solon, who set in order the Democracy by his glorious laws, the philosopher, the good legislator, entreating you, with the gravity which so well became him, never to set the rhetoric of Demosthenes above your oaths and above the laws; Aristides, who assessed the tribute of the Confederacy, and whose daughters after his death were dowered by the state—indignant at the contumely threatened to justice and asking: Are you not ashamed? When Arthmios of Zeleia brought Persian gold to Greece and visited Athens, our fathers wellnigh put him to death,
though he was our public guest, and proclaimed him expelled from Athens and from all territory that the Athenians rule; while Demosthenes, who has not brought us Persian gold but has taken bribes for himself and has kept them to this day, is about to receive a golden wreath from you! And Themistocles, and they who died at Marathon and Platæa, aye, and the very graves of our forefathers—do you not think they will utter a voice of lamentation, if he who covenants with barbarians to work against Greece shall be—crowned!
DEMOSTHENES

DEMOSTHENES was born in 384 B.C. His father, who bore the same name, was an Athenian citizen of the deme of Pseania. His grandmother on the mother’s side was a native of the region which we now call the Crimea, on which account his adversaries in after days used to taunt him with a barbarian ancestry. He was seven years old when his father, who was a manufacturer of swords and of upholstery, died, leaving a property which, invested, as it seems to have been, at 30 per cent, should have yielded about three thousand dollars a year. It was possible to live decently at Athens on a twentieth part of that income. Unfortunately for Demosthenes, his guardians abused their trust, and handed over to him, when he became of age, less than a seventh of his patrimony. His relatives also managed to throw upon him a public burden, the equipment of a ship of war, whereby his resources were still further straitened. To increase his income, he became a professional writer of speeches or pleas for the law courts, sometimes speaking himself. To some extent he seems to have continued his private law practice throughout his political career. His first direct contact with public affairs occurred in B.C. 355, and his connection with Athenian politics continued until his death in 322. The whole of his political life has sometimes been regarded as a duel between the ablest champion and the craftiest enemy of Greek freedom. For Demosthenes, however, the peril of subjugation to Macedon was only a calamitous accident. As he did not hesitate to tell his countrymen, they would have made a Philip for themselves had none been forthcoming. His constant aim was to regenerate the Athenians, to make their city the head of a free Greek confederation, and to see her stretch forth her arm on behalf of every Hellenic State against which a barbarian hand was raised. It was the duty of Athens, so he thought, to see that the central hearth of Hellas was kept pure. Consequently, he gave his energies to the task of domestic reform, as well as to the formation and maintenance of far-sighted foreign relations. As the event proved, the time had gone by for Athens to save Greece, or even save herself, but it is the glory of Demosthenes that he postponed the day of doom. Between B.C. 351, the date of the First Philippic, and B.C. 341, when the Third Philippic was spoken, Demosthenes delivered eight political orations, seven of which are concerned with the aggressions of the Macedonian ruler. Up to the Battle of Charonea, in B.C. 338, the authority of the great orator steadily grew, until it became, first predominant and then paramount. After Philip’s “dishonest victory,” which, according to an ill-founded tradition,
"slew with report that old man eloquent,"
it was Isocrates, the enemies of Demosthenes supposed that they had him in their power, but the people remained faithful to him, and in B.C. 330, when the indictment of Ctesiphon by Æschines, which had been brought eight years before, and which really put in question the value of the public services of Demosthenes, the greatest of Athenian orators gained a tremendous victory. In B.C. 324, however, Demosthenes was accused of receiving a bribe from Harpalus, Alexander's receiver-general, who had fled to Athens. The orator was tried, condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, and, in default thereof, imprisoned. He escaped to Ægina, and thence to Proæzen. He returned to Athens after Alexander's death, and took a principal part in organizing the so-called Lamian War for the recovery of the liberties of Greece. The contest went against the patriots, and Athens was spared on condition that Demosthenes and certain other orators should be condemned to death as traitors. The decree was passed in B.C. 322, and Demosthenes, who had fled to a temple of Poseidon in the island of Calauria, off the coast of Argolis, committed suicide by poison in order to avoid death by violence.

SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES IN DEFENCE OF CTESIPHON,
COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE "ORATION
ON THE CROWN"

I BEGIN, men of Athens, by praying to every god and goddess, that the same goodwill, which I have ever cherished toward the commonwealth and all of you, may be requited to me on the present trial. I pray likewise—and this specially concerns yourselves, your religion, and your honor—that the gods may put it in your minds, not to take counsel of my opponent touching the manner in which I am to be heard—that would, indeed, be cruel!—but of the laws and of your oath; wherein (besides the other obligations) it is prescribed that you shall hear both sides alike. This means, not only that you must pass no pre-condemnation, not only that you must extend your goodwill equally to both, but also that you must allow the parties to adopt such order and course of defence as they severally choose and prefer.
Many advantages hath Æschines over me on this trial; and two especially, men of Athens. First, my risk in the contest is not the same. It is assuredly not the same for me to forfeit your regard, as for my adversary not to succeed in his indictment. To me—but I will say nothing untoward at the outset of my address. The prosecution, however, is play to him. My second disadvantage is, the natural disposition of mankind to take pleasure in hearing invective and accusation, and to be annoyed by those who praise themselves. To Æschines is assigned the part which gives pleasure; that which is (I may fairly say) offensive to all, is left for me. And if, to escape from this, I make no mention of what I have done, I shall appear to be without defence against his charges, without proof of my claims to honor; whereas, if I proceed to give an account of my conduct and measures, I shall be forced to speak frequently of myself. I will endeavor then to do so with all becoming modesty; what I am driven to by the necessity of the case will be fairly chargeable to my opponent, who has instituted such a prosecution.

I think, men of the jury, you will all agree that I, as well as Ctesiphon, am a party to this proceeding, and that it is a matter of no less concern to me. It is painful and grievous to be deprived of anything, especially by the act of one's enemy; but your goodwill and affection are the heaviest loss, precisely as they are the greatest prize to gain.

Such being the matters at stake in this cause, I conjure and implore you all alike, to hear my defence to the charge in that fair manner which the laws prescribe—laws, to which their author, Solon, a man friendly to you and to popular rights, thought that validity should be given, not only by the recording of them, but by the oath of you the jurors;
not that he distrusted you, as it appears to me, but, seeing that the charges and calumnies, wherein the prosecutor is powerful by being the first speaker, cannot be got over by the defendant, unless each of you jurors, observing his religious obligation, shall with like favor receive the arguments of the last speaker, and lend an equal and impartial ear to both, before he determines upon the whole case.

As I am, it appears, on this day to render an account both of my private life and my public measures, I would fain, as in the outset, call the gods to my aid; and in your presence I implore them, first, that the goodwill which I have ever cherished toward the commonwealth and all of you may be fully requited to me on the present trial; next, that they may direct you to such a decision upon this indictment as will conduce to your common honor, and to the good conscience of each individual.

Had Æschines confined his charge to the subject of the prosecution, I, too, would have proceeded at once to my justification of the decree. But since he has wasted no fewer words in the discussion of other matters, in most of them calumniating me, I deem it both necessary and just, men of Athens, to begin by shortly adverting to these points, that none of you may be induced by extraneous arguments to shut your ears against my defence to the indictment.

To all his scandalous abuse of my private life, observe my plain and honest answer. If you know me to be such as he alleged—for I have lived nowhere else but among you—let not my voice be heard, however transcendent my statesmanship! Rise up this instant and condemn me! But if, in your opinion and judgment, I am far better and of better descent than my adversary; if (to speak
without offence) I am not inferior, I or mine, to any respectable citizens; then give no credit to him for his other statements—it is plain they were all equally fictions—but to me let the same goodwill, which you have uniformly exhibited upon many former trials, be manifested now. With all your malice, Æschines, it was very simple to suppose that I should turn from the discussion of measures and policy to notice your scandal. I will do no such thing; I am not so crazed. Your lies and calumnies about my political life I will examine forthwith; for that loose ribaldry I shall have a word hereafter, if the jury desire to hear it.

The crimes whereof I am accused are many and grievous; for some of them the laws enact heavy—most severe penalties. The scheme of this present proceeding includes a combination of spiteful insolence, insult, railing, aspersions, and everything of the kind; while for the said charges and accusations, if they were true, the state has not the means of inflicting an adequate punishment, or anything like it. For it is not right to debar another of access to the people and privilege of speech; moreover, to do so by way of malice and insult—by Heaven! is neither honest, nor constitutional, nor just. If the crimes which he saw me committing against the state were as heinous as he so tragically gave out, he ought to have enforced the penalties of the law against them at the time; if he saw me guilty of an impeachable offence, by impeaching and so bringing me to trial before you; if moving illegal decrees, by indicting me for them. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he would not have forborne to indict me myself, had he thought he could convict me. In short, whatever else he saw me doing to
your prejudice, whether mentioned or not mentioned in
his catalogue of slander, there are laws for such things,
and punishments, and trials, and judgments, with sharp
and severe penalties; all of which he might have enforced
against me: and had he done so—had he thus pursued the
proper method with me, his charges would have been con-
sistent with his conduct. But now he has declined the
straightforward and just course, avoided all proofs of guilt
at the time, and after this long interval gets up, to play
his part withal, a heap of accusation, ribaldry, and scandal.
Then he arraigns me, but prosecutes the defendant. His
hatred of me he makes the prominent part of the whole
contest; yet, without having ever met me upon that
ground, he openly seeks to deprive a third party of his
privileges. Now, men of Athens, besides all the other
arguments that may be urged in Ctesiphon's behalf, this,
methinks, may very fairly be alleged—that we should try
our own quarrel by ourselves; not leave our private dis-
pute, and look what third party we can damage. That
surely were the height of injustice.

It may appear, from what has been said, that all his
charges are alike unjust and unfounded in truth. Yet I
wish to examine them separately, and especially his calum-
nies about the peace and the embassy, where he attributed
to me the acts of himself and Philocrates. It is necessary
also, and perhaps proper, men of Athens, to remind you
how affairs stood at those times, that you may consider
every single measure in reference to the occasion.

When the Phocian war had broken out—not through
me, for I had not then commenced public life—you were
in this position: you wished the Phocians to be saved,
though you saw they were not acting right; and would
have been glad for the Thebans to suffer anything, with whom for a just reason you were angry; for they had not borne with moderation their good fortune at Leuctra. The whole of Peloponnesus was divided: they that hated the Lacedæmonians were not powerful enough to destroy them; and they that ruled before by Spartan influence were not masters of the states: among them, as among the rest of the Greeks, there was a sort of unsettled strife and confusion. Philip, seeing this—it was not difficult to see—lavished bribes upon the traitors in every state, embroiled and stirred them all up against each other; and so, by the errors and follies of the rest, he was strengthening himself, and growing up to the ruin of all. But when every one saw that the then overbearing, but now unfortunate, Thebans, harassed by so long a war, must of necessity have recourse to you; Philip, to prevent this, and obstruct the union of the states, offered to you peace, to them succor. What helped him then almost to surprise you in a voluntary snare? The cowardice, shall I call it? or ignorance—or both—of the other Greeks; who, while you were waging a long and incessant war—and that, too, for their common benefit, as the event has shown—assisted you neither with money nor men, nor anything else whatsoever. You, being justly and naturally offended with them, lent a willing ear to Philip.

The peace then granted was through such means brought about, not through me, as Æschines calumniously charged. The criminal and corrupt practices of these men during the treaty will be found, on fair examination, to be the cause of our present condition. The whole matter am I for truth's sake discussing and going through; for, let there appear to be ever so much crimi-
nality in these transactions, it is surely nothing to me. The first who spoke and mentioned the subject of peace was Aristodemus the actor; the seconder and mover, fellow-hireling for that purpose with the prosecutor, was Philocrates the Agnusian—your associate, Æschines, not mine, though you should burst with lying. Their supporters—from whatever motives—I pass that by for the present—were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had nothing to do with it.

Notwithstanding these facts, which I have stated exactly according to the truth, he ventured to assert—to such a pitch of impudence had he come—that I, besides being author of the peace, had prevented the country making it in a general council with the Greeks. Why, you—I know not what name you deserve!—when you saw me robbing the state of an advantage and connection so important as you described just now, did you ever express indignation? did you come forward to publish and proclaim what you now charge me with? If, indeed, I had been bribed by Philip to prevent the conjunction of the Greeks, it was your business not to be silent, but to cry out, to protest, and inform the people. But you never did so—your voice was never heard to such a purpose, and no wonder; for at that time no embassy had been sent to any of the Greeks—they had all been tested long before; and not a word of truth upon the subject has Æschines spoken.

Besides, it is the country that he most traduces by his falsehoods. For, if you were at the same time calling on the Greeks to take arms and sending your own ambassadors to treat with Philip for peace, you were performing the part of an Eurybatus, not the act of a commonwealth, or of
honest men. But it is false, it is false. For what purpose could ye have sent for them at that period? For peace? They all had it. For war? You were yourselves deliberating about peace. It appears, therefore, I was not the adviser or the author of the original peace; and none of his other calumnies against me are shown to be true.

Observe again, after the state had concluded the peace, what line of conduct each of us adopted. Hence you will understand who it was that co-operated in everything with Philip; who that acted in your behalf, and sought the advantage of the commonwealth.

I moved in the council, that our ambassadors should sail instantly for whatever place they heard Philip was in, and receive his oath: they would not, however, notwithstanding my resolution. What was the effect of this, men of Athens? I will explain. It was Philip's interest that the interval before the oaths should be as long as possible; yours, that it should be as short. Why? Because you discontinued all your warlike preparations, not only from the day of swearing peace, but from the day that you conceived hopes of it; a thing which Philip was from the beginning studious to contrive, believing—rightly enough—that whatever of our possessions he might take before the oath of ratification he should hold securely; as none would break the peace on such account. I, men of Athens, foreseeing and weighing these consequences, moved the decree, to sail for whatever place Philip was in, and receive his oath without delay; so that your allies, the Thracians, might be in possession of the places which Æschines ridiculed just now (Serrium, Myrtium, and Ergisoe), at the time of swearing the oaths; and that Philip might not become master of Thrace by securing the posts of vantage, nor provide him-
self with plenty of money and troops to facilitate his further designs. Yet this decree he neither mentions nor reads; but reproaches me, because, as Councillor, I thought proper to introduce the ambassadors. Why, what should I have done? Moved not to introduce men who were come for the purpose of conferring with you? or ordered the Manager not to assign them places at the theatre? They might have had places for their two obols, if the resolution had not been moved. Was it my duty to guard the petty interests of the state, and have sold our main interests like these men? Surely not. Take and read me this decree, which the prosecutor, knowing it well, passed over. Read.

THE DECREE

"In the Archonship of Mnesiphus, on the thirteenth of Hecatombaeon, in the presidency of the Pandionian tribe, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pheania, moved:—Whereas Philip hath sent ambassadors for peace, and hath agreed upon articles of treaty, it is resolved by the Council and People of Athens, in order that the peace voted in the first assembly may be ratified, to choose forthwith from the whole body of Athenians five ambassadors; and that the persons elected do repair, without any delay, wheresoever they shall ascertain that Philip is, and as speedily as may be exchange oaths with him, according to the articles agreed on between him and the Athenian people, comprehending the allies of either party. For ambassadors were chosen, Eubulus of Anaphlystus, Æschines of Cothocidæ, Cephasphon of Rhamnus, Democrats of Phlya, Cleon of Cothocidæ."

Notwithstanding that I had passed this decree for the advantage of Athens, not that of Philip, our worthy ambassadors so little regarded it, as to sit down in Macedonia three whole months, until Philip returned from Thrace after
entirely subjugating the country; although they might in ten days, or rather in three or four, have reached the Hellespont and saved the fortresses, by receiving his oath before he reduced them: for he would never have touched them in our presence, or we should not have sworn him; and thus he would have lost the peace, and not have obtained both, the peace and the fortresses.

Such was the first trick of Philip, the first corrupt act of these accursed miscreants, in the embassy: for which I avow that I was and am and ever will be at war and variance with them. But mark another and still greater piece of villany immediately after. When Philip had sworn to the peace, having secured Thrace through these men disobeying my decree, he again bribes them not to leave Macedonia until he had got all ready for his expedition against the Phocians. His fear was, if they reported to you his design and preparation for marching, you might sally forth, sail round with your galleys to Thermopylae as before, and block up the strait: his desire, that, the moment you received the intelligence from them, he should have passed Thermopylae, and you be unable to do anything. And in such terror and anxiety was Philip, lest, notwithstanding he had gained these advantages, if you voted succor before the destruction of the Phocians, his enterprise should fail; he hires this despicable fellow, no longer in common with the other ambassadors, but by himself individually, to make that statement and report to you, by which everything was lost.

I conjure and beseech you, men of Athens, throughout the trial to remember this; that, if Ἐσχίνης in his charge had not travelled out of the indictment, neither would I have spoken a word irrelevant; but since he has resorted
to every species both of accusation and calumny, it is necessary for me to reply briefly to each of his charges.

What then were the statements made by Æschines, through which everything was lost? That you should not be alarmed by Philip's having passed Thermopylæ—that all would be as you desired, if you kept quiet; and in two or three days you would hear, he was their friend to whom he had come as an enemy, and their enemy to whom he had come as a friend—it was not words that cemented attachments (such was his solemn phrase), but identity of interest; and it was the interest of all alike, Philip, the Phocians, and you, to be relieved from the harshness and insolence of the Thebans. His assertions were heard by some with pleasure, on account of the hatred which then subsisted against the Thebans. But what happened directly, almost immediately, afterward? The wretched Phocians were destroyed, their cities demolished; you that kept quiet, and trusted to Æschines, were shortly bringing in your effects out of the country, while Æschines received gold; and yet more—while you got nothing but your enmity with the Thebans and Thessalians, Philip won their gratitude for what he had done. To prove what I say, read me the decree of Callisthenes, and the letter of Philip, from both of which these particulars will be clear to you. Read.

THE DECREE

"In the Archonship of Mnæsiphilus, an extraordinary assembly having been convened by the Generals, with the sanction of the Presidents and the Council, on the twenty-first of Mæmacterion, Callisthenes, son of Eteonicus of Phalerum, moved: No Athenian shall on any pretence sleep in the country, but all in the city and Piræus, except those
who are stationed in the garrisons; and they shall every one keep the posts assigned to them, without absenting themselves by night or day. Whosoever disobeys this decree, shall be amenable to the penalties of treason, unless he can show that some necessity prevented him: the judges of such necessity shall be the General of Infantry, and he of the Finance Department, and the Secretary of the Council. All effects shall be conveyed out of the country as speedily as may be; those that are within a hundred and twenty furlongs into the city and Piræus, those that are beyond a hundred and twenty furlongs to Eleusis, and Phyle, and Aphidna, and Rhamnus, and Sunium. On the motion of Callisthenes of Phalerum.''

Was it with such expectations you concluded the peace? Were such the promises this hireling made you? Come, read the letter which Philip sent after this to Athens.

THE LETTER OF PHILIP

"Philip, king of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting. Ye know that we have passed Thermopylae, and reduced Phocis to submission, and put garrisons in the towns that opened their gates; those that resisted we took by storm, and razed to the ground, enslaving their inhabitants. Hearing, however, that ye are preparing to assist them, I have written unto you, that ye may trouble yourselves no further in the business. For it seems to me, ye are acting altogether unreasonably; having concluded peace, and, nevertheless, taking the field, and that, too, when the Phocians are not comprehended in our treaty. Wherefore, if ye abide not by your engagements, ye will gain no advantage but that of being the aggressors."

You hear how plainly, in his letter to you, he declares and asserts to his own allies—"all this I have done against the will of the Athenians, and in their despite; therefore, if ye are wise, ye Thebans and Thessalians, ye will regard
them as enemies, and put confidence in me’; not writing in such words, but meaning so to be understood. And by these means he carried them away with him, insomuch that they had neither foresight nor sense of the consequences, but suffered him to get everything into his power: hence the misfortunes under which those wretched people at present are. The agent and auxiliary who helped to win for him such confidence—who brought false reports here and cajoled you—he it is who now bewails the sufferings of the Thebans, and dilates upon them so pathetically, he himself being the cause both of these calamities, and those in Phocis, and all the rest which the Greeks have sustained. Truly must you, Æschines, grieve at these events, and compassionate the Thebans, when you hold property in Boeotia and farm their lands; and I rejoice at a work, whose author immediately required me to be delivered into his hands.

But I have fallen upon a subject which it may be more convenient to discuss by and by. I will return then to my proofs, showing how the iniquities of these men have brought about the present state of things.

When you had been deceived by Philip through the agency of these men, who sold themselves in the embassies, and reported not a word of truth to you—when the unhappy Phocians had been deceived and their cities destroyed—what followed? The despicable Thessalians and stupid Thebans looked on Philip as a friend, a benefactor, a savior: he was everything with them—not a syllable would they hear from any one to the contrary. You, though regarding his acts with suspicion and anger, still observed the peace; for you could have done nothing alone. The rest of the Greeks, cheated and disappointed like yourselves, gladly observed the peace, though they also had in a man-
ner been attacked for a long time. For when Philip was
marching about, subduing Illyrians and Triballians and
some also of the Greeks, and gaining many considerable
accessions of power, and certain citizens of the states (Æs-
chines among them) took advantage of the peace to go
there and be corrupted; all people then, against whom he
was making such preparations, were attacked. If they per-
ceived it not, that is another question, no concern of mine.
I was forever warning and protesting, both at Athens and
wheresoever I was sent. But the states were diseased; one
class in their politics and measures being venal and corrupt,
while the multitude of private men either had no foresight,
or were caught with the bait of present ease and idleness;
and all were under some such influence, only they imagined
each that the mischief would not approach themselves, but
that by the peril of others they might secure their own
safety when they chose. The result, I fancy, has been,
that the people, in return for their gross and unseasonable
indolence, have lost their liberty; the statesmen, who imag-
inged they were selling everything but themselves, discov-
ered they had sold themselves first; for, instead of friends,
as they were named during the period of bribery, they are
now called parasites, and miscreants, and the like befitting
names. Justly. For no man, O Athenians, spends money
for the traitor’s benefit, or, when he has got possession of
his purchase, employs the traitor to advise him in future
proceedings; else nothing could have been more fortunate
than a traitor. But it is not so—it never could be—it is
far otherwise! When the aspirant for power has gained his
object, he is master also of those that sold it; and then—
then, I say, knowing their baseness, he loathes, and mis-
trusts, and spurns them.
Consider only—for, though the time of the events is past, the time for understanding them is ever present to the wise: Lasthenes was called the friend of Philip for a while, until he betrayed Olynthus—Timolaus for a while, until he destroyed Thebes—Eudicus and Simus of Larissa for a while, until they brought Thessaly under Philip's power. Since then the world has become full of traitors, expelled, and insulted, and suffering every possible calamity. How fared Aristratus in Sicyon? how Perilaus in Megara? Are they not outcasts? Hence one may evidently see, it is the vigilant defender of his country, the strenuous opponent of such men, who secures to you traitors and hirelings, Æschines, the opportunity of getting bribes: through the number of those that oppose your wishes, you are in safety and in pay; for had it depended on yourselves, you would have perished long ago.

Much more could I say about those transactions, yet methinks too much has been said already. The fault is my adversary's, for having spirited over me the dregs, I may say, of his own wickedness and iniquities, of which I was obliged to clear myself to those who are younger than the events. You too have probably been disgusted who knew this man's venality before I spoke a word. He calls it friendship indeed; and said somewhere in his speech—"the man who reproaches me with the friendship of Alexander." I reproach you with friendship of Alexander! Whence gotten, or how merited? Neither Philip's friend nor Alexander's should I ever call you; I am not so mad; unless we are to call reapers and other hired laborers the friends of those that hire them. That however is not so—how could it be? It is nothing of the kind. Philip's hireling I called you once, and Alexander's
I call you now. So do all these men. If you disbelieve me, ask them; or rather I will do it for you. Athenians! is Ἀσχινες, think ye, the hireling, or the friend of Alexander? You hear what they say.

I now proceed to my defence upon the indictment itself, and to the account of my own measures, that Ἀσχινες may hear, though he knows already, on what I found my title both to these which have been decreed and to far greater rewards. Take and read me the indictment itself.

THE INDICTMENT

"In the Archonship of Chærondas, on the sixth of Elaphesbolion, Ἀσχινες, son of Atrometus of Cothocidas, preferred before the archon an indictment against Ctesiphon, son of Leosthenes of Anaphlystus; for an illegal measure: for that he proposed a decree against law, to wit, that it was right to crown Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pæania, with a golden crown, and to proclaim in the theatre at the great Dionysian festival, at the exhibition of the new tragedies, that the people crown Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pæania, with a golden crown, on account of his virtue, and of the goodwill which he has constantly cherished toward all the Greeks as well as toward the people of Athens, and of his integrity, and because he has constantly by word and deed promoted the advantage of the people, and is zealous to do whatever good he can; all which clauses are false and illegal; the laws enacting, first, that no false allegations shall be entered in the public records; secondly, that an accountable officer shall not be crowned (but Demosthenes is a conservator of the walls, and has charge of the theoretic fund); thirdly, that the crown shall not be proclaimed in the theatre at the Dionysian festival, on the new exhibition of tragedies, but if the council confer a crown, it shall be published in the council-hall, if the people, in the Pnyx at the assembly. Penalty, fifty talents. Witnesses to the summons, Cephisophon,
son of Cephisophon of Rhamnus, Cleon, son of Cleon of Cothocidæ.”

The clauses of the decree which he prosecutes are these, men of Athens. Now from these very clauses I think I shall immediately make it clear to you, that my whole defence will be just; for I shall take the charges in the same order as my adversary, and discuss them all one by one, without a single intentional omission.

With respect to the statement, “that I have constantly by word and deed promoted the advantage of the people, and am zealous to do whatever good I can,” and the praising me on such grounds, your judgment, I conceive, must depend on my public acts; from an examination of which it will be discovered whether what Ctesiphon has alleged concerning me is true and proper, or false. As to his proposing to give the crown without adding “when he has passed his accounts,” and to proclaim the crown in the theatre, I imagine that this also relates to my political conduct, whether I am worthy of the crown and the public proclamation, or not. However, I deem it necessary to produce the laws which justified the defendant in proposing such clauses.

Thus honestly and simply, men of Athens, have I resolved to conduct my defence. I now proceed to my own actual measures. And let no one suppose that I wander from the indictment, if I touch upon Grecian questions and affairs: he who attacks that clause of the decree, “that by word and deed I have promoted your good”—he who has indicted this for being false—he, I say, has rendered the discussion of my whole policy pertinent and necessary to the charge. Moreover, there being many departments of political action, I chose that which belonged to Grecian
affairs: therefore I am justified in drawing my proofs from them.

The conquests which Philip had got and held before I commenced life as a statesman and orator, I shall pass over, as I think they concern not me. Those that he was baffled in from the day of my entering on such duties, I will call to your recollection, and render an account of them; premising one thing only—Philip started, men of Athens, with a great advantage. It happened that among the Greeks—not some, but all alike—there sprang up a crop of traitors and venal wretches, such as in the memory of man had never been before. These he got for his agents and supporters: the Greeks, already ill-disposed and unfriendly to each other, he brought into a still worse state, deceiving this people, making presents to that, corrupting others in every way; and he split them into many parties, when they had all one interest, to prevent his aggrandizement. While the Greeks were all in such a condition—in such ignorance of the gathering and growing mischief—you have to consider, men of Athens, what policy and measures it became the commonwealth to adopt, and of this to receive a reckoning from me; for the man who assumed that post in the administration was I.

Ought she, ᾿Eschines, to have cast off her spirit and dignity, and, in the style of Thessalians and Dolopians, helped to acquire for Philip the dominion of Greece, and extinguished the honors and rights of our ancestors? Or, if she did not this—which would indeed have been shameful—was it right that what she saw would happen if unprevented, and was for a long time, it seems, aware of, she should suffer to come to pass?

I would gladly ask the severest censurer of our acts,
with what party he would have wished the commonwealth to side—with those who contributed to the disgraces and disasters of the Greeks, the party, we may say, of the Thessalians and their followers—or those who permitted it all for the hope of selfish advantage, among whom we may reckon the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives? But many of them, or rather all, have fared worse than ourselves. If Philip after his victory had immediately marched off and kept quiet, without molesting any either of his own allies or of the Greeks in general, still they that opposed not his enterprises would have merited some blame and reproach. But when he has stripped all alike of their dignity, their authority, their liberty—nay, even of their constitutions, where he was able—can it be doubted that you took the most glorious course in pursuance of my counsels?

But I return to the question—What should the commonwealth, Æschines, have done, when she saw Philip establishing an empire and dominion over Greece? Or what was your statesman to advise or move?—I, a statesman at Athens?—for this is most material—I who knew that from the earliest time, until the day of my own mounting the platform, our country had ever striven for precedence and honor and renown, and expended more blood and treasure for the sake of glory and the general weal than the rest of the Greeks had expended on their several interests?—who saw that Philip himself, with whom we were contending, had, in the strife for power and empire, had his eye cut out, his collar-bone fractured, his hand and leg mutilated, and was ready and willing to sacrifice any part of his body that fortune chose to take, provided he could live with the remainder in honor and glory? Hardly will any one
venture to say this—that it became a man bred at Pella, then an obscure and inconsiderable place, to possess such inborn magnanimity, as to aspire to the mastery of Greece and form the project in his mind, while you, who were Athenians, day after day in speeches and in dramas reminded of the virtue of your ancestors, should have been so naturally base, as of your own freewill and accord to surrender to Philip the liberty of Greece. No man will say this!

The only course then that remained was a just resistance to all his attacks upon you. Such course you took from the beginning, properly and becomingly; and I assisted by motions and counsels during the period of my political life—I acknowledge it. But what should I have done? I put this question to you, dismissing all else: Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Halonnesus—I mention none of them: Serrium, Doriscus, the ravaging of Peparthus, and any similar wrongs which the country has suffered—I know not even of their occurrence. You indeed said, that by talking of these I had brought the people into a quarrel, although the resolutions respecting them were moved by Eubulus and Aristophon and Diopithes—not by me, you ready utterer of what suits your purpose! Neither will I speak of these now. But I ask—the man who was appropriating to himself Eubœa, and making it a fortress against Attica, and attempting Megara, and seizing Oreus, and razing Porthmus, and setting up Philistides as tyrant in Oreus, Clitarchus in Eretria, and subjugating the Hellespont, and besieging Byzantium, and destroying some of the Greek cities, restoring exiles to others—was he by all these proceedings committing injustice, breaking the truce, violating the peace, or not? Was it meet that any of the
Greeks should rise up to prevent these proceedings, or not? If not—if Greece was to present the spectacle (as it is called) of a Mysian prey, while Athenians had life and being, then I have exceeded my duty in speaking on the subject—the commonwealth has exceeded her duty, which followed my counsels—I admit that every measure has been a misdeed, a blunder of mine. But if some one ought to have arisen to prevent these things, who but the Athenian people should it have been? Such then was the policy which I espoused. I saw him reducing all men to subjection, and I opposed him: I continued warning and exhorting you not to make these sacrifices to Philip.

It was he that infringed the peace by taking our ships: it was not the state, Æschines. Produce the decrees themselves, and Philip's letter, and read them one after another. From an examination of them, it will be evident who is chargeable with each proceeding. Read.

THE DECREES

"In the Archonship of Neocles, in the month Boedromion, an extraordinary assembly having been convened by the generals, Eubulus, son of Mnesitheus of Cytherus, moved: Whereas the generals have reported in the assembly, that Leodamas the admiral, and the twenty vessels despatched with him to the Hellespont for the safe-conduct of the corn, have been carried to Macedonia by Philip's general Amyntas, and are detained in custody, let the presidents and the generals take care that the council be convened, and ambassadors to Philip be chosen, who shall go and treat with him for the release of the admiral, vessels, and troops: and if Amyntas has acted in ignorance, they shall say that the people make no complaint against him; if the admiral was found wrongfully exceeding his instructions, that the Athenians will make inquiry, and punish
him as his negligence deserves: if it be neither of these things, but a wilful trespass on the part of him who gave or him who received the commission, let them state this also, that the people, being apprised, may deliberate what course to take."

This decree Eubulus carried, not I. The next, Aristophon; then Hegesippus, then Aristophon again, then Philocrates, then Cephisophon, then the rest. I had no concern in the matter. Read the decree.

THE DECREE

"In the Archonship of Neocles, on the last day of Boedromion, at the desire of the council, the presidents and generals introduced their report of the proceedings of the assembly; to wit, that the people had resolved to appoint ambassadors to Philip for the recovery of the ships, and to furnish them with instructions and with the decrees of the assembly; and they appointed the following: Cephisophon, son of Cleon of Anaphlystus; Democritus, son of Demophon of Anagyrus; Polycritus, son of Apemantus of Cothocidæ. In the presidency of the Hippothoontian tribe, on the motion of Aristophon of Colyttus, committee-man."

Now then, as I produce these decrees, so do you, Æschines, point out what decree of my passing makes me chargeable with the war. You cannot find one: had you any, there is nothing you would sooner have produced. Why, even Philip makes no charge against me on account of the war, though he complains of others. Read Philip's own letter.

THE LETTER OF PHILIP

"Philip, king of Macedon, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting. Your ambassadors, Cephisophon, Democritus and Polycritus, came to me and conferred about the release of the galleys which Laomedon commanded. Upon
the whole, I think you must be very simple, if you imagine I do not see that those galleys were commissioned, under the pretence of conveying corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, to relieve the Selymbrians, whom I am besieging, and who are not included in the friendly treaty subsisting between us. And these instructions were given, without leave of the Athenian people, by certain magistrates and others who are not now in office, but who are anyways desirous for the people to exchange our present amity for a renewal of war, and are far more anxious for such a consummation than to relieve the Selymbrians. They suppose it will be a source of income to themselves: however, I scarcely think it is for your advantage or mine. Wherefore I release you the vessels carried into my port; and for the future, if, instead of allowing your statesmen to adopt malignant measures, you will punish them, I too will endeavor to maintain the peace. Farewell."

Here is no mention by him of Demosthenes, or any charge against me. Why then, while he complains of the others, makes he no mention of my acts? Because he must have noticed his own aggressions, had he written aught concerning me; for on these I fixed myself—these I kept resisting. And first I proposed the embassy to Peloponnesus, when into Peloponnesus he began to steal; next that to Euboea, when on Euboea he was laying his hands; then the expedition (no longer an embassy) to Oreus, and that to Eretria, when he established rulers in those cities. Afterward I despatched all the armaments by which Chersonesus was preserved, and Byzantium, and all our allies; whence to you there accrued the noblest results—praises, eulogies, honors, crowns, thanks from those you succored; while the people attacked—those that trusted you then obtained deliverance, those that disregarded you have had often to remember your warnings,
and to be convinced that you were not only their friends, but wise men also and prophets: for all that you predicted has come to pass.

That Philistides would have given a great deal to keep Oreus—Clitarchus a great deal to keep Eretria—Philip himself a great deal to have these vantage-posts against you, and in other matters to avoid exposure, and any inquiry into his wrongful acts in general—no man is ignorant, and least of all you. For the ambassadors who came here then from Clitarchus and Philistides lodged with you, Æschines, and you were their host. The commonwealth regarded them as enemies, whose offers were neither just nor advantageous, and expelled them; but they was your friends. None of their designs then were accomplished; you slanderer—who say of me, that I am silent when I have got something, and bawl when I have spent it! That is not your custom. You bawl when you have something, and will never stop, unless the jury stop you by disfranchise-

When you crowned me then for those services, and Aristonicus drew up the same words that Ctesiphon here has now drawn up, and the crown was proclaimed in the theatre—for this now is the second proclamation in my favor—Æschines, being present, neither opposed it, nor indicted the mover. Take this decree now and read it.

THE DECREES

"In the Archonship of Chærondas, son of Hegemon, on the twenty-fifth of Gamelion, in the presidency of the Leonian tribe, Aristonicus of Phrearrii moved: Whereas Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pæania, hath rendered many important services to the people of Athens, and to divers of her allies heretofore, and hath also on the present occa-
sion aided them by his decrees, and liberated certain of the cities in Euboea, and perseveres in his attachment to the people of Athens, and doth by word and deed whatever good he can for the Athenians themselves and the rest of the Greeks: It is resolved by the Council and People of Athens, to honor Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Paeonia, with public praise and a golden crown, and to proclaim the crown in the theatre at the Dionysian festival at the new tragedies, and the proclamation of the crown shall be given in charge to the presiding tribe and the prize-master. On the motion of Aristonicus of Phrearrhi."

Is there one of you that knows of any disgrace falling on the state by reason of this decree, or any scorn or ridicule—consequences which this man now predicts, if I am crowned? It is when acts are recent and notorious that, if good, they obtain reward, if the contrary, punishment; and it appears that I then obtained reward, not blame or punishment. So, up to the period of those transactions, I am acknowledged on all occasions to have promoted the interests of the state—because my speeches and motions prevailed in your councils—because my measures were executed, and procured crowns for the commonwealth and for me and all of you—because you have offered sacrifices and thanksgivings to the gods for their success.

When Philip therefore was driven out of Euboea, with arms by you, with counsels and decrees—though some persons there should burst!—by me, he sought some new position of attack on Athens. Seeing that we use more foreign corn than any people, and wishing to command the passage of the corn-trade, he advanced to Thrace; the Byzantines being his allies, he first required them to join in the war against you, and when they refused, saying (truly enough) that they had not made alliance on such
terms, he threw up intrenchments before the city, planted batteries, and laid siege to it. What course hereupon it became you to take, I will not ask again; it is manifest to all. But who was it that succored the Byzantines, and rescued them? who prevented the alienation of the Hellespont at that crisis? You, men of Athens. When I say you, I mean the commonwealth. But who advised, framed, executed the measures of state, devoted himself wholly and unrestrainedly to the public business?—I!—What benefits thence accrued to all, you need no further to be told; you have learned by experience. For the war which then sprang up, besides that it brought honor and renown, kept you in a cheaper and more plentiful supply of all the necessaries of life than does the present peace, which these worthy maintain to their country's prejudice in the hope of something to come. Perish such hope! Never may they share the blessings for which you men of honest wishes pray to the gods, nor communicate their own principles to you!

Read them now the crowns of the Byzantines, and those of the Perinthians, which they conferred upon the country as a reward.

THE BYZANTINE DEGREE

"In the Presbytership of Bosporichus, Damagetus moved in the assembly, having obtained permission of the Council: Whereas the people of Athens have ever in former times been friendly to the Byzantines and their allies, and to their kinsmen the Perinthians, and have rendered them many signal services, and also on the present occasion, when Philip of Macedon attempted by invasion and siege to exterminate the Byzantines and Perinthians, and burned and ravaged their country, they succored us with a hundred and twenty ships and provisions and weap-
ons and soldiers, and rescued us from grievous perils, and preserved our hereditary constitution, our laws, and our sepulchres: it is resolved by the people of Byzantium and Perinthus to grant unto the Athenians the right of inter-marriage, citizenship, purchase of land and houses, the first seat at the games, first admission to the Council and People after the sacrifices, and exemption from all public services to such as wish to reside in the city: and that three statues of sixteen cubits be erected in the harbor, representing the People of Athens crowned by the People of Byzantium and Perinthus: and deputations sent to the general assemblies of Greece, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian, to proclaim the crowns wherewith the people of Athens hath been honored by us, that all the Greeks may know the virtue of the Athenians, and the gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians.

Now read the crowns given by the people of Chersonesus.

THE DEGREE OF THE CHERSONESITES

"The Chersonesites, inhabitants of Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus, crown the Council and People of Athens with a golden crown of the value of sixty talents, and build an altar to Gratitude and the Athenian People, because that People hath helped the Chersonesites to obtain the greatest of blessings, by rescuing them from the power of Philip, and restoring their country, their laws, their liberty, their sanctuaries: and in all future time they will not fail to be grateful, and do what service they can. Decreed in general Council."

Thus the saving of Chersonesus and Byzantium, the preventing Philip's conquest of the Hellespont, and the honors therefore bestowed on this country, were the effects of my policy and administration; and more than this—they proved to all mankind the generosity of Athens and the baseness of Philip. He, the ally and friend of the Byzantines, was be-
fore all eyes besieging them—what could be more shameful or outrageous?—You, who might justly on many grounds have reproached them for wrongs done you in former times, instead of bearing malice and abandoning the oppressed, appeared as their deliverers; conduct which procured you glory, goodwill, honor from all men. That you have crowned many of your statesmen, every one knows; but through what other person (I mean what minister or orator), besides myself, the commonwealth has been crowned, no one can say.

To prove now the malignity of those calumnies, which he urged against the Eubœans and Byzantines, reminding you of any unkindness which they had done you—prove it I shall, not only by their falsehood, which I apprehend you know already, but (were they ever so true) by showing the advantages of my policy—I wish to recount one or two of the noble acts of your own state, and to do it briefly; for individuals, as well as communities, should ever strive to model their future conduct by the noblest of their past.

Well then, men of Athens—when the Lacedæmonians had the empire of land and sea, and held the country round Attica by governors and garrisons, Eubœa, Tanagra, all Bœotia, Megara, Ægina, Cleoneæ, the other islands; when our state possessed neither ships nor walls; you marched out to Haliartus, and again not many days after to Corinth; albeit the Athenians of that time had many causes of resentment against both Corinthians and Thebans for their acts in the Decelean war: but they showed no resentment, none. And yet neither of these steps took they, Æschines, for benefactors, nor were they blind to the danger; but they would not for such reasons abandon people who sought their protection; for the sake of renown and glory they
willingly exposed themselves to peril; just and noble was their resolve! For to all mankind the end of life is death, though one keep one's self shut up in a closet; but it becomes brave men to strive always for honor, with good hope before them, and to endure courageously whatever the Deity ordains.

Thus did your ancestors, thus the elder among yourselves. For, though the Lacedaemonians were neither friends nor benefactors, but had done many grievous injuries to our state, yet when the Thebans, victorious at Leuctra, sought their destruction, you prevented it, not fearing the power and reputation then possessed by the Thebans, nor reckoning up the merits of those whom you were about to fight for. And so you demonstrated to all the Greeks, that, however any people may offend you, you reserve your anger against them for other occasions; but should their existence or liberty be imperilled, you will not resent your wrongs or bring them into account.

And not in these instances only hath such been your temper. Again, when the Thebans were taking possession of Euboea, you looked not quietly on—you remembered not the wrongs done you by Themison and Theodorus in the affair of Oropus, but assisted even them. It was the time when the volunteer captains first offered themselves to the state, of whom I was one;—but of this presently. However, it was glorious that you saved the island, but far more glorious that, when you had got their persons and their cities in your power, you fairly restored them to people who had ill-used you, and made no reckoning of your wrongs in an affair where you were trusted.

Hundreds of cases which I could mention I pass over—sea-fights, land-marches, campaigns, both in ancient times
and in your own, all of which the commonwealth has undertaken for the freedom and safety of the Greeks in general. Then, having observed the commonwealth engaging in contests of such number and importance for the interests of others, what was I to urge, what course to recommend her, when the question in a manner concerned herself?—To revive grudges, I suppose, against people who wanted help, and to seek pretences for abandoning everything. And who might not justly have killed me, had I attempted even by words to tarnish any of the honors of Athens? For the thing itself, I am certain, you would never have done—had you wished, what was to hinder you?—any lack of opportunity?—had you not these men to advise it?

I must return to the next in date of my political acts; and here again consider what was most beneficial for the state. I saw, men of Athens, that your navy was decaying, and that, while the rich were getting off with small payments, citizens of moderate or small fortunes were losing their substance, and the state, by reason thereof, missing her opportunities of action. I therefore proposed a law, by which I compelled the one class (the rich) to perform their duty, and stopped the oppression of the poor; and—what was most useful to the country—I caused her preparations to be made in time. And being indicted for it, I appeared on the charge before you, and was acquitted; and the prosecutor did not get his portion of the votes. But what sums, think ye, the chief men of the Boards, or those in the second and third degrees, offered me, first, not to propose that law, secondly, when I had recorded it, to drop it on the abatement-oath? Such sums, men of Athens, as I should be afraid to tell you. And no wonder they did.
so; for under the former laws they might divide the charge
between sixteen, spending little or nothing themselves, and
grinding down the needy citizens; whereas under my law
every one had to pay a sum proportioned to his means, and
there was a captain for two ships, where before there was
a partner with fifteen others for one ship; for they were
calling themselves not captains any longer, but partners.
They would have given anything then to get these regula-
tions annulled, and not be obliged to perform their duties.
Read me, first, the decree for which I appeared to the in-
dictment, then the service-rolls, that of the former law,
and that under mine. Read.

THE DECREE

"In the Archonship of Polycles, on the sixteenth of
Boedromion, in the presidency of the Hippothoontian tribe,
Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pæania, introduced a
law for the naval service, instead of the former one under
which there were the associations of joint-captains; and it
was passed by the council and people. And Patrocles of
Phlyus preferred an indictment against Demosthenes for an
illegal measure, and, not having obtained his share of the
votes, paid the penalty of five hundred drachms."

Now produce that fine roll.

THE ROLL

"Let sixteen captains be called out for every galley,
as they are associated in the companies, from the age of
twenty-five to forty, defraying the charge equally."

Now for the roll under my law.

THE ROLL

"Let captains be chosen according to their property by
valuation, taking ten talents to a galley: if the property
be valued at a higher sum, let the charge be proportionate, as far as three ships and a tender; and let it be in the same proportion for those whose property is less than ten talents, joining them in a partnership to make up ten talents."

Think ye I but slightly helped the poor of Athens, or that the rich would have spent but a trifling sum to escape the doing what was right? I glory, however, not only in having refused this compromise, and having been acquitted on the indictment, but because my law was beneficial, and I have proved it so by trial. For during the whole war, while the armaments were shipped off according to my regulations, no captain ever appealed to you against oppression, or took sanctuary at Munychia, or was imprisoned by the clearing-officers; no galley was lost to the state by capture abroad, or left behind from unfitness to go to sea. Under the former laws all these things happened—because the burden was put upon the poor, and therefore difficulties frequently arose. I transferred the charge from the poor to the wealthy, and then every duty was done. For this itself, too, I deserve praise, that I adopted all such measures as brought glory and honor and power to the state: there is no envy, spite, or malice in any measure of mine, nothing sordid or unworthy of Athens. The same character is apparent in my home and in my foreign policy. At home, I never preferred the favor of the wealthy to the rights of the many: abroad, I valued not the presents or the friendship of Philip above the general interests of Greece.

I conceive it remains for me to speak of the proclamation and the accounts: for, that I acted for the best—that I have throughout been your friend and zealous in your service—is proved abundantly, methinks, by what I have
said already. The most important part of my policy and administration I pass by, considering that I have in regular course to reply to the charge of illegality; and besides—though I am silent as to the rest of my political acts—the knowledge you all have will serve me equally well.

As to the arguments which he jumbled together about the counter-written laws, I hardly suppose you comprehend them—I myself could not understand the greater part. However I shall argue a just case in a straightforward way. So far from saying that I am not accountable, as the prosecutor just now falsely asserted, I acknowledge that I am all my life accountable for what as your statesman I have undertaken or advised; but for what I have voluntarily given to the people out of my own private fortune, I deny that I am any day accountable—do you hear, Æschines?—nor is any other man, let him even be one of the nine archons. For what law is so full of injustice and inhumanity as to enact, that one who has given of his private means, and done an act of generosity and munificence, instead of having thanks, shall be brought before malignants, appointed to be the auditors of his liberality? None. If he says there is, let him produce it, and I will be content and hold my tongue. But there is none, men of Athens. The prosecutor in his malice, because I gave some of my own money when I superintended the theatre fund, says—"the Council praised him before he had rendered his account." Not for any matters of which I had an account to render, but for what I spent of my own, you malignant!

"Oh, but you were a Conservator of Walls!" says he. Yes; and for that reason was I justly praised, because I gave the sums expended and did not charge them. A
charge requires auditing and examiners; a donation merits thanks and praise: therefore the defendant made this motion in my favor.

That this is a settled principle in your hearts as well as in the laws, I can show by many proofs easily. First, Nausicles has often been crowned by you for what he expended out of his own funds while he was general. Secondly, Diotimus was crowned for his present of shields; and Charidemus too. Again, Neoptolemus here, superintendent of divers works, has been honored for his donations. It would indeed be cruel, if a man holding an office should either, by reason of his office, be precluded from giving his own money to the state, or have, instead of receiving thanks, to render an account of what he gave. To prove the truth of my statements, take and read me the original decrees made in favor of these men.

A DECREE

"Archon, Demonicus of Phlyus. On the twenty-sixth of Boedromion, with the sanction of the council and people, Callias of Phrearri moved: That the council and people resolve to crown Nausicles, general of foot, for that, there being two thousand Athenian troops of the line in Imbrus, for the defence of the Athenian residents in that island, and Philo of the finance department being by reason of storms unable to sail and pay the troops, he advanced money of his own, and did not ask the people for it again; and that the crown be proclaimed at the Dionysian festival, at the new tragedies."

ANOTHER DECREE

"Callias of Phrearri moved, the presidents declaring it to be with the sanction of the council: Whereas Charidemus, general of foot, having been sent to Salamis, he and Diotimus, general of horse, after certain of the troops had
in the skirmish by the river been disarmed by the enemy, did at their own expense arm the young men with eight hundred shields: It hath been resolved by the council and people to crown Charidemus and Diotimus with a golden crown, and to proclaim it at the great Panathenaic festival, during the gymnastic contest, and at the Dionysian festival, at the exhibition of the new tragedies: the proclamation to be given in charge to the judges, the presidents, and the prize-masters."

Each of these men, Æschines, was accountable for the office which he held, but not accountable for the matters in respect of which he was crowned. No more then am I; for surely I have the same rights, under the same circumstances, as other men. Have I given money? I am praised for that, not being accountable for what I gave. Did I hold office? Yes; and I have rendered an account of my official acts, not of my bounties. Oh, but I was guilty of malpractices in office! And you, present when the auditors brought me up, accused me not?

To show you that he himself bears testimony to my having been crowned for what I had no account to render of, take and read the whole decree drawn up in my favor. By the portions of the bill which he never indicted it will appear that his prosecution is vexatious. Read.

THE DECREE

"In the Archonship of Euthycles, on the twenty-second of Pyanepsion, in the presidency of the Æneian tribe, Ctesiphon, son of Leosthenes of Anaphlystus, moved: Whereas Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pæania, having been superintendent of the repair of the walls, and having expended on the works three additional talents out of his own money, hath given that sum to the people; and whereas, having been appointed treasurer of the theoric fund, he hath
given to the theoretic officers of the tribes a hundred minas toward the sacrifices, the council and people of Athens have resolved to honor Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Pasania, with public praise, for the goodness and generosity which he has shown throughout on every occasion toward the people of Athens, and to crown him with a golden crown, and to proclaim the crown in the theatre, at the Dionysian festival, at the performance of the new tragedies: the proclamation to be given in charge to the prize-master."

These were my donations; none of which have you indicted: the rewards which the council says I deserve for them are what you arraign. To receive the gifts then you confess to be legal; the requital of them you indict for illegality. In the name of Heaven! what sort of person can a monster of wickedness and malignity be, if not such a person as this?

Concerning the proclamation in the theatre, I pass over the fact, that thousands of thousands have been proclaimed, and I myself have been crowned often before. But by the gods! are you so perverse and stupid, Æschines, as not to be able to reflect, that the party crowned has the same glory from the crown wherever it be published, and that the proclamation is made in the theatre for the benefit of those who confer the crown? For the hearers are all encouraged to render service to the state, and praise the parties who show their gratitude more than the party crowned. Therefore has our commonwealth enacted this law. Take and read me the law itself.

THE LAW

"Whenever any of the townships bestow crowns, proclamations thereof shall be made by them in their several townships, unless where any are crowned by the people of
Athens or the council; and it shall be lawful for them to be proclaimed in the theatre at the Dionysian festival."

Do you hear, Æschines, the law distinctly saying—"unless where any are voted by the people or the council; such may be proclaimed"? Why then, wretched man, do you play the petitfogger? Why manufacture arguments? Why don't you take hellebore for your malady? Are you not ashamed to bring on a cause for spite, and not for any offence—to alter some laws, and to garble others, the whole of which should in justice be read to persons sworn to decide according to the laws? And you that act thus describe the qualities which belong to a friend of the people, as if you had ordered a statue according to contract, and received it without having what the contract required; or as if friends of the people were known by words, and not by acts and measures. And you bawl out, regardless of decency, a sort of cart-language, applicable to yourself and your race, not to me.

Again, men of Athens—I conceive abuse to differ from accusation in this, that accusation has to do with offences for which the laws provide penalties, abuse with the scandal which enemies speak against each other according to their humor. And I believe our ancestors built these courts, not that we should assemble you here and bring forth the secrets of private life for mutual reproach, but to give us the means of convicting persons guilty of crimes against the state. Æschines knew this as well as I, and yet he chose to rail rather than to accuse.

Even in this way he must take as much as he gives; but before I enter upon such matters, let me ask him one question—Should one call you the state's enemy, or mine, Æschines? Mine, of course. Yet, where you might, for
any offence which I committed, have obtained satisfaction for the people according to the laws, you neglected it—at the audit, on the indictments and other trials; but where I in my own person am safe on every account, by the laws, by time, by prescription, by many previous judgments on every point, by my never having been convicted of a public offence—and where the country must share, more or less, in the repute of measures which were her own—here it is you have encountered me. See if you are not the people’s enemy, while you pretend to be mine!

Since therefore the righteous and true verdict is made clear to all; but I must, it seems—though not naturally fond of railing, yet on account of the calumnies uttered by my opponent—in reply to so many falsehoods, just mention some leading particulars concerning him, and show who he is, and from whom descended, that so readily begins using hard words—and what language he carps at, after uttering such as any decent man would have shuddered to pronounce—Why, if my accuser had been Æacus, or Rhadamanthus, or Minos, instead of a prater, a hack of the market, a pestilent scribbler, I don’t think he would have spoken such things, or found such offensive terms, shouting, as in a tragedy, “O Earth! O Sun! O Virtue!” and the like; and again appealing to Intelligence and Education, by which the honorable is distinguished from the base:—all this you undoubtedly heard from his lips. Accursed one! What have you or yours to do with virtue? How should you discern what is honorable or otherwise? How were you ever qualified? What right have you to talk about education? Those who really possess it would never say as much of themselves, but rather blush if another did: those who are destitute like you, but make pretensions to it from
stupidity, annoy the hearers by their talk, without getting the reputation which they desire.

I am at no loss for materials concerning you and your family, but am in doubt what to mention first—whether how your father Tromes, being servant to Elpias, who kept a reading-school in the temple of Theseus, wore a weight of fetters and a collar; or how your mother, by her morning spousals in the cottage by Hero Calamites, reared up you, the beautiful statue, the eminent third-rate actor!—But all know these things without my telling—Or how the galley-piper Phormio, the slave of Dion of Phrarrii, removed her from that honorable employment. But, by Jupiter and the gods! I fear, in saying what is proper about you, I may be thought to have chosen topics unbecoming to myself. All this therefore I shall pass by, and commence with the acts of his own life; for indeed he came not of common parents, but of such as are execrated by the people. Very lately—lately do I say?—it is but yesterday that he has become both an Athenian and an orator—adding two syllables, he converted his father from Tromes to Atrometus, and dignified his mother by the name of Glaucothea, who (as everyone knows) was called Empusa; having got that title (it is plain) from her doing and submitting to anything—how else could she have got it? However, you are so ungrateful and wicked by nature, that after being raised through the people from servitude to freedom, from beggary to affluence, instead of returning their kindness, you work against them as a hireling politician.

Of the speeches, which it may possibly be contended he has made for the good of the country, I will say nothing: of the acts which he was clearly proved to have done for the enemy, I will remind you.
What man present but knows of the outcast Antiphon, who came into the city under promise to Philip that he would burn your arsenal? I found him concealed in Piræus, and brought him before the assembly; when this mischief-maker, shouting and clamoring that it was monstrous in a free state that I should ill-treat unfortunate citizens, and enter houses without warrant, procured his release. And had not the Council of Areopagus, discovering the fact, and perceiving your ill-timed error, made search after the man, seized and brought him before you, a fellow like that would have been rescued, would have slipped through the hands of justice, and been sent out of the way by this disclaimer. As it was, you put him to torture and to death, as you ought this man also. The Council of Areopagus were informed what Æschines had done, and therefore, though you had elected him for your advocate on the question of the Delian temple, in the same ignorance by which you have sacrificed many of the public interests, as you referred the matter to the council, and gave them full powers, they immediately removed him for his treason, and appointed Hyperides to plead; for which purpose they took their ballots from the altar, and not a single ballot was given for this wretch. To prove the truth of my statements, call me the witnesses.

WITNESSES

"We, Callias of Sunium, Zenon of Phlyus, Cleon of Phalerum, Demonicus of Marathon, testify for Demosthenes in the name of all, that, the people having formerly elected Æschines for their advocate before the Amphictyons on the question of the Delian temple, we in council determined that Hyperides was more worthy to plead on behalf of the state, and Hyperides was commissioned."
Thus, by removing this man when he was about to plead, and appointing another, the council pronounced him a traitor and an enemy.

Such is one of this boy's political acts, similar—is it not?—to what he charges me with. Now let me remind you of another. When Philip sent Python of Byzantium, together with an embassy from all his own allies, with the intention of putting our commonwealth to shame, and proving her in the wrong, then—when Python swaggered and poured a flood of abuse upon you—I neither yielded nor gave way; I rose and answered him, and betrayed not the rights of the commonwealth. So plainly did I convict Philip of injustice, that his very allies rose up and acknowledged it; while Ἐσχίνης fought his battle, and bore witness, aye, false witness, against his own country.

Nor was this enough. Again, some time afterward, he was found meeting Anaxinus the spy at Thraso's house. A man, I say, who had a private meeting and conference with an emissary of the foe must himself have been a spy by nature and an enemy to his country. To prove these statements, call me the witnesses.

WITNESSES

"Teledemus son of Cleon, Hyperides son of Callæschrus, Nicomachus son of Diophantus, testify for Demosthenes, as they swore before the generals, that Ἐσχίνης son of Atrometus of Cothocidæ did, to their knowledge, meet by night in Thraso's house, and confer with Anaxinus, who was adjudged to be a spy of Philip. These depositions were returned before Nicias, on the third of Hecatombæon."

A vast deal besides that I could say about him I omit. For thus (methinks) it is. I could produce many more

1 It means "a fine fellow," as we say ironically.
such cases where Æschines was discovered at that period assisting the enemy and harassing me. But these things are not treasured up by you for careful remembrance or proper resentment. You have, through evil custom, given large license to any one that chooses to supplant and calumniate your honest counsellors, exchanging the interest of the state for the pleasure and gratification of hearing abuse; and so it is easier and safer always to be a hireling serving your enemies than a statesman attached to you.

That he should co-operate openly with Philip before the war, was shocking—O heaven and earth! could it be otherwise?—against his country! Yet allow him if you please, allow him this. But when the ships had openly been made prize, Chersonesus was ravaged, the man was marching against Attica, matters were no longer doubtful, war had begun—nothing that he ever did for you can this malicious iambic-mouter show—not a resolution has Æschines, great or small, concerning the interests of the state. If he asserts it, let him prove it now while my waterglass is running. But there is none. He is reduced to an alternative—either he had no fault to find with my measures, and therefore moved none against them; or he sought the good of the enemy, and therefore would not propose any better.

Did he abstain from speaking as well as moving when any mischief was to be done to you? Why, no one else could speak a word. Other things, it appears, the country could endure, and he could accomplish without detection; but one last act he achieved, O Athenians, which crowned all he had done before; on which he lavished that multitude of words, recounting the decrees against the Amphissian Locrians, in hopes of distorting the truth. But the thing
admits it not. No! never will you wash yourself clean from your performances there—talk as long as you will!

In your presence, men of Athens, I invoke all the gods and goddesses to whom the Attic territory belongs, and Pythian Apollo the father-god of our state; and I implore them all! As I shall declare the truth to you, as I declared it in your assembly at the time, the very moment I saw this wretch putting his hand to the work—for I perceived, instantly perceived it—so may they grant me favor and protection! If from malice or personal rivalry I bring a false charge against my opponent, may they cut me off from every blessing!

But wherefore this imprecation, this solemn assurance? Because, though I have documents lying in the public archives, from which I shall clearly prove my assertions, though I know you remember the facts, I fear this man may be considered unequal to the mischiefs which he has wrought; as before happened, when he caused the destruction of the unhappy Phocians by his false reports to you.

The Amphissian war, I say—which brought Philip to Elatea, which caused him to be chosen general of the Amphictyons, which ruined everything in Greece—was this man’s contrivance. He is the single author of all our heaviest calamities. I protested at the time, and cried out in the assembly—“You are bringing a war, Æschines, into Attica, an Amphictyonic war”—but his packed party would not let me be heard; the rest wondered, and supposed that I was bringing an idle charge against him out of personal enmity. However, the real character of those transactions, the purpose for which they were got up, the manner in which they were accomplished, hear ye now, men of Athens, as ye were prevented then. You will see that
the thing was well concerted, and it will help you much to get a knowledge of public affairs, and what craftiness there was in Philip you will observe.

Philip could neither finish nor get rid of the war with Athens, unless he made the Thebans and Thessalians her enemies. Though your generals fought against him without fortune or skill, yet from the war itself and the cruisers he suffered infinite damage. He could neither export any of the produce of his country, nor import what he needed. He was not then superior to you at sea, nor able to reach Attica, unless the Thessalians followed him and the Thebans gave him a passage; so that, while he overcame in war the generals whom you sent out—such as they were—I say nothing about that—he found himself distressed by the difference of your local position and means. Should he urge either Thessalians or Thebans to march in his own quarrel against you, none, he thought, would attend to him: but should he, under the pretence of taking up their common cause, be elected general, he trusted partly by deceit and partly by persuasion to gain his ends more easily. He sets to work therefore—observe how cleverly—to get the Amphictyons into a war, and create a disturbance in the congress. For this he thought they would immediately want him. Now, if any of the presbyters commissioned by himself or any of his allies brought it forward, he imagined that both Thebans and Thessalians would suspect the thing, and would all be on their guard; whereas, if the agent were an Athenian and commissioned by you his opponents, it would easily pass unnoticed. And thus it turned out.

How did he effect his purpose? He hires the prosecutor. No one (I believe) was aware of the thing or attend-
ing to it, and so—just as these things are usually done at Athens—Æschines was proposed for Pylæan deputy, three or four held up their hands for him, and his election was declared. When clothed with the dignity of the state he arrived among the Amphictyons, dismissing and disregarding all besides, he hastened to execute what he was hired for. He makes up a pretty speech and story, showing how the C Irrhœan plain came to be consecrated; reciting this to the presbyters, men unused to speeches and unsuspicous of any consequences, he procures a vote from them to walk round the district, which the Amphissians maintained they had a right to cultivate, but which he charged to be parcel of the sacred plain. The Locrians were not then instituting any suit against us, or any such proceeding as Æschines now falsely alleges. This will show you—It was impossible (I fancy) for the Locrians to carry on process against our commonwealth without a citation. Who summoned us then? In whose archonship? Say who knows—point him out. You cannot. Your pretence was flimsy and false.

When the Amphictyons, at the instance of this man, walked over the plain, the Locrians fell upon them and wellnigh speared them all; some of the presbyters they carried off captive. Complaints having followed, and war being stirred up against the Amphissians, at first Cottymphus led an army composed entirely of Amphictyons; but as some never came, and those that came did nothing, measures were taken against the ensuing congress by an instructed gang, the old traitors of Thessaly and other states, to get the command for Philip. And they had found a fair pretext: for it was necessary, they said, either to subsidize themselves and maintain a mercenary force and fine all recusants, or to elect him. What need of many words?
ON THE CROWN

He was thereupon chosen general; and immediately afterward collecting an army, and marching professedly against Cirrha, he bids a long farewell to the Cirrhæans and Locrians, and seizes Elatea. Had not the Thebans, upon seeing this, immediately changed their minds and sided with us, the whole thing would have fallen like a torrent upon our country. As it was, they for the instant stopped him; chiefly, O Athenians, by the kindness of some divinity to Athens, but secondly, as far as it could depend on a single man, through me. Give me those decrees, and the dates of the several transactions, that you may know what mischiefs this pestilent creature has stirred up with impunity. Read me the decrees.

THE DECREES OF THE AMPHICTYONS

"In the priesthood of Clinagoras, at the spring congress, it hath been resolved by the deputies and councillors of the Amphictyons, and by the assembly of the Amphictyons, seeing that the Amphissians trespass upon the sacred plain and sow and depasture it with cattle, that the deputies and councillors do enter thereupon and define the boundaries with pillars, and enjoin the Amphissians not to trespass for the future."

ANOTHER DECREE

"In the priesthood of Clinagoras, at the spring congress, it hath been resolved by the deputies and councillors of the Amphictyons and by the assembly of the Amphictyons, seeing that the people of Amphissa have partitioned among themselves the sacred plain and cultivate and feed cattle upon the same, and on being interrupted have come in arms, and with force resisted the general council of the Greeks, and have wounded some of them: that Cottyphus the Arcadian, who hath been elected general of the Amphictyons, be sent ambassador to Philip of Macedon, and do request him to come to the aid of Apollo and the
Amphictyons, that he may not suffer the god to be insulted by the impious Amphissians; and do announce that the Greeks who are members of the Amphictyonic Council appoint him general with absolute powers."

Now read the dates of these transactions. They correspond with the time when Æschines was deputy. Read.

DATES

"Mnesithides archon, on the sixteenth of the month Anthesterion."

Now give me the letter which, when the Thebans would not hearken to Philip, he sends to his allies in Peloponnesus, that you may plainly see, even from this, how the true motives of his enterprise, his designs against Greece and the Thebans and yourselves, were concealed by him, while he affected to be taking measures for the common good under a decree of the Amphictyons. The man who furnished him with these handles and pretexts was Æschines. Read.

THE LETTER OF PHILIP

"Philip, king of Macedon, to the magistrates and councilors of the confederate Peloponnesians and to all the other allies greeting: Whereas the Locrians surnamed Ozolian, dwelling in Amphissa, commit sacrilege against the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and coming with arms despoil the sacred plain, I propose with your assistance to avenge the god, and to chastise people who violate any part of our recognized religion. Wherefore meet me with arms in Phocis, bringing provisions for forty days, in the ensuing month of Lous, as we style it, Boedromion, as the Athenians, Panemus, as the Corinthians. Those who do not meet us with all their forces, we shall visit with punishment. Farewell."
You see, he avoids all private pleas, and has recourse to an Amphictyonic. Who was it, I say, that helped him to this contrivance—that lent him these excuses? Who is most to blame for the misfortunes which have happened? Surely Ἀσχίνη. Then go not about saying, O Athenians, that one man has inflicted these calamities on Greece. Heaven and earth! It was not a single man, but a number of miscreants in every state. Ἀσχίνη was one of them; and, were I obliged to speak the truth without reserve, I should not hesitate to call him the common pest of all that have since been ruined, men, places, cities: for whoever supplies the seed, to him the crop is owing. I marvel, indeed, you turned not your faces away the moment you beheld him. But there is a thick darkness, it seems, between you and the truth.

The mention of this man’s treasonable acts brings me to the part which I have myself taken in opposition to him. It is fair you should hear my account of it for many reasons, but chiefly, men of Athens, because it would be a shame, when I have undergone the toil of exertions on your behalf, that you should not endure the bare recital of them.

When I saw that the Thebans, and I may add the Athenians, were so led away by Philip’s partisans and the corrupt men of either state, as to disregard and take no precaution against a danger which menaced both, and required the utmost precaution (I mean the suffering Philip’s power to increase), and were readily disposed to enmity and strife with each other; I was constantly watchful to prevent it, not only because in my own judgment I deemed such vigilance expedient, but knowing that Aristophon, and Eubulus, had all along desired to bring about that union, and, while they were frequently opposed upon
other matters, were always agreed upon this. Men whom in their lifetime—you reptile!—you pestered with flattery, yet see not that you are accusing them in their graves: for the Theban policy that you reproach me with is a charge less affecting me than them, who approved that alliance before I did. But I must return.—I say, when Ἀσχίνες had excited the war in Amphissa, and his coadjutors had helped to establish enmity with Thebes, Philip marched against us—that was the object for which these persons embroiled the states—and had we not roused up a little in time, we could never have recovered ourselves: so far had these men carried matters. In what position you then stood to each other you will learn from the recital of these decrees and answers. Here, take and read them.

DECREES

"In the Archonship of Heropythus, on the twenty-fifth of the month Elaphebolion, in the presidency of the Erechtheian tribe, by the advice of the Council and the Generals: Whereas Philip hath taken possession of certain neighboring cities, and is besieging others, and finally is preparing to advance against Attica, setting our treaty at naught, and designs to break his oaths and the peace, in violation of our common engagements: The Council and People have resolved to send unto him ambassadors, who shall confer with him, and exhort him above all to maintain his relations of amity with us and his convention, or if not, to give time to the Commonwealth for deliberation, and conclude an armistice until the month Thargelion. These have been chosen from the Council: Simus of Anagyrus, Euthydemos of Phlyus, Bulagoras of Alopece."

ANOTHER DECREES

"In the Archonship of Heropythus, on the last day of the month Munychion, by the advice of the Polemarch:
ON THE CROWN

Whereas Philip designs to put the Thebans at variance with us, and hath prepared to advance with his whole army to the places nearest to Attica, violating the engagements that subsist between us, the Council and People have resolved to send unto him a herald and ambassadors, who shall request and call upon him to conclude an armistice, so that the people may take measures according to circumstances; for now they do not purpose to march out in the event of anything reasonable. Nearchus, son of Sosinomus, and Polycrates, son of Epiphron, have been chosen from the Council; and for herald, Eunomus of Anaphlystus from the People."

Now read the answers:

THE ANSWER TO THE ATHENIANS

"Philip, king of Macedon, to the Council and People of Athens greeting: Of the part which you have taken in reference to me from the beginning I am not ignorant, nor what exertions you are making to gain over the Thessalians and Thebans, and also the Boeotians. Since they are more prudent, and will not submit their choice to your dictation, but stand by their own interest, you shift your ground, and sending ambassadors and a herald to me, you talk of engagements and ask for an armistice, although I have given you no offence. However, I have given audience to your ambassadors, and I agree to your request and am ready to conclude an armistice, if you will dismiss your evil counsellors and degrade them as they deserve. Farewell."

THE ANSWER TO THE THEBANS

"Philip, king of Macedon, to the Council and People of Thebes greeting: I have received your letter, wherein you renew peace and amity with me. I am informed, however, that the Athenians are most earnestly soliciting you to accept their overtures. I blamed you at first for being inclined to put faith in their promises and to espouse their policy. But
since I have discovered that you would rather maintain peace with me than follow the counsels of others, I praise you the more in divers accounts, but chiefly because you have consulted in this business for your safety, and preserve your attachment to me, which I trust will be of no small moment to you, if you persevere in that determination. Farewell."

Philip having thus disposed the states toward each other by his contrivances, and being elated by these decrees and answers, came with his army and seized Elatea, confident that, happen what might, you and the Thebans could never again unite. What commotion there was in the city you all know; but let me just mention the most striking circumstances.

It was evening. A person came with a message to the presidents that Elatea was taken. They rose from supper immediately, drove off the people from their market-stalls, and set fire to the wicker-frames; others sent for the generals and called the trumpeter; and the city was full of commotion. The next morning at daybreak the presidents summoned the council to their hall, and you went to the assembly, and before they could introduce or prepare the question, the whole people were up in their seats. When the council had entered, and the presidents had reported their intelligence and presented the courier, and he had made his statement, the crier asked—"Who wishes to speak?"—and no one came forward. The crier put the question repeatedly—still no man rose, though all the generals were present and all the orators, and our country with her common voice called for some one to speak and save her—for when the crier raises his voice according to law, it may justly be deemed the common voice of our country. If those who desired the salvation of Athens were the proper
parties to come forward, all of you and the other Athenians would have risen and mounted the platform; for I am sure you all desired her salvation—if those of greatest wealth, the three-hundred—if those who were both, friendly to the state and wealthy, the men who afterward gave such ample donations; for patriotism and wealth produced the gift. But that occasion, that day, as it seems, called not only for a patriot and a wealthy man, but for one who had closely followed the proceedings from their commencement, and rightly calculated for what object and purpose Philip carried them on. A man who was ignorant of these matters, or had not long and carefully studied them, let him be ever so patriotic or wealthy, would neither see what measures were needful, nor be competent to advise you.

Well, then—I was the man called for upon that day. I came forward and addressed you. What I said, I beg you for two reasons attentively to hear—first, to be convinced that of all your orators and statesmen I alone deserted not the patriot's post in the hour of danger, but was found in the very moment of panic speaking and moving what your necessities required—secondly, because at the expense of a little time you will gain large experience for the future in all your political concerns.

I said—those who were in such alarm under the idea that Philip had got the Thebans with him did not, in my opinion, understand the position of affairs; for I was sure, had that really been so, we should have heard not of his being at Elatea, but upon our frontiers: he was come, however, I knew for certain, to make all right for himself in Thebes. "Let me inform you," said I, "how the matter stands.—All the Thebans whom it was possible either to bribe or deceive he has at his command; those who have
resisted him from the first and still oppose him he can in no way prevail upon: what then is his meaning, and why has he seized upon Elatea? He means, by displaying a force in the neighborhood, and bringing up his troops, to encourage and embolden his friends, to intimidate his adversaries, that they may either concede from fear what they now refuse, or be compelled. Now"—said I—"if we determine on the present occasion to remember any unkindness which the Thebans have done us, and to regard them in the character of enemies with distrust, in the first place, we shall be doing just what Philip would desire; in the next place, I fear, his present adversaries embracing his friendship and all Philippizing with one consent, they will both march against Attica. But if you will hearken to me, and be pleased to examine (not cavil at) what I say, I believe it will meet your approval, and I shall dispel the danger impending over Athens. What then do I advise?—First, away with your present fear; and rather fear all of ye for the Thebans—they are nearer harm than we are—to them the peril is more immediate:—next I say, march to Eleusis, all the fighting men and the cavalry, and show yourselves to the world in arms, that your partisans in Thebes may have equal liberty to speak up for the good cause, knowing that, as the faction who sell their country to Philip have an army to support them at Elatea, so the party that will contend for freedom have your assistance at hand if they are assailed. Further I recommend you to elect ten ambassadors, and empower them in conjunction with the generals to fix the time for going there and for the outmarch. When the ambassadors have arrived at Thebes, how do I advise that you should treat the matter? Pray attend particularly to this—Ask nothing of the
Thebans (it would be dishonorable at this time); but offer to assist them if they require it, on the plea that they are in extreme danger, and we see the future better than they do. If they accept this offer and hearken to our counsels, so shall we have accomplished what we desire, and our conduct will look worthy of the state: should we miscarry, they will have themselves to blame for any error committed now, and we shall have done nothing dishonorable or mean."

This and more to the like effect I spoke, and left the platform. It was approved by all; not a word was said against me. Nor did I make the speech without moving, nor make the motion without undertaking the embassy, nor undertake the embassy without prevailing on the Thebans. From the beginning to the end I went through it all; I gave myself entirely to your service, to meet the dangers which encompassed Athens.

Produce me the decree which then passed. Now, Æschines, how would you have me describe you, and how myself, upon that day? Shall I call myself Batalus, your nickname of reproach, and you not even a hero of the common sort, but one of those upon the stage, Cresphontes or Creon, or the Ænomaus whom you execrably murdered once at Colyttus? Well; upon that occasion I the Batalus of Æania was more serviceable to the state than you the Ænomaus of Cothocidae. You were of no earthly use; I did everything which became a good citizen. Read the decree.

THE DEGREE OF DEMOSTHENES

"In the Archonship of Nausicles, in the presidency of the Æcantian tribe, on the sixteenth of Scirophorion, Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Æania, moved: Whereas Philip, king of Macedon, hath in time past been violating the
treaty of peace made between him and the Athenian people, in contempt of his oaths and those laws of justice which are recognized among all the Greeks, and hath been annexing unto himself cities that no way belong to him, and hath besieged and taken some which belong to the Athenians without any provocation by the people of Athens, and at the present time he is making great advances in cruelty and violence; forasmuch as in certain Greek cities he puts garrisons and overturns their constitution, some he razes to the ground and sells the inhabitants for slaves, in some he replaces a Greek population with barbarians, giving them possession of the temple and sepulchres, acting in no way foreign to his own country or character, making an insolent use of his present fortune, and forgetting that from a petty and insignificant person he has come to be unexpectedly great; and the people of Athens, so long as they saw him annexing barbarian or private cities of their own, less seriously regarded the offence given to themselves, but now that they see Greek cities outraged and some destroyed, they think it would be monstrous and unworthy of their ancestral glory to look on while the Greeks are enslaved: Therefore it is resolved by the Council and People of Athens, that having prayed and sacrificed to the gods and heroes who protect the Athenian city and territory, bearing in mind the virtue of their ancestors, who deemed it of greater moment to preserve the liberty of Greece than their own country, they will put two hundred ships to sea, and their admiral shall sail up into the straits of Thermopylae, and their general and commander of horse shall march with the infantry and cavalry to Eleusis, and ambassadors shall be sent to the other Greeks, and first of all to the Thebans, because Philip is nearest their territory, and shall exhort them without dread of Philip to maintain their own independence and that of Greece at large, and assure them that the Athenian people, not remembering any variance which has formerly arisen between the countries, will assist them with troops and money and weapons and arms, feeling that for them
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(being Greeks) to contend among themselves for the leadership is honorable, but to be commanded and deprived of the leadership by a man of foreign extraction is derogatory to the renown of the Greeks and the virtue of their ancestors: further, the people of Athens do not regard the people of Thebes as aliens either in blood or race; they remember also the benefits conferred by their ancestors upon the ancestors of the Thebans; for they restored the children of Hercules who were kept by the Peloponnesians out of their hereditary dominion, defeating in battle those who attempted to resist the descendants of Hercules; and we gave shelter to Òedipus and his comrades in exile; and many other kind and generous acts have been done by us to the Thebans: wherefore now also the people of Athens will not desert the interests of the Thebans and the other Greeks: And let a treaty be entered into with them for alliance and intermarriage, and oaths be mutually exchanged. Ambassadors: Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes of Òæania, Hyperides, son of Cleander of Spettus, Mnesithides, son of Antiphanes of Phrearrii, Democrats, son of Sophilus of Phlyus, Callæchrus, son of Diotimus of Cothocidæ."

That was the commencement and first step in the negotiation with Thebes: before then the countries had been led by these men into discord and hatred and jealousy. That decree caused the peril which then surrounded us to pass away like a cloud. It was the duty of a good citizen, if he had any better plan, to disclose it at the time, not to find fault now. A statesman and a pettifogger, while in no other respect are they alike, in this most widely differ. The one declares his opinion before the proceedings, and makes himself responsible to his followers, to fortune, to the times, to all men: the other is silent when he ought to speak; at any untoward event he grumbles. Now, as I said before, the time for a man who regarded the common-
wealth, and for honest counsel, was then: however I will go to this extent—if any one now can point out a better course, or indeed if any other was practicable but the one which I adopted, I confess that I was wrong. For if there be any measure now discovered, which (executed then) would have been to our advantage, I say it ought not to have escaped me. But if there is none, if there was none, if none can be suggested even at this day, what was a statesman to do? Was he not to choose the best measures within his reach and view? That did I, Æschines, when the crier asked, “Who wishes to speak?”—not, “Who wishes to complain about the past, or to guarantee the future?” While you on those occasions sat mute in the assembly, I came forward and spake. However, as you omitted then, tell us now. Say what scheme that I ought to have devised, what favorable opportunity was lost to the state by my neglect?—what alliance was there, what better plan, to which I should have directed the people? But no! The past is with all the world given up; no one even proposes to deliberate about it: the future it is, or the present, which demands the action of a counsellor. At the time, as it appeared, there were dangers impending, and dangers at hand. Mark the line of my policy at that crisis; don’t rail at the event. The end of all things is what the Deity pleases: his line of policy it is that shows the judgment of the statesman. Do not then impute it as a crime to me that Philip chanced to conquer in battle: that issue depended not on me, but on God. Prove that I adopted not all measures that according to human calculation were feasible—that I did not honestly and diligently and with exertions beyond my strength carry them out—or that my enterprises were not honorable and worthy of the
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state and necessary. Show me this, and accuse me as soon as you like. But if the hurricane that visited us hath been too powerful, not for us only, but for all Greece besides, what is the fair course? As if a merchant, after taking every precaution, and furnishing his vessel with everything that he thought would insure her safety, because afterward he met with a storm and his tackle was strained or broken to pieces, should be charged with the shipwreck! "Well, but I was not the pilot"—he might say—just as I was not the general.—"Fortune was not under my control: all was under hers."

Consider and reflect upon this—If, with the Thebans on our side, we were destined so to fare in the contest, what was to be expected, if we had never had them for allies, but they had joined Philip, as he used every effort of persuasion to make them do? And if, when the battle was fought three days' march from Attica, such peril and alarm surrounded the city, what must we have expected, if the same disaster had happened in some part of our territory? As it was (do you see?) we could stand, meet, breathe; mightily did one, two, three days, help to our preservation: in the other case—but it is wrong to mention things of which we have been spared the trial by the favor of some deity, and by our protecting ourselves with the very alliance which you assail.

All this, at such length, have I addressed to you, men of the jury, and to the outer circle of hearers; for, as to this contemptible fellow, a short and plain argument would suffice.

If the future was revealed to you, Æschines, alone, when the state was deliberating on these proceedings, you ought to have forewarned us at the time. If you did not
foresee it, you are responsible for the same ignorance as the rest. Why then do you accuse me in this behalf, rather than I you? A better citizen have I been than you in respect of the matters of which I am speaking (others I discuss not at present), inasmuch as I gave myself up to what seemed for the general good, not shrinking from any personal danger, nor taking thought of any; while you neither suggested better measures (or mine would not have been adopted), nor lent any aid in the prosecuting of mine: exactly what the basest person and worst enemy of the state would do, are you found to have done after the event; and at the same time Aristatus in Naxos and Aristolaus in Thasos, the deadly foes of our state, are bringing to trial the friends of Athens, and Ἀeschines at Athens is accusing Demosthenes. Surely the man, who waited to found his reputation upon the misfortunes of the Greeks, deserves rather to perish than to accuse another; nor is it possible that one, who has profited by the same conjunctures as the enemies of the commonwealth, can be a well-wisher of his country. You show yourself by your life and conduct, by your political action, and even your political inaction. Is anything going on that appears good for the people? Ἀeschines is mute. Has anything untoward happened or amiss? Forth comes Ἀeschines; just as fractures and sprains are put in motion, when the body is attacked with disease.

But since he insists so strongly on the event, I will even assert something of a paradox: and I beg and pray of you not to marvel at its boldness, but kindly to consider what I say. If then the results had been foreknown to all, if all had foreseen them, and you, Ἀeschines, had foretold them and protested with clamor and outcry—you that never
opened your mouth—not even then should the commonwealth have abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory, or ancestry, or futurity. As it is, she appears to have failed in her enterprise, a thing to which all mankind are liable, if the Deity so wills it: but then—claiming precedency over others and afterward abandoning her pretensions—she would have incurred the charge of betraying all to Philip. Why, had we resigned without a struggle that which our ancestors encountered every danger to win, who would not have spit upon you? Let me not say, the commonwealth or myself! With what eyes, I pray, could we have beheld strangers visiting the city, if the result had been what it is, and Philip had been chosen leader and lord of all, but other people without us had made the struggle to prevent it; especially when in former times our country had never preferred an ignominious security to the battle for honor? For what Grecian or what barbarian is ignorant that by the Thebans, or by the Lacedæmonians who were in might before them, or by the Persian king, permission would thankfully and gladly have been given to our commonwealth, to take what she pleased and hold her own, provided she would accept foreign law and let another power command in Greece? But, as it seems, to the Athenians of that day such conduct would not have been national, or natural, or endurable: none could at any period of time persuade the commonwealth to attach herself in secure subjection to the powerful and unjust; through every age has she persevered in a perilous struggle for precedency and honor and glory. And this you esteem so noble and congenial to your principles, that among your ancestors you honor most those who acted in such a spirit; and with reason. For who would not admire the virtue of
those men, who resolutely embarked in their galleys and quitted country and home, rather than receive foreign law, choosing Themistocles, who gave such counsel for their general, and stoning Cyrsilus to death, who advised submission to the terms imposed—not him only, but your wives also stoning his wife? Yes; the Athenians of that day looked not for an orator or a general, who might help them to a pleasant servitude: they scorned to live, if it could not be with freedom. For each of them considered that he was not born to his father or mother only, but also to his country. What is the difference? He that thinks himself born for his parents only, waits for his appointed or natural end: he that thinks himself born for his country also, will sooner perish than behold her in slavery, and will regard the insults and indignities, which must be borne in a commonwealth enslaved, as more terrible than death.

Had I attempted to say, that I instructed you in sentiments worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man who would not justly rebuke me. What I declare is, that such principles are your own; I show that before my time such was the spirit of the commonwealth; though certainly in the execution of the particular measures I claim a share also for myself. The prosecutor, arraigning the whole proceedings, and imbittering you against me as the cause of our alarms and dangers, in his eagerness to deprive me of honor for the moment, robs you of the eulogies that should endure forever. For should you, under a disbelief in the wisdom of my policy, convict the defendant, you will appear to have done wrong not to have suffered what befell you by the cruelty of fortune. But never, never can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all! I swear it by your fore-
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fathers—those that met the peril at Marathon, those that took the field at Plataea, those in the sea-fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines, not only the successful or victorious! Justly! For the duty of brave men has been done by all: their fortune has been such as the Deity assigned to each.

Accursed scribbler! you, to deprive me of the approbation and affection of my countrymen, speak of trophies and battles and ancient deeds, with none of which had this present trial the least concern; but I!—O you third-rate actor!—I, that rose to counsel the state how to maintain her pre-eminence! in what spirit was I to mount the hustings? In the spirit of one having unworthy counsel to offer?—I should have deserved to perish! You yourselves, men of Athens, may not try private and public causes on the same principles: the compacts of every-day life you are to judge of by particular laws and circumstances; the measures of statesmen, by reference to the dignity of your ancestors. And if you think it your duty to act worthily of them, you should every one of you consider, when you come into court to decide public questions, that together with your staff and ticket the spirit of the commonwealth is delivered to you.

But in touching upon the deeds of your ancestors, there were some decrees and transactions which I omitted. I will return from my digression.

On our arrival at Thebes, we found ambassadors there from Philip, from the Thessalians and from his other allies; our friends in trepidation, his friends confident. To prove that I am not asserting this now to serve my own purposes,
read me the letter which we ambassadors despatched on the instant. So outrageous is my opponent’s malignity, that, if any advantage was procured, he attributes it to the occasion, not to me; while all miscarriages he attributes to me and my fortune. And according to him, as it seems, I, the orator and adviser, have no merit in results of argument and counsel, but am the sole author of misfortunes in arms and strategy. Could there be a more brutal calumniator or a more execrable? Read the letter.

[The letter is read]

On the convening of the assembly, our opponents were introduced first, because they held the character of allies. And they came forward and spoke, in high praise of Philip and disparagement of you, bringing up all the hostilities that you ever committed against the Thebans. In fine, they urged them to show their gratitude for the services done by Philip, and to avenge themselves for the injuries which you had done them, either—it mattered not which—by giving them a passage against you, or by joining in the invasion of Attica; and they proved, as they fancied, that by adopting their advice the cattle and slaves and other effects of Attica would come into Boeotia, whereas by acting as they said we should advise Boeotia would suffer pillage through the war. And much they said besides, tending all to the same point. The reply that we made I would give my life to recapitulate, but I fear, as the occasion is past, you will look upon it as if a sort of deluge had overwhelmed the whole proceedings, and regard any talk about them as a useless troubling of you. Hear them

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1 This, and all the documents subsequently referred to by the Orator, are lost.
what we persuaded them and what answer they returned. Take and read this:

[The answer of the Thebans]

After this they invited and sent for you. You marched to their succor, and—to omit what happened between—their reception of you was so friendly, that, while their infantry and cavalry were outside the walls, they admitted your army into their houses and citadel, among their wives and children and all that was most precious. Why, upon that day three of the noblest testimonies were before all mankind borne in your favor by the Thebans, one to your courage, one to your justice, one to your good behavior. For when they preferred fighting on your side to fighting against you, they held you to be braver and juster in your demands than Philip; and when they put under your charge what they and all men are most watchful to protect, their wives and children, they showed that they had confidence in your good behavior. In all which, men of Athens, it appeared they had rightly estimated your character. For after your forces entered the city, not so much as a groundless complaint was preferred against you by any one; so discreetly did you behave yourselves: and twice arrayed on their side in the earlier battles, that by the river and the winter-battle, you proved yourselves not irreproachable only, but admirable in your discipline, your equipments, and your zeal: which called forth eulogies from other men to you, sacrifice and thanksgiving from you to the gods. And I would gladly ask Æschines—while these things were going on, and the city was full of enthusiasm and joy and praise, whether he joined with the multitude in sacrifice and festivity, or sat at home sorrowing and moaning and repining
at the public success. For if he was present and appeared with the rest, is not his conduct monstrous, or rather impious, when measures, which he himself called the gods to witness were excellent, he now requires you to condemn—you that have sworn by the gods? If he was not present, does he not deserve a thousand deaths for grieving to behold what others rejoiced at? Read me now the decrees.

[The decrees for sacrifice]

We thus were engaged in sacrifice; the Thebans were in the assurance that they had been saved through us; and it had come about, that a people, who seemed likely to want assistance through the practices of these men, were themselves assisting others in consequence of my advice which you followed. What language Philip then uttered, and in what trouble he was on this account, you shall learn from his letters which he sent to Peloponnesus. Take and read them, that the jury may know what my perseverance and journeys and toils, and the many decrees which this man just now pulled to pieces, accomplished.

Athenians, you have had many great and renowned orators before me; the famous Callistratus, Aristophon, Cephalus, Thrasybulus, hundreds of others; yet none of them ever thoroughly devoted himself to any measure of state: for instance, the mover of a resolution would not be ambassador; the ambassador would not move a resolution; each one left for himself some relief, and also, should anything happen, an excuse. How then—it may be said—did you so far surpass others in might and boldness as to do everything yourself? I don't say that: but such was my conviction of the danger impending over us, that I con-
sidered it left no room or thought for individual security; a man should have been only too happy to perform his duty without neglect. As to myself, I was persuaded, perhaps foolishly; yet I was persuaded, that none would move better resolutions than myself, none would execute them better, none as ambassador would show more zeal and honesty. Therefore I undertook every duty myself. Read the letters of Philip.

[The letters]

To this did my policy, Æschines, reduce Philip. This language he uttered through me, he that before had lifted his voice so boldly against Athens! For which I was justly crowned by the people; and you were present and opposed it not, and Diodas, who preferred an indictment obtained not his share of the votes. Here, read me the decrees which were then absolved, and which this man never indicted.

[The decrees]

These decrees, men of Athens, contain the very words and syllables which Aristonicus drew up formerly, and Ctesiphon the defendant has now. And Æschines neither arraigned these himself, nor aided the party who preferred an indictment. Yet, if his present charge against me be true, he might then have arraigned Demomeles the mover and Hyperides with more show of reason than he can the defendant. Why? Because Ctesiphon may refer to them, and to the decisions of the courts, and to the fact of Æschines not having accused them, although they moved the same decrees which he has now, and to the laws which bar any further proceedings in such a case, and to many points besides:—whereas then the question would have
been tried on its own merits, before any such advantages had been obtained. But then, I imagine, it would have been impossible to do what Æschines now does—to pick out of a multitude of old dates and decrees what no man knew before, and what no man would have expected to hear to-day, for the purpose of slander—to transpose dates, and assign measures to the wrong causes instead of the right, in order to make a plausible case. That was impossible then. Every statement must have been according to the truth, soon after the facts, while you still remembered the particulars and had them almost at your fingers' ends. Therefore it was that he shunned all investigation at the time, and has come at this late period; thinking, as it appears to me, that you would make it a contest of orators, instead of an inquiry into political conduct; that words would be criticised, and not interests of state.

Then he plays the sophist, and says, you ought to disregard the opinion of us which you came from home with—that, as when you audit a man's account under the impression that he has a surplus, if it casts up right and nothing remains, you allow it, so should you now accept the fair conclusion of the argument. Only see, how rotten in its nature (and justly so) is every wicked contrivance! For by this very cunning simile he has now acknowledged it to be your conviction, that I am my country's advocate and he is Philip's. Had not this been your opinion of each, he would not have tried to persuade you differently. That he has however no reasonable ground for requiring you to change your belief, I can easily show, not by casting accounts—for that mode of reckoning applies not to measures—but by calling the circumstances briefly to mind, taking you that hear me both for auditors and witnesses.
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Through my policy, which he arraigns, instead of the Thebans invading this country with Philip, as all expected, they joined our ranks and prevented him;—instead of the war being in Attica, it took place seven hundred furlongs from the city on the confines of Boeotia;—instead of corsairs issuing from Euboea to plunder us, Attica was in peace on the coast-side during the whole war;—instead of Philip being master of the Hellespont by taking Byzantium, the Byzantines were our auxiliaries against him. Does this computation of services, think you, resemble the casting of accounts? Or should we strike these out on a balance, and not look that they be kept in everlasting remembrance? I will not set down that of the cruelty, remarkable in cases where Philip got people all at once into his power, others have had the trial; while of the generosity, which, casting about for his future purposes, he assumed toward Athens, you have happily enjoyed the fruits. I pass that by.

Yet this I do not hesitate to say; that any one desirous of truly testing an orator, not of calumniating him, would never have made the charges that you advanced just now, inventing similes, mimicking words and gestures (doubtless it hath determined the fortune of Greece, whether I spoke this word or that, whether I moved my hand one way or the other!): no! he would have examined the facts of the case, what means and resources our country possessed, when I entered on the administration, what, when I applied myself to it, I collected for her, and what was the condition of our adversaries. Then, if I had lessened her resources, he would have shown me to be guilty; if I had greatly increased them, he would not have calumniated me. However, as you have declined this course, I will adopt it. See if I state the case fairly.
For resources—our country possessed the islanders; not all, but the weakest; for neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor Corcyra was with us: subsidies she had amounting to five-and-forty talents; and they were anticipated: infantry or cavalry, none besides the native. But what was most alarming and wrought most in favor of the enemy—these men had got all our neighbors to be hostile rather than friendly to us; Megarians, Thebans, Eubœans. Such were the circumstances of our state; no man can say anything to the contrary: look now at those of Philip, whom we had to contend with. In the first place, he ruled his followers with unlimited sway, the most important thing for military operations: in the next place, they had arms always in their hands: besides, he had plenty of money, and did what he pleased, not giving notice by decrees, not deliberating openly, not brought to trial by calumniators, not defending indictments for illegal measures, not responsible to any one, but himself absolute master, leader, and lord of all. I, who was matched against him—for it is right to examine this—what had I under my control? Nothing. Public speech, for instance, the only thing open to me—even to this you invited his hirelings as well as myself; and whenever they prevailed over me (as often happened for some cause or other), your resolutions were passed for the enemy's good. Still under these disadvantages I got you for allies Eubœans, Achaæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyreans; from whom were collected fifteen thousand mercenaries and two thousand horse, besides the national troops. Of money, too, I procured as large a contribution as possible.

If you talk about just conditions with the Thebans, Æschines, or with the Byzantines or Eubœans, or discuss
now the question of equal terms, first I say—you are ignorant that of those galleys formerly which defended Greece, being three hundred in number, our commonwealth furnished two hundred, and never (as it seemed) thought herself injured by having done so, never prosecuted those who advised it or expressed any dissatisfaction—shame on her if she had!—but was grateful to the gods, that, when a common danger beset the Greeks, she alone furnished double what the rest did for the preservation of all. Besides, it is but a poor favor you do your countrymen by calumniating me. For what is the use of telling us now what we should have done?—Why, being in the city and present, did you not make your proposals then; if, indeed, they were practicable at a crisis, when we had to accept not what we liked, but what the circumstances allowed? Remember, there was one ready to bid against us, to welcome eagerly those that we rejected, and give money into the bargain.

But if I am accused for what I have actually done, how would it have been if, through my hard bargaining, the states had gone off and attached themselves to Philip, and he had become master at the same time of Euboea, Thebes, and Byzantium? What, think ye, these impious men would have said or done? Said, doubtless, that the states were abandoned—that they wished to join us and were driven away—that he had got command of the Hellespont by the Byzantines, and become master of the corn-trade of Greece—that a heavy neighbor-war had by means of the Thebans been brought into Attica—that the sea had become unnavigable by the excursion of pirates from Euboea! All this would they have said, sure enough, and a great deal besides. A wicked, wicked thing, O Athenians, is a calumniator always, every way spiteful and faultfinding. But
this creature is a reptile by nature, that from the beginning never did anything honest or liberal; a very ape of a tragedian, village Ænomaus, counterfeit orator! What advantage has your eloquence been to your country? Now do you speak to us about the past? As if a physician should visit his patients, and not order or prescribe anything to cure the disease, but on the death of any one, when the last ceremonies were performing, should follow him to the grave and expound how, if the poor fellow had done this and that, he never would have died! Idiot! do you speak now?

Even the defeat—if you exult in that which should make you groan, you accursed one!—by nothing that I have done will it appear to have befallen us. Consider it thus, O Athenians. From no embassy, on which I was commissioned by you, did I ever come away defeated by the ambassadors of Philip—neither from Thessaly, nor from Ambracia, nor from the kings of Thrace, nor from Byzantium, nor from any other place, nor on the last recent occasion from Thebes; but where his ambassadors were vanquished in argument, he came with arms and carried the day. And for this you call me to account; and are not ashamed to jeer the same person for cowardice, whom you require single-handed to overcome the might of Philip—and that, too, by words! For what else had I at my command? Certainly not the spirit of each individual, nor the fortune of the army, nor the conduct of the war, for which you would make me accountable; such a blunderer are you!

Yet understand me. Of what a statesman may be responsible for I allow the utmost scrutiny; I deprecate it not. What are his functions? To observe things in the be-
ginning, to foresee and foretell them to others—this I have done: again; wherever he finds delays, backwardness, ignorance, jealousies, vices inherent and unavoidable in all communities, to contract them into the narrowest compass, and, on the other hand, to promote unanimity and friendship and zeal in the discharge of duty. All this, too, I have performed; and no one can discover the least neglect on my part. Ask any man by what means Philip achieved most of his successes, and you will be told, by his army, and by his bribing and corrupting men in power. Well; your forces were not under my command or control; so that I cannot be questioned for anything done in that department. But by refusing the price of corruption I have overcome Philip: for as the offerer of a bribe, if it be accepted, has vanquished the taker, so the person who refuses it and is not corrupted has vanquished the person offering. Therefore is the commonwealth undefeated as far as I am concerned.

These and such as these (besides many others) are the grounds furnished by myself to justify the defendant's motion in my behalf. Those which you, my fellow-citizens, furnished, I will proceed to mention. Immediately after the battle the people, knowing and having witnessed everything which I did, in the very midst of their alarm and terror, when it would not have been surprising if the great body of them had even treated me harshly, passed my resolutions for the safety of the country; all their measures of defence, the disposition of the garrisons, the trenches, the levies for our fortifications, were carried on under my decrees: and, further, upon the election of a commissioner of grain, they chose me in preference to all. Afterward, when those who were bent to do me a mischief
conspired, and brought indictments, audits, impeachments and the rest of it against me, not at first in their own persons, but in such names as they imagined would most effectually screen themselves (for you surely know and remember that every day of that first period I was arraigned, and neither the desperation of Sosicles, nor the malignity of Philocrates, nor the madness of Dionidas and Melantus, nor anything else was left untried by them against me); on all those occasions, chiefly through the gods, next through you and the other Athenians, I was preserved. And with justice! Yes, that is the truth, and to the honor of the juries who so conscientiously decided. Well, then: on the impeachments, when you acquitted me and gave not the prosecutors their share of the votes, you pronounced that my policy was the best: by my acquittal on the indictments my counsels and motions were shown to be legal; by your passing of my accounts you acknowledged my whole conduct to have been honest and incorruptible. Under these circumstances, what name could Ctesiphon with decency or justice give to my acts? Not that which he saw the people give—which he saw the jurors give—which he saw truth establish to the world?

Aye, says he; but that was a fine thing of Cephalus, never to have been indicted. Yes, and a lucky one, too. But why should a man, who has often been charged, but never convicted of crime, be a whit the more liable to reproach? However, men of Athens, against my opponent I have a right to use the boast of Cephalus; for he never preferred or prosecuted any indictment against me; therefore I am a citizen as good as Cephalus by his admission.

From many things one may see his unfeelingness and malignity, but especially from his discourse about fortune.
For my part, I regard any one, who reproaches his fellow-man with fortune, as devoid of sense. He that is best satisfied with his condition, he that deems his fortune excellent, cannot be sure that it will remain so until the evening: how, then, can it be right to bring it forward, or upbraid another man with it? As Æschines, however, has on this subject (besides many others) expressed himself with insolence, look, men of Athens, and observe how much more truth and humanity there shall be in my discourse upon fortune than in his.

I hold the fortune of our commonwealth to be good, and so I find the oracles of Dodonean Jupiter and Pythian Apollo declaring to us. The fortune of all mankind, which now prevails, I consider cruel and dreadful: for what Greek, what barbarian, has not in these times experienced a multitude of evils? That Athens chose the noblest policy, that she fares better than those very Greeks who thought, if they abandoned us, they should abide in prosperity, I reckon as part of her good fortune: if she suffered reverses, if all happened not to us as we desired, I conceive she has had that share of the general fortune which fell to our lot. As to my fortune (personally speaking) or that of any individual among us, it should, as I conceive, be judged of in connection with personal matters. Such is my opinion upon the subject of fortune, a right and just one, as it appears to me, and I think you will agree with it. Æschines says that my individual fortune is paramount to that of the commonwealth, the small and mean to the good and great. How can this possibly be?

However, if you are determined, Æschines, to scrutinize my fortune, compare it with your own, and, if you find my fortune better than yours, cease to revile it. Look, then,
from the very beginning. And I pray and entreat that I may not be condemned for bad taste. I don't think any person wise, who insults poverty, or who prides himself on having been bred in affluence: but by the slander and malice of this cruel man I am forced into such a discussion; which I will conduct with all the moderation which circumstances allow.

I had the advantage, Æschines, in my boyhood of going to proper schools, and having such allowance as a boy should have who is to do nothing mean from indigence. Arrived at man's estate, I lived suitably to my breeding; was choir-master, ship-commander, rate payer; backward in no acts of liberality, public or private, but making myself useful to the commonwealth and to my friends. When I entered upon state affairs, I chose such a line of politics that both by my country and many people of Greece I have been crowned many times, and not even you, my enemies, venture to say that the line I chose was not honorable. Such, then, has been the fortune of my life: I could enlarge upon it, but I forbear, lest what I pride myself in should give offence.

But you, the man of dignity, who spit upon others, look what sort of fortune is yours compared with mine. As a boy you were reared in abject poverty, waiting with your father on the school, grinding the ink, sponging the benches, sweeping the room, doing the duty of a menial rather than a freeman's son. After you were grown up, you attended your mother's initiations, reading her books and helping in all the ceremonies: at night wrapping the novitiates in fawn-skin, swilling, purifying, and scouring them with clay and bran, raising them after the lustration, and bidding them say, "Bad I have 'scaped, and better l
have found’; priding yourself that no one ever howled so lustily—and I believe him! for don’t suppose that he who speaks so loud is not a splendid howler! In the daytime you led your noble orgiasts, crowned with fennel and poplar, through the highways, squeezing the big-cheeked serpents, and lifting them over your head, and shouting Evæ Sabœ, and capering to the words Hyes Attes, Attes Hyes, saluted by the beldames as Leader, Conductor, Chest-bearer, Fan-bearer, and the like, getting as your reward tarts and biscuits and rolls; for which any man might well bless himself and his fortune!

When you were enrolled among your fellow-townsmen—by what means I stop not to inquire—when you were enrolled however, you immediately selected the most honorable of employments, that of clerk and assistant to our petty magistrates. From this you were removed after a while, having done yourself all that you charge others with; and then, sure enough, you disgraced not your antecedents by your subsequent life, but hiring yourself to those ranting players, as they were called, Simylus and Socrates, you acted third parts, collecting figs and grapes and olives like a fruiterer from other men’s farms, and getting more from them than from the playing, in which the lives of your whole company were at stake; for there was an implacable and incessant war between them and the audience, from whom you received so many wounds that no wonder you taunt as cowards people inexperienced in such encounters.

But passing over what may be imputed to poverty, I will come to the direct charges against your character. You espoused such a line of politics (when at last you thought of taking to them), that, if your country prospered, you lived the life of a hare, fearing and trembling and ever expecting
to be scourged for the crimes of which your conscience accused you; though all have seen how bold you were during the misfortunes of the rest. A man who took courage at the death of a thousand citizens—what does he deserve at the hands of the living? A great deal more that I could say about him I shall omit: for it is not all I can tell of his turpitude and infamy which I ought to let slip from my tongue, but only what is not disgraceful to myself to mention.

Contrast now the circumstances of your life and mine, gently and with temper, Æschines; and then ask these people whose fortune they would each of them prefer. You taught reading, I went to school: you performed initiations, I received them: you danced in the chorus, I furnished it: you were assembly-clerk, I was a speaker: you acted third parts, I heard you: you broke down, and I hissed: you have worked as a statesman for the enemy, I for my country. I pass by the rest; but this very day I am on my probation for a crown, and am acknowledged to be innocent of all offence; while you are already judged to be a pettifogger, and the question is, whether you shall continue that trade, or at once be silenced by not getting a fifth part of the votes. A happy fortune, do you see, you have enjoyed, that you should denounce mine as miserable.

Come now, let me read the evidence to the jury of public services which I have performed. And by way of comparison do you recite me the verses which you murdered:

From Hades and the dusky realms I come.

And

Ill news, believe me, I am loth to bear.

Ill betide thee, say I, and may the gods, or at least the
Athenians, confound thee for a vile citizen and a vile third-rate actor!

Read the evidence.

[Evidence]

Such has been my character in political matters. In private, if you do not all know that I have been liberal and humane and charitable to the distressed, I am silent, I will say not a word, I will offer no evidence on the subject, either of persons whom I ransomed from the enemy, or of persons whose daughters I helped to portion, or anything of the kind. For this is my maxim. I hold that the party receiving an obligation should ever remember it, the party conferring should forget it immediately, if the one is to act with honesty, the other without meanness. To remind and speak of your own bounties is next door to reproaching. I will not act so: nothing shall induce me. Whatever my reputation is in these respects, I am content with it.

I will have done then with private topics, but say another word or two upon public. If you can mention, Æschines, a single man under the sun, whether Greek or barbarian, who has not suffered by Philip's power formerly and Alexander's now, well and good; I concede to you, that my fortune, or misfortune (if you please), has been the cause of everything. But if many that never saw me or heard my voice have been grievously afflicted, not individuals only but whole cities and nations; how much juster and fairer is it to consider, that to the common fortune apparently of all men, to a tide of events overwhelming and lamentable, these disasters are to be attributed. You, disregarding all this, accuse me whose ministry has been among my countrymen, knowing all the while, that a part (if not the whole) of your calumny falls upon the people,
and yourself in particular. For if I assumed the sole and absolute direction of our counsels, it was open to you and other speakers to accuse me: but if you were constantly present in all the assemblies, if the state invited public discussion of what was expedient, and if these measures were then believed by all to be the best, and especially by you (for certainly from no goodwill did you leave me in possession of hopes and admiration and honors, all of which attended on my policy, but doubtless because you were compelled by the truth and had nothing better to advise); is it not iniquitous and monstrous to complain now of measures, than which you could suggest none better at the time?

Among all other people I find these principles in a manner defined and settled—Does a man wilfully offend? He is the object of wrath and punishment. Hath a man erred unintentionally? There is pardon instead of punishment for him. Has a man devoted himself to what seemed for the general good, and without any fault or misconduct been in common with all disappointed of success? Such a one deserves not obloquy or reproach, but sympathy. These principles will not be found in our statutes only: Nature herself has defined them by her unwritten laws and the feelings of humanity. Æschines, however, has so far surpassed all men in brutality and malignity, that even things which he cited himself as misfortunes he imputes to me as crimes.

And besides—as if he himself had spoken everything with candor and goodwill—he told you to watch me, and mind that I did not cajole and deceive you, calling me a great orator, a juggler, a sophist, and the like: as though, if a man says of another what applies to himself, it must
be true, and the hearers are not to inquire who the person is that makes the charge. Certain am I, that you are all acquainted with my opponent's character, and believe these charges to be more applicable to him than to me. And of this I am sure, that my oratory—let it be so: though indeed I find, that the speaker's power depends for the most part on the hearers; for according to your reception and favor it is, that the wisdom of a speaker is esteemed—if I however possess any ability of this sort, you will find it has been exhibited always in public business on your behalf, never against you or on personal matters; whereas that of Arechines has been displayed not only in speaking for the enemy, but against all persons who ever offended or quarreled with him. It is not for justice or the good of the commonwealth that he employs it. A citizen of worth and honor should not call upon judges impanelled in the public service to gratify his anger or hatred or anything of that kind; nor should he come before you upon such grounds. The best thing is not to have these feelings; but, if it cannot be helped, they should be mitigated and restrained.

On what occasions ought an orator and statesman to be vehement? Where any of the commonwealth's main interests are in jeopardy, and he is opposed to the adversaries of the people. Those are the occasions for a generous and brave citizen. But for a person, who never sought to punish me for any offence either public or private, on the state's behalf or on his own, to have got up an accusation because I am crowned and honored, and to have expended such a multitude of words—this is a proof of personal enmity and spite and meanness, not of anything good. And then his leaving the controversy with me, and attacking the defendant, comprises everything that is base.
I should conclude, Æschines, that you undertook this cause to exhibit your eloquence and strength of lungs, not to obtain satisfaction for any wrong. But it is not the language of an orator, Æschines, that has any value, nor yet the tone of his voice, but his adopting the same views with the people, and his hating and loving the same persons that his country does. He that is thus minded will say everything with loyal intention: he that courts persons from whom the commonwealth apprehends danger to herself, rides not on the same anchorage with the people, and therefore has not the same expectation of safety. But—do you see?—I have: for my objects are the same with those of my countrymen; I have no interest separate or distinct. Is that so with you? How can it be—when immediately after the battle you went as ambassador to Philip, who was at that period the author of your country's calamities, notwithstanding that you had before persisted in refusing that office, as all men know?

And who is it that deceives the state? Surely the man who speaks not what he thinks. On whom does the crier pronounce a curse? Surely on such a man. What greater crime can an orator be charged with, than that his opinions and his language are not the same? Such is found to be your character. And yet you open your mouth, and dare to look these men in the faces! Do you think they don't know you?—or are sunk all in such slumber and oblivion, as not to remember the speeches which you delivered in the assembly, cursing and swearing that you had nothing to do with Philip, and that I brought that charge against you out of personal enmity without foundation? No sooner came the news of the battle, than your forgot all that; you acknowledged—and avowed that between Philip and yourself
there subsisted a relation of hospitality and friendship—new names these for your contract of hire. For upon what plea of equality or justice could Æschines, son of Glaucothea the timbrel-player, be the friend or acquaintance of Philip? I cannot see. No! You were hired to ruin the interests of your countrymen: and yet, though you have been caught yourself in open treason, and informed against yourself after the fact, you revile and reproach me for things which you will find any man is chargeable with sooner than I.

Many great and glorious enterprises has the commonwealth, Æschines, undertaken and succeeded in through me; and she did not forget them. Here is the proof—On the election of a person to speak the funeral oration immediately after the event, you were proposed, but the people would not have you, notwithstanding your fine voice, nor Demades, though he had just made the peace, nor Hegemon, nor any other of your party—but me. And when you and Pythocles came forward in a brutal and shameful manner (O merciful Heaven!) and urged the same accusations against me which you now do, and abused me, they elected me all the more. The reason—you are not ignorant of it—yet I will tell you. The Athenians knew as well the loyalty and zeal with which I conducted their affairs, as the dishonesty of you and your party; for what you denied upon oath in our prosperity, you confessed in the misfortunes of the republic. They considered therefore, that men who got security for their politics by the public disasters had been their enemies long before, and were then avowedly such. They thought it right also, that the person who was to speak in honor of the fallen and celebrate their valor, should not have sat under the same roof or at the same table with their antagonists; that he should not revel there and
sing a psan over the calamities of Greece in company with their murderers, and then come here and receive distinction; that he should not with his voice act the mourner of their fate, but that he should lament over them with his heart. This they perceived in themselves and in me, but not in any of you: therefore they elected me, and not you. Nor, while the people felt thus, did the fathers and brothers of the deceased, who were chosen by the people to perform their obsequies, feel differently. For having to order the funeral banquet (according to custom) at the house of the nearest relative to the deceased, they ordered it at mine. And with reason: because, though each to his own was nearer of kin than I was, none was so near to them all collectively. He that had the deepest interest in their safety and success, had upon their mournful disaster the largest share of sorrow for them all.

Read him this epitaph, which the state chose to inscribe on their monument, that you may see even by this, Æschines, what a heartless and malignant wretch you are. Read.

**THE EPITAPH**

These are the patriot brave, who side by side  
Stood to their arms, and dash'd the foeman's pride:  
Firm in their valor, prodigal of life,  
Hades they chose the arbiter of strife;  
That Greeks might ne'er to haughty victors bow,  
Nor thraldom's yoke, nor dire oppression know;  
They fought, they bled, and on their country's breast  
(Such was the doom of Heaven) these warriors rest.  
Gods never lack success, nor strive in vain,  
But man must suffer what the fates ordain.

Do you hear, Æschines, in this very inscription, that "Gods never lack success, nor strive in vain"? Not to the statesman does it ascribe the power of giving victory
in battle, but to the gods. Wherefore then, execrable man, do you reproach me with these things? Wherefore utter such language? I pray that it may fall upon the heads of you and yours.

Many other accusations and falsehoods he urged against me, O Athenians, but one thing surprised me more than all, that, when he mentioned the late misfortunes of the country, he felt not as became a well-disposed and upright citizen, he shed no tear, experienced no such emotion: with a loud voice, exulting, and straining his throat, he imagined apparently that he was accusing me, while he was giving proof against himself, that our distresses touched him not in the same manner as the rest. A person who pretends, as he did, to care for the laws and constitution, ought at least to have this about him, that he grieves and rejoices for the same cause as the people, and not by his politics to be enlisted in the ranks of the enemy, as Æschines has plainly done, saying that I am the cause of all, and that the commonwealth has fallen into troubles through me, when it was not owing to my views or principles that you began to assist the Greeks; for, if you conceded this to me, that my influence caused you to resist the subjugation of Greece, it would be a higher honor than any that you have bestowed upon others. I myself would not make such an assertion—it would be doing you injustice—nor would you allow it, I am sure; and Æschines, if he acted honestly, would never, out of enmity to me, have disparaged and defamed the greatest of your glories.

But why do I censure him for this, when with calumny far more shocking has he assailed me? He that charges me with Philippizing—O heaven and earth!—what would he not say? By Hercules and the gods! if one had hon-
estly to inquire, discarding all expression of spite and falsehood, who the persons really are, on whom the blame of what has happened may by common consent fairly and justly be thrown, it would be found, they are persons in the various states like Αeschines, not like me—persons who, while Philip's power was feeble and exceedingly small, and we were constantly warning and exhorting and giving salutary counsel, sacrificed the general interests for the sake of selfish lucre, deceiving and corrupting their respective countrymen, until they made them slaves—Daochus, Cineas, Thrasyrules, the Thessalians; Cercidas, Hieronymus, Eucampidas, the Arcadians; Myrtis, Teledamus, Mnaseas, the Argives; Euxitheus, Cleotimus, Aristoclesm, the Eleans; Neon and Thrasylochus, sons of the accursed Philiadēs, the Messenians; Aristatus, Epichares, the Sicyonians; Dinarchus, Demaratus, the Corinthians; Ptoleodorus, Helixus, Perilaus, the Megarians; Timolaus, Theogiton, Anemostas, the Thebans; Hipparchus; Clitarchus, Sosistratus, the Euboeans. The day will not last me to recount the names of the traitors. All these, O Athenians, are men of the same politics in their own countries as this party among you—profugates, and parasites, and miscreants, who have each of them crippled their fatherlands; toasted away their liberty, first to Philip and last to Alexander; who measure happiness by their belly and all that is base, while freedom and independence, which the Greeks of olden time regarded as the test and standard of well-being, they have annihilated.

Of this base and infamous conspiracy and profligacy—or rather, O Athenians, if I am to speak in earnest, of this betrayal of Grecian liberty—Athens is by all mankind acquitted, owing to my counsels; and I am acquitted by
you. Then do you ask me, Æschines, for what merit I claim to be honored? I will tell you. Because, while all the statesmen in Greece, beginning with yourself, have been corrupted formerly by Philip and now by Alexander, me neither opportunity, nor fair speeches, nor large promises, nor hope, nor fear, nor anything else could tempt or induce to betray aught that I considered just and beneficial to my country. Whatever I have advised my fellow-citizens, I have never advised like you men, leaning as in a balance to the side of profit: all my proceedings have been those of a soul upright, honest, and incorrupt: intrusted with affairs of greater magnitude than any of my contemporaries, I have administered them all honestly and faithfully. Therefore do I claim to be honored.

As to this fortification, for which you ridiculed me, of the wall and fosse, I regard them as deserving of thanks and praise, and so they are; but I place them nowhere near my acts of administration. Not with stones nor with bricks did I fortify Athens: nor is this the ministry on which I most pride myself. Would you view my fortifications aright, you will find arms, and states, and posts, and harbors, and galleys, and horses, and men for their defence. These are the bulwarks with which I protected Attica, as far as was possible by human wisdom; with these I fortified our territory, not the circle of Piræus or the city. Nay more; I was not beaten by Philip in estimates or preparations; far from it; but the generals and forces of the allies were overcome by his fortune. Where are the proofs of this? They are plain and evident. Consider.

What was the course becoming a loyal citizen—a states-
man serving his country with all possible forethought and zeal and fidelity? Should he not have covered Attica on the seaboard with Euboea, on the midland frontier with Boeotia, on the Peloponnesian with the people of that confine? Should he not have provided for the conveyance of corn along a friendly coast all the way to Piraeus? preserved certain places that belonged to us by sending off succors, and by advising and moving accordingly—Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos? brought others into alliance and confederacy with us—Byzantium, Abydus, Euboea?—cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and supplied what the commonwealth was deficient in? All this has been accomplished by my decrees and measures; and whoever will examine them without prejudice, men of Athens, will find they were rightly planned and faithfully executed; that none of the proper seasons were lost or missed or thrown away by me, nothing which depended on one man's ability and prudence was neglected. But if the power of some deity or of fortune, or the worthlessness of commanders, or the wickedness of you that betrayed your countries, or all these things together, injured and eventually ruined our cause, of what is Demosthenes guilty? Had there in each of the Greek cities been one such man as I was in my station among you; or rather, had Thessaly possessed one single man, and Arcadia one, of the same sentiments as myself, none of the Greeks either beyond or within Thermopylae would have suffered their present calamities: all would have been free and independent, living prosperously in their own countries with perfect safety and security, thankful to you and the rest of the Athenians for such manifold blessings through me.

To show you that I greatly understated my services for
fear of giving offence, here—read me this—the list of auxiliaries procured by my decrees.

[The list of auxiliaries]

These and the like measures, Æschines, are what become an honorable citizen (by their success—O earth and heaven!—we should have been the greatest of people incontestably, and deserved to be so: even under their failure the result is glory, and no one blames Athens or her policy; all condemn fortune that so ordered things); but never will he desert the interests of the commonwealth, nor hire himself to her adversaries, and study the enemy's advantage, instead of his country's; nor on a man who has courage to advise and propose measures worthy of the state, and resolution to persevere in them, will he cast an evil eye, and, if any one privately offends him, remember and treasure it up; no, nor keep himself in a criminal and treacherous retirement, as you so often do. There is indeed a retirement just and beneficial to the state, such as you, the bulk of my countrymen, innocently enjoy: that however is not the retirement of Æschines; far from it. Withdrawing himself from public life when he pleases (and that is often), he watches for the moment when you are tired of a constant speaker, or when some reverse of fortune has befallen you, or anything untoward has happened (and many are the casualties of human life); at such a crisis he springs up an orator, rising from his retreat like a wind; in full voice, with words and phrases collected, he rolls them out audibly and breathlessly, to no advantage or good purpose whatsoever, but to the detriment of some or other of his fellow-citizens and to the general disgrace.

Yet from this labor and diligence, Æschines, if it pro-
ceded from an honest heart, solicitous for your country's welfare, the fruits should have been rich and noble and profitable to all—alliances of states, supplies of money, conveniences of commerce, enactment of useful laws, opposition to our declared enemies. All such things were looked for in former times; and many opportunities did the past afford for a good man and true to show himself; during which time you are nowhere to be found, neither first, second, third, fourth, fifth, nor sixth—not in any rank at all—certainly in no service by which your country was exalted. For what alliance has come to the state by your procurement? What succors, what acquisition of goodwill or credit? What embassy or agency is there of yours, by which the reputation of the country has been increased? What concern domestic, Hellenic, or foreign, of which you have had the management, has improved under it? What galleys? what ammunition? what arsenals? what repair of walls? what cavalry? What in the world are you good for? What assistance in money have you ever given, either to the rich or the poor, out of public spirit or liberality? None. But, good sir, if there is nothing of this, there is at all events zeal and loyalty. Where? when? You infamous fellow! Even at a time when all who ever spoke upon the platform gave something for the public safety, and last Aristonicus gave the sum which he had amassed to retrieve his franchise, you neither came forward nor contributed a mite—not from inability—not for you have inherited above five talents from Philo, your wife's father, and you had a subscription of two talents from the chairmen of the Boards for what you did to cut up the navy law. But, that I may not go from one thing to another and lose sight of the question, I pass this by.
ON THE CROWN

That it was not poverty prevented your contributing, already appears: it was, in fact, your anxiety to do nothing against those to whom your political life is subservient. On what occasions then do you show your spirit? When do you shine out? When aught is to be spoken against your countrymen!—then it is you are splendid in voice, perfect in memory, an admirable actor, a tragic Theocrines.

You mention the good men of olden times; and you are right so to do. Yet it is hardly fair, O Athenians, that he should get the advantage of that respect which you have for the dead, to compare and contrast me with them—me who am living among you; for what mortal is ignorant that toward the living there exists always more or less of ill will, whereas the dead are no longer hated even by an enemy? Such being human nature, am I to be tried and judged by the standard of my predecessors? Heaven forbid! It is not just or equitable, Æschines. Let me be compared with you, or any persons you like of your party who are still alive. And consider this—whether it is more honorable and better for the state, that because of the services of a former age, prodigious though they are beyond all power of expression, those of the present generation should be unrequited and spurned, or that all who give proof of their good intentions should have their share of honor and regard from the people? Yet indeed—if I must say so much—my politics and principles, if considered fairly, will be found to resemble those of the illustrious ancients, and to have had the same objects in view, while yours resemble those of their calumniators: for it is certain there were persons in those times who ran down the living, and praised people dead and gone, with a malignant purpose like yourself.
You say that I am nothing like the ancients. Are you like them, Æschines? Is your brother, or any of our speakers? I assert that none is. But pray, my good fellow (that I may give you no other name), try the living with the living and with his competitors, as you would in all cases—poets, dancers, athletes. Philammon did not, because he was inferior to Glaucus of Carystus and some other champions of a bygone age, depart uncrowned from Olympia, but, because he beat all who entered the ring against him, was crowned and proclaimed conqueror. So I ask you to compare me with the orators of the day, with yourself, with any one you like: I yield to none. When the commonwealth was at liberty to choose for her advantage, and patriotism was a matter of emulation, I showed myself a better counsellor than any, and every act of state was pursuant to my decrees and laws and negotiations: none of your party was to be seen, unless you had to do the Athenians a mischief. After that lamentable occurrence, when there was a call no longer for advisers, but for persons obedient to command, persons ready to be hired against their country and willing to flatter strangers, then all of you were in occupation, grand people with splendid equipages; I was powerless, I confess, though more attached to my countrymen than you.

Two things, men of Athens, are characteristic of a well-disposed citizen: so may I speak of myself and give the least offence:—In authority, his constant aim should be the dignity and pre-eminence of the commonwealth; in all times and circumstances his spirit should be loyal. This depends upon nature; power and might upon other things. Such a spirit, you will find, I have ever sincerely cherished. Only see. When my person was demanded—
ON THE CROWN

when they brought Amphictyonic suits against me—when they menaced—when they promised—when they set these miscreants like wild beasts upon me—never in any way have I abandoned my affection for you. From the very beginning I chose an honest and straightforward course in politics, to support the honor, the power, the glory of my fatherland, these to exalt, in these to have my being. I do not walk about the marketplace gay and cheerful because the stranger has prospered, holding out my right hand and congratulating those who I think will report it yonder, and on any news of our own success shudder and groan and stoop to the earth, like these impious men, who rail at Athens, as if in so doing they did not rail at themselves; who look abroad, and if the foreigner thrives by the distresses of Greece, are thankful for it, and say we should keep him so thriving to all time.

Never, O ye gods, may those wishes be confirmed by you! If possible, inspire even in these men a better sense and feeling! But if they are, indeed, incurable, destroy them by themselves; exterminate them on land and sea; and for the rest of us, grant that we may speedily be released from our present fears, and enjoy a lasting deliverance.
ORATION ON THE EMBASSY

IN THIS ORATION DEMOSTHENES CHARGES ÆSCHINES WITH CORRUPT CONDUCT IN AN EMBASSY TO PHILIP OF MACEDON

OF THE intrigue and canvassing which there has been about this trial, men of Athens, I imagine you are all aware, having seen what a throng assailed you at the ballot just now. I shall only ask at your hands—what those who don't ask it are entitled to—that you will value no person and no one's favor more highly than justice and the oath which each juror has sworn, remembering that this is for the good of yourselves and the community; whereas all this intrigue and importunity of partisans is to get advantages for some persons over the rest, which the laws assemble you here to prevent, not to secure for the benefit of the unjust.

Other men, who enter honestly upon the service of the public, even after their audit, I see, profess a continued responsibility: Æschines does the very reverse; for before he appeared in court to give a reckoning of his actions, one of the persons who came to demand it he has removed out of the way; others he goes about threatening, and thus introduces into the commonwealth a practice most flagitious and injurious to you; for if a man who has discharged or administered any public office can by intimidation, and not by honesty, keep people from accusing him, you will be deprived of all authority.

That I shall prove the defendant to be guilty of many (112)
grave misdemeanors, and to merit the severest punishment, I am confident and persuaded: what, notwithstanding such conviction, I am afraid of, I will tell you without disguise. It appears to me, O Athenians, that all the causes which come before you depend on the time of bringing them as much as upon the merits, and I fear the length of time since the embassy may have caused you to forget or become reconciled to your wrongs. Yet, even under these circumstances, you may, I think, arrive at a correct judgment and decision: I will tell you how. You must consider among yourselves, men of the jury, and reflect for what things the commonwealth should receive an account from an ambassador. First it should be on the subject of his reports; secondly, of his counsels; thirdly, of your instructions to him; next, as to the circumstances of time; and after all, whether in each of these points he has acted incorruptly or not. Why these inquiries? Because, from his reports you have to deliberate on your course of action; if they are true, you determine rightly, if not so, otherwise. The advice of ambassadors you give more credit to, because you listen to them as to men who understand what they were sent about: never then ought an ambassador to be convicted of giving bad or mischievous advice. And of course, whatever you instructed him either to do or say, whatever commission you expressly gave him, it is his duty to have executed. But why the account of time? Because it often happens, men of Athens, that the season for many important measures falls in a short space, and if it be sacrificed and betrayed to the enemy, do what you will, it cannot be recalled. As to the absence of corrupt motive—I am sure you will all agree, that to take reward for acts which
injure the commonwealth is shocking and abominable. The legislator indeed does not define it so, but absolutely forbids the taking of bribes in any way, considering, as it appears to me, that a person who is once bribed and corrupted ceases to be even a safe judge of what is useful for the state. If then I shall prove and demonstrate clearly, that Æschines the defendant has reported what was untrue, and prevented the people hearing the truth from me—that he has given advice totally opposed to your interests, and fulfilled none of your instructions on the embassy—that he has wasted time in which many important opportunities have been lost to the commonwealth—and that for all this he has received presents and wages in conjunction with Philocrates—convict him, punish him as his crimes deserve: if I prove not these statements; or not all of them, look with contempt on me, and acquit the defendant.

Many grievous things can I lay to his charge besides those which I have mentioned, O Athenians—enough to make every one detest him—but before I enter upon other topics, I will remind you (though nearly all indeed must remember) what character Æschines first assumed in politics, and what language he thought proper to address to the people against Philip, that you may see, his own early acts and speeches will most surely convict him of taking bribes.

He is the first Athenian (as he declared in his speech) who discovered that Philip was plotting against the Greeks, and corrupting certain of the leading men in Arcadia. He it is who, having Ischander, son of Neoptolemus, to play second part to him, applied to the council on this matter, and also to the people, and persuaded you to send ambassadors everywhere to assemble a congress at Athens for
consulting about war with Philip; who afterward, on his return from Arcadia, reported those fine long speeches, which he said he had delivered on your behalf before the ten thousand at Megalopolis, in answer to Philip's advocate Hieronymus, and dwelt on the enormous injury done, not only to their own countries, but to the whole of Greece, by the men who took presents and money from Philip. Such being his politics then, such the specimen which he had given of himself, when Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon, and the rest, who brought reports from Macedonia without a word of truth, prevailed on you to send ambassadors to Philip for peace, this man is put into the embassy, not as one of a party who would sell your interests, not as one of those who trusted Philip, but as one who would help to watch the others; for, on account of his former speeches and hostility to Philip, you all naturally held that opinion of him. He came then to me, and arranged that we should act in the embassy together; and strongly urged that we should both watch that impudent profligate Philocrates. And until his return home from the first embassy, men of Athens, I certainly never discovered that he was corrupted and had sold himself; for, besides the speeches which, as I said, he had made before, he rose in the first of the assemblies in which you debated on the peace, and began—I think I can repeat his opening to you in the very same words which he used—"Had Philocrates been meditating ever so long, men of Athens, upon the best means of opposing the peace, he could not, methinks, have found a better way than a motion like the present. Never will I, while a single Athenian is left, advise the commonwealth to make a peace like this: peace, however, I do advise"—and to such
purport briefly and fairly he expressed himself. Yet the same man who had thus spoken on the first day in the hearing of you all, on the next, when the peace was to be ratified, when I supported the resolution of our allies, and exerted myself to make the peace equitable and just, and you were of my opinion, and would not even hear the voice of the despicable Philocrates—he then got up and addressed the people in support of Philocrates, and said what (O heavens!) deserved a thousand deaths—that you ought not to remember your ancestors, nor put up with persons who talked about trophies and sea-fights, and that he would propose and pass a law to prevent your succoring any Greeks who had not previously succored you. All which this impudent wretch dared to utter in the presence and hearing of the ambassadors, whom you sent for out of Greece at his persuasion before he had sold himself.

How he wasted the time, O Athenians, after you had appointed him again to receive the oaths; how he ruined all the affairs of the commonwealth, and quarrelled with me about it when I sought to prevent him, you shall hear presently. But when we had returned from that embassy for the oaths, which is the subject of your present inquiry—we not having obtained a particle, great or small, of what was promised and expected when you made the peace, but having been cheated in everything, and these men having a second time outstepped their duty as ambassadors, and neglected your orders—we went before the council. What I am about to say is known to many people; for the council-hall was full of strangers. I came forward and reported the whole truth to the council, and accused these men, and reckoned everything up, begin-
ning with those first hopes which Ctesiphon and Aristodemus brought you, showing what speeches Æschines had made at the time of your concluding peace, and into what position they had brought the commonwealth; and as to what remained, that is, the Phocians and Thermopylae, I advised that we should not sacrifice them and repeat our errors, not keep hanging on hopes and promises, till we let things come to an extremity. And so I persuaded the council. But when the assembly came, and we had to address you, Æschines advanced before any of us: and do, I entreat you, try and recollect, as I go on, whether I am telling the truth; for what marred and utterly ruined all our affairs is just this. From any report of our proceedings on the embassy, from any mention of what was said in the council, whether or no he disputed the truth of my statements, he altogether abstained; but told a tale promising such mighty advantages that he carried you all away with him. He said that he had brought Philip entirely over to the interests of Athens, both on Amphictyonic questions and all others; and he went through a long speech, which he said he had addressed to Philip against the Thebans, and repeated to you the heads, and computed that in two or three days (thanks to his own diplomacy) you would hear, without leaving home or having any field-service or trouble, that Thebes, alone and separately from the rest of Boeotia, was besieged, that Thespiae and Plataea were having their people restored, and the treasures of the god were demanded not from the Phocians, but from the Thebans, who had formed the design of seizing his temple; for he had taught Philip, he said, that those who designed were guilty of as much impiety as those who executed; and on that account the
Thebans had set a price upon his head. He declared further he had heard some of the Euboeans, who were frightened and alarmed at the connection of our state with Philip, say to the ambassadors, "We are not unaware of the terms on which you have concluded peace with Philip; we are not ignorant, that you have given Amphipolis to him, and Philip has agreed to surrender Euboea to you": there was indeed another thing which he had arranged, but he would not mention it yet a while; for some of his colleagues were jealous of him—hinting in obscure words at Oropus. Exalted in your opinion by this plausible tale, judged to be a consummate orator and a wonderful man, he quitted the platform with much solemnity. I rose, and declared that I knew none of those things, and was proceeding to tell what I had reported to the council; but the defendant standing up on one side, and Philocrates on the other, shouted and clamored me down, and at last mocked me. You laughed, and would neither hear nor believe anything but what Aeschines had reported. And, by the gods! I think your behavior was not unnatural; for who could have endured, with such splendid prospects of advantage, to hear any one say they were delusive, or arraign what these men had done? Everything else, I fancy, at that time was secondary to the hopes and prospects before you; opposition looked like spite and annoyance merely; the results achieved for the country were so marvellously advantageous, as it seemed.

Why have I begun by reminding you of these things, and going over these speeches? Chiefly and principally, men of Athens, for this reason, that when you hear me speak of any proceeding, and it appears outrageously bad, you may not cry in astonishment, "Why didn't you speak
at the moment, and inform us?" but remembering the promises of these men, by means of which on every occasion they prevented others from being heard, and also that specious announcement of Æschines, you may see that he has injured you in this way among others, because you were not suffered to learn the truth at the instant when it was needful, but cheated by hopes and impostures and promises. Such was the chief and principal cause of my entering into these details. What was the second? One of no less importance; that, while you remember his political principles before he was corrupted—how wary, how mistrustful he was of Philip—you may observe his sudden conversion to confidence and friendship; and if his reports to you have been verified, and the results are all right, you may hold his conversion to have been honest and for the country's good; but if the events have all been contrary to what he said, and are fraught with deep disgrace and grievous peril to the country, you may see that he has changed from sordid avarice and bartering of the truth for money.

As I have been led into these topics, I would take the earliest opportunity of mentioning how they took the Phocian business out of your hands. And you must not suppose, men of the jury, when you look at the magnitude of that affair, that the crimes and charges imputed to Æschines are too great for his character, but consider that any person whom you had placed in that position and made the arbiter of events, had he sold himself, like Æschines, for the purpose of cheating and deceiving you, would have wrought the same mischief as Æschines. It is not because you often put mean persons in public employments that the affairs which other people deem our
state worthy to administer are mean; quite otherwise. And, again—Philip, I grant, has destroyed the Phocians; but these men helped him: and we must look and see whether such chance of saving the Phocians as depended on the embassy was sacrificed and lost by the treachery of these men; not that Æschines destroyed the Phocians by himself—how could he?

Give me the resolution which the council passed on my report, and the deposition of the person who drew it up—to show you, I am not repudiating acts which I was silent about before, for I denounced them immediately, and foresaw the consequences; and the council, who were not prevented hearing the truth from me, would neither vote thanks to these men, nor invite them to the city hall. Such an indignity is not known to have befallen any ambassadors since the foundation of the city, not even Timagoras, whom the people condemned to death; yet it has been suffered by these men.

Read them first the evidence, and then the resolution.

[The evidence]

[The resolution of the council]

Here is no vote of thanks, no invitation of the ambassadors by the council to the city hall. If Æschines says there is, let him show and produce it, and I will sit down. But there is none. I allow, if we all acted alike in the embassy, the council did right in thanking none of us; for the conduct of all was truly shameful: but if some of us acted uprightly and some not, through the rogues, it would seem, honest men have come in for a share of the disgrace. How, then, may you easily distinguish who is the knave? Recollect among yourselves who it is that
ON THE EMBASSY

denounced the proceedings from the beginning: for it is clear that the guilty party was content to be silent, to elude the present time, and never afterward submit his conduct to inquiry; while to a man conscious of nothing wrong it occurred that possibly by holding his tongue he might seem to be an accomplice in misdemeanor and crime. Well, then, I am the person who accused these men from the beginning; none of them accused me.

The council had passed their resolution. The assembly was convened, and Philip already at Thermopylae. This, indeed, was their prime offence, that they gave the conduct of such an affair to Philip, and when the proper course was that you should have information, and then deliberate, and afterward execute what you determined, you received intelligence only at the moment of his arrival, and it was difficult even to advise what should be done. And, besides, no one ever read to the people that resolution of the council; the people never heard it; but Æschines got up and harangued as I have just told you, stating what immense advantages he had persuaded Philip to grant, and that the Thebans on that account had set a price upon his head; at which you, though terrified at first by Philip's arrival, and angry with these men for having given no warning, became as gentle as possible, in the expectation of getting all that you desired, and would not suffer me or any one else to speak. And then was read Philip's letter, which Æschines wrote without our privity, and which is in terms a plain and direct apology for these men's faults. For it states that he hindered them from going to the cities as they wished and receiving the oaths, and that he kept them to assist him as mediators between the Haliens and Pharsalians; and he adopts and takes upon himself all their
delinquencies: but as to the Phocians or Thespians, or the defendant's reports to you, there is not a syllable. And it was not done in this way by accident: but where you ought to have punished these men for non-performance and neglect of your positive instructions, Philip takes the blame off their shoulders, and says that he himself was in fault, because (as I imagine) you were not likely to punish him: where he desired to cheat and surprise us out of some advantage, Æschines made the report, that you might have no charge or complaint against Philip afterward, the statements not being in a letter or any other communication of his. Read them the letter itself, which this man wrote and Philip sent. You will see, it is just as I explained. Read.

[The letter]

You hear the letter, O Athenians—how fair and friendly it is. About the Phocians, however, or the Thebans, or the other matters which this man reported, there is not a word: and, therefore, there is nothing honest in it, as you shall see directly. He kept them, as he says, to help him in making up the quarrel of the Haliens: but a pretty making-up the Haliens have got—they have been outcast, and their city has been razed to the ground. As to the prisoners, this man who was considering what he could do to oblige you says he never thought of ransoming them: but it has often, as you know, been testified before the assembly that I went with a talent to redeem them, and it shall be testified now: therefore, to deprive me of the credit of a generous act, Æschines persuaded him to insert this. But here is the most important thing:—He that wrote in the first letter which we brought—"I should have ex.
pressly mentioned what benefits I had in store for you, had I been sure of the alliance also’—after the alliance had been concluded says, he knows not what he can do to oblige you; he knows not even his own promise! Of course he knew that if he was not playing false! To prove that he wrote so at first—here, read the passage out of the letter—begin here—read.

[The passage from the letter]

You see, before he obtained peace, he promised, if alliance also was granted him, he would write and say what benefits he had in store for you. Now that both have been granted him, he says he knows not what he can do to oblige you, but, if you will tell him, he will do anything that is not disgraceful or dishonorable; having recourse to these pretences, and (should you mention anything and be induced to make a proposal) leaving himself an escape.

These and many other tricks one might then instantly have exposed, and enlightened you on the subject, and not permitted you to abandon everything, had not Thespiae and Platea and the expectation of immediate punishment being inflicted on Thebes blinded you to the truth. If these things were merely to be heard, and the commonwealth to be deluded, it was proper enough to tell you of them: but if they were really to be performed they should not have been talked about. For if matters had gone so far that the Thebans, even discovering the design, could not have helped themselves, why has it not been executed? If they discovered it in time to prevent the execution, who let out the secret? Was it not Ἀσχίνης? But no—he never had any such meaning or intention, and
Æschines never expected it: so I acquit him entirely of letting the secret out. The fact is—it was necessary that you should be amused by these statements, and refuse to hear the truth from me, and that you should yourselves remain at home, and a decree pass by which the Phocians would be destroyed. Therefore were these statements fabricated, and therefore publicly announced.

I, when I heard the defendant making such magnificent promises, being quite certain of their falsehood—and I will tell you why: first, because when Philip was about to swear the oath of peace, the Phocians were by these men expressly excluded from the treaty, a thing they should have been quite silent about, if the Phocians were to be saved—secondly, because Philip’s ambassadors used no such language, nor Philip’s letter, but only the defendant. Making my conjectures accordingly, I got up to speak, and attempted to answer him; but, as you refused to hear me, I held my tongue, protesting only—I pray and entreat you to recollect—that I had no knowledge of these things, that I had no concern in them, and, what was more, I did not expect them. At this (the not expecting) you fired up. “Athenians,” I said, “if any of this comes true, be sure you praise and honor and crown these men, and not me; but if it turns out differently, let them feel your resentment. I am out of it altogether.” “Don’t be out of it now,” said Æschines, interrupting—“Mind you don’t want to be in it another time.” “Certainly,” said I, “or I should be acting unfairly”; at which Philocrates rose in a flippant manner and said, “No wonder, men of Athens, that I and Demosthenes agree not in opinion; for he drinks water, and I drink wine”—and you laughed.

Read the decree, which Philocrates presented afterward,
of his own drawing. It is very well just to hear: but when one takes into account the occasion on which it was prepared, and the promises which the defendant then made, it will appear they plainly delivered up the Phocians to Philip and the Thebans, all but tying their hands behind them. Read the decree.

[The decree]

You see, men of Athens, how full the decree is of fair and flattering words; that it extends the peace with Philip to his descendants, and the alliance, and awards praise to Philip for offering to do what was just. But Philip offered nothing at all—so far from offering, he says he knows not what he can do to oblige you: it was the defendant that spoke and promised in his name. Philocrates, seeing you jump at the defendant's promise, inserts in the decree that, unless the Phocians did what was right and gave up the temple to the Amphictyons, the Athenian people would send forces against those who resisted. So, men of Athens, as you were staying at home and had never been out, as the Lacedæmonians seeing the artifice had withdrawn, and no other Amphictyons were present besides Thessalians and Thebans, he has proposed in the blandest possible language to deliver up the temple to them, proposing (as he does) to deliver it up to the Amphictyons—what Amphictyons? for none were there but Thebans and Thessalians—not that you should convene the Amphictyonic body, or wait till they assembled; not that Proxenus should carry succor to the Phocians, or that the Athenians should take the field, or anything of the kind. Philip, however, twice summoned you by letter—not to induce you to march, most assuredly: or he would never have
destroyed your opportunities of marching and summoned you then; he would not have prevented my sailing home when I desired it, or ordered Æschines to make statements calculated to stop your march: no—it was that you, under the belief that he would do all you desired, might vote nothing against him; that the Phocians might not be encouraged by hopes from you to hold out and resist, but might in utter despair surrender themselves into his hands. Read Philip's letters, and let them speak for themselves.

[The letters]

You see, the letters summon you, and verily for the first time: but these men—had there been anything honest about it—ought surely to have pressed for your going out, and moved that Proxenus, whom they knew to be in the neighborhood, should immediately carry succor. Yet it appears they have done just the contrary: and no wonder. They heeded not his epistles, for they understood his intentions in writing them: those intentions they seconded and strove to forward.

The Phocians, when they learned your views from the assembly, and received this decree of Philocrates, and heard the defendant's report and his promises, were in every way undone. Consider only. There were some intelligent persons there who distrusted Philip: they were induced to put faith in him—why?—because they supposed that, if Philip deceived them ten times over, he would at all events not dare to deceive the Athenian envoys, but that the defendant's reports to you were correct, and destruction menaced the Thebans, not themselves. There were others inclined to resist at any price: but even their zeal was slackened by the persuasion that
Philip was on their side, and that, if they refused compliance, you would attack them, you from whom they had expected succor. Some, however, believed that you repented having made peace with Philip: to these they showed that you had voted the same peace with his posterity, so that all hope from you must have been despaired of. Therefore they got all this into one decree. And here, in my opinion, have they done you the most grievous wrong. In drawing a treaty of peace with a mortal man raised to power by certain accidents, to have covenanted for an immortality of disgrace to the commonwealth!—to have deprived her not merely of other things, but also of the chances of fortune!—to have been so wantonly wicked as to injure not only the existing Athenians, but all hereafter to come in being!—is not this most dreadful? Never afterward would you have consented to add to the treaty this clause, "and to his posterity," had you not relied on the promises announced by Æschines. On these the Phocians relied, and were ruined: for, after they had surrendered to Philip and put their cities into his hands, they met with treatment the very opposite of what he assured them.

To convince you that all has been lost in this manner and through these men, I will compute to you the dates of the several transactions. Whoever disputes any of these particulars may get up and speak while my water is running. The peace was concluded on the nineteenth of Elaphebolion, and we were away to receive the oaths three whole months; and during all that time the Phocians were safe. We returned from the embassy for the oaths on the thirteenth of the month Scirophorion, and Philip was by that time at Thermopylae, and making promises to the
Phocians, of which they believed not a single word. The proof is this;—they would not otherwise have come here to you. The assembly, in which these men ruined all by their false and delusive statements to you, was held afterward, on the sixteenth of Scirophorion. On the fifth day after that, as I reckon, intelligence of your proceedings reached the Phocians; for the Phocian envoys were here, and it much concerned them to know what these men would report, and what resolution you would pass. I reckon, then, it was on the twentieth that the Phocians heard of your proceedings, for that is the fifth day from the sixteenth. Then comes the twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third: on this the convention took place, and it was all over with Phociis. How does this appear? On the twenty-seventh you were assembled in Piræus on the business of the arsenal, and Dercylus came from Chalcis, and reported to you that Philip had put everything into the hands of the Thebans; and he computed it to be the fifth day from the convention. Twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven—that makes it exactly the fifth. So, you see, by the date of their report, by the date of their motion, by all the dates, are they convicted of having acted in concert with Philip, and assisted in the destruction of the Phocians.

Again, the circumstance that not a city of the Phocians was taken by storm or blockade, but that they were utterly destroyed by the convention, is a decisive proof that they suffered because these men had persuaded them that they would be saved by Philip. For of his character they were certainly not ignorant. Give me the treaty of alliance with the Phocians, and the decrees under which they dismantled the fortifications—to show you in what relation
you stood to them, and how they were treated notwithstanding through these accursed men. Read.

[The treaty of alliance between the Athenians and the Phocians]

That is what they had to expect from you—friendship, alliance, succor. Now hear what treatment they got through this man who prevented your succoring them. Read.

[The convention between Philip and the Phocians]

You hear, O Athenians. A convention between Philip and the Phocians, it says, not between the Thebans and Phocians, nor Thessalians and Phocians, nor Locrians, nor any other of the people present. And again it says, that the Phocians shall deliver up these cities to Philip; not to the Thebans, nor the Thessalians, nor any other people. Why? Because this man reported to you that Philip had come to save the Phocians. To him they trusted for all; to him they looked for all; with him they concluded peace. Now for the rest. Look what they trusted to, and what they got. Anything like was it or similar to this man’s assurance? Read.

[The decree of the Amphictyons]

Results more awful and momentous, O Athenians, have not been wrought in Greece within our time, nor I should think in any time heretofore. Yet such mighty results has Philip singly been able to accomplish during the existence of the Athenian commonwealth, whose hereditary privilege it is to take the lead in Greece, and not permit any proceeding of this kind.

The ruin which has fallen on the poor Phocians may be
seen not only by these decrees, but by what has actually been done—a shocking and pitiable spectacle, O Athenians! On our late journey to Delphi we were forced to see it all—houses razed to the ground, walls demolished, a country stripped of its adult population, a few women and little children and miserable old men. No language can come up to the wretchedness now existing there. I hear you all say, that once this people gave the opposite vote to the Thebans on the question of enslaving us. How think ye then, O Athenians?—could your ancestors return to life, what vote or judgment would they pass upon the authors of this destruction? In my opinion, though they stoned them with their own hands, they would consider themselves pure. For is it not disgraceful—is it not, if possible, worse than disgraceful—that people who had then saved us, who gave the vote for our preservation, should have met with an opposite return through these men, and been suffered to incur greater misfortunes than any Greeks ever knew? Who then is the author of them? Who was the deceiver? Æschines—who but he?

For many things, men of Athens, might one felicitate Philip on his fortune, but for one thing with the greatest justice—one piece of luck which (by the gods and goddesses!) I don’t think has fallen to any other man in our time. To have taken great cities and subdued a large territory, these and the like feats are wonderful, I allow, and splendid—how can they help being? Yet they have been achieved, it may be said, by many others. This, however, is a peculiar good fortune which has occurred to no other mortal—what?—That, when he wanted base men for his purposes, he found baser than he desired. Can we avoid holding such an opinion of these men, when
falsehoods which Philip dared not utter in his own behalf, notwithstanding their importance to him—which he neither wrote in any letter nor commissioned any ambassador to state—they lent themselves to for hire, and deceived you by them? Antipater and Parmenio, who were serving a master, and not likely to encounter you afterward, contrived not to be the instruments of your deception: yet ambassadors appointed by the Athenian state, the freest in the world, had the hardiness to deceive you—you whom they were certain to look upon face to face, and to pass the remainder of their lives with, and before whom they would have to render an account of their conduct. Could any men be more wicked or abandoned?

To show that he is devoted by you to execration, that after such falsehoods you could not with any regard to sanctity or religion acquit him—recite the curse—read it from the law here.

[The curse]

This imprecation, men of Athens, the crier pronounces on your behalf according to law in every assembly, and also before the council when it sits. Æschines can’t say that he was not well acquainted with it: for, as your clerk and servant to the council, he himself dictated this law to the crier. Would it not be a strange and monstrous proceeding, if what you enjoin, or rather request the gods to do in your behalf, you should fail to do yourselves when it is in your power to-day, and acquit a man whom you implore the gods to extirpate with his house and family? Don’t think of such a thing. When a man escapes you, leave the gods to punish him: when you catch him yourselves, trouble them about him no more.
So far will he carry his impudence and audacity, I am told, that, leaving the facts of the case, his reports, his promises, his impostures upon the state, as if he were tried before some other people, and not before you who know it all, he will accuse first the Lacedæmonians, then the Phocians, then Hegesippus. But this is mockery, or rather abominable effrontery. For, whatever he may say now about the Phocians or the Lacedæmonians or Hegesippus—that they would not receive Proxenus, that they are guilty of impiety, or anything else against them—surely it had all taken place before these ambassadors returned, and was no obstacle to the Phocians being saved, as is said — by whom? — by Æschines, the defendant, himself. For he did not then report, that but for the Lacedæmonians, or but for their not receiving Proxenus, or but for Hegesippus, or but for this thing and the other, the Phocians would have been saved—No: he passed over all that, and said expressly that he had prevailed on Philip to save the Phocians, to repopulate Boeotia, to arrange things to your advantage; that it would all be accomplished in two or three days, and on that account the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Therefore, if he talks about what the Lacedæmonians or what the Phocians had done before he made these reports, don’t listen to him nor hear a word; and don’t suffer him to make charges of immorality against the Phocians. It was not for their merit that you rescued the Lacedæmonians formerly, or these accursed Eubœans, or many others, but because their safety was for the interest of the commonwealth, as that of the Phocians was lately. And what fault did the Phocians or the Lacedæmonians or yourselves or any other people commit after this man’s statements, to cause the miscarriage of what he
then told you? Ask him this: he won't be able to explain. There have been but five days in which he made his false report, you believed him, the Phocians got the news, yielded themselves up, and perished. From this, I imagine, it appears clearly, that the whole fraud and artifice was contrived for the purpose of destroying the Phocians. For in the interval after the peace, while Philip was unable to march, but was making preparations, he sent for the Lacedæmonians, and promised to do everything for them, that the Phocians might not get them for auxiliaries through you. But when he arrived at Thermopylæ, and the Lacedæmonians, perceiving the snare, withdrew, he then put this man forward to deceive you; for he feared, if you discovered that he was acting for the Thebans, he might get into war and delay and embarrassment, by the Phocians defending themselves and your assisting them, and he wished rather to complete his conquest without a struggle; which indeed has been the case. Don't then, because Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians and the Phocians also, let this man escape punishment for his deception of you. That would hardly be just.

If, to compensate for the Phocians and Thermopylæ and the rest of our losses, he alleges that the Chersonese is preserved to us, by heavens! men of the jury, don't admit the excuse; don't endure that, in addition to the injuries which you have sustained by the embassy, he should by his defence cast reproach upon the state, as if you made a reservation for certain of your own possessions, while you sacrificed the welfare of your allies. You did no such thing: for, after the peace was made and the Chersonese was in security, the Phocians were safe during the four ensuing months, and the falsehoods of this man
afterward, by imposing on you, caused their ruin. Besides, you will find the Chersonese is in greater danger now than it was then. For let me ask, would it have been easier to punish Philip for attacking it before he had snatched any of these advantages from us, or is it easier now? I imagine it was much easier before. What sort of preservation then is it for the Chersonese, when he that would violate it is released from fear and danger?

I understand, however, that he intends to say something of this kind—that he wonders how it is Demosthenes accuses him, and not any of the Phocians. It is better you should hear the explanation from me beforehand. Among the expatriated Phocians, the best and most respectable being in exile and consequent distress keep themselves quiet, and none of them would like to incur private hostility on account of the public misfortunes; while those who would do anything for money can find no one to give it them. I certainly would not have feed any of them, to stand up for me here and cry out what they had suffered: for the truth and the facts cry out of themselves. As to the Phocian commonalty, they are in such a wretched and deplorable condition that they have no thought of being prosecutors at Athenian audits, but are every one of them slaves, frightened to death at the Thebans and the mercenaries of Philip, whom they are forced to maintain, scattered themselves over villages, and deprived of their arms. Don’t allow him then to use that argument, but make him show that the Phocians have not been ruined, or that he never promised that Philip would save them. These are the questions at the account of an embassy—What has been negotiated? what was your report? If true, take your acquittal; if false, pay the penalty. What matters
it whether the Phocians are present or not? They are in such a plight, I fancy—and you did your best to bring them into it—they can neither help their friends nor punish their enemies.

But besides the general discredit and disgrace which these proceedings are attended with, it is easy to show that serious perils consequently menace the state. For which of you is ignorant that by the Phocian war, and the Phocians being masters of Thermopylae, we were out of all apprehension from the Thebans; never could they or Philip make their way to Peloponnesus, nor to Euboea, nor Attica? This security, which place and circumstances guaranteed to the commonwealth, you, trusting to the falsehoods and artifices of these men, abandoned: fortified though it was by arms, by continued war, by great cities of an allied people, and by an extensive territory, you suffered it to be overthrown. And your former expedition to Thermopylae has become fruitless, which cost you more than two hundred talents, reckoning the private expenses of those who served. Your hopes about the Thebans are fruitless also. But what, among many shameful services which this man has performed for Philip, involves really the most contemptuous treatment of the commonwealth, and all of you, I beg you to hear—it is this: that Philip having determined from the beginning to do all that he has done for the Thebans, Æschines, by reporting the contrary, and making it manifest that you were against what he did, has increased your enmity with the Thebans and their friendliness to Philip. How could a man have treated you more contumeliously?

Take and read the decree of Diophantus, and that of Callisthenes, to show you that when you performed your
duties, you were recompensed with thanksgivings and praise both at Athens and elsewhere, but after you had been deluded by these men, you brought in your women and children from the country, and decreed to perform the Heraclean sacrifice within the city in time of peace: which makes me wonder whether you will let off with impunity a man who caused even the gods to be deprived of their customary worship. Read the decree.

[The decree]

Thus worthily of your conduct, O Athenians, you voted then. Now read the next.

[The decree]

Such was the vote you then passed through the conduct of these men; though it was not with such prospects that you either originally concluded peace and alliance, or were afterward persuaded to insert the clause, "and to his posterity," but under the belief that through these men you would get marvellous benefits. You all know how often afterward you were alarmed by hearing of Philip's army and mercenaries in the neighborhood of Porthmus or Megara. Therefore, though he may not yet have invaded Attic ground, it is not that you must look at, nor relax in your vigilance: you must see whether he has through these men got the opportunity of doing it when he pleases; this peril you must keep in view, and abhor and punish the guilty person who has furnished him with such opportunity.

I know indeed that Æschines will avoid all discussion of the charges against him; that, seeking to withdraw you as far as possible from the facts, he will rehearse what mighty blessings accrue to mankind from peace, and, on
the other hand, what evils from war; in short, he will
pronounce a panegyric on peace, and take up that line of
defence. Yet even these are so many arguments to con-
vict him. For if the cause of blessings to others has been
the cause of so many troubles and such confusion to us,
what else can one suppose, but that by taking bribes
these men have spoiled a thing in its own nature ex-
cellent?

Oh, but—he may say perhaps—have you not pre-
served, and won’t you preserve through the peace three
hundred galleys, with stores for them and money?—In
regard to this you must understand that Philip’s resources
likewise have been largely augmented through the peace,
in supplies of arms, in territory, in revenues, of which
he has gained an abundance. True, some have come in
to us also. But that establishment of power and alliances,
through which people hold their good things either for
themselves or their superiors—ours has been sold by these
men, and gone to ruin and decay; his hath become for-
midable and mightier by far. It is not just, that Philip
should through these men have augmented both his alli-
ances and his revenues, while what Athens must naturally
have gained by the peace they set off against what was
sold by themselves. The one has not come to us in ex-
change for the other—very far from it: one we should
equally have had, and the other in addition, but for
these men.

Speaking generally, men of Athens, I presume you will
agree that on the one hand, however many and grievous
have been the misfortunes of the commonwealth, if Æs-
chines be not to blame for any, your resentment ought
not to fall upon him; and, on the other hand, if any ad-
vantages have been achieved through others, they ought not to save him. Consider what the defendant has been the cause of; look favorably on him, if favor he deserves, but with anger, if he has done aught to excite it. How will you ascertain the truth of the matter? In this way—you must not let him confound all things together—the misdeeds of the generals, the war with Philip, the blessings of peace—but you must consider each point by itself. For example—Was Philip at war with us? He was. Does any man complain of Æschines on that account? Would any man wish to arraign him for the transactions of the war? No man. Well then; upon those points he is acquitted, and has no need to say anything: for it is a defendant's business to produce witnesses and proofs upon the matters in issue, not to mystify the court by pleading what no one disputes. Mind then, that you say nothing about the war; for no one charges you with anything concerning it. Afterward certain persons advised us to make peace; we followed their advice; we sent ambassadors; they brought people to Athens to conclude peace. Here again, does any one blame Æschines for this? No one. Does any man say that he introduced the question of peace, or is guilty of crime for having brought people here to conclude it? No man. No more should he say anything about the fact of our concluding peace: for he is not chargeable with it.

What, then, do you say, man?—suppose I were asked—from what point do you commence your accusation? From this, men of Athens—when, at the time you were deliberating, not whether you should make peace or no (for that had already been resolved upon), but what sort of a peace you should have, he opposed the men who of-
fered honest advice, and supported the mover of a corrupt resolution, himself being bribed; and afterward, on being chosen to receive the oaths, he entirely neglected your instructions, destroyed those allies who had come safe through the whole war, and told such huge falsehoods as no mortal ever did either before or after. At first, indeed, until Philip got leave to negotiate for peace, Ctesiphon and Aristodemus commenced the beginning of the plot; but when things were ripe for execution, they handed it over to Philocrates and the defendant, who took up the matter and ruined everything. Now that he must render an account of what has been done, and stand his trial for it, the defendant, I imagine, like a rascally and abominable clerk as he is, will plead his defence as if he were tried for the peace—not that he may render an account of more than he is accused of; that were madness—but he sees that in his own conduct there is nothing good and everything criminal, while a defence of peace, if it have nothing else about it, has in name at least a show of humanity. I fear, indeed, O Athenians, I fear that without knowing it, like persons who borrow money, we are enjoying the peace at a high rate: for these men betrayed what constituted its strength and security, the Phocians and Thermopylae. However, it was not through the defendant we originally made it: for what I am about to say is strange, yet perfectly true—if any one is really glad of the peace, let him thank the generals for it, whom all accuse. Had they carried on the war as you desired, the very name of peace would have been intolerable to you. Peace, therefore, is owing to them: perilous and unstable and insecure has it become through these men having taken bribes. Bar him then, bar him from any argument
in favor of peace, and put him to his defence for what he has done. For Æschines is not tried for the peace; no: the peace is discredited through Æschines. Here is the proof—if the peace had been concluded without any deception being afterward practiced on you, or any of your allies being ruined, what mortal would the peace have aggrieved, independently of its being dishonorable? Of this, indeed, the defendant was in part the cause, by supporting Philocrates: nothing fatal, however, would have taken place. Now, I conceive, he is answerable for a great deal.

That these men have shamefully and basely wrought all this ruin and mischief, I suppose you are all satisfied. I, however, men of the jury, am so far from entering upon these questions in a vexatious spirit, or wishing you to do so, that if it has all been brought about through thoughtlessness or good nature or any kind of ignorance, I acquit Æschines myself and I advise you also. Though, indeed, none of these excuses is constitutional or just, for no one is required or compelled by you to perform public business; but when a man has persuaded himself of his ability and applies for it, you, acting the part of worthy and benevolent people, receive him with favor and without envy; you elect him, and put your affairs into his hands. Then, if a man be successful, he will be honored and have an advantage over the bulk of the people in this respect; if he fails, shall he set up excuses and apologies? That would not be fair. It would be no satisfaction to our ruined allies or to their wives or children or any other parties that my incapacity (not to say the defendant's) had brought such misfortune upon them—far from it, indeed. However, you may forgive Æschines these dread-
ful and monstrous things if it appears that he has damaged the cause through stupidity or any kind of ignorance: but if he has done it from a base motive, having received money and presents, and if he is clearly convicted by the facts themselves, put him to death if it be possible, or, if that cannot be, make him a living example to others. Now consider in your minds how convincing the proof of his guilt will be.

I presume that Æschines, the defendant, must have addressed those speeches to you, those about the Phocians and Thespiae and Euboea (supposing he was not from a corrupt motive intentionally playing false), from one of two causes; either because he had heard Philip expressly promise to effect and do the things in question, or else because he was charmed and beguiled by Philip's general liberality, and therefore expected those things from him also. There is no other alternative. Now in either of these cases he ought, beyond all other men, to detest Philip. Why? Because, so far as it depended on Philip, he has suffered the utmost indignity and disgrace. He has deceived you; he has become infamous; he is judged to be a lost man, if he had his deserts. Had due proceedings been taken, he would have been impeached long ago; but now, through your simplicity and good nature, he attends his audit, and chooses his time for it. Is there one of you who has heard the voice of Æschines accusing Philip?—who has seen him pressing any charge or speaking to the point? No one. Every Athenian is more ready to accuse Philip—any, indeed, that you like—though none of them assuredly has sustained any personal injury. I should have expected language like this from him, if he had not sold himself—"Men of Athens, deal with me as
you please: I believed, I was deluded, I was in error, I confess it: but beware of the man, O Athenians: he is not to be trusted, he is a juggler, a villain. See you not how he has treated me? how he has cajoled me?' I hear no language of this kind, nor do you. Why? Because he was not cajoled or deceived, but had hired himself and taken money when he made those statements, and betrayed you to Philip, and has been a good, true and faithful hireling to him, but a traitorous ambassador and citizen to you, deserving to perish not once, but three times over.

Nor is this the only proof that he was bribed to make all those statements. There came to you lately some envoys from Thessaly, and some of Philip's with them, requiring you to acknowledge Philip as an Amphictyon. Now, of all men, who was most especially bound to oppose them? Æschines here. Why? Because his reports to you were contradicted by Philip's acts. This man said that he would fortify Thespiae and Platea, and not destroy the Phocians, but humble the insolence of the Thebans: whereas Philip has made the Thebans greater than they should be, the Phocians he has utterly destroyed; and instead of fortifying Thespiae and Platea, he has reduced Orchomenus and Coronea also to slavery. How could any things be more contrary to one another? Yet he opposed them not; he never opened his mouth or uttered a word against them. And this, bad as it is, is not the worst:—he spoke on their side, he and no other person in the state. Even the profligate Philocrates ventured not to do this; Æschines, the man before you, did: and when you clamored and refused to hear him, he came down from the platform, and said, showing himself off to Philip's ambas-
sadors who were present—"There were many to clamor, but few to fight when it was needful": this you surely remember—he himself doubtless being a wonderful soldier, O Jupiter!

Yet more—if we were unable to show that any of the ambassadors had got anything, and it was not plain enough for all men to see, we must have resorted to question by torture and the like. But if Philocrates not only confessed his gains frequently in your assembly, but even displayed them before you, selling wheat, building houses, declaring that he would make his journey, whether you elected him or not, importing timber, changing gold openly at the banks; he surely cannot deny that he has had money, he that himself makes a confession and display of it. Then is there any man so senseless or infatuate, that, to procure money for Philocrates, and bring discredit and danger upon himself, when he might appear in the ranks of the innocent, he would rather be at enmity with them, and side with Philocrates to be prosecuted? There is no such man, I believe. All these,—if you examine them rightly, O Athenians, you will find to be clear and ample proofs that Æschines has taken bribes.

A thing which has last occurred, but is as good a proof as any that he has sold himself to Philip, I beg you to consider. You know, of course, that when Hyperides lately impeached Philocrates, I came forward and said I was dissatisfied with one point in the impeachment, if it alleged that Philocrates had alone been guilty of so many grave misdemeanors, and the other nine ambassadors were entirely innocent. And I declared it was not so; for he by himself would have been of no account, if he had not had some of these men to co-operate with him. "How-
ever," said I, "that I may neither acquit nor accuse any man, but that facts themselves may discover the guilty, and clear those who are not implicated, let any man that pleases get up and declare before you that he has no concern in the acts of Philocrates, and approves them not. And whoever does so I will acquit him," I said. This you remember, I suppose. Well: no one came forward or showed himself. And the rest have each an excuse: one was not accountable; one, perhaps, was not present; another had a son-in-law yonder. The defendant, however, has no such reason. So completely hath he sold himself, and not only received wages for past services, but makes it plain that hereafter, should he now get off, he will help Philip against you, that, to avoid letting fall even a word in opposition to Philip, he accepts not even acquittal when we offer it, but chooses to incur infamy, prosecution, any kind of indignity at Athens, rather than do anything to give Philip displeasure.

But what is this connection, this over-anxiety for Philocrates? Had he done ever such great things, and got every advantage by his diplomacy, yet, if he confessed having made money by it, as he does confess, this is the very thing from which an incorrupt ambassador should have kept himself aloof and clear, and protested against it for his own part. Æschines, however, has not done so. Are not these facts plain, men of Athens? Don't they cry aloud that Æschines has taken bribes and is a scoundrel systematically for lucre's sake, not in thoughtlessness, nor in ignorance, nor by reason of failures?

And what witness proves that I have taken bribes?—says he. This is his grand point.—The facts, Æschines, which are the surest of all things; and it is impossible to
charge or allege that they are what they are in obedience or out of favor to any person. No: just what your treason and mischief has made them they, on examination, appear to be. But, in addition to the facts, you shall bear testimony against yourself immediately. Come, stand up and answer me. You can’t urge that from inexperience you have nothing to say. You that conduct new prosecutions, like new dramas, and win them without witnesses even, in the division of a day, you must surely be a prodigy of an orator.

Many dreadful things hath Æschines, the defendant, perpetrated, involving a high degree of baseness, as I think you will agree; yet there is nothing in my judgment so dreadful as what I am about to mention; nothing that will so palpably convict him of having taken bribes and sold everything.

When you were for the third time again despatching envoys to Philip, under those great and splendid expectations which the defendant had held out, you elected him and me and most of the others the same as before. I came forward directly and excused myself, and when certain persons clamored and called on me to go, I declared I would not leave Athens: the defendant had then been elected. After the assembly had broken up these men met and consulted whom they should leave behind; for, while things were yet in suspense and the future was uncertain, conferences and discussions of all kinds took place in the market; they feared, therefore, that an extraordinary assembly might be convened on a sudden, that you might hear the truth from me, and pass some proper resolutions in favor of the Phocians, and so things would slip out of Philip’s hands. Indeed, had you but voted and shown them a glimpse of hope they
would have been saved. For impossible, impossible was it for Philip to remain if you had not been tricked; as there was neither any grain in the country, it not having been sown on account of the war, nor could any grain be brought while your galleys were there and commanded the sea; and the Phocian cities were numerous and hard to take, except by a long siege; for, if he took a city in a day, they are twenty-two in number. For all these reasons, that you might not change the course into which you had been entrapped, they left Æschines at home. Well, but to excuse himself without some ground was dangerous, and fraught with suspicion.—"What say you? aren't you going, after these mighty advantages of your own announcing, and won't you be on the embassy?"—Still it was necessary to stay. How to act then?—He pretends to be ill, and his brother, taking Exceustus, the physician, and going to the council, made affidavit of the defendant's illness, and was himself appointed. Five or six days after, when the Phocians had been destroyed, and this man's hire had come to an end like anything else, and Dercylus had returned from Chalcis, and reported to you, in assembly at Piræus, that the Phocians were destroyed, and you, men of Athens, naturally on receiving that intelligence were smitten with compassion for them and terror on your own account, and passed a vote to bring in your women and children from the country, and to repair the garrisons and fortify Piræus, and offer the Heraclean sacrifice within the city—in this state of things, when the commonwealth was in the midst of such confusion and alarm, this clever and powerful and loud-voiced orator, without any appointment by the council or the people, went off as ambassador to the author of all the mischief, taking
into account neither the illness on which he grounded his excuse, nor the fact that another ambassador had been chosen in his stead, nor that the law provides the penalty of death for such conduct, nor how monstrous it was, after reporting that a price had been set upon his head in Thebes, when the Thebans had, in addition to the lordship of all Boeotia, become masters also of the Phocian territory, to take a journey then to the heart of Thebes and the Theban camp; so insane was he, so intent upon his pelf and reward, that in defiance and despite of all these considerations he took himself off.

Such is the character of this proceeding: but what he did on his arrival there is far more shocking. For when all of you here, and the Athenians in general, considered the poor Phocians so shamefully and cruelly treated, that you would not send either members of the council or the judges to represent you at the Pythian games, but abstained from your customary deputation to the festival, Æschines went to the sacrifice which Philip and the Thebans offered in honor of their success and conquest, and was feasted, and joined in the libations and prayers which Philip offered up in thanksgiving for the lost fortresses and territory and troops of your allies, and donned the garland and sang the pæan in company with Philip, and pledged to him the cup of friendship.

Nor is it possible that I should state the matter thus, and the defendant otherwise. With respect to the affidavit, there is an entry in your public register in the temple of Cybele, which is given in charge to the superintendent, and a decree has been specially drawn concerning that name. With respect to his doings yonder, there will be evidence against him by his colleagues and persons
present, who told the particulars to me; for I did not go with them on the embassy, but excused myself. Now read me the decree and the register, and call the witnesses.

[The decree. The public register. The witnesses]

What prayer do you suppose Philip offered to the gods when he poured his libation? What do you suppose the Thebans? Did they not pray for might and victory in battle for them and their allies; the contrary for the allies of the Phocians? Well, then; Æschines joined in that prayer, and invoked a curse upon his country, which you ought now to make recoil upon his head.

He departed, therefore, in violation of the law, which makes such an act punishable with death: on his arrival, it has been shown, he did what he deserves to die for a second time: and his former acts and measures in this behalf as ambassador will justify his execution. Consider, then, what penalty there can be of severity enough to be deemed adequate to all his crimes. For would it not be shameful, O Athenians, that you and the whole people should publicly condemn all the proceedings consequent upon the peace, and refuse to take any part in Amphictyonic business, and regard Philip with displeasure and distrust, because the proceedings are impious and shocking, opposed, at the same time, to your interests and to justice; yet, when you have come into court to adjudicate at the audit of these matters, a sworn jury on behalf of the commonwealth, you should acquit the author of all the mischief, whom you have caught in the very act when his guilt was complete? And which of your fellow-citizens, or, rather, of the Greeks at large, will not have reason to complain of you, seeing that you are wroth with Philip,
who, in the transition from war to a treaty of peace, purchased his advantages from those that would sell them, a thing very venial in him; yet you acquit this man, who so disgracefully sold your interests, although the laws prescribe the heaviest penalties for such conduct.

Perhaps, however, an argument of the following kind may be advanced by these men—that it will cause enmity with Philip, if you convict the ambassadors who negotiated peace. If this be true, I can't imagine anything stronger to be urged against the defendant. For, if the man who expended money to obtain the peace has now become so formidable and mighty, that you must disregard your oaths and obligations, and consider only what you can do to gratify Philip, in what way can the authors of such a result be sufficiently punished? Though I think, indeed, I can show that it will more probably lead to a friendship advantageous for you. For it should be understood, men of Athens, that Philip does not despise your commonwealth, and did not prefer the Thebans to you, because he thought you less capable of serving him; but he was instructed by these men and informed—as I told you once before in the assembly, and none of them contradicted me—"that the people is, of all things, the most unstable and inconstant, like a restless wind in the sea, put in motion by any accident—one comes and another goes; no one cares for the public interests, or keeps them in mind—he should have friends to transact everything for him with you, and manage just as he would himself: if that were contrived for him, he would accomplish all that he desired with you easily."—If he had heard, I fancy, that the persons who used such language to him then had immediately after their return home been cudgelled to death, he would
have done the same as the Persian king. What did the Per-
sian king? He had been deceived by Timagoras, and given
him forty talents, as report says; but when he heard that
Timagoras had been put to death at Athens, and had not
the means even to insure his own safety, much less to per-
form his late promise to him, he saw that he had not given
his fee to the party with whom the power rested. So, in
the first place, he made Amphipolis again your subject,
which before he had registered as his own ally and friend;
and, in the next place, he never afterward gave money to
any man. And Philip would have done the same, if he
had seen any of these men punished; and now, if he sees
it, he will do so. But when he hears that they enjoy repu-
tation among you as speakers, as prosecutors of other men,
what should he do? Seek to incur large expenses, when he
may incur less, and volunteer to court all, instead of two or
three? Why, he would be mad.

Even the Thebans Philip had no desire to serve as a
people—far from it; but he was persuaded by the ambas-
sadors, and I will tell you in what manner. Ambassadors
came to him from Thebes, at the same time that we were
there from you. He offered them money, and (according
to their statement) a great deal. The Theban envoys
would not accept or receive it. Afterward, at a certain
sacrifice and banquet, when Philip was drinking and mak-
ing himself agreeable to them, he offered them over the
cup divers things, such as captives and the like, and,
lastly, some gold and silver goblets. All these things
they rejected, and would in no way compromise them-
selves. At length Philon, one of the ambassadors, made
a speech worthy, O Athenians, to have been spoken not
on behalf of the Thebans, but on yours. He said he was
delighted and rejoiced to see Philip liberally and generously disposed to them: they, for their part, were his friends already without those gifts; but they desired him to apply his generosity to the affairs of the commonwealth, in which he was then engaged, and to do something worthy both of himself and the Thebans; and they promised then that the whole commonwealth, as well as themselves, would be attached to him. Now only see what has come of this, what events have happened to the Thebans; and consider, in good sooth, what an important thing it is not to sell the interests of the state. First, they have obtained peace when they were distressed and harassed by the war and getting the worst of it; secondly, their enemies, the Phocians, have been utterly destroyed, and all their fortifications and cities demolished. Is that all? No, indeed! Besides that they have Orchomenus, Coronea, Corisæ, Tilphosseum, as much of the Phocian territory as they please. Such advantages have the Thebans gained by the peace: greater they could not wish for, I imagine: but what have the Theban ambassadors gained? The advantage of having done so much for their country—that is all; but that is honorable and glorious, O Athenians, in regard to praise and renown, which these men bartered away for gold.

Now let me contrast what the Athenian commonwealth has gained by the peace, and what the Athenian ambassadors; and see if the commonwealth and these men themselves have fared alike. To the commonwealth the result has been that she has relinquished all her possessions and all her allies, and has sworn to Philip that, should any one else interfere ever to preserve them, you will prevent it, and will regard the person who wishes to restore them to
you as an adversary and a foe, the person who has deprived you of them as an ally and a friend. These are the terms which Æschines, the defendant, supported, and his coadjutor, Philocrates, proposed; and when I prevailed on the first day and had persuaded you to confirm the resolution of your allies, and to summon Philip's ambassadors, the defendant drove it off to the following day, and persuaded you to adopt the decree of Philocrates, in which these clauses, and many others yet more shameful, are contained. To the state, then, such consequences have resulted from the peace:—consequences more disgraceful could not easily be found: but what to the ambassadors who caused them? I pass by all the other matters which you have seen—houses—timber—grain; but in the territory of our ruined allies they have estates and farms of large extent, bringing in to Philocrates an income of a talent, to Æschines here thirty minas. Is it not shocking and dreadful, O Athenians, that the misfortunes of your allies have become a source of revenue to your ambassadors; that the same peace has to the country which sent them proved to be destruction of allies, cession of dominions, disgrace instead of honor, while to the ambassadors, who wrought these mischiefs to the country, it has produced revenues, resources, estates, riches, in exchange for extreme indigence? To prove the truth of my statements, call me the Olynthian witnesses.

[Witnesses]

I shall not be surprised, however, if he ventures to say something of this kind—that it was not possible to conclude the peace honorably or in the manner I desired, as the generals had conducted the war badly. Should he
say this, pray remember to ask him, whether he went ambassador from any other state, or from this only. If he went from another, which he can say had been victorious in war and possessed generals of ability, he has taken money with good reason: but if he went from this, why on a treaty, where the state which sent him renounced her own rights, did he receive presents into the bargain? The state which sent the embassy should have got the same advantages as her ambassadors, if any justice were done.

And again, consider this, men of Athens—Which, think ye, more prevailed in the war, the Phocians over the Thebans, or Philip over you? I am quite clear, the Phocians over the Thebans. They held Orchomenus and Coronea and Tilphossæum, and had cut off the Theban force at Neones, and had slain two hundred and seventy at Hedyleum, and a trophy was erected, and their cavalry were masters of the field, and an Iliad of misfortunes beset the Thebans. You had suffered nothing of the kind, and I trust you never may: the worst thing in the war with Philip was, that you could not do him harm when you desired; but you were perfectly secure against being damaged yourselves. How comes it then, that by the same peace the Thebans, who were so much beaten in the war, have recovered their own possessions and won those of their enemies, while you, the Athenians, have lost in time of peace even what was preserved in war? It is because their interests were not sold by their ambassadors, while these men have bartered yours away. That such has been the character of these transactions, you will learn yet more clearly from what follows.

When this treaty of Philocrates, which the defendant
spoke in favor of, was concluded, and Philip's ambassadors had received the oaths and departed (and up to this point no incurable mischief had been done, but, though the peace was dishonorable and unworthy of the state, yet we were to have those wonderful advantages by way of compensation), I asked your leave, and urged these men to sail with the utmost speed for the Hellespont, and not to sacrifice or let Philip get possession of any of the places there in the interval. For I knew well that whatever is sacrificed in the transition from war to peace is lost to the neglectful parties: for when once people have made up their minds on the whole for peace, they won't renew the war for what has been abandoned, but that remains the property of the captors. Besides, I believed the state would be sure to get one of two advantages, if we sailed—for either, we being on the spot and having sworn him according to the decree, he would restore the places which he had taken from the republic, and forbear to attack the rest, or, if he did not, we should immediately report it to Athens; and, so you, seeing his rapacity and perfidy in those distant and less important matters, would not be careless about these more important and nearer home—I mean the Phocians and Thermopylae: on the other hand, if he had not captured those places and you had not been tricked, all your interests would be secure, and your just demands cheerfully accorded by him. And I had reason for supposing it would be so. For if the Phocians were safe, as they were then, and masters of Thermopylae, Philip could have held out no threat to prevent your insisting upon any of your rights: neither a land march nor a victory by sea would have opened him the road to Attica, while you, if he refused
to give you satisfaction, would instantly close his ports, and again reduce him to distress for money and to a state of general blockade; so that he would be the party dependent on the benefits of peace, not you. That I am not now inventing and assuming the merit of these things after the event, but that they were perceived by me at the time, and foreseen on your behalf and communicated to these men, I will now give you the proof:—As all the assemblies had been exhausted, and therefore no new one could be had, and these men were not gone, but lingering here, I as councillor frame a decree (the people having given full power to the council) ordering the ambassadors to depart without delay, and the general Proxenus to convey them to whatever place they should hear Philip was in; and I drew it up just as I am telling you, in those express words. Here—read me the decree.

[The decree]

I carried them from Athens downright against their will, as you will see clearly by what they did afterward. When we arrived at Oreus and joined Proxenus, these men, instead of sailing and performing your instructions, took a circuitous journey, and before we came to Macedonia we wasted three-and-twenty days; all the rest of the time before Philip came we sat down in Pella, making fifty days altogether with those of the journey. In that interval Doriscus, Thrace, the Fortresses, the Sacred Mountain—everything, in short, during a time of peace and truce was taken and disposed of by Philip; though I was constantly speaking and remonstrating, at first giving my opinion as in consultation, afterward by way of instruction to ignorant men, lastly as if I were addressing venal
and impious wretches without any reserve. The man who openly opposed what I said, who thwarted all my counsels and your decrees, was the defendant. Whether that pleased the other ambassadors, you will know presently; for as yet I say nothing about any one—I make no accusation—there is no need for any of them to appear honest to-day by compulsion, but of their own choice, and by having had no connection with the crimes. For that the acts done are disgraceful and flagitious and not unpaid for, you have all seen: the thing itself will disclose who have been concerned in them.

But, forsooth, in that interval they received the oaths from the allies, or performed other duties. Very far from it. Although they were absent for three whole months, and had received from you a thousand drachms for their travelling expenses, from not a single state, either on the journey there or on the journey back, did they receive the oaths; but in the inn before the temple of Castor and Pollux—if any of you has been at Pheræ, he knows the place I mean—here the oaths were administered, when Philip was marching hither with his army, in a manner disgraceful, O Athenians, and unworthy of you. Philip indeed would have given a great deal to have it managed in this way. For when they were unable to draw up the treaty as these men attempted at first, excluding the Haliants and Phocians, but Philocrates was compelled by you to expunge that clause and insert expressly the Athenians and allies of the Athenians, he did not wish any of his own allies to have sworn that oath (for then they would not have marched with him to attack those possessions of yours which he now holds, but would have made the oaths an excuse), nor did he wish them to witness the
promises on which he was obtaining the peace, nor to have it shown to all, that in fact the Athenian commonwealth had not been beaten in war, but it was Philip who desired peace, and was making large promises to the Athenians if he could obtain peace. So, for fear what I say might be publicly known, he objected to these men going anywhere; and they did everything to gratify him with an ostentation of zeal and extravagant servility.

I say then—when they are convicted of all these things—having wasted the time, sacrificed the posts in Thrace, done nothing that you directed or that your interests required, brought false intelligence to Athens—how is it possible for them to escape with intelligent and conscientious judges? To prove the truth of these statements, read first the decree prescribing how the oath was to be administered, then the letter of Philip, then the decree of Philocrates and that of the people.

[The decree prescribing the oath]
[The letter of Philip]
[The decree of Philocrates]
[The decree of the People amending that of Philocrates]

To show that we should have caught Philip in the Hellespont, if they had followed my advice and executed your commands as expressed in the decrees, call the witnesses there present.

[Witnesses]

Now read the other deposition, what answer Philip made to Euclides here, who came afterward.

[The deposition]

They can't deny they did all this to serve Philip—at- tend, and you will see. When we started on the former
embassy for the peace, you sent a herald before us to stipulate for our safe conduct. On that occasion, as soon as they arrived at Oreus, they did not wait for the herald or create any delay, but, though Halus was under siege, they crossed over to it, and again coming out of that city to Parmenio, who was besieging it, they set off through the hostile army for Pagassæ, and going on met the herald at Larissa: with such expedition and diligence they proceeded then. Yet when there was peace and every security for travelling, and your command to make haste, it never occurred to them either to expedite their journey or to go by sea. How came this about? Because on the former occasion it was Philip's interest that the peace should be concluded as quickly as possible, but on this it was for his advantage that the interval before demanding the oaths should be as much as possible protracted. To show that these statements are also true, here—take this deposition.

[The deposition]

Is there any evidence to convict men of entire subservience to Philip stronger than this—that on the same journey they loitered when they ought to have made haste in your service, and hurried when they ought not even to have travelled before the arrival of the herald?

During the time that we were there and loitering in Pella, see what different employments we each chose for ourselves. Mine was to deliver the captives and seek them out, to expend money of my own, and request Philip to ransom them with what he would have given in presents to us. What the defendant made it his business to accomplish, you shall hear immediately. What was it?
That Philip should make us a common present of money. For you must know, among other things, Philip sounded us all—in what way?—by sending to each privately, and offering, O Athenians, a heap of gold. Failing with one, no matter whom—(for it is not for me to mention myself; the facts and circumstances will show)—he thought that a common present would be accepted without suspicion by all, and thus there would be security for those who had privately sold themselves, if in ever so small a degree we all joined in the acceptance. Therefore the offer was made, under pretence of being a gift of hospitality. I having stopped it, these men divided the money among themselves—this besides what they had had before. Philip, when I requested him to expend it upon the captives, could neither inform against these men with honor, or say—"Oh! but this and that person have it"—nor yet escape the outlay; so he consented, giving an evasive promise to send them home by the Panathenean festival. Read the deposition of Apolophanes, then that of the other persons who were present. Read.

[The deposition]

Now let me tell you how many of the prisoners I ransomed myself. During the time that we stayed in Pella, before the arrival of Philip, some of the captives who were out on bail, doubting (I suppose) whether they should afterward be able to prevail on Philip, said they should like to ransom themselves, and not be under an obligation to Philip; and they applied for loans, one of three minas, another of five, and so on, according to what each man's ransom came to. When Philip therefore consented to redeem the rest, I called the men together, to
whom I had advanced the money, and reminding them of what had been done, that they might not seem to be in a worse position for their haste, or to have been ransomed (poor as they were) out of their own private means, while the others expected to be released by Philip, I made them a present of the redemption-money. To prove my statements, read these depositions.

[The depositions]

The sums that I forgave and made a present of to our unfortunate fellow-citizens are what you hear. Should the defendant say to you presently—"How comes it, Demosthenes, having discovered (as you say) from my supporting Philocrates, that we were after no good, you went with us on the subsequent embassy for the oaths, and did not excuse yourself?"—remember, I had promised the men whom I ransomed, that I would come and bring the redemption-money, and do my best to deliver them. It would have been shameful then to break my word, and abandon fellow-citizens in misfortune. But, had I got off the appointment, I could not have made a private excursion there with propriety or safety: for, but that I desired to release the captives, perdition seize me, if I would have taken a very large sum of money to be the colleague of these men. And I can prove it—for you twice elected me for the third embassy, and I twice excused myself; and during the whole of my absence on this I opposed them in everything.

Thus went your affairs, so far as I had the control on the embassy: what these men carried by being the majority has ruined all. Indeed all our measures would have been consistent with what I have just stated, had my ad-
vice been followed. For I was not such a wretched idiot as to give money, when I saw others receiving it, for the sake of standing well with you, while things that might be accomplished without expense, and that drew with them far greater advantages to the commonwealth, I was in my wishes opposed to. I wished for them earnestly, O Athenians; but these men, I trow, were too many for me.

Come now—see what have been the defendant's acts in comparison with mine, and what those of Philocrates; for in contrast they will appear more glaring. First, they excluded the Phocians and the Haliens and Cersobleptes from the treaty, contrary to your decree and the declaration made to you: secondly, they attempted to disturb and alter the decree, which we had been commissioned to execute: further, they set down the Cardians as allies of Philip. And the letter written by me to you they determined not to send, while they sent one written by themselves without a word of truth. Then this brave fellow here said I had promised Philip to overturn your democracy, because I denounced those acts, not only regarding them as disgraceful, but fearing I might be involved in the ruin of these men through their fault; while he himself never ceased during the whole time holding private interviews with Philip. And the rest I say nothing about—but Dercylus (not I), with the assistance of this boy of mine, watched him during the night at Pheræ, and having caught him coming out of Philip's tent, told the boy to report it to me and keep it in his own remembrance; and finally this abominable and shameless fellow for a night and day after our departure stayed behind with Philip. To prove the truth of my statements, in the first
place, I will draw up my own deposition and make myself responsible as a witness; in the next place, I call each of the other ambassadors, and will force them to do one or the other, to give testimony or swear they are unable. If they swear they are unable, I shall convict them of perjury before you clearly.

[The deposition]

With what annoyances and troubles I was beset, during the whole of the expedition, you have seen. You may guess indeed what they did in the neighborhood of their paymaster, when such are their doings before your eyes, in whose power it is either to reward or to punish.

I will now reckon up the charges from the beginning, to show you I have performed all that I promised in the outset of my speech. I have shown by the evidence not of words, but of the facts themselves, that his reports have been utterly false and that he imposed on you. I have shown, that owing to him you refused to hear the truth from me, being influenced by his promises and assurances; that all his advice was contrary to what it should have been: that he opposed the peace of the allies and supported that of Philocrates; he wasted the time, to prevent your marching to Phocis, even if you desired it; he has committed many grievous things besides during his absence; he has betrayed and sold everything, taken bribes, stopped short of nothing that is villainous. All these things I promised in the beginning; all I have made out. Mark then what follows—this that I have next to say to you is simple:—You have sworn to give your verdict according to the laws and the decrees of the people and the council of five hundred: the defendant is
proved by his whole conduct as ambassador to have violated the laws, the decrees, the obligations of justice: it is fit therefore he should be convicted before an intelligent jury.

Were he guilty of nothing else, two of his acts are sufficient to kill him: for he has betrayed not only the Phocians, but Thrace also to Philip. Two places in the world more important to our commonwealth could not be pointed out than Thermopylæ by land, and the Hellespont by sea: both which together have these men disgracefully sold and delivered into Philip's hands against you. What an offence even this is, without anything further—the sacrificing of Thrace and the Fortresses—would be an infinite topic of discussion: and it were easy to show, how many persons have on that account been sentenced to death before you, or incurred heavy fines—Ergophilus, Cephisodotus, Timomachus, in ancient times Ergocles, Dionysius, and others, all of whom together (I may nearly say) have injured the commonwealth less than this man. But then, O Athenians, you were still, on calculation, wary and provident of danger: while now, what for the day gives you no trouble, no present annoyance, you disregard; and here you pass idle votes: that Philip shall take the oaths to Cersobleptes—that he shall not interfere in Amphictyonic business—that you will amend the peace. But there would have been no necessity for any of these decrees, if the defendant had chosen to sail and perform his duty: what might have been preserved by sailing, he has lost by advising a land journey; what might have been saved by telling truth, he has lost by lying.

He will make it a grievance presently, as I am informed, that he should be the only orator in the assembly
who is called to account for words. I will not press the argument, that all men should be made responsible for their words, if they speak for lucre; but I say this—If Æschines in his private capacity played the fool or made any slip, don't be overnice; let it pass, forgive him: but if in the character of ambassador he has for lucre's sake purposely deceived you, don't let him off, don't tolerate that he is not to be brought to trial for what he said. For what else ought we to call ambassadors to account but for words? Ambassadors have not galleys or posts or soldiers or citadels under their control (for no one intrusts ambassadors with these things), but only words and times. With respect to time—if he never destroyed the opportunities of the state, he is innocent; if he has destroyed them, he is guilty. And as to words—if his reports have been true or serviceable, let him be acquitted; if false and corrupt and injurious, let him be convicted. A man can do you no greater wrong than by telling falsehoods: for where the government depends on words, how is it possible, if these be untrue, to carry it on safely? And if speakers will even take bribes for the interest of the enemy, how can you avoid being in peril? Nor indeed is it the same thing to rob oligarchs or despots of their opportunities, as it is to rob you; nor anything like. For in those governments, I take it, everything is done sharply according to order: but with you, first the council must hear of all matters and frame their previous order, and that only after publication of notice for heralds and embassies, not always; then they must convene an assembly, and that only when it is allowable by the laws: then your honest counsellors must get the day, and prevail over those who ignorantly or wickedly oppose them. And after
all this, when a resolution has passed, and its advantage is apparent, time has to be allowed for the indigence of the multitude to provide themselves with what is needful, that they may be able to execute your resolve. A man, I say, who destroys these times of action in a government such as ours has done more than destroy times of action; he has absolutely robbed you of your main chance.

There is a ready argument however for all who wish to deceive you—"the disturbers of the commonwealth!—the persons who prevent Philip from doing the state a service!" To them I shall offer not a word in reply, but read you Philip's letters, and remind you of the occasions on which in every instance you have been cheated, that you may see, by cajoling you, he has forfeited that boastful title that one got sick of hearing.

[Letters of Philip]

His acts in the embassy having been thus disgraceful, so many, nay all of them, having been treason against you, he goes about saying—"What name does Demosthenes deserve; who accuses his colleagues?" Verily I accuse, whether I will or no, having been so plotted against by you during the whole of my absence, and having the choice of two things left me, either in acts of such a description to be thought your accomplice, or to accuse. I say that I have not been your colleague at all in the embassy, but that you did many heinous things as ambassador, and I did what was best for these people. Philocrates has been your colleague, and you his, and Phrynon: for you all did these things, and approved of them.

But where is the salt? where the social board and libations? Such is the rant he goes about with: as if does
of justice, and not doers of iniquity, were the betrayers of these things! I know that all the presidents on every occasion sacrifice in common, and sup with each other, and pour libations together; and the good do not on this account imitate the bad, but if they find any of their body committing an offence, they inform the council and the people. In like manner the council offer their opening sacrifice, banquet together, join in libations and ceremonials. So do the generals, and I may say nearly all the magistrates. But do they on such account allow impunity to their members who commit crime? Far from it. Leon accused Timagoras, after having been four years his co-ambassador: Eubulus accused Tharrex and Smicythus, after having been their messmate: the famous Conon of old accused Adimantis, after having shared the command with him. Which then violated the salt and the cup, Æschines—the traitors, the false ambassadors and acceptors of bribes, or their accusers? Assuredly the men of iniquity violated, as you have done, the sanctities of their whole country, not merely those of private fellowship.

To show you, however, that these men have been the vilest and basest not only of all public deputies to Philip, but of all (without exception) who ever privately visited him, let me tell you a little circumstance unconnected with the embassy.

When Philip took Olynthus, he celebrated Olympic games, and invited all kinds of artists to the sacrifice and the festival. While he was feasting them and crowning the conquerors, he asked Satyrus, our comic actor, why he was the only person who preferred no request, whether it was that he had observed in him any meanness or discourtesy toward himself. Satyrus (they say) replied, that
he wanted none of the things which the others asked, that what he should like to propose it would be very easy for Philip to oblige him with, but he was fearful of being refused. Philip bade him speak out, assuring him in handsome terms, that there was nothing he would not do; upon which (they say) he declared, that Apollopahanes of Pydna was his friend; that, after he had been assassinated, his relations in alarm secretly removed his daughters, then little children, to Olynthus. "They," said he, "now that the city is taken, have become prisoners, and are in your hands: they are of marriageable age. Give me them, I pray and beseech you. Yet I wish you to hear and understand, what sort of a present you will give me, if you do give it. I myself shall derive no profit from the grant; for I shall give them in marriage with portions, and not suffer them to be treated in any manner unworthy of myself or their father." When the company at the banquet heard this, there was a clapping of hands and tumult of applause from all sides, insomuch that Philip was touched, and gave him the girls. Yet this Apollopahanes was one of the persons who killed Philip's brother Alexander.

Now let us contrast with this banquet of Satyrus another banquet, which these men held in Macedonia; and see if it has any likeness or resemblance.

These men were invited to the house of Xenophron, the son of Phaedimus, one of the Thirty, and off they went. I did not go. When they came to the drinking, he introduces a certain Olynthian woman, good-looking, and well-born also and modest, as the case proved. At first (I believe) they only made her drink quietly and eat dessert; so Iatrocles told me the next day: but as it went on, and they became heated, they ordered her to sit down
and sing a song. The woman was in a sad way; she neither
would do it nor could; whereupon the defendant and Phry-
non said it was an insult, and not to be tolerated that a
captive woman, one of the accursed and pestilent Olynthi-
as, should give herself airs; and—"Call the boy"; and—
"A lash here." A servant came with a whip: and as they
were in liquor, I imagine, and it took but little to exas-
perate them, upon her saying something or other and
bursting into tears, the servant rips off her tunic and
gives her several cuts on the back. The woman, madd-
dened by the pain and the whole treatment, jumps up,
throws herself at the knees of Iatrocles, and overturns the
table: and had he not snatched her away, she would have
perished by drunken violence; for the drunkenness of this
scoundrel is terrible. There was a talk about this female
in Arcadia before the Ten Thousand; and Diophantus
made a report to you, which I will compel him now to
give evidence of; and there was much talk in Thessaly
and everywhere.

Notwithstanding his guilty conscience, this polluted
wretch will dare to look you in the face, will raise his
voice presently and talk about the life that he has lived;
which chokes me to listen to. Don't these people know
that in early life you used to read the books for your
mother at her initiations, and as a boy were rolled about
among orgiasts and drunkards?—that afterward you were
an office under-clerk, and did dirty work for two or three
drachms?—that it is but lately you got a wretched liveli-
hood for your services as third-rate player on the boards
of other men? What sort of a life can you mention which
you have not lived, when that which you have lived ap-
ppears to be of such a character? But his assurance for-
sooth! He brought another man to trial before you for infamous practices! But of that by and by. Read me first these depositions.

[Depositions]

Such being the number, men of the jury, such the character of the offences which he has committed against you, including every species of criminality—a receiver of bribes, a flatterer, under the curse, a liar, a betrayer of his friends—all the most heinous crimes are included;—from none of these charges will he defend himself, no plain and honest defence will he be able to plead; what I have heard he intends to say amounts almost to madness, though, perhaps, a person who has no other plea to urge is obliged to employ what artifices he can. I am told he will say that I have been a partner in all that I denounce, that I approved of all and co-operated with him, but I have suddenly changed and become accuser. This is no fair or proper justification of his conduct, but only an accusation of me: for, if I have so acted, I am a good-for-nothing man, and yet the proceedings are none the better for that; quite otherwise. However, I consider it my duty to show to you, both that the assertion, if he makes it, will be false, and what the fair line of defence is. The fair and honest defence is to show either that the things alleged against him have not been done, or that, being done, they benefit the state. Neither of these points can he establish. For neither surely can he say that it is to our advantage for the Phocians to be destroyed and Philip to hold Thermopylae and the Thes- bans to be strong and troops to be in Euboea and forming designs on Megara and the peace to be unsworn; the com-
trary to all of which his reports to you announced as being to your advantage and about to take place: nor can he persuade you, who have yourselves seen and known all the circumstances, that these results have not been accomplished. It remains, then, for me to prove that I have had no connection with these men in anything. Would you like me to pass over all the rest—how I spoke against them before you, how I quarrelled on the journey, how I have opposed them all along—and produce these men themselves as witnesses that my acts and theirs have been entirely different, and that they have received money to be your enemies, while I refused to take it? Mark, then.

What man in the commonwealth should you say was the most odious blackguard, with the largest stock of impudence and insolence? Not one of you, I am certain, could even by mistake name any other than Philocrates. What man speaks the loudest, and can utter what he likes with the clearest voice? AEschines, the defendant, I am sure. Whom do these men call spiritless and cowardly with the mob while I call him reserved? Myself: for never was I intrusive in any way; never have I done violence to your inclinations. Well: in all the assemblies whenever there has been a discussion upon these matters you hear me always both accusing and convicting these men, and positively declaring that they have taken money and sold all the interests of the state. And none of them hearing my statements ever contradicted them, or opened his mouth or showed himself. What can be the reason that the most odious blackguards in the commonwealth and the loudest speakers are overpowered by me, who am the timidest of men, and speak no louder than
any one else? It is that truth is strong, and, on the other hand, the consciousness of having sold your interests is weak. This takes off from the audacity of these men, this warps their tongue, stops their mouths, chokes and keeps them silent. You know, of course, on the late occasion in Piræus, when you would not allow him to be your envoy, how he shouted out that he would impeach and indict me, with cries of "Shame! shame!" Yet all that is the prelude to numerous contests and arguments, whereas these are simple, and, perhaps, but two or three words, which a slave bought yesterday might have spoken—"Athenians, it is atrocious: here is a man accusing me of what he has himself been concerned in; and saying that I have taken money, when he has taken it himself."—Nothing of this kind did he say or utter: none of you heard him; but he threatened something different. Why? Because he was conscious of guilt, and not independent enough to speak those words: his resolution never reached that point, but shrank back, for his conscience checked it. No one, however, prevented him from indulging in general abuse and calumny.

The strongest point of all, a matter not of argument but of fact, I am about to mention: Upon my offering to do what was just, namely, as I had been twice ambassador, to render my account twice, Æschines, the defendant, came up to the auditors with divers witnesses, and warned them not to summon me into court, on the ground that I had passed my audit and had no further liability. And the thing was beyond measure ridiculous. What was the meaning of it? He having rendered his account of the former embassy, which no one arraigned,
did not wish to attend a fresh audit for that which he is now tried upon, which included all his misdeeds: but if I attended twice, the consequence would be that he, too, must come into court again; therefore he would not let them summon me. Now, men of Athens, this circumstance proves both points clearly to you, both that Æschines has condemned himself, so that none of you can conscientiously acquit him now, and that he will not utter a word of truth about me; for, had he anything to say, he would have come forward with it then and accused me, never have given notice not to summon me into court. In support of my statements, call the witnesses to them.

[Witnesses]

Should he speak any slander about me foreign to the embassy, on many accounts you should refuse to hear him. I am not on my trial to-day; and after this no water is poured in for me. What is it, then, but lack of honest arguments? For who upon his trial would elect to accuse, if he had a good defence? Again, consider this, men of the jury. If I were tried, and Æschines accusing, and Philip the judge, and I, having no means of showing my innocence, began maligning Æschines and trying to blacken his character, don’t you think Philip would, on this very account, be indignant that any one before him should malign his benefactors? Do not you then be worse than Philip, but compel him to make his defence upon the points in issue.

[The deposition]

You see, I, because I was conscious of no wrong, thought proper to render my account, and submit to all
that the laws required; Æschines did the reverse. How, then, can his actions and mine have been the same? or how can he possibly maintain before you what he has never even alleged against me before? Surely he cannot. He will, however; and verily I don't wonder. For you surely know this—that since the creation of man, and since trials have been instituted, no one ever was found guilty confessing his crime: no; they put on a bold face, deny the charge, tell lies, invent excuses, do anything to escape punishment.

You must not be duped by anything of this sort to-day, but decide the case by your knowledge, and pay no heed to my statements or the defendant's, no, nor to the witnesses whom he will have ready to prove what he likes, with Philip for his paymaster (you'll see how promptly they will give evidence for him): neither care whether Æschines has a loud and fine voice, nor I a poor one. For it is not your business, if you are wise, to have a trial of orators or speeches to-day, but to regard the dire and shameful ruin of your affairs, and to cast back the infamy upon its authors, having inquired into these doings that are within your own knowledge. What doings? These which you know, and need not be informed by me. If all which they promised you has resulted from the peace, and you confess yourselves to be so full of cowardice and baseness that without enemies in the country, without being blockaded by sea, without the city being in any danger, while you were purchasing cheap corn, and in other respects no worse off than at present, when you knew and had been told by these men that your allies would be ruined, and the Thebans would become powerful, and that Philip would take the fortresses in
Thrace, and that sallying places would be established against you in Euboea, and that all which has been done would happen, you were content to make the peace notwithstanding—acquit Æschines, and do not in addition to so many disgraces incur the sin of perjury: for he does you no wrong; I am a fool and a madman to accuse him. But if just the reverse—if they spoke in the kindest manner of Philip, saying that he loved the commonwealth, he would save the Phocians, he would humble the pride of Thebes, yet more, he would confer benefits on you beyond the value of Amphipolis, if he obtained the peace, and would restore Euboea and Oropus—if after saying and promising all this they have cheated and cajoled you, and all but stripped you of Attica, pronounce your verdict against him, and let it not be that, in addition to the other outrages put upon you (for I know not what else to call them), you, for the bribes taken by these men, carry home the curse and the perjury.

Consider again, men of the jury: for what object could I have chosen to accuse these men, if they were innocent? You can find none. Is it pleasant to have many enemies? It is not even safe. Was there any quarrel subsisting between Æschines and me? None. What then? You feared for yourself, and through cowardice thought this was your security:—that I have heard he says.—Well, but without there being any danger or crime, Æschines, as you allege! Should he repeat that, consider, men of the jury, whether for crimes, which I who am innocent feared would be my ruin through those persons—what ought they to suffer who are the guilty parties? But it is for no such reason. Wherefore, then, do I accuse you? Vexatiously, forsooth, that I may get money from
you! And, pray, was it better for me to receive a large sum, as large as any of these men, from Philip who offered it, and have both him and these for my friends (for they would, they would have been my friends, if I had been their accomplices: even now the feud between us is not hereditary, but because I have not been a partner in their acts): or to beg from them a portion of their receipts, and be at enmity both with Philip and them?—and while I ransomed the prisoners at such an expense out of my own means, to ask these men for a disgraceful pittance which made them my enemies? Impossible. I reported what was true, and abstained from taking presents out of regard to justice and truth and my future life, believing that, if I was virtuous, I should be honored among you no less than certain other people, and that I must not barter away my public spirit for any lucre: and these men I abhor, because I saw them in the embassy to be villainous and execrable, and I have been deprived, too, of my personal distinctions, since through the corruption of these men your displeasure has fallen upon the whole embassy: and I accuse now and am come to the audit foreseeing the future, and wishing to have it determined by the verdict of this tribunal that my actions have been the opposite of theirs. And I fear, I fear (all my thoughts shall be declared to you) hereafter you may drag me who am innocent along with them, but you will remain passive now. For it seems to me, O Athenians, you are wholly paralyzed, waiting till calamity falls upon you; and while you see other people suffer, you take no precaution, nor give a thought to the commonwealth, now so long in many fearful ways declining.

Don't you think it dreadful and monstrous?—for
though I had resolved to be silent, I am led on to speak:—You must know Pythocles, the son of Pythodorus. With him I was on very friendly terms, and up to this day nothing unpleasant has passed between us. He turns out of my way now when he meets me, ever since he has been with Philip; and if he is compelled to cross my path he starts away in a moment, for fear some one should see him speaking to me: yet with Aeschines he walks all round the market, and holds consultation. It is really dreadful and shocking, 0 Athenians—while people who have chosen Philip's service have this advantage, that his perception is in either case so keen, they believe each of them, as surely as if he were standing at their side, that nothing they do even here can escape him, and they regard as friends whom he thinks proper, and as enemies likewise—those who are devoted to you, who are ambitious of your esteem and have never sacrificed it, find in you such a deafness and blindness that these miscreants are here contending on equal terms with me, and that, too, before a jury who know all the circumstances. Would you like to know and hear the reason? I will tell you; and, pray, be not offended at my speaking the truth. It is because Philip, I take it, having one body and one soul, loves with his whole heart the people that do him good, and hates those that do the contrary; whereas any one of you never thinks that a person serving the state serves him, or that a person damaging the state damages him; each individual has things of greater importance to himself, by which you are frequently led astray—compassion, envy, resentment, granting favors, a thousand things besides—indeed, should one escape everything else, there is no escaping persons who don't like one to be such. The fault in each of
these instances gradually undermines and ends in being the total ruin of the commonwealth.

Do not, O Athenians, commit any such error to-day; do not acquit the man who has so greatly wronged you. For really what will be said of you, if you do acquit him? —Certain ambassadors went from Athens to Philip; Philocrates, Æschines, Phrynion, Demosthenes. What then? One of them, besides that he made no profit by the embassy, redeemed the captives out of his own private means: another with the money for which he sold the country's interests went about purchasing harlots and fish. Another sent his son to Philip, before he had entered him in the roll of citizens; the brutal Phrynion: while the first did nothing unworthy of the commonwealth or himself. One, though choir-master and captain, thought it right in addition to incur these voluntary expenses, to redeem the captives, and not permit any of his fellow-countrymen to be in distress for want: another, so far from delivering any already in captivity, helped to bring a whole district, and more than ten thousand infantry and nearly a thousand cavalry of an allied nation, into the power of Philip. What followed? The Athenians got hold of them—having known all about it long before—well?—the men who had taken money and presents, who had disgraced themselves and the country and their own children, they acquitted, considering them to be men of sense and the country to be in a flourishing state;—but what of the man who accused them?—him they judged to be an idiot, ignorant of the country, not knowing how to throw his own away.

And who, O Athenians, after seeing this example, will wish to prove himself an honest man? Who will be an ambassador for nothing, if he is neither to take reward,
nor with you to be held more trustworthy than persons who have taken it? Therefore, you are not only trying these men to-day; no: you are legislating for all time to come, whether ambassadors should take money to work disgracefully for the enemy, or do their best in your behalf without bribe or fee.

Upon the other matters you require no witness: but as to Phrynon sending his son, call me the witnesses to that.

[Witnesses]

Æschines never prosecuted this man on the charge of sending his son to Philip for dishonor. But if one being in his youth better looking than another, not foreseeing what suspicion might arise from such comeliness, hath been a little wild in after-life, Æschines must prosecute him for infamous crime.

Now let me speak of the entertainment and the decree: I had nearly forgotten what was most material to say to you. In drawing up the order of council concerning the first embassy, and again before the people at the assemblies in which you were to debate the question of peace, when nothing either spoken or done wrong by these persons was known, I according to customary usage commended and invited them to the city hall. And what is more, I entertained Philip's ambassadors, and very splendidly, too, O Athenians: for when I saw them in Macedonia glorying even in such things as proofs of wealth and splendor, it occurred to me that I should begin directly to surpass them in these things, and display greater magnificence myself: however, the defendant now will bring the matter forward, and say, "'Demosthenes himself commended us, himself feasted the ambassadors'"—not distinguishing
the when. It was before the country had sustained an injury, before it was discovered that these men had sold themselves; when the ambassadors had just arrived for the first time, and the people had to hear what they proposed, and it was not yet known that the defendant would support Philocrates, or that he would make such a motion. If, therefore, he should bring this forward, remember the dates; they are earlier than the offences: since that time there has not been the slightest connection or communion between these men and me. Read the deposition.

[The deposition]

Perhaps his brothers Philochares and Aphobetus will plead for him. To both of them there is much that you may with justice reply (I must speak freely, O Athenians, without any reserve):—Aphobetus and Philochares! you being a painter of perfume boxes and drums, your brothers under-clerks and common persons (there is no reproach in these things, yet they hardly deserve a general’s rank); we dignified you with embassies, generalships, and the highest honors. Now, supposing that none of you committed any crime, we should have nothing to be grateful for to you, but you for these things ought to be grateful to us; for we, passing by many persons more worthy of honor, exalted you. But if in the very exercise of your dignities one of you has committed crime, and crime, too, of such a nature, don’t you much more deserve execration than pardon? Much more, in my opinion.

They will be violent, perhaps, with their loud voices and impudence, and with the plea that “it is pardonable to assist a brother.” But don’t you give way: remember,
while it is their duty to regard Æschines, it is yours to regard the laws and the whole commonwealth, and (above all) the oaths that you have yourselves sworn as jurors. If, indeed, they have requested any of you to save the defendant, see whether they mean, in case he is not shown to have injured the commonwealth, or even in case he is. If they mean in case of innocence, I am also for saving him; if unconditionally and however guilty he has been, they have asked you to commit perjury. For though the ballot is secret, it will not be hidden from the gods. Most wisely was it seen by him that enacted the law of secret voting that none of these men will know which of you has obliged him, but the gods and the divine spirit will know who has voted iniquitously: from whom it is better for each of you to secure good hopes for himself and his children by giving a righteous and proper judgment, than to confer a secret and uncertain obligation upon these men, and to acquit a person who has given evidence against himself. For what stronger witness, Æschines, can I produce, to prove your misconduct as ambassador, than you against yourself? You that thought it necessary to involve in such a dreadful calamity the man who would have brought some of your deeds to light, certainly expected some heavy punishment yourself, should the people hear what you had done.

This proceeding, if you are wise, will turn out to his own prejudice, not only on this account, that it is a flagrant indication of what his acts as ambassador have been, but because in conducting the accusation he used those arguments which stand good against him now: for surely the same principles, which you laid down when you prosecuted Timarchus, are available also for others against
yourself. You then said to the jury—"Demosthenes will defend him, and will arraign my conduct as ambassador: and, then, if he misleads you by his speech, he will brag and go about saying—how? what do you think? I led the jurors right away from the question, and stole the case out of their hands." Don't yourself act thus. Confine your defence to the subject of your trial. When you were prosecuting him, then was the time for accusing and saying what you pleased.

Again you recited before the jury, having no witness to bring in support of your charge against the accused—

Rumor which many people noise abroad
Not wholly dies: a goddess eke is she.

Well, Æschines; and all these people say that you have received money from the embassy; so that against you, too, I should think, Rumor which many people noise abroad not wholly dies. For inasmuch as more accuse you than him, see how the matter stands. Timarchus even his neighbors did not all know; but of you ambassadors there is no Greek or barbarian who does not say, that you have received money from the embassy. If rumor therefore is true, that of the multitude is against you all; and that such rumor is credible, and that a goddess eke is she, and that the poet who wrote this was a wise man, you have yourself laid down.

And besides, he got up a number of Iambics, and repeated them; for instance—

IAMBICS FROM THE PHOENIX OF EURIPIDES

Who loves the fellowship of evil men,
Of him I never ask, assured that whom
He seeks for comrades he resembles most.
"The man who frequented the cock-pits and walked about with Pittalacus"—these were his words and others like them—"don't you know," said he, "what sort of a person to consider him?" Well, Æschines: these iambics will suit me now against you; and I shall speak fitly and properly, if I recite to the jury—Who loves the fellowship of Philocrates, and that too on an embassy, of him I never ask, assured that he has received money like Philocrates who confesses it.

When he calls other men speech-writers and sophists, and attempts to vilify them, he will prove to be himself liable to these reproaches. For those iambics are from the Phœnix of Euripides: and that drama was never acted by either Theodorus or Aristodemus, to whom the defendant used to take third parts, but Molon played in it, and other old performers whoever they were. The Antigone of Sophocles, however, Theodorus has often acted, and so has Aristodemus; in which there are iambics beautifully written and in a strain useful to you, which, though he has himself often spoken and knows them quite by heart, he omitted. You are of course aware, that in all tragic pieces it is a sort of special privilege for third-rate actors to come on as tyrants and sceptre-bearers. See then what the verses are in this drama, which the poet has put into the mouth of Creon Æschines, which he neither conned over to himself to serve him in the embassy, nor repeated to the jury. Read:

LAMBCOS FROM THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES

Ye cannot tell the spirit of a man,
His wisdom, nor his worth, till they be tried
In public life and acts of policy.
The statesman, who to serve the common weal
ON THE EMBASSY

Adopts not what in counsel is the best,
But closes up his mouth for fear of danger,
Base have I ever deem'd, and deem him still,
And whose dearer than his country loves
A private friend, as nothing I esteem.
For I (bear witness, thou all-seeing Jove!) Should not keep silence, if I saw destruction
Advancing toward my people 'stead of safety;
Nor e'er would I accept as friend of mine
My country's enemy; for well I know,
'Tis she preserves us all; in her embark'd,
While steadily she sails, we lack not friendship.

None of these verses did Æschines repeat to himself on the embassy: instead of the commonwealth, he deemed Philip's friendship of the greatest importance and advantage to himself, bidding a long farewell to the wise Sophocles: when he saw destruction advancing nigh, the expedition against Phocis, he gave no warning or notice, but on the contrary helped to conceal and forward it, and those who wished to give information he prevented; not remembering that she it is who preserves us all, and in her his mother initiating and purifying, and making a profit from the houses of her employers, reared up all these children, and that his father teaching the alphabet, as I am informed by older men, lived how he could next door to Heros the physician, but lived at all events in this city; and they themselves got money by being under-clerks and servants to all the public functionaries, and at last having been appointed clerks by you were maintained for two years in the Round-room, and from this city was the defendant sent but just now as ambassador. None of these things did he consider; no care he took that the commonwealth should sail steadily, but overturned and sank her, and did his utmost to throw her into the power of her enemies. Are not you then a sophist, and a vile one
too? Are not you a speech-writer, ay, and one hated by
the gods? you that passed over what you had often played
and knew perfectly by heart, while what you never acted
in your life you searched out and quoted to injure one of
your fellow-citizens?

Come, consider now his remarks about Solon. He said
there was a statue of Solon, exemplifying the decorous
style of the orators of that day, with his hand folded in-
side the mantle; this by way of reproach and rebuke to
the forwardness of Timarchus. But the Salaminians say
the statue has not been erected fifty years, and it is nearly
two hundred and forty years from Solon to the present
time, so that the artist who shaped that figure was not
only himself no contemporary of Solon, but his grand-
father was not either. However, he said this to the jury,
and gave an imitation: but what was of far greater advan-
tage to the state than Solon's attitude, to see (namely) his
heart and mind—of them he gave no imitation, quite the
contrary.

Solon (after Salamis had revolted from the Atheni-
ans, and they had decreed to punish with death who-
ever advised its recovery), at the risk of his own life
composed and sang an elegy, and preserved that country
to Athens, and removed the disgrace which had fallen
upon her. Æschines, although the Persian king and all
the Greeks had acknowledged Amphipolis to be yours,
gave up and sold it, and supported Philocrates, who moved
the resolution. Worth his while (was it not?) to mention
Solon! And not only here acted he so, but on his arrival
there he never uttered the name of the place which he came
to negotiate about. And so he himself reported to you;
for you must remember his saying—"I too had something
to say about Amphipolis, but I omitted it, to give Demosthenes an opportunity of taking up the subject."—I came forward and said, that he had left nothing for me that he wished to say to Philip; for he would sooner give a part of his blood than a part of his speech to any one. The fact, I apprehend, was—having received money, he could say nothing on the other side of the question to Philip, who had paid him on purpose that he might not restore Amphipolis. Here—take and read these elegiads of Solon, and let the jury see that Solon abhorred men like the defendant.

Not to speak with the hand folded, Æschines—not that—but to perform your embassage with the hand folded, is needful. You, after extending and holding it open yonder and disgracing your countrymen, talk pompously here, and, having got up and spouted some wretched phrases, imagine you can escape punishment for all these grievous crimes, if you put a cap on your head and walk about and abuse me.

Read, if you please:

**THE ELEGIADS OF SOLOM**

Our city everlasting shall stand;
So Jupiter and all the gods command:
Athenian Pallas lends her guardian aid,
She of the mighty Father, heavenly Maid.
Yet the fair city breedeth for her bane
A generation covetous and vain,
Ill-minded statesmen, who shall yet be tried
In many sorrows to rebuke their pride;
Insatiable, in riot they devour
The fleeting pleasures of the festal hour,
Indulge their lustful appetite of gain,
And sparing neither sacred nor profane,
By spoil and rapine thrive, nor hold in awe
Omniscient Themis and her holy law,
Who sits in watchful silence, and the day
Of vengeance bides, more dreadful for delay.
Thus on a people creeps the dire disease,
Till perish all their ancient liberties:
Or civil strife or warfare is at hand,
To waste the youthful promise of the land.
A factious race the sword shall overthrow;
Who wrong their friends are pillaged by the foe.
Over the country these misfortunes brood:
The poor meanwhile, a hapless multitude,
Are dragg'd to foreign shores and long exile,
To slavery sold, and bound in fetters vile.
The common Pest of all comes home to each;
No door can guard him from the Fury's reach;
She leaps the lofty wall; hide where he will,
In cell or chamber, she shall find him still.
Fain am I thus, Athenians, to advise,
What evils under Anarchy arise,
How Discipline the public weal maintains,
Ourb wicked men with penance and with chains;
How she can tame the wild, the proud put low,
And wither mischief ere to strength it grow;
How straighten crooked justice, and assuage
The might of passion and unruly rage:
Under her sway confusion, discord cease,
And men abide in fellowship and peace.

You hear, O Athenians, what Solon declares of such men, and of the gods who (he says) protect the commonwealth. For myself, I believe as I hope, that his statement is eternally true; that the gods do indeed protect our commonwealth: and in some sort I believe, that all which has taken place upon this audit has been a manifestation to the commonwealth of divine benevolence. Only see:—A man who has grossly violated his duty as ambassador, who has given up places in which the gods had ought to be worshipped by you and your allies, disfranchised an accuser who obeyed his challenge. To what end? That he may obtain neither pity nor pardon for
his own offences. Further, in accusing that person he chose to speak ill of me, and again before the people he threatened to prefer indictments and the like. For what purpose? That when I accuse him, who thoroughly know his villanies and have closely watched them all, I may be received by you with the utmost indulgence. Furthermore, by pushing off his trial during all the former period he has been led on to a crisis, at which, out of regard to future consequences, if to nothing else, it is neither safe nor possible for you to let him escape punishment for his bribery. You ought indeed, O Athenians, at all times to execrate and to punish men guilty of corruption and treason; but now it will be most especially seasonable and for the common benefit of all mankind. For a plague, O Athenians, has fallen upon Greece, a grievous and severe one, that requires some extraordinary good fortune and carefulness on your part. The notables intrusted with the administration of state affairs are betraying their own liberty, unhappy men, and bringing upon themselves a voluntary servitude, which they call friendship and intimacy and connection with Philip, and other flattering names: the rest of the people and the authorities (whatever they are) in the several states, who ought to punish those men and put them instantly to death, so far from doing anything of the kind, admire and envy them, and would like every one to be in their places.

This sort of thing, this kind of ambition, men of Athens, until but the other day had destroyed the sovereignty and national dignity of the Thessalians, and is at this moment stealing away their liberty; for the citadels of some of them are garrisoned by Macedonians. It has entered Peloponnesus, and caused the massacres in Elis;
and with such frenzy and madness did it inspire those wretched people, that, to get dominion over each other and gratify Philip, they would spill the blood of their kindred and fellow-countrymen. And it stops not even here. It entered into Arcadia, and has turned everything there upside down; and now many of the Arcadians (who ought like yourselves to be eminently proud of freedom, for the only indigenous people are you and they) hold Philip in admiration, and set him up in brass, and crown him; and to complete all, should he visit Peloponnesus, they have passed resolutions to receive him in their cities. The Argives have done the same. By Ceres, if one must speak in earnest, these matters require no little precaution; as the plague, advancing in a circle, has entered, men of Athens, even here. While then you are yet in safety, be on your guard, and punish with infamy the persons who first introduced it; or else, see that my words be not deemed to have been wisely spoken, when you have no longer any resource.

See you not, O men of Athens, how notable and striking an example the poor Olynthians are; who owe their destruction, unhappy men, to nothing so much as to conduct of this kind? You may discover it plainly by what has befallen them. When they had only four hundred horse, and were not more than five thousand altogether in number, the Chalcidians not yet being all united, although the Lacedæmonians attacked them with a considerable army and fleet—for of course you know that the Lacedæmonians had the command (so to speak) both of sea and land at that period—notwithstanding the attack of so mighty a force, they lost neither their city nor a single fortress, but even won many battles, and killed three of the enemy's
generals, and at last put an end to the war upon their own terms.

But when certain men had begun to receive bribes, and the multitude, through stupidity or through ill fortune rather, regarded them as more trustworthy than their honest counsellors, when Lasthenes roofed his house with timber given from Macedonia, and Euthycrates fed herds of kine without paying a price to any one, and one man came with sheep, another with horses, and the mass of the people, against whom these treasons were committed, instead of being incensed or calling for punishment of the traitors, looked on them with respect and admiration, honored and esteemed them for manliness—when things proceeded thus far and corruption got the ascendancy, although they possessed a thousand horse and were more than ten thousand in number, and you sent to their assistance ten thousand mercenaries and fifty galleys and four thousand citizens besides, all of it could not save them; before a year of the war had expired, the betayers had lost all the cities in Chalcidice; Philip could no longer be at the call of the betayers, and was puzzled what he should first take possession of. Five hundred horse, betrayed by their own leaders, did Philip capture with all their arms, such a number as no mortal ever did before. And the perpetrators of all this were not ashamed to look at the sun, or at the earth (their country) on which they stood, or at her temples or sepulchres, or at the infamy that upon such doings was sure to follow. 'So mad and senseless, O Athenians, are people rendered by the taking of bribes! You therefore, you the people, must be wise, and not permit such practices, but punish them by public sentence. It would indeed be monstrous if, having passed so many
severe resolutions against the betrayers of Olynthus, you should fail to punish criminals in your own country. Read me the decree concerning the Olynthians.

[The decree]

These resolutions, men of the jury, you have in the opinion of all people, whether Greek or barbarian, righteously and nobly passed against traitors and miscreants. Since, therefore, the acceptance of bribes precedes such practices, and it is on that account that people are found to commit such acts, whomsoever you see accepting bribes, men of Athens, look upon him as a traitor. If one person betrays opportunities, another measures, another troops, each of you, I take it, ruins that of which he has the management: but all persons of this kind ought equally to be detested. You, O Athenians, are the only people in the world who upon such matters may take examples from home, and imitate in action the forefathers whom you justly praise.

Though the battles, the campaigns, the adventures, by which they were renowned, there is no occasion for imitating, since for the present you are at peace, imitate at least their wisdom. This there is always need for, and a wise judgment is not a whit more troublesome or irksome than a foolish one: each of you will sit here for as long a time, whether by a right decision and verdict upon the case he improves the condition of the commonwealth and acts worthily of your forefathers, or by an improper decision he damages the public interests and acts unworthily of your forefathers. What then was their judgment upon such a case? Take and read this inscription, clerk. You ought to know, that the acts which you re-
gard with apathy are such as your ancestors have passed capital sentence upon. Read.

[The inscription]

You hear, men of Athens, the inscription declaring Arthmius, the son of Pythonax of Zelea, to be an enemy and a foe to the people of Athens and their allies, himself and all his race. On what account? Because he brought the gold of the barbarians among the Greeks. You may see then, as it appears from this, that your forefathers were anxious to prevent even strangers being hired to injure Greece; while you make no provision even to prevent your fellow-citizens doing wrong to the state.

Oh, but this inscription stands in some ordinary place! No. While the whole of yonder citadel is sacred and of considerable extent, it stands on the right by the great bronze statue of Pallas, which the republic offered up as the chief memorial of their war with the barbarians, the Greeks having given the money. At that time then justice was so revered, so honorable was it to punish people who did such things, that the same station was appropriated to the prize-offering of the goddess and the sentence against offenders of that kind: now all is mockery, impunity, disgrace, unless you repress these extravagant liberties to-day.

I think therefore, ye men of Athens, you will do right to imitate your ancestors, not in one point only, but in the whole series of their conduct. They—I am sure you have all heard the story—after Callias the son of Hipponicus had negotiated that peace which is in the mouths of all men, providing that the king should not approach within a day's ride of the sea-coast, nor sail with a vessel of war within the Chelidonian islands and Cyanean rocks, because it ap-
peared that he had taken gifts on his embassy, they fined him fifty talents at his audit, and were near putting him to death. Yet no man can say that the commonwealth has ever made a better peace either before or after: but it was not that they looked at. For that they considered was owing to their own valor and the reputation of the commonwealth; while the taking or not taking of money depended on the disposition of the ambassador; they expected therefore of any man who entered on public duties, that he should show a disposition for honesty and integrity. Your ancestors thus considered bribe-taking so imical and injurious to the state, that they would not suffer it upon any occasion or in any person; but you, O Athenians, though you have seen that the same peace has demolished the walls of your allies and is building the houses of your ambassadors, that it has taken away the possessions of the commonwealth and has earned for these men what they never imagined even in a dream, have not spontaneously put these men to death, but require an accuser, and hear on their trial persons whose crimes are actually beheld by all.

But one need not confine one’s self to ancient events, nor by such examples incite you to vengeance, for in the time of you that are here present and still living many have been brought to justice; the rest of whom I will pass by, and mention only one or two, sentenced to death upon an embassy which has wrought far less mischief to the state than this. Take and read me this decree.

[The decree]

According to this decree, men of Athens, you condemned to death those ambassadors, of whom one was
Epiorates, a man (as I hear from my elders) of good character, who was on many occasions serviceable to the state, one of those that marched from Piræus and restored the democracy, and generally a friend to the people. However, none of these things helped him; and justly: for one who undertakes to manage such important concerns should not be honest by halves, nor take advantage of your confidence to do greater mischief, but should never do you any wrong at all wilfully.

Well: if these men have left undone any part of what those have been sentenced to death for, kill me this very moment. Just see. "Since those men," it says, "acted contrary to their instructions on the embassy": and this is the first of the charges. And did not these act contrary to their instructions? Did not the decree say, "for the Athenians and allies of the Athenians," and did not these men exclude the Phocians expressly from the treaty? Did not the decree order them to swear the magistrates in the states, and did not they swear the persons whom Philip sent to them? Did not the decree say that they should nowhere meet Philip alone, and did not they incessantly hold private conferences with him? "And some of them were convicted of making false reports in the council"—ay, and these men before the people, too, and by what evidence?—for this is the grand point—By the facts themselves: for surely the very reverse of what they reported has taken place. "And sending false intelligence by letter," it says. So have these men. "And calumniating the allies and taking bribes."—Well instead of calumniating, say, having completely ruined: and this surely is far more dreadful than calumniating. With respect to the having taken bribes, I can only say, if they denied it,
proof would have been necessary; since they confess it, they should have been led off to punishment surely.

How say ye then, O Athenians? Under these circumstances, you being the descendants of those men, yourselves being some of them still living, will you endure that Epicrates, the benefactor of the people and the liberator from Piraeus, should be degraded and punished?—that again lately Thrasybulus, the son of Thrasybulus the people’s friend, who marched from Phyle and restored the democracy, should have incurred a penalty of ten talents?—and that the descendant of Harmodius and Aristogiton and men who have conferred on you the greatest benefits, whom, on account of their meritorious services, you have by law adopted to be partakers of the cup and libations in all your temples at the sacrifices, whom you celebrate and honor equally with your heroes and gods, should all have suffered punishment according to law; and that neither mercy nor pity, neither weeping children named after your benefactors, nor anything else, should have helped them?—and shall the son of Atrometus the pedagogue and Glaucothea (the assembler of Bacchanals for performances which another priestess has died for), shall he, when you have caught him, be let off, he, the issue of such parents, he that in no single instance has been useful to the state, neither himself nor his father, nor any other of his family? For what horse, what galley, what expedition, what chorus, what state service, what contribution, what present, what feat of valor, what thing of the kind has at any time come from these men to the republic? Even though he possessed all these merits, without the addition that he has been an honest and incorrupt ambassador, he ought assuredly to suffer death.
But if he has neither the one nor the other, will you not avenge yourselves on him? Will you not remember what he said on his accusation of Timarchus, that there was no good in a commonwealth which had not sinews to stretch against malefactors, or in a government where mercy and canvassing had greater power than the laws; and that you ought to have no pity either for the mother of Timarchus, an old woman, or for his children, or any one else, but consider this, that, should you abandon the laws and the constitution, you would find none to have pity on yourselves. And shall that unhappy man remain in infamy, because he saw the defendant to be a criminal, and will you allow the defendant to go unscathed? For what reason? If Ἀeschines thought fit to demand such heavy satisfaction from trespassers against him and his party, what should you, sworn judges, demand from such heinous trespassers against the state, of whom the defendant is proved to be one? Oh, but our young men will be all the better for that trial! Well; and this will improve our statesmen, on whom the most important chances of the commonwealth depend. They also need your attention.

To convince you, however, that he destroyed this man Timarchus, not (good heavens!) out of any desire to make your children virtuous (for they are virtuous already, O Athenians: never may such misfortune befall the commonwealth that her younger members should need Aphobetus and Ἀeschines to reform them!), but because he moved in the council that whoever should be convicted of carrying arms or naval implements to Philip should be punishable with death. To prove this, let me ask—how long was Timarchus a public speaker? A considerable time. Well: during all that time Ἀeschines was in
the city, and never took umbrage, or thought it a shock-
ing matter that such a person should open his mouth, until he went to Macedonia and became a hireling. Here, take and read me the decree of Timarchus itself:

[The decree]

You see, the person who proposed on your behalf that no one, on pain of death, should carry arms to Philip in time of war, has been ruined and disgraced; and this man, who delivered up to Philip the arms of your allies, was his accuser, and declaimed upon prostitution (O heaven and earth!), while by him were standing his two brothers-in-law, at the sight of whom you would cry out with aston-
ishment, the odious Nicias, who hired himself to Chabrias to go to Egypt, and the accursed Cyrebion, who plays his part in the procession reveals without his mask. But this is nothing—he did it with his brother Aphobetus before him! Verily, upon that day all the haranguing about prostitution was a flowing up the stream.

To show you what dishonor our commonwealth has been brought to by this man’s wickedness and false-
hood, I will pass by everything else, and mention a thing which you all know. Formerly, men of Athens, what you had decreed was looked for by the people of Greece; now we go about inquiring what the others have resolved, listening what news there is of the Arcadians, what of the Amphictyons, where Philip is about to march, whether he is alive or dead. Is it not thus we employ ourselves? I, for my part, am afraid, not if Philip is alive, but if the abhorring and punishing of criminals is dead in the commonwealth. Philip alarms me not, if all is sound with you; but if you allow impunity to men who
are willing to be his hirelings, if certain of the people in your confidence will plead for these men, and, after denying all along that they are Philip's agents, will get up for them now—this alarms me. How comes it, Eubulus, that on the trial of Hegesilaus, who is your cousin, and on that of Thrasybulus lately, the uncle of Niceratus, on the first voting you would not even hearken to their call, and on the question of punishment you got up, yet never spoke a word on their behalf, but begged the jury to excuse you? And do you refuse then to get up for relatives and connections, but will stand up for Æschines, who, when Aristophon was prosecuting Philonicus and through him assailing your conduct, joined him in accusing you, and appeared as one of your enemies? And when you, having terrified the Athenians, and told them they must immediately go down to Piræus and pay a property tax and make the theatric fund a military one, or vote for the measures which this man supported and the odious Philocrates moved, it came about that the peace was made on disgraceful instead of honorable terms, and these men, by their subsequent misdeeds, have ruined everything—then is it that you are reconciled? And before the people you cursed Philip, and swore with imprecations on your children that you would like him to be destroyed, and now will you help the defendant? How can he be destroyed when you come to the rescue of those who take his bribes? Yes! How on earth could you prosecute Mærocles, because he got the mine-tenants to give him twenty drachms each—and indict Cephisophon for embezzlement of sacred moneys, because three days after the time he paid seven minas into the bank; while persons who have received money, who confess it, who are caught in the fact, and proved to have
done it on purpose to ruin your allies, these, instead of bringing to trial, you desire us to acquit? That the charges in this case are fearful, and require a deal of prudence and precaution, whereas what you prosecuted those men for were laughing matters, will appear from the following considerations:—There were persons in Elis who plundered the public? Very probably. Well: were any of those persons concerned in overthrowing the democracy there lately? Not one. Again: while Olyanthus existed, there were persons of the same kind? I should think so. Did Olyanthus fall through them? No. At Megara, again, think ye not there was a thief or two who pilfered the public moneys? Undoubtedly; and it has come to light. Which of them caused the events which have occurred there? Not one. What sort of people, then, are they who commit these heavy crimes? The men who deem themselves of importance enough to be called friends and acquaintances of Philip—men who covet command and are invested with civic dignity, and who consider they ought to be greater than the common people. Was not Perilaus tried lately at Megara before the Three Hundred because he had gone to Philip; and did not Ptoleodorus, a man of wealth, birth, and reputation the first of the Megarians, come forward and beg him off, and again send him out to Philip; and afterward the one came with his mercenary troops, while the other was cooking up matters in the city? That is one example. There is nothing, nothing in the world more to be guarded against than allowing any one to be exalted above the people. Don’t let me have men saved or destroyed at the pleasure of this or that individual; but whoever is saved by his actions, or the contrary, let him be entitled to the proper verdict at
your hands. That is constitutional. Besides, many men have on occasions become powerful with you: Callistratus, again, Aristophon, Diophantus, others before them: but where did they each exercise their sway? In the popular assembly. In courts of justice no man up to the present day has ever had an authority greater than yourselves or the laws or your oaths. Then don't suffer this man to have it now. To show you that it will be more reasonable to take such precaution than to put confidence in these men, I will read you an oracle of the gods, who always protect the commonwealth far better than her statesmen. Read the verses:

[The oracle]

You hear, O Athenians, what the gods admonish you. If now they have given you this response during a time of war, they mean that you should beware of your generals; for the generals are conductors of war: but if after the conclusion of peace, they mean your chief statesmen; for they have the lead, their counsels you follow, by them are you in danger of being deceived.

And you are told by the oracle to hold the commonwealth together, so that all may have one mind, and not cause gratification to the enemy. Think ye now, O Athenians, that the preserving, or the punishing of a man who has done all this mischief would cause gratification to Philip? I think the preserving. The oracle, however, says you should do your best to prevent the enemy rejoicing. So it exhorts all with one mind to punish those who have in any way been subservient to the enemy: Jupiter, Dione, all the gods. They that intend you evil are outside, their supporters are inside; the business of the
former is to give bribes, of the latter to receive, and get off those who have received them.

Besides, even by human reasoning one may see that the most mischievous and dangerous of all things is to suffer a leading statesman to become attached to those who have not the same objects with the people. Consider by what means Philip has become master of everything, and by what means he has achieved the greatest of his works. By purchasing success from those who would sell it; by corrupting and exciting the ambition of leading statesmen: by such means. Both these, however, it is in your power, if you please, to render ineffective to-day: if to one class of men you will not listen, when they plead for people of this kind, but show that they have no authority with you (for now they say they have authority): and if you will punish him that has sold himself, and this shall be seen by all.

With any man you might well be wroth, O Athenians, who had done such deeds, and sacrificed allies and friends and opportunities, which make or mar the fortunes of every people, but with none more strongly or more justly than the defendant. A man who took his place with the mistrusters of Philip—who first and singly discovered him to be the common enemy of all the Greeks, and then deserted and turned traitor, and has suddenly become a supporter of Philip—can it be doubted that such a man deserves a thousand deaths? The truth of these statements he himself will not be able to gainsay. Who is it that brought Ischander to you in the beginning, whom he represented to have come here from the country's friends in Arcadia? Who cried out that Philip was packing Greece and Peloponnesus while you were sleeping? Who was it that made those fine long orations before the assembly, and read the decrees of Miltiades
and Themistocles, and the young men's oath in the temple of Aglauros? Was it not this man? Who persuaded you to send embassies almost to the Red Sea, urging that Greece was plotted against by Philip, and that it became you to foresee it and not abandon the interests of the Greeks? Was not the mover of the decree Eubulus, and the envoy to Peloponnesus the defendant, Æschines? What he may have talked and harangued about when he got there, is best known to himself; but what he reported to you I am sure you all remember. Several times in his speech he called Philip a barbarian and a pest, and told you the Arcadians were delighted that the Athenian commonwealth was now attending to her affairs and rousing herself. But what most of all had made him indignant, he said—coming home he met Atrestidas on his way from Philip's court, and there were about thirty women and children walking with him; and he was astonished, and asked one of the travellers who the man was, and who the crowd that followed him; but when he heard that these were Olynthian captives, whom Atrestidas was bringing away as a present from Philip, he thought it shocking, and wept, and bemoaned the miserable condition of Greece that she should regard such calamitous events with indifference. And he advised you to send persons to Arcadia to denounce the agents of Philip; for he heard, he said, from his friends, that if the commonwealth would turn their attention to it and send an embassy they would be punished. Such was then his language, honorable, indeed, O Athenians, and worthy of the state. But after he had gone to Macedonia, and beheld this Philip, the enemy of himself and the Greeks, was it like or similar? Very far from it. He said you were not to remember your ancestors, not to
talk of trophies or succor any one; and he was surprised at the men who advised you to consult with the Greeks about peace with Philip, as if any one else had to be persuaded on a question that concerned you alone; and that Philip himself was (O Hercules!) a thorough Greek, an eloquent speaker, a warm friend of Athens, and that there were some men in the city so unreasonable and perverse as not to be ashamed of abusing him and calling him a barbarian.

Is it possible that the same man, after having made the former speeches, could have ventured to make these, without having been corrupted? But further; is there a man who, after having then execrated Arestidas on account of the women and children of the Olynthians, could have endured now to co-operate with Philocrates, who brought free-born Olynthian women hither for dishonor, and is so notorious for his abominable life that I have no need to say anything scandalous or offensive about him, but let me only say that Philocrates brought women, you and the bystanders know all the rest, and feel pity, I am sure, for those poor unhappy creatures, whom Æschines pitied not, nor wept for Greece on their account, that among an allied people they should be outraged by the ambassadors.

But he will shed tears for himself, such an ambassador as he has been: perhaps he will bring forward his children and mount them up on the bar. But remember, ye men of the jury—against his children—that you had many friends and allies, whose children are wanderers, roaming about in beggary, having suffered cruel injuries through this man; who are far more deserving of your compassion than the sons of such a malefactor and traitor; and that these men, by adding to the treaty the words "and to his
posterity," have deprived your children even of their hopes. Against his own tears harden yourselves by reflecting that you have in your power a man who bade you send accusers into Arcadia against the agents of Philip. Now, then, you need not send an embassy to Peloponnesus, or go a long journey, or incur travelling expenses, but only advance each of you up to the bar here, and give your righteous and just verdict for your country against a man, who (O heaven and earth!), after having declaimed, as I told you in the outset, about Marathon, Salamis, battles, and trophies, all of a sudden, when he had set foot in Macedonia, used the very opposite language—that you should not remember your ancestors, not talk of trophies, not succor any one, not deliberate in conjunction with the Greeks, but should almost dismantle your city walls. Surely more disgraceful language has never at any period of time been spoken among you. For what Greek or barbarian is there so stupid, so uninformed, so bitter an enemy of our state, who, if the question were asked—"Tell me, of this present land and country of Greece is there a part which would have had the name, or been occupied by the Greeks who now possess it, if the heroes of Marathon and Salamis, our ancestors, had not enacted those feats of valor on their behalf?"—there is not one, I am certain, who would not answer, "No; it must all have been taken by the barbarians!" Persons that even an enemy would not rob of their praise and honor, are you, their descendants, I say, forbidden to remember by Æschines, for the sake of his own pelf? And observe, other advantages are not shared in by the dead, but praise for glorious actions is the peculiar property of those who have died in achieving it; for then even envy opposes them no longer; and the defendant, for de-
priving them of this, deserves now to be deprived of his rank, and you will do well to inflict this punishment upon him on behalf of your ancestors. But by such language, you miscreant, while of the deeds of our ancestors you made spoil and havoc with your tongue, you ruined all our affairs. And out of all this you are a landowner and become a considerable personage. For here again: Before he had wronged the state so grievously, he acknowledged that he had been a clerk and was under obligation to you for electing him, and he behaved himself with decency; but since he has wrought such infinite mischief, he has drawn up his eyebrows, and if any one says, "the ex-clerk, Ἐσχινερ," he is at once his enemy, and says he has been slandered; and he traverses the market with his robe down to his ankles, walking as stately as Pythocles, puffing out his cheeks, one of the friends and acquaintances of Philip for you—that's what he is now—one of those that would be rid of the people, and regard the present establishment as a raging sea: he that formerly worshipped the dining-hall!

Let me now recapitulate to you in what manner Philip outmanœuvred you by getting these abominable men to assist him. It is well worth your while to examine and look into the whole artifice. At first when he wanted peace, his dominions being pillaged by corsairs, and his ports having been closed so that he could enjoy none of their advantages, he sent those men who made such friendly declarations in his name, Neoptolemus, Aristodemus, Ctesiphon; but after we ambassadors had been with him, he engaged the defendant's services directly, to second and support the beastly Philocrates, and to overpower us whose intentions were honest; and he composed a letter
ON THE EMBASSY

to you, through which he mainly expected to obtain peace. Yet even this did not enable him to do anything important against you without destroying the Phocians; and that was not easy; for his affairs had been brought as it were by accident to such a critical point that either it was impossible for him to accomplish any of his objects, or he must commit falsehood and perjury, and have all men, Greeks and barbarians, witnesses of his baseness. For should he accept the Phocians as allies, and take the oaths to them in conjunction with you, it became necessary at once to break his oaths to the Thessalians and Thebans, the latter of whom he had sworn to assist in subjugating Boeotia, the former in restoring the Pylean congress. Should he refuse to accept them (as, in fact, he did refuse) he thought you would not suffer him to pass, but would send forces to Thermopylae, as, but for being overreached, you would have done, and in that case he reckoned it would be impossible to pass. This, indeed, there was no need for him to be informed by others; he had his own testimony to the fact: for the first time when he vanquished the Phocians, and overthrew their mercenary troops and their chieftain and general, Onomarchus, when no people in the world, Greek or barbarian, succored the Phocians but you, so far from passing the strait or accomplishing any of his objects by the passage, he could not even approach it. He was certain, therefore, I take it, that now when Thessaly was quarrelling with him—the Phereans, for example, refused to join his march—when the Thebans were getting the worst and had lost a battle, and a trophy had been erected over them, it was impossible to pass, if you sent forces, or to attempt it with impunity, unless he had recourse to some artifice. "How,
then, shall I escape open falsehood, and effect all my objects without the imputation of perjury? How? In this way—if I can find some Athenian citizens to deceive the Athenians; for that disgrace will not devolve upon me.' Therefore his ambassadors gave you notice that Philip would not accept the Phocians for allies; but these men explained it to the people thus—that it was not proper for Philip openly to accept the Phocians for allies, on account of the Thebans and Thessalians; but if he got things into his hands and obtained the peace, he would then do exactly what we should now desire him to agree to. By such promises and lures he obtained peace from you, excluding the Phocians; but he had next to prevent your sending succor to Thermopylae, for the chance of which even then your fifty galleys were lying at anchor, so that, if Philip advanced, you might oppose him. "Well? what contrivance shall I have again about this?" To deprive you of your opportunities, and bring matters suddenly upon you, so that, even if you wished, you should not be able to march from home. It was managed by these men accordingly, it appears. I, as you have heard several times, was unable to depart earlier, and though I hired a vessel, I was prevented from setting sail. But it was necessary also that the Phocians should put confidence in Philip, and voluntarily surrender themselves, so that no delay might intervene, and no hostile decree come from you. "Well, then; it shall be reported by the Athenian ambassadors that the Phocians are to be saved, so that even those who mistrust me will deliver themselves up, relying on the ambassadors: the Athenians themselves I will send for, that they, believing all their objects to be secured, may pass no adverse vote; and these men shall
carry such reports and assurances from me that under no circumstances will they be induced to stir."

In this manner and by such contrivances, through men doomed themselves to destruction, was everything brought to ruin; for immediately, instead of seeing Thespiae and Platea re-established, you heard that Orchomenus and Coronea were enslaved; instead of Thebes being humbled and her pride and insolence abated, the fortifications of your allies the Phocians were being razed to the ground, the persons razing them were the Thebans, who by Æschines in his speech had been scattered into villages. Instead of Eubœa being given to you as a compensation for Amphipolis, Philip is even establishing places in Eubœa to attack you from, and is continually forming designs upon Geræstus and Megara. Instead of Oropus being restored to us, we are marching out with arms to fight for Drymus and the country by Panactus, which we never did while the Phocians were in safety. Instead of the ancient rites in the temple being restored, and his treasures being recovered for the god, the genuine Amphictyons are exiled and expelled, and their country has been laid desolate; they that never were Amphictyons in the olden time, Macedonians and barbarians, are now thrusting themselves into the council; whoever makes mention of the holy treasures is thrown down the precipice, and Athens has been deprived of her preaudience at Delphi. The whole business has been a sort of enigma to the state. Philip has been disappointed in nothing, and has accomplished every one of his purposes; you, after expecting all that you could wish, have seen the reverse come to pass, and, while you appear to be at peace, have suffered greater calamities than if you were at war; and these men have
their wages for it, and up to the present day have not been brought to justice.

That they have been bribed outright for all this, and have received the price of it, has in many ways, I imagine, been apparent to you for some time; and I fear I am doing the reverse of what I intend—I have been annoying you all this time in striving to make out a complete demonstration of what you knew yourselves. However, do let me add one thing more: Is there any of the ambassadors sent by Philip to whom you, men of the jury, would erect a brazen statue in the market-place? Nay: would you give dinner in the city hall, or any other of those rewards which you honor your benefactors with? I should think not. Why? You are certainly neither ungrateful nor unjust nor bad men. It is, you would say, and with truth and justice, because they did everything for Philip and not a thing for you. Think ye then that your sentiments are such, and Philip's are different—that he confers upon these men presents of such number and value, because on their embassy they acted well and faithfully for you? Impossible. You see how he received Hegesippus and his co-ambassadors. I pass by the rest; but he banished our poet, Xenoclides, for entertaining them, his fellow-countrymen. Such is the way he behaves to those who honestly speak their opinions on your behalf, while to those who have sold themselves he behaves as he does to these men. Are witnesses required for this? Are any stronger proofs wanted for this? Can any one get this away from you?

A person however came up to me just before the opening of the court, and told me the strangest thing—that he was prepared to accuse Chares, and expected, by taking
that course and talking in that style, to impose on you. Now I will not strongly insist upon this fact, that Chares (howsoever brought to trial) has been found to have acted faithfully and loyalty, as far as lay in his power, for your interests, though he has incurred many failures through persons who from corrupt motives ruin everything; but I will make a large concession. Let me grant that the defendant will speak nothing about him but the truth: even then, I say, it is a perfect mockery for the defendant to accuse him; for I charge not Ἀσχίνης with any of the transactions in the war (for them the generals are accountable), nor with the state’s having concluded peace: but thus far I acquit him entirely. What then do I say, and from what do my charges take their rise? From his speaking, when the state was concluding peace, on the side of Philocrates, and not on theirs who moved for the good of the country; and from his having taken bribes; from his afterward on the second embassy wasting the times, and performing none of your instructions; from his tricking the state, and, after giving us to expect that Philip would do all we desired, having utterly ruined our affairs; from his afterward, when others warned you to beware of a man who had done so many wrongs, appearing as that man’s advocate. These are my charges; keep these in remembrance: for a just and equitable peace, and men who had betrayed nothing and not afterward told lies, I would even have commended, and advised you to honor them with a crown. But if any general has injured you, it has nothing to do with the present inquiry. For what general has lost Halas, or who has destroyed the Phocians? who Doriscus? who Cersobleptes? who the Sacred Mountain? who Thermopylae? who has given to Philip a road all the
way to Attica through the territory of friends and allies? who has alienated Coronea, Orchomenus, Euboea? who nearly Megara lately? who has made the Thebans powerful? Of all these important matters none was lost through the generals; none has Philip had yielded to him at the peace with your consent: they have been lost through these men and their venality. If therefore he shirks these points, if, to lead you astray, he will talk of anything sooner than them: meet him as I suggest—"We are not sitting in judgment upon a general; you are not tried upon those charges. Don’t tell us who else has caused the destruction of the Phocians, but show that you are not the cause. Why, if Demosthenes did any wrong, do you mention it now, but did not accuse him when he rendered his account? For this very reason you have deserved to perish. Don’t tell us that peace is a fine thing or an advantageous thing, for no one charges you with the state’s having concluded peace; but that the peace is not a shameful and ignominious one—that we have not been cheated in many ways and all was not lost after it—this you may tell us. For all these consequences are proved to have been brought upon us by you; and how is it that up to this very day you praise the author of such things?" If you keep watch upon him thus, he will have nothing to say, but will raise his voice here and have exercised himself in spouting all to no purpose.

About his voice too it may be necessary to say something; for I hear that upon this also he very confidently relies, as if he can overpower you by his acting. I think, however, you would be committing a gross absurdity, if, when he played the miseries of Thyestes and the men at Troy, you drove and hissed him off the boards, and nearly
stoned him to death, so that at last he desisted from his playing of third-rate parts, yet now that, not upon the stage, but in public and most important affairs of state, he has wrought infinity of evil, you should pay regard to him as a fine speaker. Heaven forbid! Do not you be guilty of any folly, but consider: if you are making trial of a herald, you should see that he has a good voice, but if of an ambassador and undertaker of public duties, that he is honest, that he demeans himself with spirit as your representative, like a fellow-citizen toward you; as I (for example) had no respect for Philip, but respected the prisoners, delivered them, and never flinched; whereas the defendant crouched before him, and sang the paeans, but you he disregarded. Further, when you see eloquence or a fine voice or any other such accomplishment in a man of probity and honorable ambition, you should all rejoice at it and encourage its display; for it is a common advantage to you all: but when you see the like in a corrupt and base man, who yields to every temptation of gain, you should discourage and hear him with enmity and aversion; as knavery, getting from you the reputation of power, is an engine against the state. You see what mighty troubles have fallen upon the state from what the defendant has got renown by. And other powers are tolerably independent; but that of speaking is crippled, if you the hearers are unfavorable. Listen then to this man as to a venal knave, who will not speak a syllable of truth.

Observe now, that not only in other respects, but in relation to your dealings with Philip, it is in every way expedient for the defendant to be convicted. For, on the one hand, should he ever arrive at the necessity of doing justice to Athens, he will alter his plan; now he has deter-
mined to cheat the many and court the few, but if he hear
that these men are destroyed he will choose hereafter to
serve you the many and masters of all. On the other hand,
should he continue in the same position of power and
pride, the persons who are ready to do anything for him
you will have removed from the country, if you remove
these. How think ye?—men that acted so, believing they
should be called to account—what will they do if they
have your license for their acts? What Euthycrates, what
Lasithenes, what traitor will they not surpass? And which
of all the rest will not be a worse member of the common-
wealth, seeing that those who have sold your interests
obtain riches, credit, a capital in Philip's friendship, while
those who behave themselves like honest men and have
spent money of their own get annoyance, enmity, ill-will
from a certain class of people? Never let it come to this!
Neither for your honor, nor for your religion, nor for your
safety, nor in any other point of view, is it desirable to
acquit the defendant. You must avenge yourselves, and
make him an example to all, both to your fellow-citizens
and to the rest of the Greeks.
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

OLYNTHUS was a city in Macedonia, at the head of the Toroniac gulf, and north of the peninsula of Pallene. It was colonized by a people from Chalcis in Euboea, and commanded a large district called Chalcidice, in which there were thirty-two cities. Over all this tract the sway of Olynthus was considerable, and she had waged wars anciently with Athens and Sparta, and been formidable to Philip's predecessors on the throne of Macedon. Soon after Philip's accession, the Olynthians had disputes with him, which were at first accommodated, and he gratified them by the cession of Anthemus. They then joined him in a war against Athens, and he gave up to them Potidaea, which had yielded to their united arms. After the lapse of some years, during which Philip had greatly increased his power, and acquired considerable influence in Thessaly and Thrace, the Olynthians became alarmed, and began to think him too dangerous a neighbor. The immediate cause of rupture was an attack which he made on one of the Chalcidian towns. An embassy was instantly sent to Athens, to negotiate an alliance. Philip, considering this as an infraction of their treaty with him, declared war against them, and invaded their territory. A second embassy was sent to Athens, pressing for assistance. The question was debated in the popular assembly. Demades, an orator of considerable ability, but profligate character, opposed the alliance. Many speakers were heard; and at length Demosthenes rose to support the prayer of the embassy, delivering one of those clear and forcible speeches which seldom failed to make a strong impression on his audience. The alliance was accepted, and succors voted.

The orator here delicately touches on the law of Eubulus, which had made it capital to propose that the Theoric fund should be applied to military service. This fund was in fact the surplus revenue of the civil administration, which by the ancient law was appropriated to the defence of the commonwealth; but it had by various means been diverted from that purpose, and expended in largesses to the people, to enable them to attend the theatre; and other public shows and amusements. The law of Eubulus perpetuated this abuse. Demosthenes, seeing the necessity of a war supply, hints that this absurd law ought to be abolished, but does not openly propose it.

There has been much difference of opinion among the learned as to the order of
the three Olynthiac orations; nor is it certain whether they were spoken on the occasion of one embassy, or several embassies. The curious may consult Bishop Thirlwall's Appendix to the fifth volume of his Grecian History, and Jacob's Introduction to his translation. I have followed the common order, as adopted by Bekker, whose edition of Demosthenes is the text of this translation; and indeed my opinion is, on the whole, in favor of preserving the common order.

I BELIEVE, men of Athens, you would give much to know what is the true policy to be adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the case, you should be willing to hear with attention those who offer you their counsel. Besides that you will have the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I esteem it part of your good fortune that many fit suggestions will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from them all you may easily choose what is profitable.

The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand, if you care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in the matter.¹ My own opinion is, vote succor immediately, and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before; send also ambassadors to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For the danger is that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other times (his threats may well be believed), slandering us and urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some of our

¹ This is a cautious way of hinting at the general reluctance to adopt a vigorous policy. And the reader will observe the use of the first person, whereby the orator includes himself in the same inscription.
main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the very cause of Philip's strength is a circumstance favorable to you. His having it in his sole power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and everywhere accompanying his army, is a great advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but, for a peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians that now they are fighting, not for glory or a slice of territory, but to save their country from destruction and servitude. They know how he treated those Amphipolitans who surrendered to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance. And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all else of importance considered, I say, you must take heart and spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing undone. No plea or pretence is left you for declining your duty. What you were all so clamorous about that the Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has, of itself, come to pass, and in a way most advantageous to you. For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they might have been slippery allies, with minds but half resolved, perhaps: but since they hate him on a quarrel of their own, their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when we returned from succoring the Eubeans, and Hierax and
Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform, urging us to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of Euboea, you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places (not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt and reasonable succor, we should have found Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king of Macedon ever was. Here, then, is come a crisis, this of Olynthus, self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And, methinks, men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our acceptance, I must regard as manifestations of divine favor. It is much the same as in money matters. If a man keep what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if he lose it by imprudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation. So in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even the good which the gods send them; for every prior event is judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athe-

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2 The hustings from which the speakers addressed the people. It was cut to the height of ten feet out of the rock which formed the boundary wall of the assembly; and was ascended by a flight of steps.
nians, we must be exceedingly careful of our future measures, that by amendment therein we may efface the shame of the past. Should we abandon these men, too, and Philip reduce Olynthus, let any one tell me, what is to prevent him marching where he pleases? Does any one of you, Athenians, compute or consider the means by which Philip, originally weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa next, Methone afterward, he invaded Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pheræ, Pagasæ, Magnesia, everywhere exactly as he pleased, he departed for Thrace; where, after displacing some kings and establishing others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Pæonia, that against Arymbas, and some others.

Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you, Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one thing after another, and the activity which forms part of Philip's habit and existence, which makes it impossible for him to rest content with his achievements. If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has done, and yours to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what the end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple as not to know that the war yonder will soon be here, if we are careless? And should this happen, I fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so will it

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8 Here he points to the Olymthian ambassadors.
4 Arymbas was a king of the Molossians in Epirus, and uncle of Olympias, Philip's wife.

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be with us; found to have paid dear for our idleness and self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts, and struggle for the salvation of our country.

To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show what measures the case requires, is a part of a counsellor. I am not ignorant, Athenians, that frequently, when any disappointment happens, you are angry, not with the parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I suppress what I deem for your interest. I say, then, you must give a twofold assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns, and send out troops for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the expedition will be fruitless. For should he, suffering your incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will easily march to the defence of his kingdom; or, should you only throw succor into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time prevail over the besieged. Your assistance, therefore, must be effective and twofold.

Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund than any people; and you receive it just as you please. If ye will assign this to your troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or rather ye have none at all. How, then? some man may exclaim: do you move that this be a military fund? Verily, not I.* My opinion, indeed, is that there should

* There is some studied obscurity in this passage, owing to the necessity under which the speaker lay of avoiding the penalty of the law; and a little
be soldiers raised, and a military fund, and one and the same regulation for receiving and performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that all must contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little. Money must be had; without it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other ways and means. Choose which ye think expedient; and put hands to the work, while it is yet time.

It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's affairs now stand. They are not, as they appear, or as an inattentive observer might pronounce, in very good trim, or in the most favorable position. He would never have commenced this war had he imagined he must fight. He expected to carry everything on the first advance, and has been mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles and dispirits him; another is the state of Thessaly. That people were always, you know, treacherous to all men; and just as they ever have been, they are to Philip. They have resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasee, and have prevented his fortifying Magnesia; and I was told they would no longer allow him to take the revenue of their harbors and markets, which they say should be applied to the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip. Now, if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much straitened

quiet satire on his countrymen, who seemed desirous of eating their pudding and having it too. The logic of the argument runs thus—My opinion is, that we ought to have a military fund, and that no man should receive public money, without performing public service. However, as you prefer taking the public money to pay for your places at the festivals, I will not break the law by moving to apply that money to another purpose. Only you gain nothing by it; for, as the troops must be paid, there must be an extraordinary contribution, or property tax, to meet the exigency of the case.
for paying his mercenaries. And surely we must suppose that Esonians and Illyrians, and all such people, would rather be free and independent than under subjection; for they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant. So report says, and I can well believe it; for undeserved success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it appears often that to maintain prosperity is harder than to acquire it. Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his difficulty as your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the war, sending embassies where required, taking arms yourselves, exciting all other people; for if Philip got such an opportunity against us, and there was a war on our frontier, how eagerly think ye he would attack you! Then are you not ashamed that the very damage which you would suffer, if he had the power, you dare not seize the moment to inflict on him?

And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now the choice, whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold out, you will fight there and distress his dominions, enjoying your own home in peace. If Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his marching here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who cannot defend their own country without your assistance. Or some other ally? But, good sir, he will not desire! Strange indeed, if, what he is thought fool-hardy for prating now, this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument. If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only, and take the necessaries for camp-service from the land (I mean, without an enemy therein), your agricultural popu-
lation would sustain, I believe, greater damage than what the whole expense of the late war amounted to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected? There is the insult, too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any damage, to right-thinking men.

On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our succor, and drive off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance which they happily possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the young, that gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they may become redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the orators, that they may pass a good account of their statesmanship; for on the result of measures will depend your judgment of their conduct. May it for every cause be prosperous.

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6 The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.
7 Strictly, those of the military age, which was from eighteen years to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were liable only to serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison the walls. Afterward they were liable to any military service, under the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens.
8 Every man, who is required to justify the acts for which he is responsible, may be said to be "called to account." But Demosthenes speaks with peculiar reference to those accounts, which men in official situations at Athens were required to render at the close of their administration.
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and resolved to send succours. But the sending of them was delayed, partly by the contrivance of the opposite faction, partly from the reluctance of the people themselves to engage in a war with Philip. Demosthenes stimulates them to exertion, and encourages them, by showing that Philip’s power is not so great as it appears.

ON MANY occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the gods to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the present. That here are men prepared for a war with Philip, possessed of a neighboring territory and some power; and (what is most important) so fixed in their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an extraordinary act of divine beneficence. It must then be our care, Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances have been; as it would be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have abandoned not only cities and places that once belonged to us, but also the allies and advantages provided by fortune.

To dilate, Athenians, on Philip’s power, and by such discourse to incite you to your duty, I think improper: and why? Because all that may be said on that score involves matter of glory for him, and misconduct on our part. The more he has transcended his repute, the more is he universally admired; you, as you have used your advantages unworthily, have incurred the greater disgrace.
This topic, then, I shall pass over. Indeed, Athenians, a correct observer will find the source of his greatness here, and not in himself. But of measures, for which Philip's partisans deserve his gratitude and your vengeance, I see no occasion to speak now. Other things are open to me, which it concerns you all to know, and which must, on a due examination, Athenians, reflect great disgrace on Philip. To these will I address myself.

To call him perjured and treacherous, without showing what he has done, might justly be termed idle abuse. But to go through all his actions and convict him in detail, will take, as it happens, but a short time, and is expedient, I think, for two reasons: first, that his baseness may appear in its true light; secondly, that they, whose terror imagines Philip to be invincible, may see he has run through all the artifices by which he rose to greatness, and his career is just come to an end. I myself, men of Athens, should most assuredly have regarded Philip as an object of fear and admiration, had I seen him exalted by honorable conduct; but observing and considering I find, that in the beginning, when certain persons drove away the Olynthians who desired a conference with us, he gained over our simplicity by engaging to surrender Amphipolis, and to execute the secret article once so famous; afterward he

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1 In this assembly, by the contrivance of venal orators, or through the supineness of the people. In the first Philippic there is a more pointed allusion to the practice of Philip's adherents, who are charged with sending him secret intelligence of what passed at home. Such men as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, perhaps Demades and others are referred to. Æschines had not yet begun to be a friend of Philip.

2 A secret intrigue was carried on between Philip and the Athenians, by which he engaged to put Amphipolis in their hands, but on the understanding that they would deliver up Pydna to him. Demosthenes only mentions the former part of the arrangement, the latter not being honorable to his countrymen.
got the friendship of the Olynthians, by taking Potidæa from you, wronging you his former allies, and delivering it to them; and lastly now the Thessalians, by promising to surrender Magnesia, and undertake the Phocian war on their behalf. In short, none who have dealt with him has he not deceived. He has risen by conciliating and cajoling the weakness of every people in turn who knew him not. As, therefore, by such means he rose, when every people imagined he would advance their interest, so ought he by the same means to be pulled down again, when the selfish aim of his whole policy is exposed. To this crisis, O Athenians, are Philip's affairs come; or let any man stand forward and prove to me, or rather to you, that my assertions are false, or that men whom Philip has once overreached will trust him hereafter, or that the Thessalians who have been degraded into servitude would not gladly become free.

But if any among you, though agreeing in these statements, thinks that Philip will maintain his power by having occupied forts and havens and the like, this is a mistake. True, when a confederacy subsists by goodwill, and all parties to the war have a common interest, men are willing to co-operate and bear hardships and persevere. But when one has grown strong, like Philip, by rapacity and artifice, on the first pretext, the slightest reverse, all is overturned and broken up. Impossible is it—impossible, Athenians—to acquire a solid power by injustice and perjury and falsehood. Such things last for once, or for a short period; maybe they blossom fairly with hope; but in time they are discovered and drop away. As a house, a ship, or the like, ought to have the lower parts firmest, so in human conduct, I ween, the principle and founda-
tion should be just and true. But this is not so in Philip's conduct.

I say, then, we should at once aid the Olynthians (the best and quickest way that can be suggested will please me most) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some of our measures, and to stir up the rest; for they have now resolved to demand Pagasse, and remonstrate about Magnesia. But look to this, Athenians, that our envoys shall not only make speeches, but have some real proof that we have gone forth as becomes our country, and are engaged in action. All speech without action appears vain and idle, but especially that of our commonwealth; as the more we are thought to excel therein, the more is our speaking distrusted by all. You must show yourselves greatly reformed, greatly changed, contributing, serving personally, acting promptly, before any one will pay attention to you. And if ye will perform these duties properly and becomingly, Athenians, not only will it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor state of his native empire and power will be revealed.

To speak roundly, the Macedonian power and empire is very well as a help, as it was for you in Timotheus's time against the Olynthians; likewise for them against Potidæa the conjunction was important; and lately it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the regnant house: and the accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly useful. But the Macedonian is feeble of itself, and full of defects. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's greatness, his wars and his expeditions, have made it more insecure than it was originally. Think not, Athenians, that Philip and his
subjects have the same likings. He desires glory, makes that his passion, is ready for any consequence of adventure and peril, preferring to a life of safety the honor of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did before. They have no share in the glorious result; ever harassed by these excursions up and down, they suffer and toil incessantly, allowed no leisure for their employments or private concerns, unable even to dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed on account of the war. By this then may easily be seen how the Macedonians in general are disposed to Philip. His mercenaries and guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained soldiers, but, as I heard from one who had been in the country, a man incapable of falsehood, they are no better than others. For if there be any among them experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous of such men and drives them away, he says, wishing to keep the glory of all actions to himself; his jealousy (among other failings) being excessive. Or if any man be generally good and virtuous, unable to bear Philip's daily intemperances, drunkenness, and indecencies, he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character, who will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you. My information is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as worse rascals than mountebanks, Callias the town-slave and the like of him, antic-jesters, and composers of ribald songs to lampoon

8 The original signifies a certain lascivious dance, which formed a part of riotous festivities. We gather from history that the orator's description here is not wholly untrue, though exaggerated. It has been observed, that Philip's partiality for drinking and dancing, his drollery, and a dash of scurrility in his character, endeared him especially to the Thessalians.
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

their companions, such persons Philip caresses and keeps about him. Small matters these may be thought, Athenians, but to the wise they are strong indications of his character and wrongheadedness. Success perhaps throws a shade over them now; prosperity is a famous hider of such blemishes; but, on any miscarriage, they will be fully exposed. And this (trust me, Athenians) will appear in no long time, if the gods so will and you determine. For as in the human body a man in health feels not partial ailments, but, when illness occurs, all are in motion, whether it be a rupture or a sprain or anything else un- sound; so with states and monarchs, while they wage external war, their weaknesses are undiscerned by most men, but the tug of a frontier war betrays all.

If any of you think Philip a formidable opponent, because they see he is fortunate, such reasoning is prudent, Athenians. Fortune has indeed a great preponderance—nay, is everything, in human affairs. Not but that, if I had the choice, I should prefer our fortune to Philip's, would you but moderately perform your duty. For I see you have many more claims to the divine favor than he has. But we sit doing nothing; and a man idle himself cannot require even his friends to act for him, much less the gods. No wonder then that he, marching and toiling in person, present on all occasions, neglecting no time or season, prevails over us delaying and voting and inquiring. I marvel not at that; the contrary would have been marvellous, if we doing none of the duties of war had beaten one doing all. But this surprises me, that formerly, Athenians, you resisted the Lacedæmonians for the rights of Greece, and rejecting many opportunities of selfish gain, to secure the rights of others, expended your property in
contributions, and bore the brunt of the battle; yet now you are loth to serve, slow to contribute, in defence of your own possessions, and, though you have often saved the other nations of Greece collectively and individually, under your own losses you sit still. This surprises me, and one thing more, Athenians; that not one of you can reckon how long your war with Philip has lasted and what you have been doing while the time has passed. You surely know that while you have been delaying, expecting others to act, accusing, trying one another, expecting again, doing much the same as ye do now, all the time has passed away. Then are ye so senseless, Athenians, as to imagine that the same measures which have brought the country from a prosperous to a poor condition will bring it from a poor to a prosperous? Unreasonable were this and unnatural; for all things are easier kept than gotten. The war now has left us nothing to keep; we have all to get, and the work must be done by ourselves. I say then, you must contribute money, serve in person with alacrity, accuse no one, till you have gained your objects; then, judging from facts, honor the deserving, punish offenders; let there be no pretences or defaults on your own part; for you cannot harshly scrutinize the conduct of others, unless you have done what is right yourselves. Why, think you, do all the generals whom you commission avoid this

4 A system of employing mercenary troops sprang up at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when there were numerous Grecian bands accustomed to warfare and seeking employment. Such troops were eagerly sought for by the Persian satraps and their king, by such men as Jason of Pherae, Dionysius of Syracuse, or Philomelus of Phocea. Athens, which had partially employed mercenaries before, began to make use of them on a large scale, while her citizens preferred staying at home, to attend to commerce, politics, and idle amusements. The ill effects however were soon apparent. Athenian generals, ill supplied with money, and having little control over their followers, were
war, and seek wars of their own (for of the generals too must a little truth be told)? Because here the prizes of the war are yours; for example, if Amphipolis be taken, you will immediately recover it; the commanders have all the risk and no reward. But in the other case the risks are less, and the gains belong to the commanders and soldiers; Lamphacaeus, Sigeum, the vessels which they plunder. So they proceed to secure their several interests: you, when you look at the bad state of your affairs, bring the generals to trial; but when they get a hearing and plead these necessities, you dismiss them. The result is that, while you are quarrelling and divided, some holding one opinion, some another, the commonwealth goes wrong. Formerly, Athenians, you had boards for taxes; now you have boards for politics. There is an orator presiding on either side, a general under him, and three hundred men to shout; the rest of you are attached to the one party or the other. This you must leave off; be yourselves again; establish a general liberty of speech, deliberation, and action. If some are appointed to command as with royal authority, some to be ship-captains, taxpayers, soldiers by compulsion, others only to vote against them, and help

tempted or obliged to engage in enterprises unconnected with, and often adverse to, the interests of their country. Sometimes the general, as well as the troops, was an alien, and could be very little depended on.

* Chares, the Athenian general, was said to have received these Asiatic cities from Artabazus, the Persian satrap, in return for the service he had performed. Probably it was some authority or privileges in those cities, not the actual dominion, that was conferred upon him.

* This refers to the boards for management of the property-tax at Athens. The argument of Demosthenes is as follows: The three hundred wealthier citizens, who were associated by law for purposes of taxation, had become a clique for political purposes, with an orator at their head (he intentionally uses the term chairman of the board) to conduct the business of the assembly, while they stood to shout and applaud his speeches. The general, who held a judicial court to decide disputes about the property-tax, and who in matters of state ought to be independent, was subservient to the orator, who defended him in the popular assembly.
in nothing besides, no duty will be seasonably performed; the aggrieved parties will still fail you, and you will have to punish them instead of your enemies. I say, in short, you must all fairly contribute, according to each man’s ability; take your turns of service till you have all been afield; give every speaker a hearing, and adopt the best counsel, not what this or that person advises. If ye act thus, not only will ye praise the speaker at the moment, but yourselves afterward, when the condition of the country is improved.

THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

The Athenians had despatched succors to Olynthus, and received, as Libanius says, some favorable intelligence; more probably, however, some vague rumors, which led them to imagine the danger was for the time averted. They began, very prematurely, as the result showed, to be confident of success, and talked of punishing Philip for his presumption. In this they were encouraged by certain foolish orators, who sought to flatter the national prejudices. Demosthenes in this oration strives to check the arrogance of the people; reminds them of the necessity of defensive rather than offensive measures, and especially of the importance of preserving their allies. He again adverted (and this time more boldly) to the law of Eubulus, which he intimates ought to be repealed; and he exhorts the Athenians generally to make strenuous exertions against Philip.

NOT the same ideas, men of Athens, are presented to me; when I look at our condition, and when at the speeches which are delivered. The speeches, I find, are about punishing Philip; but our condition is come to this, that we must mind we are not first damaged ourselves. Therefore, it seems to me, these orators commit the simple error of not laying before you the true subject of debate. That once we might safely have held
our own and punished Philip, too, I know well enough; both have been possible in my own time, not very long ago. But now, I am persuaded, it is sufficient in the first instance to effect the preservation of our allies. When this has been secured, one may look out for revenge on Philip; but before we lay the foundation right, I deem it idle to talk about the end.

The present crisis, O Athenians, requires, if any ever did, much thought and counsel. Not that I am puzzled in what advice to give in the matter; I am only doubtful in what way, Athenians, to address you thereupon. For I have been taught, both by hearsay and experience, that most of your advantages have escaped you, from unwillingness to do your duty, not from ignorance. I request you, if I speak my mind, to be patient, and consider only whether I speak the truth, and with a view to future amendment. You see to what wretched plight we are reduced by some men haranguing for popularity.

I think it necessary, however, first to recall to your memory a few past events. You remember, Athenians, when news came three or four years ago, that Philip was in Thrace besieging Herseum. It was then the fifth month, and after much discussion and tumult in the assembly you resolved to launch forty galleys, that every citizen under forty-five should embark, and a tax be

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1 A fortress on the Propontis (now Sea of Marmora), near Perinthus. This was a post of importance to the Athenians, who received large supplies of corn from that district.

2 Corresponding nearly to our November. The Attic year began in July, and contained twelve lunar months, of alternately twenty-nine and thirty days. The Greeks attempted to make the lunar and solar courses coincide by cycles of years, but fell into great confusion.

3 This large proportion of the serviceable citizens shows the alarm at Athens. Philip's illness seems to have put a stop to his progress in Thrace at this period. Immediately on his recovery he began his aggression against Olynthia.
raised of sixty talents. That year passed; the first, second, third month arrived; in that month, reluctantly, after the mysteries, you despatched Charidemus with ten empty ships and five talents in money; for as Philip was reported to be sick or dead (both rumors came) you thought there was no longer any occasion for succors, and discontinued the armament. But that was the very occasion; if we had then sent our succors quickly, as we resolved, Philip would not have been saved to trouble us now.

Those events cannot be altered. But here is the crisis of another war, the cause why I mentioned the past that you may not repeat your error. How shall we deal with it, men of Athens? If you lend not the utmost possible aid, see how you will have manœuvred everything for Philip's benefit. There were the Olynthians, possessed of some power; and matters stood thus: Philip distrusted them, and they Philip. We negotiated for peace with them; this hampered (as it were) and annoyed Philip that a great city, reconciled to us, should be watching opportunities against him. We thought it necessary by all means to make that people his enemies; and lo, what erewhile you clamored for, has somehow or other been accomplished. Then what remains, Athenians, but to assist them vigorously and promptly? I know not. For besides the disgrace that would fall upon us, if we sacrificed any of our interests, I am alarmed for the consequences, seeing how the Thebans are affected toward us, the Phocian treasury exhausted, nothing to prevent Philip, when he has subdued what lies before him, from turning to matters here. Whoever postpones until then the per-

4 The Eleusinian Mysteries, in honor of Ceres and Proserpine, called The Mysteries from their peculiar sanctity.
formance of his duty, wishes to see the peril at hand, when he may hear of it elsewhere, and to seek auxiliaries for himself, when he may be auxiliary to others; for that this will be the issue, if we throw away our present advantage, we all know pretty well.

But, it may be said, we have resolved that succors are necessary, and we will send them; tell us only how. Marvel not then, Athenians, if I say something to astonish the multitude. Appoint law revisers: at their session enact no statutes, for you have enough, but repeal those which are at present injurious; I mean, just plainly, the laws concerning our theatrical fund, and some concerning the troops, whereof the former divide the military fund among stayers-at-home for theatrical amusement, the latter indemnify deserters, and so dishearten men well inclined to the service. When you have repealed these, and made the road to good counsel safe, then find a man to propose what you all know to be desirable. But before doing so, look not for one who will advise good measures and be destroyed by you for his pains. Such a person you will not find, especially as the only result would be, for the adviser and mover to suffer wrongfully, and, without forwarding matters, to render good counsel still more dangerous in future. Besides, Athenians, you should require the same men to repeal these laws who have introduced them. It is unjust that their authors should enjoy a popularity which has

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5 A provision was made by Solon for a periodical revision of the Athenian laws by means of a legislative committee. They were chosen by lot from the judicial body, on a reference to them by a vote of the popular assembly. Demosthenes says, "enact no statutes," instead of saying "let the committee enact no statutes." This is because the committee would be taken from the people themselves, and the part is treated as the whole.
injured the commonwealth, while the adviser of salutary measures suffers by a displeasure that may lead to general improvement. Till this is set right, Athenians, look not that any one should be so powerful with you as to transgress these laws with impunity, or so senseless as to plunge into ruin right before him.

Another thing, too, you should observe, Athenians, that a decree is worth nothing, without a readiness on your part to do what you determine. Could decrees of themselves compel you to perform your duty, or execute what they prescribe, neither would you with many decrees have accomplished little or nothing, nor would Philip have insulted you so long. Had it depended on decrees, he would have been chastised long ago. But the course of things is otherwise. Action, posterior in order of time to speaking and voting, is in efficacy prior and superior. This requisite you want; the others you possess. There are among you, Athenians, men competent to advise what is needful, and you are exceedingly quick at understanding it; ay, and you will be able now to perform it, if you act rightly. For what time or season would you have better than the present? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has not the man got possession of all our strongholds? And if he become master of this country, shall we not incur foul disgrace? Are not they, to whom we promised sure protection in case of war, at this moment in hostilities? Is he not an enemy, holding our possessions—a barbarian*—anything you like to call

* Barbarians (among the Greeks) designates persons who were not of Hellenic origin. Alexander, an ancestor of Philip, had obtained admission to the Olympic games by proving himself to be of Argive descent. But the Macedonian people were scarcely considered as Greeks till a much later period; and Demosthenes speaks rather with reference to the nation than to Philip personally.
him? But, O heavens! after permitting, almost helping him to accomplish these things, shall we inquire who were to blame for them? I know we shall not take the blame to ourselves. For so in battles, no runaway accuses himself, but his general, his neighbor, any one rather; though, sure enough, the defeat is owing to all the runaways; for each who accuses the rest might have stood his ground, and had each done so, they would have conquered. Now, then, does any man not give the best advice? Let another rise and give it, but not censure the last speaker. Does a second give better advice? Follow it, and success attend you! Perhaps it is not pleasant: but that is not the speaker’s fault, unless he omits some needful prayer. To pray is simple enough, Athenians, collecting all that one desires in a short petition: but to decide, when measures are the subject of consideration, is not quite so easy; for we must choose the profitable rather than the pleasant, where both are not compatible.

But if any one can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it may be asked. I grant it, if this were possible: but I wonder if any man ever was or will be able, after wasting his means in useless expenses, to find means for useful. The wishes of men are, indeed, a great help to such arguments, and therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit, for every man believes what he wishes, though the reality is often different. See, then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and you will be able to serve and have pay. It becomes not a wise or magnanimous people to neglect military operations for want of money, and bear disgraces like these; or, while you snatch up arms to
march against Corinthians and Megarians, to let Philip
enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your
troops.

I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving of-
fence: I am not so foolish or perverse as to provoke
your displeasure without intending your good: but I
think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement
of the commonweal to the gratification of his audience.
And I hear, as perhaps you do, that the speakers in our
ancestors’ time, whom all that address you praise, but not
exactly imitate, were politicians after this form and fash-
ion;—Aristides, Nicias, my namesake,1 Pericles. But
since these orators have appeared, who ask, What is
your pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige
you? the public welfare is complimented away for a
moment’s popularity, and these are the results; the ora-
tors thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what
a summary contrast may be drawn between the doings in
our olden time and in yours. It is a tale brief and fa-
miliar to all; for the examples by which you may still
be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at
home. Our forefathers, whom the speakers humored not
nor caressed, as these men caress you, for five-and-forty
years took the leadership of the Greeks by general con-
sent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the
citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to
them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glo-
rious trophies they erected for victories won by their own
fighting on land and sea, and they are the sole people in
the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to

1 Demosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian war, who
defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in Sicily.
envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and consecrated furniture that posterity has no power to surpass them. In private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our constitution that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had, or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no grander than those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth. By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods, brother-like among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.

So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness or resemblance? I pass over other topics, on which I could expatiate; but observe: in this utter absence of competitors (Lacedaemonians depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the supremacy with us), when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory, and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come forward and tell me by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? Look at the men of
whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from obscurity to honor; some have made their private houses more splendid than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined their fortunes have been exalted.

What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously then, and now goes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his share of honor, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen dispose of emoluments; through them everything is done; you, the people, enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you paltry beeves; and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be similar. By Ceres, I should not wonder if I, for mentioning these things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects; I marvel, indeed, you have allowed it here.

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8 Entertainments were frequently given to the people after sacrifices, at which a very small part of the victim was devoted to the gods, such as the legs, and intestines, the rest being kept for more profane purposes. The Athenians were remarkably extravagant in sacrifices. Demades, ridiculing the donations of public meat, compared the republic to an old woman sitting at home in slippers and supping her broth. Demosthenes charges the magistrates with supplying lean and poor oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy and large.
THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military service and act worthily of yourselves; would you employ these domestic superfluities as a means to gain advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians, perhaps you might gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of these perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for the sick. As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the patient to die, so your allowances are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor yet permit you to reject them and turn to something else. Thus do they increase the general apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you stipendiary service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all, Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public, may be what the state requires. Is peace to be had? You are better at home, under no compulsion to act dishonorably from indigence. Is there such an emergency as the present? Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your country’s cause, maintained by those very allowances. Is any one of you beyond the military age? What he now irregularly takes without doing service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting needful business. Thus, without derogating from or adding to our political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into order, establishing a uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in war, for sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give to idlers the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and helpless, to hear that such a one’s mercenaries are victorious; as we now do. Not that I blame any one who does you a service: I only call upon you, Athenians, to perform on your own account those
duties for which you honor strangers, and not to surrender that post of dignity which, won through many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.

I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you will adopt that course which is best for the country and yourselves.

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

Philip, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward the pass of Thermopylae, which, however, he found occupied by the Athenians, who had sent a force for the purpose of preventing his advance. Being baffled there, he directed his march into Thrace, and alarmed the Athenians for the safety of their dominions in the Chersonese. At the same time he sent a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and Imbrus, infested the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even insulted her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing the cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes, or extending his own influence over other parts of Thrace, where he established or expelled the rulers, as it suited him. It was just at that time that Demosthenes spoke the following oration, the first in which he called the attention of his countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's power. He had become convinced by the course of events, and by observing the restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to fear from him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly appreciated the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as he was now by the friendship of Thessaly, possessed of a navy and maritime towns, and relieved from the presence of any powerful neighbors. What were the precise views of Demosthenes as to the extent of the impending danger, we cannot say. It was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to awaken them from their lethargy. This he does in a speech, which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his countrymen; points out both their weakness and their strength; rouses them to a sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it; recommends not any extraordinary efforts, for which at the moment there was no urgent
necessity, and to make which would have exceeded their power, but unfolds a scheme, simple and feasible, suiting the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.

Had the question for debate been anything new, Athenians, I should have waited till most of the usual speakers had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking, I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the subject of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity for deliberating now.

First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the same, there would be no hope of amendment.

Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember; how vast a power the Lacedæmonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that

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1 By an ancient ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years of age were first called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased to be in force; but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate. There could be frequent occasions for departing from such a custom, and Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking first.

2 He refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans against Lacedæmon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos. That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers.

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nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take for example the strength of the Lacedæmonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidæa and Methone and all the region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion. But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of war, that the possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present, those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such principle, he has won everything and keeps it, either by way of conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side with and respect those whom they see prepared and willing to make proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now, though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give his service to the state, be ready to give it without excuse, the wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing himself, while his neighbor does everything for
him, you shall then with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are who hate and fear and envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has advanced, who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and, while we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then, Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now? Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one another—is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should anything befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his own strength as by our negligence. And again; should anything happen to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them as you pleased;
but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis, you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor counsels at hand.

However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I say no more.

As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you from your difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the best and speediest method (in my judgment) of providing all the necessaries, I shall endeavor to inform you forthwith, making only one request, men of Athens. When you have heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And let none think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak most to the purpose (for what has already happened we shall not be able to prevent by our present armament); but he that shows what and how great and whence procured must be the force capable of enduring, till either we have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall we escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show, without offence to any other man who has a plan to offer. My promise indeed is large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my judges.

First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships, and hold ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require also an equipment of

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* The Athenian ship of war at this time was the “trireme,” or galley with three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak with a sharp iron head, which, in a charge (generally made at the broadside), was able to shatter the planks of the enemy’s vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew and marines. These last were usually ten for each ship, but the number was often increased.
transports for half the cavalry, and sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden marches from his own country to Thermopylæ, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to Euboea, and formerly (they say) to Haliartus, and very lately to Thermopylæ. And although you should not pursue just the course I would advise, it is no slight matter that Philip, knowing you to be in readiness—know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own people who report everything to him—may either keep quiet from apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard, there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper, but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend—and beware of doing what has often

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4 The total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one hundred.

5 The expedition about five years before, when the Thebans had sent an army to Euboea, and Timotheus roused his countrymen to expel them from the island.

6 B.C. 395, when the war between Thebes and Sparta had begun, and Lysander besieged Hallartus. He was slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.

7 Literally "written in letters"; that is, promised to the generals or allies, but never sent.
been injurious—thinking all measures below the occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish the least—rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right, serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so as to relieve one another: the rest should be mercenaries. And with them two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.

Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force, therefore, must not be over-large (for there is not pay or subsistence), nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary troops at Corinth, commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others, and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told that these mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the Lacedæmonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves,

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8 He alludes to the time when Corinth, Athens, Thebes, and Argos were allied against Sparta, and held a congress at Corinth, B.C. 394. The allies were at first defeated, but Iphicrates gained some successes, and acquired considerable reputation by cutting off a small division of Spartan infantry.
they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go off to Artabazus 9 or anywhere rather, and the general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses, both of general and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as inspectors of the general’s conduct. The way we manage things now is a mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed, you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals 10 of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians; should there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own commanders, that the force might really be the state’s? Or should your general of horse sail to Lemnos, 11 while Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting

9 Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social war, having no money to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a victory for the satrap, and received a supply of money. But this led to a complaint and menace of war by the king, which brought serious consequences.

10 There were chosen at Athens every year, ten generals (one for each tribe) ten captains (one for each tribe), two generals of cavalry, ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe).

In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division, both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would be present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took place in later times when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three Athenian generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period only one. Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which we can well understand, viz., the necessity of offering the foreign mercenaries from home.

11 To assist at a religious ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where many Athenians resided.
for your possessions? I speak not as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the person be.

Perhaps you admit the justice of these statements, but wish principally to hear about the supplies, what they must be and whence procured. I will satisfy you. Supplies, then, for maintenance, mere rations for these troops, come to ninety talents and a little more: for ten swift galleys forty talents, twenty minas a month to every ship; for two thousand soldiers forty more, that each soldier may receive for rations ten drachms a month; and for two hundred horsemen, each receiving thirty drachms a month, twelve talents. Should any one think rations for the men a small provision, he judges erroneously. Furnish that, and I am sure the army itself will, without injuring any Greek or ally, procure everything else from the war, so as to make out their full pay. I am ready to join the fleet as a volunteer, and submit to anything, if this be not so. Now for the ways and means of the supply, which I demand from you.

[Statement\textsuperscript{11} of ways and means]

This, Athenians, is what we have been able to devise. When you vote upon the resolutions, pass what you\textsuperscript{11} approve, that you may oppose Philip, not only by decrees and letters, but by action also.

I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and the whole arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of the hostile country, and consider that Philip by

\textsuperscript{11} Here the clerk or secretary reads the scheme drawn up by Demosthenes, in the preparing of which he was probably assisted by the financial officers of the state. What follows was, according to Dionysius, spoken at a different time.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{i.e.}, some measure, if not mine, whereby the war may be waged effectually.
the winds and seasons of the year get the start in most of his operations, watching for the trade-winds\textsuperscript{14} or the winter to commence them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On this account we must carry on the war not with hasty levies (or we shall be too late for everything), but with a permanent force and power. You may use as winter quarters for your troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Scithus, and the islands\textsuperscript{15} in that neighborhood, which have harbors and corn and all necessaries for an army. In the season of the year, when it is easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they will easily take their station off the coast itself and at the entrances of the seaports.

How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed by you will determine as occasion requires. What you must find is stated in my bill. If, men of Athens, you will furnish the supplies which I mention, and then, after completing your preparations of soldiers, ships, cavalry, will oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service, and, while you become your own paymasters and commissaries, demand from your general an account of his conduct, you will cease to be always discussing the same questions without forwarding them in the least, and besides, Athenians, not only will you cut off his greatest revenue—What is this? He maintains war against you through the resources of your allies, by his piracies on their navigation—But what next? You will be out of the reach of injury yourselves: he will not do as in time past, when falling upon Lemnos and

\textsuperscript{14} The Etesian winds blowing from the northwest in July, which would impede a voyage from Athens to Macedonia and Thrace.

\textsuperscript{15} As Scopolus, Halonnesus, Pperfectus, which were then subject to Athens.
Imbrus he carried off your citizens captive, seizing the vessels at Geræstus he levied an incalculable sum, and lastly, made a descent at Marathon and carried off the sacred galley from our coast, and you could neither prevent these things nor send succors by the appointed time. But how is it, think you, Athenians, that the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals take place always at the appointed time, whether expert or unqualified persons be chosen to conduct either of them, whereas you expend larger sums than upon any armament, and which are more numerous attended and magnificent than almost anything in the world; while all your armaments are after the time, as that to Methone, to Pagasæ, to Potidæa? Because in the former case everything is ordered by law, and each of you knows long beforehand who is the choirmaster of his tribe, who the gymnastic master, when, from whom, and what he is to receive, and what to do. Nothing there is left unascertained or undefined: whereas in the business of war and its preparations all is irregular, unsettled, indefinite. Therefore, no sooner have we heard anything, than we appoint ship captains, dispute with them.

16 A ship called "Paralus," generally used on religious missions or to carry public despatches.
17 The Panathenaic festivals were in honor of Pallas or Athene, the protector of Athens, and commemorated also the union of the old Attic towns under one government. There were two, the greater held every fourth year, the lesser annually. They were celebrated with sacrifices, races, gymnastic and musical contests, and various other amusements and solemnities, among which was the carrying the pictured robe of Pallas to her temple.
18 The choregus, or choirmaster, of each tribe, had to defray the expenses of the choruses, whether dramatic, lyric, or musical which formed part of the entertainment on solemn occasions. This was one of the burdensome offices to which men of property were liable at Athens.
19 The gymnasiarch, like the choregus, had a burden imposed on him by his tribe, to make certain provisions for the gymnasium, public place or school of exercise. Some of the contests at the festivals being of a gymnastic nature, such as the Torch-race, it was his duty to make arrangements for them, and more particularly to select the ablest youths of the school for performers.
on the exchanges, and consider about ways and means; then it is resolved that resident aliens and householders shall embark, then to put yourselves on board instead: but during these delays the objects of our expedition are lost; for the time of action we waste in preparation, and favorable moments wait not our evasions and delays. The forces that we imagine we possess in the meantime are found, when the crisis comes, utterly insufficient. And Philip has arrived at such a pitch of arrogance, as to send the following letter to the Euboeans:

[The letter is read]

Of that which has been read, Athenians, most is true, unhappily true; perhaps not agreeable to hear. And if what one passes over in speaking, to avoid offence, one could pass over in reality, it is right to humor the audience: but if graciousness of speech, where it is out of place, does harm in action, shameful is it, Athenians, to delude ourselves, and by putting off everything unpleasant to miss the time for all operations, and be unable even to understand that skilful makers of war should not follow circumstances, but be in advance of them; that just as a general may be expected to lead his armies, so are men of prudent counsel to guide circumstances, in order that their resolutions may be accomplished, not their motions determined by the event. Yet you, Athenians, with larger means than any people—ships, infantry, cavalry, and revenue—have never up to this day

For every ship of war a captain, or trierarch, was appointed, whose duty it was, not merely to command, but take charge of the vessel, keep it in repair, and bear the expense (partly or wholly) of equipping it. In the Peloponnesian war we find the charge laid upon two joint captains, and afterward it was borne by an association formed like the Symmecrise of the Property Tax.
made proper use of any of them; and your war with Philip differs in no respect from the boxing of barbarians. For among them the party struck feels always for the blow; strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look in the face he cannot nor will. So you, if you hear of Philip in the Chersonese, vote to send relief there, if at Thermopylae, the same; if anywhere else, you run after his heels up and down, and are commanded by him; no plan have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see beforehand, only "when you learn that something is done, or about to be done. Formerly, perhaps, this was allowable: now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our proceedings, has put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of things which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that none of you, Athenians, notices with concern and anger that the beginning of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will not stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for this? And if you despatch empty galleys and hopes from this or that person, think ye all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not

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21 This loose mode of expression, which is found in the original, I designedly retain.
make a descent upon his coast? Where, then, shall we land? some one asks. The war itself, men of Athens, will discover the rotten parts of his empire, if we make a trial; but if we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse and malign one another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, where a portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with the rest, Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but where you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes from the hustings, nothing that you desire is done; your enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of such an armament. For it is impossible—ay, impossible, for one man to execute all your wishes: to promise, and assert, and accuse this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are ruined. The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here are persons easily found who tell you lies of his conduct; you vote at random from what you hear: what, then, can be expected?

How is this to cease, Athenians? When you make the same persons soldiers, and witnesses of the general's conduct, and judges when they return home at his audit; so that you may not only hear of your own affairs, but be present to see them. So disgraceful is our condition now that every general is twice or thrice tried before you for his life, though none dares even to

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22 Chares is particularly alluded to. The "promises of Chares" passed into a proverb.
23 The audit or scrutiny of his conduct which every officer of the republic had to undergo, before a jury if necessary, at the end of his administration. In the case of a general, the scrutiny would be like a court-martial. The Athenian people, says Demosthenes, as represented by the citizen soldiers, would themselves be witnesses of the general's conduct. These same soldiers, when they came home, or at least a portion of them, might serve on the jury; and so the people would be both witnesses and judges.
hazard his life against the enemy; they prefer the death of kidnappers and thieves to that which becomes them; for it is a malefactor's part to die by sentence of the law, a general's to die in battle. Among ourselves, some go about and say that Philip isconcerting with the Lacedæmonians the destruction of Thebes and the dissolution of republics; some, that he has sent envoys to the king; others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria: so we wander about, each inventing stories. For my part, Athenians, by the gods, I believe that Philip is intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits, and has many such dreams in his imagination, seeing the absence of opponents, and elated by success; but most certainly he has no such plan of action, as to let the silliest people among us know what his intentions are; for the silliest are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy, who robs us of our own and has long insulted us; that wherever we have expected aid from any quarter, it has been found hostile, and that the future depends on ourselves, and unless we are willing to fight him there, we shall, perhaps, be compelled to fight here. This let us remember, and then we shall have determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves it will be disastrous, unless you attend to your duty, and are willing to act as becomes you.

As for me, never before have I courted favor, by speaking what I am not convinced is for your good, and now I have spoken my whole mind frankly and unreservedly. I could have wished, knowing the advantage of good

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"The king of Persia, generally called the king by the Greeks."
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counsel to you, I were equally certain of its advantage to the counsellor: so should I have spoken with more satisfaction. Now, with an uncertainty of the consequence to myself, but with a conviction that you will benefit by adopting it, I proffer my advice. I trust only that what is most for the common benefit will prevail.

THE ORATION ON THE PEACE

THE ARGUMENT

To understand as well the subject of this oration as the motives of Demosthenes, who here recommends a course of action different from the vigorous measures counselled by him on other occasions, it is necessary to take a short review of the preceding events, and observe the position in which Athens stood at the time when the speech was delivered.

Philip, after taking Olynthus, turned his thoughts to new objects, of which the more immediate were, first to get possession of the Greek towns on the Hellespont and the Chersonese; secondly, to get a footing in southern Greece. The first of these seemed comparatively easy since the reduction of Olynthus; the second was more difficult, and could only be accomplished by the aid or sufferance of certain Greek states. But the continuance of the Sacred war afforded Philip an opportunity of which he skilfully availed himself. Phæleus, son of Onomarchus, had maintained his ground against the enemy, and both Thebans and Thessalians began to be desirous of Macedonian aid. But Athens was in alliance with Phocis, and Philip had seen some few years before, when the Athenians occupied the pass of Thermopylae, that they were still capable of vigorous efforts, if under able direction or any strong excitement. It became therefore his policy to conciliate Athens for the present. He caused it to be announced by means of his agents and partisans, that he was desirous of peace, and reports of various acts of kindness done by him to Athenian citizens in Macedonia were studiously disseminated. This seems to have been the period at which Philip gained over to his interest, or even retained in his service, divers active members of the Athenian assembly. Among them was Philocrates, who first made a formal motion, that Philip should have leave to open a negotiation. Soon after he carried a decree to send ambassadors to Philip, and ten were despatched, among them Philocrates himself, Aeschines, and Demosthenes. They returned with a letter from Philip,
and were soon followed by three Macedonian envoys of high distinction, Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus. The Athenians met in assembly; peace was determined on, and the ambassadors were again ordered to sail to Macedonia to receive the oath of Philip. In the meantime Philip had marched into Thrace, where he defeated Cersobleptes, the king of that country, and took possession of a part of his dominions. From this expedition he had not returned when the Athenian ambassadors arrived at Pella, the Macedonian capital. Here they waited a month, and, on Philip's return, were induced by that monarch, who had secretly prepared for his invasion of Phocis, to accompany him as far as Phere in Thessaly. From Phere they departed for Athens, and Philip marched straight to Thermopylae. The Athenians, deceived by his promises, were huddled into security; Phalectus, seeing no hope of assistance, withdrew from Phocis, while Philip, strengthened by the forces of Thessaly and Thebes, overran the country, and took possession of Delphi. An Amphictyonic council was convened to sit in judgment on the sacrilegious Phocians. Sentence was passed on them, which (besides other penalties) deprived them of their seat in the council of Amphictyons, and transferred their privileges to the king of Macedonia.

The first intelligence of these transactions was received at Athens with consternation. Measures were taken to put the city in a state of defence, as if an invasion were threatened. Philip sent a calm letter of remonstrance, which allayed the fears of the people, but did not abate their anger and ill humor. A feeling of disappointment was mingled with shame for their own credulity, and alarm at the increase of Macedonian influence. They saw, too, with deep vexation, that Philip, instead of conferring any benefit upon Athens, as they had fondly hoped he would, had exerted himself to promote the advantage of Thebes, which, by his assistance, recovered her subject Boeotian towns, and even obtained some of the Phocian territory for herself. Nothing more strongly marked the state of public feeling at Athens, than her refusal at this time to attend the Pythian games, at which Philip had been chosen to preside by the Amphictyonic decree.

The Athenians by absenting themselves made a sort of protest against his election.

It was in this state of things that Macedonian ambassadors, accompanied by Thessalian and Boeotian, arrived at Athens, to demand from her a formal sanction of the decree by which Philip had become a member of the Amphictyonic council. An assembly was held to consider the question. The people were exceedingly clamorous, and applauded those orators who opposed the claim of Philip. \text俄siches, who supported it, could scarcely obtain a hearing. Demosthenes at length addressed the assembly, and, without advising any dishonorable submission, or even direct concession to what the envoys required, strongly dissuaded his countrymen from taking any course which might draw Athens into a war. It was not that Philip was less to be dreaded now than he was before; on the contrary, his power
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had greatly increased; but this was not the time to provoke his hostility, backed as he was by Thessaly and Thebes; and even if Athens could stand alone against such a combination, a mere Amphictyonic title was not a proper subject of quarrel.

It appears that the Athenians came to no formal vote on this matter, but their anger was so far calmed by the arguments of Demosthenes, that the envoys departed with full confidence that the peace would not be broken.

I SEE, men of Athens, our affairs are in great perplexity and confusion, not only because many interests have been sacrificed, and it is useless to make fine speeches about them, but because, for preserving what remains, you cannot agree upon any single expedient, some holding one opinion, and some another. And besides, perplexing and difficult as deliberation of itself is, you, Athenians, have rendered it far more so. For other men usually hold counsel before action, you hold it after: the result of which during all the time of my remembrance has been, that the censurer of your errors gets repute and credit as a good speaker, while your interests and objects of deliberation are lost. Yet, even under these circumstances, I believe, and I have risen with the persuasion that if you will desist from wrangling and tumult, and listen as becomes men on a political consultation of such importance, I shall be able to suggest and advise measures by which our affairs may be improved and our losses retrieved.

Well as I know, Athenians, that to talk before you of one's self and one's own counsels is a successful artifice with unscrupulous men, I think it so vulgar and offensive, that I shrink from it even in a case of necessity. However, I think you will better appreciate what I shall say now, by calling to mind a little that I said on former occasions. For example, Athenians, when they were advising you in
the troubles of Euboea to assist Plutarch, and undertake a discreditable and expensive war, I, and I alone, stood forward to oppose it, and was nearly torn to pieces by the men who for petty lucre have seduced you into many grievous errors. A short time later, when you incurred disgrace, and suffered what no mortals ever did from parties whom they assisted, you all acknowledged the worthlessness of their counsels who misled you, and the soundness of mine. Again, Athenians, when I saw that Neoptolemus the actor, privileged under color of his profession, was doing serious mischief to the state, managing and directing things at Athens on Philip's behalf, I came and informed you, not from any private enmity or malice, as subsequent occurrences have shown. And herein I shall not blame the advocates of Neoptolemus (for there was none), but you yourselves; for had you been seeing a tragedy in the temple of Bacchus, instead of it being a debate on the public weal and safety, you could not have heard him with more partiality, or me with more intolerance. But I suppose you all now understand that he made his journey to the enemy, in order (as he said) to get the debts there owing to him, and defray thereout his public charges at home; and, after urging this argument, that it was hard to reproach men who brought over their effects from abroad, as soon as he obtained security through the peace he converted into money all the real estate which he possessed here, and has gone off with it to Philip. Thus two of my warnings, justly and rightfully pronounced in accordance with the truth, testify in my favor as a counsellor. A third, men of Athens, I will mention, this one only, and straight proceed to the subject of my address. When we ambassadors, after receiving the oaths on the peace, had
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returned, and certain men were promising that Thespiae and Platæ would be repeopled; that Philip, if he got the mastery, would save the Phocians, and disperse the population of Thebes; that Oropus would be yours, and Eubœa given as compensation for Amphipolis, with more of the like hopes and delusions, which led you on, against policy, equity and honor, to abandon the Phocians; you will find, I neither aided in any of these deceits, nor held my tongue. I warned you, as you surely remember, that I knew not of these things nor expected them, and deemed it all idle gossip.

These instances, wherein I have shown greater foresight than others, I mention not by way of boast, nor ascribe, Athenians, to any sagacity of my own, nor will I pretend to discover or discern the future from any but two causes, which I will state: first, men of Athens, through good fortune, which I observe beats all the craft and cleverness of man; secondly, because I judge and estimate things disinterestedly, and no one can show that any lucre is attached to my politics or my speeches. Therefore, whatever be your true policy, as indicated by the circumstances, I have a correct view of it; but when you put money on one side as in a balance, it carries away and pulls down the judgment with it, and he that does so can no longer reason upon anything justly or soundly.

The first thing which I maintain to be necessary is this: Whether you seek to obtain allies, or contribution,¹ or aught else for the state, do it without disturbing the present peace; not that it is very glorious or worthy of

¹ I.e., money contributed by allies. When the Athenians re-established their confederacy, which had been dissolved by the Peloponnesian war, the payments received from the allies received the name of contributions, as less obnoxious than tribute.
you, but, whatever be its character, it had better suited our interests never to have made peace than to break it ourselves: for we have thrown away many advantages, which would have rendered the war then safer and easier for us than it can be now. Secondly, Athenians, we must take care that these people assembled and calling themselves Amphictyons are not by us necessitated, or furnished with a plea, to make a common war against us. I grant, if we renewed the war with Philip on account of Amphipolis, or any such private quarrel, in which Thessalians, Argives and Thebans are not concerned, none of them would join in it, and least of all—hear me before you cry out—the Thebans: not that they are kindly disposed to us, or would not gratify Philip, but they see clearly, stupid as one may think them, that, if they had a war with you, the hardships would all be theirs, while another sat waiting for the advantages. Therefore they would not throw themselves into it, unless the ground and origin of the war were common. So if we again went to war with the Thebans for Oropus or any private cause, I should fear no disaster, because our respective auxiliaries would assist us or them, if either country were invaded.

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9 The Amphictyonic league, at the head of which Philip was now placed, was a federal union of Hellenic (or Greek) tribes, having for its object the maintenance of a common religion and nationality. The various deputies met twice a year, in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn at Anthedon near Thermopylae. They met, not only to celebrate games and festivals, but to transact the business of the league, to determine questions of international law and religion. The oracular sanctity of Delphi gave a dignity to these meetings, but the rivalry and jealousies of the more powerful Greek states did not permit them (in general) to be controlled by Amphictyonic decrees. The three Sacred wars are instances in which their decrees were enforced by combination; but in the last two, for which Philip's aid was invited, there was but little enthusiasm in the cause from any motive of religion or patriotism. The meeting at which Philip had been chosen president was so tumultuous and irregular, that the Athenians would not allow it to be a legal convocation of the Amphictyonic body. Philip greatly resented this, because his election was considered to establish the title of his countrymen to rank among the Greek nations.
but would join with neither in aggression. Such is the spirit of alliances that are worth regard, and so the thing naturally is. People are not friendly either to us or the Thebans, to the extent of equally desiring our safety and our predominance. Safe they would all have us for their own sake; dominant, so as to become their masters, they would not have either of us. What then, say I, is the danger? what to be guarded against? Lest in the coming war there be found a common plea, a common grievance for all. If Argives, and Messenians, and Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians, who are in league with them, are hostile to us on account of our negotiating with the Lacedæmonians and seeming to take up some of their enterprises; if the Thebans are (as they say) our enemies, and will be more so, because we harbor their exiles and in every way manifest our aversion to them; Thessalians again, because we harbor the Phocian exiles, and Philip, because we oppose his admission to the Amphictyonic body; I fear that, each incensed on a private quarrel, they will combine to bring war upon you, setting up the decrees of the Amphictyons, and be drawn on (beyond what their single interests require) to battle it with us, as they did with the Phocians. For you are surely aware, that now the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians have co-operated, without having each exactly the same views. For example, the Thebans could not hinder Philip from advancing and occupying the passes, nor yet from coming last and having the credit of their labors. True, in respect of territorial acquisition, something has been done for them; but in regard to honor and reputation, they have fared wretchedly; since, had Philip not stepped in, they would (it seems) have got nothing. This
was not agreeable to them, but having the wish without
the power to obtain Orchomenos and Coroenea, they sub-
mitted to it all. Of Philip, you know, some persons ven-
ture to say, that he would not have given Orchomenos and
Coroenea to the Thebans, but was compelled to do so. I
wish them joy of their opinion; but thus far I believe that
he cared not so much about that business, as he desired
to occupy the passes, and have the glory of the war, as
being determined by his agency, and the direction of the
Pythian games. Such were the objects of his ambition.
The Thessalians wished not either Philip or Thebes to be
aggrandized, since in both they saw danger to themselves;
but sought to obtain these two advantages, the synod at
Thermopylae, and the privileges at Delphi; for which
objects they aided the confederacy. Thus you will find
that each party has been led into many acts unwillingly;
and against this danger, being such as I describe, you must
take precautions.

2 Demosthenes did not entirely scout the suggestion made with regard to
Philip’s views; but perhaps he thought that Philip could not venture to offend
his Theban allies then; and one of the means of humbling Athens was, to in-
crease the power of her neighbor. If it be asked why Philip might not have
seized upon Elatea at this time, as well as eight years later, I should say, not
on account of the peace with Athens, but because he desired to rest upon his
Amphictyonic honors, and have the full benefit of the moral ascendancy which
he had acquired. It was not clear that his grand object, which was rather to
lead than to conquer Greece, might not be obtained without a war against any
of her principal states. Afterward, when the Athenians, under the active ad-
ministration of Demosthenes, baffled his efforts in the north, and showed a de-
termination to counteract all his projects, it became necessary for him to strike
a decisive blow, even at the risk of irritating Thebes. He ran this risk, and
succeeded, but not without danger.

4 The Thessalians were peculiarly aggrieved by their exclusion (during the
Sacred war) from the national synod, and from the oracle and festivities of
Delphi. Their country had been the cradle of the Hellenic race, their deputies
were the most numerous in the council, and their vicinity to the places of meet-
ing gave them a greater interest in the proceedings. Hence they most eagerly
pressed for punishment of the Phocians. To gratify the Thessalians, Philip put
them in possession of Nicaea, one of the towns near the pass of Thermopylae,
but even there he kept a Macedonian garrison. The Thebans had expected
to have that town themselves, and were disappointed.
ON THE PEACE

Must we then do as we are bidden, for fear of the consequences? and do you recommend this? Far from it. I advise you so to act, as not to compromise your dignity, to avoid war, to prove yourselves right-thinking, just-speaking men. With those who think we should boldly suffer anything, and do not foresee the war, I would reason thus. We permit the Thebans to have Oropus; and if one asked us why, and required a true answer, we should say, To avoid war. And to Philip now we have ceded Amphipolis by treaty, and allow the Cardians to be excepted from the other people of the Chersonese; and the Carian to seize the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to detain our vessels; evidently because we think the tranquillity of peace more beneficial than strife and contest about such questions. It were folly then and utter absurdity, after dealing thus with each party singly on matters of vital moment to ourselves, to battle now with them all for a shadow at Delphi.

THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of Philip was called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions between Sparta and her old enemies afforded him an occasion of interference. The Spartans had never abandoned their right to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested

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5 Cardia was a city at the northwestern extremity of the Chersonese, and from its position on the isthmus was considered the key of the peninsula. Among the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes, Cardia had not been included; but the Athenians afterward laid claim to it, and Philip supported the Cardians in resisting that claim.

6 Idrius, king of Caria, who was now in possession of these islands, which had revolted from Athens in the Social war.

7 Compel them to go into their port to pay harbor duties.
from them by Epiandropolis; and since Thebes was no longer to be feared, they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost power. The Argives and the Arcadians of Megalopolis were in league with Messenae, but Sparta had her allies in the Peloponnese, and even Athens was suspected of favoring her cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities had taken place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the Peninsula. The progress which Macedonian influence was making there having alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with an embassy to counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos, addressed the people, and pointed out the dangers to which all Greece was exposed by Philip's ambition. It seems that he failed in rousing their suspicions, or they were too much occupied by an immediate peril to heed one that appeared remote. Philip, however, resented this proceeding on the part of the Athenians, and sent an embassy to expostulate with them, especially on the charge of bad faith and treachery which had been preferred against him by Demosthenes. Ambassadors from Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens and Lacedemon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties of Peloponnese. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly; repeating the substance of what he had said to the Peloponneseans, vindicating his own conduct, and denouncing the Macedonian party at Athens. The embassy led to no immediate result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.

IN ALL the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made on our behalf are thought just and generous,1 and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of Athens brought that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece, the more difficult it becomes to advise

1 Generous, as regards the Greek states, whose independence the Athenians stand up for. This praise Demosthenes frequently claims for his countrymen, and, compared with the rest of the Greeks, they deserved it.
you how to act. The cause lies in all of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings shrink from our duty, of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only declaim on the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue justly, or comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his designs, are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest about; Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and there is no trouble: but if we are to take measures for the correction of these evils, to prevent their insensible progress, and the rising up of a mighty power, against which we could have no defence, then our course of deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and agreeable.

First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons why I am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may give your adherence to them.

Thus, then, I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master of after the peace? Thermopylae—*12—Vol. I.
ylæ and the Phocian state. Well, and how used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace, quiet, or justice, he saw plainly that to a people of our character and principles nothing could he offer or give that would induce you for self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you, having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him in everything else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal, when Alexander, this man’s ancestor, came as herald to

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9 Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks. The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is related by Herodotus.
negotiate, but preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention, though none could ever speak them worthily, and, therefore, I must be silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought, then, if he chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached himself to them, he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.

Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the least open to him. He that bids the Lacedæmonians resign Messene, how can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, to have acted on a conviction of justice?

But, forsooth, he was compelled—this plea remains—he made concessions against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust the Thebans; and some carry news about that he will fortify Elatea. All this he intends and will intend, I dare say; but to
attack the Lacedæmonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected himself with a great force. The Lacedæmonians, who are enemies of Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed, will he now preserve?

And who can believe this? I cannot think that Philip, either if he was forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove to a correct observer that his whole plan of action is against our state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him, since by retaining what belongs to you he secures the rest of his dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he deemed himself unsafe at home. He knows, therefore, both that he is plotting against you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you. Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from dulness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is better they should be repeated to you.
Ye men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have brooked to hear anything against Philip at those times, when he surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidæa, taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicæa and Magnesia, they expected to have the decemvirate which is now established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylæ would take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may never know him

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3 Thessaly was anciently divided into four districts, each called a tetras, and this was restored soon after the termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great Thessalian families by a division of power. The decemvirate here spoken of was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we adopt the opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of ten, or that each city was placed under ten governors. Jacobs understands the word decemvirate not to refer to any positive form of government, but generally to designate a tyranny, such as that which the Lacedaemonians used to introduce into conquered cities. However this be, Philip seems to have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the decadarchy, should be his own creatures.

4 Pylæ, which signifies gates, was a name applied by the Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of Thermopylæ, which opened through the ridges of Mount Æla into the country of the Epicenmidian Locrions, and was so called from the hot sulphurous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountains.
for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands, and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking deliverance from war, you find a master?

They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship and promises. And no wonder that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion, will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's ease and indulgence prevail over distant advantage.

As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the assembly to decide upon.

[Here the proposed answer was read]

It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never have submitted to go
as ambassador, and you would certainly not have discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace, would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay, and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared—after the peace, when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when, perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the abandonment of Thermopylæ and the Phocians—that I, being a water drinker,* was naturally a churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would do just as you desired, fortify Thespiae and Platæa, humble the Thebans, cut through the Chersonese* at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Eubœa in exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries. And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination before you, and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no

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* It was Philocrates who said this. There were many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.

* This peninsula being exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce Acte, to protect the Athenian settlements.
longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I fear, then, as your ambassadors have concealed the purpose for which they know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on persons most in their power. While, therefore, the mischief is only coming and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylae, by the command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus, and has brought it to this that your deliberation must be, not about claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defence of your home and a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and, indeed, it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would he have marched with a land force by Phocis and Thermopylae: he must either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.

* He means Ἀσχίνες.
THE ORATION ON HALONNESUS

THE ARGUMENT

The occasion from which this oration has received its title, was a dispute between Philip and the Athenians concerning the small island of Halonnesus, which lies off the coast of Thessaly, below the entrance to the Thermaic gulf. A group of small islands here, among which were also Scithus, Scopelus, and Peparethus, belonged to Athens. Halonnesus, not long after the termination of the Phocian war, was taken by a pirate named Sostratus. He, having given annoyance to Philip, was expelled by that king from the island; but Philip, instead of restoring it to the Athenians, kept it in his own hands. At this the Athenians took umbrage, and probably thought that Halonnesus being so near to Euboea, as well as to the other islands, it might be dangerous to leave it in Philip's possession. An embassy was sent to Macedonia, B.C. 343, to negotiate about this, and also various other subjects of dispute which at that time existed, such as Amphipolis, Potidaea, and the affairs of the Chersonese. At the head of the embassy was Hegesippus, a friend of Demosthenes. The claims made by the Athenians were deemed by Philip so preposterous that he rejected them at once, and dismissed the envoys. Soon after, he sent an embassy to Athens, with a letter written by himself, in which he pointed out the extravagance of their demands, but expressed his willingness to make certain concessions. With respect to Halonnesus, he contended that it had become his by conquest, the Athenians having lost it, but offered to make them a present of the island. The letter was read in the assembly. All that we know of it is from the following speech, in which the orator comments on its various statements, and endeavors to show that Philip was in the wrong. The whole of the speech has not come down to us; for it appears to have contained a resolution, moved by the orator, by way of reply to Philip.

Most modern critics, following Libanius, have come to the opinion, that not Demosthenes, but Hegesippus, was the author of this oration. The argument rests, not only upon the style of the oration itself, which is beneath the general character of Demosthenes, but also on collateral circumstances. There is, indeed, good evidence that Demosthenes made a speech on the same question, and also that he took the same views upon it as Hegesippus, with whom he generally agreed in politics. This may account for the fact, that the only extant speech on the subject has been attributed to Demosthenes, when his own is lost.
THE ORATION ON HALONNESUS

Men of Athens, never can we who maintain your rights in this assembly be deterred by the complaints of Philip from advising you for the best. It would be monstrous, if our privilege on the hustings could be destroyed by his epistles. I will first, men of Athens, go through the articles of Philip’s letter; and then I will answer the statements of the ambassadors.

Philip begins about Halonnesus, saying, it belongs to him, but he gives it you. He denies your claim to restitution, as he neither took it from Athens, nor detains it from her. He addressed the like argument to us, on our embassy to Macedon; that he had won the island from pirates, and it was properly his own. It is not difficult to deprive him of this argument by showing its fallacy. All pirates seizing places wrongfully, and fortifying themselves therein, make excursions to annoy other people. One who has chastised and vanquished the pirates surely cannot urge with reason that what they robbed the owners of becomes his property. If you grant this, then, supposing that pirates seized a place in Attica, or Lemnos, or Imbrus, or Scyrus, and some persons dislodged the pirates, what is to prevent that place where the pirates were, and which belonged to us, from instantly becoming their property who chastised the pirates? Philip is not ignorant of the injustice of this plea; he knows it better than any one; but he expects you will be cajoled by a set of men, who, having undertaken to manage things here as he desires, are performing that service now. Moreover, he cannot fail to see that under either title, whichever you adopt,
you will have the island, whether it be given, or given back. Why, then, is it material to him, not to use the just phrase and restore it to you, but to use the unjust, and make it a present? His object is, not to charge it to you as an obligation (for such an obligation would be ridiculous), but to display to all Greece that the Athenians are glad to receive their maritime dependencies from the Macedonian. This you must not allow, men of Athens.

When he says that he wishes to submit to arbitration on these questions, he only mocks you, in asking Athenians to refer a dispute with a man of Pella concerning their title to the islands. And besides, if your power, which delivered Greece, is unable to preserve your maritime dominion, and the judges to whom you refer, and with whom the award rests, preserve it for you, supposing Philip does not corrupt them; do you not confessedly, by taking such course, renounce all possessions on the continent, and demonstrate to the world that you will not contend with him for any, when even for possessions on the sea, where you consider your strength lies, you contend not by arms, but litigation?

Further, he says he has sent commissioners here to settle a judicial treaty,¹ to be in force not after ratification in your court, as the law commands, but after reference

¹ Arrangements were sometimes made between different countries for the administration of justice between their respective people. These arrangements would embrace certain general principles of jurisprudence, according to which any dispute between a native and an alien should be determined by the tribunal of either country; the complainant always seeking justice in the court of his adversary's domicile. Thus, supposing such a legal tariff to be agreed upon between Athens and Philip, an Athenian having a complaint against one of his subjects would prefer his suit in Macedonia, but the judge must decide the cause not entirely by Macedonian law, but in accordance with the articles of the compact; and conversely if a Macedonian were the plaintiff.
to him; giving an appeal to himself from your judgment. He wishes to get this advantage of you, and procure an admission in the treaty, that you make no complaint for his aggressions on Potidæa, but confirm the lawfulness both of his taking and holding it. Yet the Athenians who dwelt in Potidæa, while they were not at war, but in alliance with Philip, and notwithstanding the oath which Philip swore to the inhabitants of Potidæa, were deprived by him of their property. I say, he wishes to get your absolute acknowledgment, that you complain not of these wrongful acts, nor deem yourselves injured. That there is no need of a judicial treaty between Athens and Macedonia, past times may suffice to show. Neither Amyntas, Philip's father, nor any other kings of Macedon, ever had such a contract with our state; although the intercourse between us was formerly greater than it is now: for Macedonia was dependent on us, and paid us tribute, and we then resorted to their ports, and they to ours, more frequently than now, and there were not the monthly sittings punctually held, as at present, for mercantile causes, dispensing with the necessity of a law-treaty between such distant countries. Though nothing of the sort then existed, it was not requisite to make a treaty, so that people should sail from Macedonia to Athens for justice, or Athenians to Macedonia: we obtained redress by their laws and they by ours. Be assured, therefore, these articles are drawn

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* We have seen a similar boast in the third Olynthiac. But neither of the statements is to be understood as strictly true. While the kings of Macedonia possessed no towns on the coast, they (no doubt) submitted to the maritime supremacy of Athens, and paid harbor dues and tolls, which might be called tribute in loose language.

* The sittings here alluded to had not very long been established. They were held in the six winter months for the speedy trial of mercantile suits.
for an admission that you have no further pretence for claiming Potidæa.

As to pirates, you ought jointly, he says, you and yourself, to guard the sea against these depredators: but he really asks to be introduced by us to maritime power, for you to confess that you are unable even to keep guard of the sea without Philip, and further for the privilege to be granted him of sailing about and touching at the islands under the pretence of watching pirates, so that he may corrupt the islanders and seduce them from you; and besides restoring to Thasus by means of your commanders the exiles whom he harbored, he designs to gain over the other islands, by sending his agents to sail with your commanders on the joint protective service. And yet some persons deny that he wants the sea. But, without any want, he is equipping galleys, building docks, seeking to send out armaments and incur no trifling expense for maritime enterprises on which he sets no value.

Do you think, then, Athenians, that Philip would ask you to make these concessions, if he did not despise you, and rely on the men whom he has chosen to be his friends here? men who are not ashamed to live for Philip and not for their country, and think they carry home his presents, when all at home they sell!

Concerning the peace, which the ambassadors sent by him permitted us to amend, because we made an amend-

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4 Thasus is an island off the coast of Thrace opposite the mouth of the Nestus. It was celebrated for its wine, and also for its marble quarries and mines. The gold mines on the adjacent continent belonged to the Thasians, when they were seized by Philip. The island, having been wrested from the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, was afterward recovered, and at this time they kept a garrison in it.

5 This Macedonian embassy preceded the one from Athens which Hegesippus conducted, and which conveyed the Athenian proposals for the amendment of the treaty.
ment which all mankind allow to be just, that each party should hold his own, he denies that he gave the permission, or that his ambassadors so stated to you; doubtless, having been instructed by his friends here, that you remember not what is said before the people. This, however, of all things it is impossible for you to forget; since it was in the same assembly that his ambassadors addressed you, and that the decree was drawn; and so it is not possible, as the words had just been spoken and the decree was instantly read, that you could have passed a resolution which misrepresented the ambassadors. Wherefore, this charge in his letter is not against me, but against you, that you sent a decree in answer to something which you never heard. And the ambassadors themselves, whom the decree misrepresented, when you read them your answer and invited them to partake your hospitality, ventured not to come forward and say, "You misrepresent us, Athenians, and make us to have stated what we never did," but went their way in silence.

I wish, men of Athens (as Python, * who was then ambassador, obtained credit with you for his address), to remind you of the very words which he spoke. I am sure you will remember them; they were exactly like what Philip has now written. While he complained of us who decry Philip, he found fault with you also, that notwithstanding his intentions to serve you, his preference of your

* Python of Byzantium, who was an able speaker and diplomatist, and employed with great advantage by Philip in his negotiations with other states. Demosthenes seems to have been the only man who could cope with him, and boasts in his speech on the Crown that on one occasion he reduced him to silence in the presence of a multitude of ambassadors. Perhaps it was on the embassy here referred to; or it might be on that which gave occasion to the second Philippic. It is probable, but not certain, that this was the same Python who murdered Cotys, king of Thrace.
friendship to that of any of the Greeks, you oppose him yourselves, and listen to slanderers who ask him for money and abuse him: that by such language—when people report that he was calumniated, and you listened to it—his feelings are altered, finding himself mistrusted by those whom he had purposed to befriend. He therefore advised the public speakers not to disparage the peace, for it were better not to break peace; but if there were aught amiss in the articles, to rectify it, as Philip would concur in any resolution of yours. Should they persist in slander, without proposing anything themselves, by which the peace might stand and Philip cease to be suspected, you ought not (he said) to attend to such persons.

You heard and approved these statements, and said that Python's argument was just. And just it was. But he made those statements, not that any articles might be cancelled which were advantageous to Philip, and for the insertion of which he had spent large sums of money, but at the suggestion of his instructors here, who thought no man would move anything counter to the decree of Philocrates, which lost Amphipolis. I, men of Athens, have never dared to make an unlawful motion, but I made one contravening the decree of Philocrates, which was unlawful, as I will show. The decree of Philocrates, according to which you lost Amphipolis, ran counter to the former decrees, through which you acquired that territory. Therefore that decree of Philocrates was unlawful, and it was impossible for the author of a legal motion to move in accordance with an unlawful decree. But moving in accordance with those former decrees, which were lawful and preserved your territory, I moved a lawful resolution, and convicted Philip of deceiving you, and desiring, not to
amend the peace, but to bring your honest counsellors into discredit.

That he then allowed the amendment and now denies it, you all know. But he says Amphipolis belongs to him, because you declared it to be his, when you resolved he should keep what he held. You did indeed pass that resolution, but not that Amphipolis should be his: for it is possible to hold the property of another, and all holders hold not their own. Many possess what belongs to others; therefore this sophistry of his is absurd. And he remembers the decree of Philocrates, but has forgotten the letter which he sent you when he was besieging Amphipolis, in which he acknowledged that Amphipolis was yours; for he promised after its reduction to restore it to Athens, as it belonged to her, and not to the holders. So they, it seems, who occupied Amphipolis before Philip's conquest, held the domain of Athenians, but, since Philip has conquered it, he holds not the domain of Athenians, but his own. Olynthus, too, Apollonia and Pallene, belong to him, not by usurpation, but in his own right. Think you he studies in all his despatches to you, to show himself by word and deed an observer of what the world calls justice, or rather has he set it at defiance, when a land, which the Greeks and the Persian monarch have voted and acknowledged to be yours, he asserts to be not yours, but his own?

As to the other amendment which you made in the articles, that the Greeks not included in the peace should be free and independent, and, if any one attacked them,

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7 The treaty had for its basis the principle of the uti possidetis, to adopt the expression of modern diplomacy. According to the true construction of this, Amphipolis would belong to Philip, and the reasoning of the orator is unsound. But no doubt, in the whole affair of Amphipolis, and the peace also, Philip overreached the Athenians.
should be succored by all parties to the treaty, you deeming it equitable and righteous, that not only we and our allies, and Philip and his allies, should enjoy the peace, while those who were neither our allies nor Philip's were exposed, and might be oppressed by the powerful, but that they also should have security by your peace, and we should lay down our arms and enjoy peace in reality; although he confesses in the letter, as you hear, that this amendment is just, and that he allows it, he has taken their town from the Pherseans and put a garrison in the citadel, doubtless to make them independent; he marches against Ambracia, bursts into three Cassopian cities, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elatea, colonies of Elis, after ravaging their territories, and gives them in vassalage to his kinsman Alexander. Proofs how much he desires the freedom and independence of Greece!

Respecting his continual promises of doing you important service, he says that I misrepresent and slander him to the Greeks; for he never promised you anything. So impudent is this man, who has written in a letter, which is now in the senate house (when he declared he would silence us his opponents if the peace were made), that he would confer on you such an obligation as, were he sure of the peace, he would instantly communicate; implying that these favors, intended for us in the event of peace,

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8 Philip's expedition against Ambracia followed the campaign in Epirus, which took place in B.C. 343. His designs against Ambracia were defeated by the exertions of the Athenians, who formed a league against him, and sent troops to assist the Ambracians. Demosthenes in the third Philippic speaks of an embassy, in which both himself and Hegesippus were engaged, which had the effect of stopping Philip's invasion of Ambracia and Peloponnesus.

9 Cassopia is a district of Epirus, which Philip invaded, B.C. 343, and added to the kingdom of Alexander his brother-in-law, between whom and Philip's uncle, Arymbas, the province of Epirus was divided. The Cassopian Elatea must not be confounded with the Phocian.
were ready and provided. After the peace was made, the good things intended for us all vanished, and among the Greeks has been wrought such ruin as you have seen. In his present letter he promises you, that if you will trust his friends and advocates, and punish us who slander him to the people, he will greatly serve you. Such, however, will be the character of his service; he will not return you your own, for he claims it himself; nor will his grants be in this part of the world, for fear of offending the Greeks: but I suppose some other land and locality will be found where his gifts may take effect.

As to the places which he has taken during the peace, taken from you in contempt of the treaty and violation of its terms, since he has nothing to urge, but stands convicted of injustice, he offers to submit to a fair and impartial tribunal, on a question which, of all others, requires no arbitration, for the number of days determines it. We all know the month and the day when the peace was concluded. As surely do we know in what month and on what day Serrium, Ergisce, and the Sacred Mount were taken. These transactions are not so obscure; they need no trial; it is notorious to all which month was the earlier, that in which the peace was signed or that in which the places were captured.

He says also that he has returned all our prisoners who were taken in war. Yet in the case of that Carystian, the

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10 These were places in Thrace, taken by Philip from Cerasobleptes.
11 Carystus is a town of Euboea. The Proxenus, or public friend of a foreign state, was one who protected its interests in his own country, performing duties not unlike that of a modern consul. A relation of mutual hospitality subsisted between him and the citizens of the friendly state; and he was expected to entertain the ambassadors, or any persons who came on public business.
friend of our state, for whom you sent three embassies to
demand his liberty, Philip was so anxious to oblige you
that he killed the man, and would not even suffer him to
be taken up for burial.

It is worth while to examine what he writes to you
about the Chersonese, and likewise to ascertain what his
conduct is. All the district beyond Agora, as if it were
his own, and belonged not to you, he has given into the
possession of Apollonides the Cardian. Yet the boundary
of the Chersonese is not Agora, but the altar of Terminal
Jupiter, which is between Pteleum and Leuce-Acte, where
the canal was to be cut through the Chersonese, as the
inscription on the altar of Terminal Jupiter shows. Mark
the words:

This holy altar built by native hands,
'Twixt Pteleum and the Chalky Beach it stands,
Stands for the limit of their just domains,
The guardian He who in Olympus reigns.

This territory, large as most of you know it to be, he
claims: part he enjoys himself, part he has given to others,
and so he reduces all your property into his possession.
And not only does he appropriate the country beyond
Agora, but also with reference to the Cardians, who dwell
on this side Agora, he writes in his present letter, that if
you have any difference with the Cardians (who dwell in
your dominions), you must refer it to arbitration. They
have a difference with you; see if it is about a small mat-

19 This was a place in the Chersonese, the whole of which, except Cardia,
belonged to Athens. The orator contends, that the boundary of the Chersonese
was a line drawn across the isthmus from Pteleum to Leuce-Acte, the latter of
which places was probably named from the white cliffs on the beach. In the
centre of this line was erected the altar, which anciently separated the bounda-
ries of those towns. Agora was within the line.
ter. They say, the land they inhabit belongs to them, not to you; that yours are mere occupations in a foreign country, theirs are possessions in their own; and that your fellow-citizen, Callippus of Psania,\textsuperscript{18} alleged this in a decree. And here they are right; he did so allege, and, on my indicting him for an unlawful measure, you acquitted him; and thus he has caused your title to the land to be contested. But if you could bring yourselves to refer this dispute with the Cardians, whether the land be yours or theirs, why should not the other people of the Chersonese be dealt with on the same principle? His treatment of you is so insolent, that he says, if the Cardians will not submit to arbitration, he will compel them, as if you were unable even to compel Cardians to do you justice. As you are unable, he says he will himself compel them. Don't you really find him a great benefactor? And some men have declared this epistle to be well written; men who are far more deserving of your detestation than Philip. He, by constant opposition to you, acquires honor and signal advantage for himself: Athenians who exhibit zeal, not for their country, but for Philip, are wretches that ought to be exterminated by you, if you carry your brains in your temples, and not trodden down in your heels.

It now remains that to this well-drawn epistle and the speeches of the ambassadors I propose an answer, which in my opinion is just and expedient for Athens.

\textsuperscript{18} Psania is one of the townships into which Attica was divided. Libanius says, it was Hegesippus who preferred this indictment against Callippus.
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THE ARGUMENT

The Athenians had sent a body of citizens, commanded by Diopithes, to receive allotments of land in the Chersonese, and at the same time to protect the interests of Athens by acting as an army of observation. They soon fell into disputes with the Cardians about the limits of their territory. Philip, who at this time was engaged in a Thracian war, sent assistance to the Cardians; but Diopithes, having collected a troop of mercenaries, kept the field successfully, and, not content with acting on the defensive, carried the war into Thrace, assisted the enemies of Philip, and wrested from him some of his conquests. Philip, who, as we have seen in the last oration, had written before to the Athenians on the subject of Cardia, now wrote them a letter complaining of the conduct of Diopithes, charging them with an infringement of the peace. This letter arrived early in the summer of the year B.C. 342, and an assembly was immediately called to consider what measures should be taken. The Macedonian party were vehement in denouncing Diopithes, and urging his recall. Demosthenes, seeing that Athens, though nominally at peace with Philip, was really defending herself against his aggressions, rose to justify Diopithes, insisted on the necessity, which he had so strongly urged in the first Philippic, of keeping a permanent force on the northern coast, and contended that the army of Diopithes should rather be reinforced than recalled at a time when its presence was peculiarly necessary. He again warns his countrymen of impending danger, and points out the measures which, as men of spirit and prudence, they ought to pursue.

This oration is full of good sense and manly eloquence. It had the success which it deserved. Diopithes was continued in his command; and the exertions of Athens in the next few years had the effect of preserving the Chersonese and the Bosphorus.

Diopithes was father to Menander, the celebrated comic poet, whose plays have been copied by Terence.

I T WERE just, men of Athens, that the orators in your assembly should make no speeches to gratify either friendship or malice, but every one declare what he considers for the best, especially when you are deliberating on public measures of importance. However, since there
are persons who are impelled to address you from factious motives, or others which I cannot name, it becomes you, Athenians, the majority, laying all else aside, to determine and to do what you find beneficial to the state. The serious question here is, the position of the Chersonese, and the campaign in Thrace, which Philip has now for upward of ten months been carrying on; yet most of the speeches have been about Diopithes, his conduct and designs. It seems to me that on a charge against any of these men, whom according to the laws you may punish when you please, it is in your option either to proceed immediately or at a later time, and needless for me, or for any one, to argue the point strongly; but for the defence of our dominions, which Philip, our standing enemy, and now in great force about the Hellespont, is making haste to conquer, and, if we are once too late, we shall never recover, our duty is to consult and prepare with the utmost speed, and not for clamors and charges about other matters to run off from this.

I wonder at many things which are commonly said here, but I have been particularly surprised, Athenians, at what I lately heard a man declare in the Council,¹ that a statesman's advice should be, either to make war decidedly, or to observe the peace. True; if Philip keeps quiet, neither holding any of our territories contrary to the treaty, nor packing a world of enemies against us, there is nothing to say: peace we must absolutely observe, and I see every readiness on your part. But if the conditions of the peace, which we swore to, are recorded and open to inspection; if it appears that, from the beginning (before Diopithes

¹ The Council or Senate of Five Hundred, of which Demosthenes became a member when he was thirty-six years of age.
and the settlers, who are accused as authors of the war, ever sailed from Athens), Philip has robbed us of divers territories, of which you still complain in these unrepealed resolutions, and has been all along incessantly gathering the spoil of other nations, Greek and barbarian, for the materials of an attack upon you, what mean they by saying we must have war or peace? We have no choice in the matter: there remains but one most just and necessary course, which these men purposely overlook. What is it? To defend ourselves against an aggressor. Unless indeed they mean that, so long as Philip keeps aloof from Attica and Piræus, he neither wrongs you nor commits hostility. But if they put our rights on this principle, and so define the peace, besides that the argument is iniquitous, monstrous, and perilous for Athens, as I imagine is evident to all, it happens also to be inconsistent with their complaint against Diopithes. For why, I wonder, should we give Philip license to do what he pleases, provided he abstain from Attica, while Diopithes is not suffered even to assist the Thracians, without our saying that he makes war? Here, it will be granted, they are shown in the wrong: but the mercenaries make sad work ravaging the Hellespontine coast, and Diopithes has no right to detain vessels, and we must not allow him! Well; be it so! I am content. Yet I think, if they really give this counsel in good faith, as their object is to disband a force in your service, while they denounce the general who maintains it, they ought likewise to show that Philip's army will be disbanded if

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8 The settlers were citizens sent out to receive parcels of land in some country dependent on Athens, but who still retained rights of Athenian citizenship, whether or not they permanently resided abroad.

9 Philip sought to conquer Athens in Thrace, as Napoleon to conquer England in Egypt or Portugal.
you follow their advice. Otherwise, observe, they just bring the country into the same way, through which all our past measures have miscarried. For you surely know, that by nothing in the world has Philip beaten us so much as by being earlier in his operations. He with an army always attending him, knowing his own designs, pounces on whom he pleases in a moment: 4 we, when we hear that something is going on, begin to bustle and prepare. Me-thinks the result is, that he very quietly secures what he goes for; we arrive too late, and have incurred all the expense for nothing. Our enmity and our hostile intention we manifest, and get the disgrace of missing the time for action.

Then be sure, Athenians, now, that all the rest is talk and pretence, the real aim and contrivance is, that while you remain at home, and the country has no force abroad, Philip may accomplish what he pleases without interruption. First, consider what is actually going on. Philip is staying with a large army in Thrace, and sending for reinforcements, as eye-witnesses report, from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now, should he wait for the trade-winds, and then march to the siege of Byzantium, 5 think ye the Byzantines would persist in their present folly, and would not invite you and implore your assistance? I don’t believe it. No; they will receive any people, even those they distrust more than us, sooner than surrender their city to Philip; unless indeed he is beforehand with them and cap-

4 More closely, “is upon the enemy, whom he pleases to attack, in a moment.”
5 Athens and Byzantium had not been on good terms since the Social war. Even at this period the Byzantines looked with more suspicion upon the Athenians than on Philip. Yet less than a year elapsed before the predictions of Demosthenes were fulfilled. Athens was in alliance with Byzantium, and defending her successfully against Philip.
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tures it. If then we are unable to sail northward, and there
be no help at hand, nothing can prevent their destruction.
Well! the men are infatuated and besotted. Very likely;
yet they must be rescued for all that, because it is good
for Athens. And this also is not clear to us, that he will
not attack the Chersonese: nay, if we may judge from the
letter which he sent us, he says he will chastise the people
in the Chersonese. Then if the present army be kept on
foot, it will be able to defend that country, and attack
some of Philip's dominions; but if it be once disbanded,
what shall we do, if he march against the Chersonese?
Try Diopithes, I suppose. And how will our affairs be
bettered? But we shall send succor from Athens. And
suppose the winds prevent us? Oh, but he won't come!
And who will insure that? Do you mark and consider,
men of Athens, the approaching season of the year, against
which certain persons desire to get the Hellespont clear
of you, and deliver it up to Philip? Suppose he should
leave Thrace, and, without going near Chersoneseus or
Byzantium (I beg you also to consider this), he should
invade Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did Oreus,† think
you it is better to resist him here and suffer the war to
approach Attica, or to find employment for him yonder?
I think the last.

With such facts and arguments before you, so far from
disparaging and seeking to disband this army, which Di-
opithes is endeavoring to organize for Athens, you ought
yourselves to provide an additional one, to support him
with money and other friendly co-operation. For if Philip
were asked, "Which would you prefer, that these soldiers

† Oreus of Euboea was betrayed to Philip not long before this time, as ex-
plained in the third Philippic. The designs of Philip on Megara were baffled.
Oration—*13—Vol. I.
of Diopithes, whatever be their character (I dispute not about that), should thrive and have credit at Athens, and be reinforced with the assistance of the state, or that they should be dispersed and destroyed at the instance of calumniators and accusers?"—I think he would say the latter. And what Philip would pray to the gods for certain persons among us are bringing about; and after this you ask how the state is ruined!

I wish, therefore, to examine with freedom our present affairs, to consider how we are dealing with them, and what we are ourselves about. We like not to contribute money, we dare not take the field, we cannot abstain from the public funds, we neither give supplies to Diopithes nor approve what he finds for himself, but grumble and inquire how he got them, and what he intends to do, and the like; and yet, though thus disposed, we are not willing to mind our own business, but with our mouths applaud those who speak worthily of the state, while in action we co-operate with their adversaries. You like always to ask the speaker—What must we do? I will ask you this—What must I say? For if you will neither contribute, nor take the field, nor abstain from the public funds, nor give supplies to Diopithes, nor let alone what he finds for himself, nor be content to mind your own business, I have nothing to say. If to these men, so prompt to accuse and calumniate, you already give such a license, as to hear them complain by anticipation of projects which they impute to Diopithes, what can one say?

But the probable effect of such conduct some of you should hear. I will speak frankly; indeed, I could not speak otherwise. All the generals who have ever sailed from Athens (or let me suffer any penalty) take money
from Chians, from Erythraeans, from whom they severally can, I mean from the people who dwell in Asia. Those who have one or two galleys take less, those who have a greater fleet, more. And the givers give not, either the small or the larger sums, for nothing (they are not so mad), but by way of bargain, that the merchants who leave their harbors may not be wronged or plundered, that their vessels may be convoyed, or the like. They say they give benevolences: that is the name of the presents. And so Diopithes, having an army, is well aware that all these people will give money: for how else do you suppose that a man who has received nothing from you, and has nothing of his own to pay withal, can maintain his troops? From the skies? Impossible. He goes on with what he collects, begs, or borrows. Therefore they, who accuse him before you, in effect warn all people to give him nothing, as being sure to be punished for his intentions, much more for his acts, either as principal or auxiliary. Hence their clamors—he is preparing a siege! he is giving up the Greeks! So concerned are many of these persons for the Asiatic Greeks: perhaps quicker to feel for strangers than for their country. And this is the meaning of our sending another general to the Hellespont. Why, if Diopithes commits outrage and detains vessels, a small, very small summons, men of Athens, can stop it all; and

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1 Erythrae is a city of Asia Minor.
2 It is singular that the same name should be given so many centuries after to the illegal contributions which were extorted by some English kings from their subjects, under the pretense of their being voluntary gifts. Edward the Fourth and Henry the Seventh were most oppressive in this way.
3 The argument is—This is what my opponents mean by recommending that another general should be sent to supersede and send back Diopithes. Such a course is wholly unnecessary, for you can summon him home by an order of state.
the laws prescribe this, to impeach the guilty parties, but not to watch them ourselves at a great expense and with a large navy, for that were the extreme of madness. Against our enemies, whom we cannot bring under the laws, it is right and needful to maintain troops, and despatch a fleet, and contribute money; but against ourselves a decree, an impeachment, the state-galley,10 are sufficient. Thus would men of discretion act; malignant and mischievous politicians would proceed as these do. And that certain of these men are thus disposed, bad though it be, is not the worst. For you of the assembly are so minded now that if any one comes forward and says that Diopites is the author of all your misfortunes, or Chares, or Aristophon, or what citizen he likes to name, you instantly assent and shout approbation; but if one rises to speak the truth—Athenians, you are trifling; of all these misfortunes and troubles Philip is the cause; had he only kept quiet, the state would have had no trouble—you are unable to contradict these statements, yet, methinks, you are annoyed, and feel as if something were lost. The reason is—and pray allow me, when I speak for the best, to speak freely—certain statesmen have long since got you to be severe and terrible in the assemblies, in warlike preparations feeble and contemptible. If the party blamed be one whom you are certain to find within your reach, you say ay, and are content: but if one be accused whom you cannot punish without vanquishing him by arms, you appear confounded and pained at the exposure. It ought, Athenians, to have been the reverse; your statesmen should

10 The Paralus, or the Salaminia, which were employed for state purposes, and sometimes to fetch home criminals to be tried or punished. Thus the Salaminia was despatched to bring Alcibiades back from Sicily.
have accustomed you to be mild and merciful in the assembly, since there your dealings are with citizens and allies; in warlike preparations they should have shown you to be terrible and severe, since in them the contest is with adversaries and foes. But by excessive coaxing and humoring they have brought you to such a condition that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at hearing nothing but compliments, while in your measures and proceedings you are putting everything to hazard.

By Jupiter! suppose the Greeks called you to account for the opportunities which you have indolently lost, and asked you, saying, "Men of Athens, you send us ambassadors on every occasion, and assert that Philip is plotting against us and all the Greeks, and that we should take precautions against the man, and more to the same effect" (we must admit and acknowledge it; for so we do): "and yet, O ye wretchedest of mankind, though Philip has been ten months away, and by illness and winter and wars prevented from returning home, you have neither liberated Euboea, nor recovered any of your dominions. He, on the contrary, while you were staying at home, at leisure, in health (if men so acting may be called in health), established two rulers in Euboea, one like a hostile fortress opposite Attica, one threatening Scithus;" and these nuisances you have never got rid of; not even this would ye attempt; you have submitted, left the road open to him clearly, and made it manifest that, if he died a hundred times, you would stir never a step the more. Then

11 Clitarchus was established in Eretria, which is opposite the coast of Athens; Philistides in Oreus, which is in the north of Euboea. The island of Scithus is a little above Euboea, and off the Magnesian coast of Thessaly. As the group of islands, of which Scithus was one, belonged to Athens, Oreus was a dangerous position to be occupied by an enemy.
wherefore send embassies and make accusations and give us trouble?' If they asked this, what could we answer or say, men of Athens? I really cannot tell.

There are some persons, indeed, who imagine they confute the speaker by asking, What must we do? I can give them a perfectly just and true answer—Do not what you are now doing: however, I will enter into more full detail; and I trust they will be as ready to act as to interrogate. First, men of Athens, you must be satisfied in your minds that Philip is at war with the republic, and has broken the peace (pray cease reproaching one another about this); that he is ill-disposed and hostile to all Athens, to her very ground, and (I may say) to all her inhabitants, even those who think they oblige him most. Or let them look at Euthycrates and Lasthenes the Olynthians, who fancied themselves on the most friendly footing with him, but, since they betrayed their country, are sunk to the most abject state. But there is nothing that his wars and his schemes are directed against so much as our constitution; nothing in the world is he so earnest to destroy. And this policy is in some sort natural for him. He knows perfectly that even if he conquer everything else, he can hold nothing secure, while your democracy subsists; but on the occurrence of any reverse (and many may happen to a man), all who are now under constraint will come and seek refuge with you. For you are not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; you are famous for checking the usurper or depriving him of his conquest; ever ready to molest the aspirants

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18 They betrayed Olynthus to Philip, and went to reside afterward at his court. But they were universally scouted as traitors, and on their complaining to Philip, he said, the Macedonians were a plain-spoken people, who called a spade a spade.
for empire, and vindicate the liberties of all people. He
likes not that a free spirit should proceed from Athens to
watch the moments of his peril: far otherwise; nor is his
reasoning weak or idle. First, then, you must assume him
for this reason to be an irreconcilable enemy of our consti-
tution and democracy: without such conviction upon your
minds you will have no zeal for public duty. Secondly,
you must be assured that all his operations and contriv-
ances are planned against our country, and, wherever he
is resisted, the resistance will be for our benefit. None
of you surely is so foolish as to suppose that Philip covets
those miseries in Thrace (for what else can one call Drongi-
lus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and the places which he is
taking and conquering now?), and to get them endures
toils and winters and the extreme of danger, but covets
not the Athenian harbors, and docks, and galleys, and
silver mines," and revenues of such value; and that he
will suffer you to keep them, while for the sake of the
barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in
the midst of horrors." Impossible. The object of that
and every other enterprise is to become master here.
What, then, is the duty of wise men? With these as-
surances and convictions, to lay aside an indolence which
is becoming outrageous and incurable, to pay contribu-
tions and to call upon your allies, see to and provide for
the continuance of the present force that, as Philip has a
power ready to injure and enslave all the Greeks, so you
may have one ready to save and to succor all. It is not

13 The mines of Laurium in Attica.
14 The original signifies a pit, into which condemned criminals were thrown
at Athens. It is pretty much the same as if we were to speak of the black
hole; and the horrors of Thrace would convey to an Athenian the same sort
of idea as the horrors of Siberia to us.
possible with hasty levies to perform any effective service. You must have an army on foot, provide maintenance for it, and paymasters and commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care shall be taken of your funds, and demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of the campaign. If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel Philip to observe a just peace and abide in his own country (the greatest of all blessings), or you will fight him on equal terms.

It may be thought, and truly enough, that these are affairs of great expense and toil and trouble: yet only consider what the consequences to us must be, if we decline these measures, and you will find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose some god would be your surety—for certainly no mortal could guarantee such an event—that, notwithstanding you kept quiet and abandoned everything, Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all the gods, it were disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the character of Athens and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish ease to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my own part, I would rather die than have given such counsel; though, if another man advises it, and you are satisfied, well and good; make no resistance, abandon all. If however no man holds this opinion, if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the more we let Philip conquer the more ruthless and powerful an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to perform our duty? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long
ORATION ON THE CHERSONESE

ago: and surely you must deprecate that of slaves. What is the difference? To a freeman, the greatest necessity is shame for his proceedings; I know not what greater you can suggest: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to mention!

I would gladly enter into every particular, and show how certain politicians abuse you; but I confine myself to one. When any question about Philip arises, people start up and cry, What a blessing it is to be at peace! what a burden to maintain a large army! certain persons wish to plunder our treasury!—and more to the same effect; by which they amuse you, and leave him at leisure to do what he pleases. The result is, to you, Athenians, ease and idleness for the present, which, I fear, you may hereafter think dearly purchased; to these men, popularity and payment for their speeches. Methinks it is not you that need persuading to peace, who sit here pacifically disposed; but the person who commits hostilities: let him be persuaded, and all is ready on your part. Burdensome we should deem, not what we expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of our refusal to do so. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by a plan for its safe keeping, not by abandonment of our interests. But this very thing makes me indignant, that some of you, Athenians, are grieved at the thought of your treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to keep it safe and to chastise the peculator, yet are not grieved at Philip's conduct, seizing thus successively on every country in Greece, and seizing them for his designs upon you.

What then is the reason, men of Athens, that while Philip is thus openly in arms, committing aggressions, capturing cities, none of these persons ever say that he is
making war; but they denounce as authors of the war whoever advises you to oppose him and prevent these losses? I will explain. Their desire is that any anger which may be naturally excited by your sufferings in the war may be turned upon your honest counsellors, so that you may try them instead of resisting Philip, and they themselves be accusers instead of paying the penalty of their conduct. Such is the meaning of their assertion that there is a war party among you; and such is the object of this present debate. I am indeed sure, that, before any Athenian moved a declaration of war, Philip had taken many of our possessions, and recently sent succor to Corcyra. If however we choose to assume that he is not at war with us, it were extreme folly in him to convince us of our mistake. But when he marches to attack us, what shall we say? He will assure us that he is not making war, as he assured the people of Oreus when his troops were in their country, as he assured the Pheranians before he assaulted their walls, and the Olynthians at first, until he was actually in their territories with his army. Shall we then declare that men who bid us defend ourselves make war? If so, we must be slaves: nothing else remains, if we neither resist nor are suffered to be at peace. And remember, you have more at stake than other people: Philip seeks not to subdue, but to extirpate our city. He knows for certain you will not submit to servitude; you could not if you would, being accustomed to empire; and if you get the opportunity, you will be able to give him more annoyance than all the rest of the world.

You must therefore be convinced that this is a struggle for existence: these men who have sold themselves to Philip you must execrate and cudgel to death; for it is
impossible, impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have punished your enemies (his ministers) at home. They will be the stumbling-blocks that prevent your reaching the others. Why do you suppose Philip now insults you (for to this, in my opinion, his conduct amounts), and while to other people, though he deceives them, he at least renders services, he is already threatening you? For example, the Thessalians by many benefits he seduced into their present servitude: how he cheated the wretched Olynthians, first giving them Potidæa and divers other things, no man can describe: now he is enticing the Thebans by giving up to them Boeotia, and delivering them from a toilsome and vexatious war. Thus did each of these people grasp a certain advantage, but some of them have suffered what all the world knows, others will suffer what may hereafter befall them. From you—all that has been taken I recount not: but in the very making of the peace, how have you been abused! how despoiled! Of Phocis, Thermopylæ, places in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself! Does he not now possess the city of Cardia and avow it? Wherefore, I say, deals he thus with other people, and not in the same manner with you? Because yours is the only state in which a privilege is allowed of speaking for the enemy, and an individual taking a bribe may safely address the assembly, though you have been robbed of your dominions. It was not safe at Olynthus to be Philip's advocate, unless the Olynthian commonalty had shared the advantage by possession of Potidæa: it was not safe in Thessaly to be Philip's advocate, unless the people of Thessaly had shared the advantage, by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylæan synod: it was not safe in Thebes, until he gave
up Boeotia to them and destroyed the Phocians. Yet at Athens, though Philip has deprived you of Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, nay, is even making Euboea a fortress to curb us, and advancing to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip’s behalf. Therefore of these men, some, from being poor, have become rapidly rich, from nameless and obscure, have become honored and distinguished; you have done the reverse, fallen from honor to obscurity, from wealth to poverty; for I deem the riches of a state, allies, confidence, attachment, of all which you are destitute. And from your neglecting these matters and suffering them to be lost, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are abject and forlorn, magnificent in the abundance of your market, but in provision for actual need ridiculous. I observe, however, that some of our orators take different thought for you and for themselves. You, they say, should be quiet even under injustice; they cannot live in quiet among you themselves, though no man injures them.

Then some one steps forward and says, "Why, you won’t move any resolution, or run any risk; you are cowardly and faint-hearted." Let me say this: bold, brutal, and impudent I neither am nor wish to be; yet, methinks, I possess far more courage than your headstrong politicians. For a man who, neglecting the interest of the state, tries, confiscates, bribes, accuses, does not act from any courage,

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18 Not that Philip had commenced any operations against Byzantium, but from his march in that direction Demosthenes rightly conjectured that he had designs thereupon.

19 By subjecting yourself to an "indictment for having proposed an illegal decree"; and also to the general responsibility which a statesman incurred by advising important measures.
Athenians; the popularity of his speeches and his measures serves for a pledge of security, and he is bold without danger. But one who acting for the best frequently opposes your wishes, who never speaks to flatter but always to benefit you, and adopts a line of policy in which more depends on fortune than on calculations, while he makes himself responsible to you for both, this is a courageous man, ay, and a useful citizen is he; not they who for ephemeral pleasure have thrown away the main resources of the country; whom I am so far from emulating or esteeming as worthy citizens of Athens, that if I were asked to declare what service I had done the state, although, ye men of Athens, I could mention services as ship-captain and choir-master, payment of contributions, ransom of prisoners, and similar acts of liberality, I would mention none of them; I would say that I espouse a different course of politics from these, that although I might perhaps, like others, accuse and bribe and confiscate and do everything which these men do, I have never engaged myself in such a task, never been induced either by avarice or ambition; I continue to offer counsel, by which I sink below others in your regard; but you, if you followed it, would be exalted. So perhaps might one speak without offence. I consider it not the part of an honest citizen to devise measures by which I shall speedily become the first among you, and you the last among nations: with the measures of good citizens the advancement of their country should keep pace: their counsel should still be the salutary, rather than the agreeable: to the latter will nature herself incline; to the former a good citizen must direct by argument and instruction.

I have ere now heard an objection of this kind, that
true it is I always advise for the best, yet my services are only words, and you want deeds and something practical. Upon which I will tell you my sentiments without reserve. I do not think a counsellor has any other business but to give the best advice: and that this is so, I can easily demonstrate. You are aware doubtless that the brave Timotheus once harangued the people, urging them to send troops and save the Euboeans, when the Thebans were attempting their conquest; and to this effect he spake:— "What? do you deliberate," said he, "when you have Thebans in the island, how to deal with them, how to proceed? Will you not cover the sea, Athenians, with your galleys? Will you not start up and march to Piræus? will you not launch your vessels?" Thus Timotheus spoke and you acted," and through both together success was obtained. But had his advice been ever so good, as it was, and you shrank from exertion and disregarded it, would any of those results have accrued to Athens? Impossible. Then do likewise in regard to my counsels or any other man's; for action look to yourselves, to the orator for the best instruction in his power.

I will sum up my advice, and quit the platform. I say, you must contribute money, maintain the existing troops, rectifying what abuses you may discover, but not on the first accusation disbanding the force. Send out ambassadors everywhere, to instruct, to warn, to effect what they can for Athens. Yet further I say, punish your corrupt

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"Dioecles and Charis conducted this expedition, which took place B.C. 357, and which, after various combat in the island of Euboea, ended in the expulsion of the Thebans. Just at that time the finances of the Athenians were exceedingly low, and the generosity of the wealthier citizens was largely taxed to provide necessaries for the armament. Demosthenes himself came forward as a liberal contributor."
statesmen, execrate them at all times and places, to prove that men of virtue and honorable conduct have consulted wisely both for others and themselves. If you thus attend to your affairs, and cease entirely neglecting them, perhaps, perhaps even yet they may improve. But while ye sit here, zealous as far as clamor and applause, laggards when any action is required, I see not how any talking, unaided by your needful exertions, can possibly save the country.

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

This speech was delivered about three months after the last, while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had happened which called for any special consultation; but Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip’s enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the difference between Philip’s new method of warfare and that adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of corresponding measures for defence. The peaceful professions of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendency were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment, before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice of Demosthenes now is, to despatch reinforcements to the Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.

The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the Propontine cities, fully justified the warnings of Demosthenes. And the extraordinary activity which the Athenians displayed in resisting him shows that the
exertions of the orator had their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an able and effective minister.

Many speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstances may have brought us to this state; our affairs have not declined from one or two causes only: but, if you rightly examine, you will find it chiefly owing to the orators, who study to please you rather than advise for the best. Some of whom, Athenians, seeking to maintain the basis of their own power and repute, have no forethought for the future, and therefore think you also ought to have none; others, accusing and calumniating practical statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in such occupation to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and do what he pleases. Politics of this kind are common here, but are the causes of your failures and embarrassment. I beg, Athenians, that you will not resent my plain speaking of the truth. Only consider. You hold liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of all residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure of it even to foreigners and slaves, and
many servants may be seen among you speaking their thoughts more freely than citizens in some other states; and yet you have altogether banished it from your councils. The result has been that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you are brought to the utmost peril. If such be your disposition now, I must be silent; if you will listen to good advice without flattery, I am ready to speak. For though our affairs are in a deplorable condition, though many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox, and yet a truth, am I about to state. That which is the most lamentable in the past is best for the future. How is this? Because you performed no part of your duty, great or small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done all that became you, and your situation were the same, there would be no hope of amendment. Philip has indeed prevailed over your sloth and negligence, but not over the country: you have not been worsted; you have not even bestirred yourselves.

If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war, one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or advises a measure of defence is in danger of being accused afterward as author of the war.
I will first, then, examine and determine this point, whether it be in our power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if it depends on us (to begin with this), I say we ought to maintain peace, and I call upon the affirmand to move a resolution, to take some measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace, while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a madman, or he talks of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.

If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with us, we are the simplest of mortals: for he would not declare that, though he marched even against Attica and Piræus, at least if we may judge from his conduct to others. For example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he was forty furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though before that time, whenever he was accused of such an intent, he took it ill and sent ambassadors to justify himself. Again, he marched toward the Phocians as if they were allies, and there were Phocian envoys who accompanied his march, and many among you contended that his advance would not benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late as a friend and ally, yet he has taken possession of Phœæ: and lastly he.
told these wretched people of Oreus¹ that he had sent his soldiers out of goodwill to visit them, as he heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it was the part of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such occasions. People who would never have harmed him, though they might have adopted measures of defence, he chose to deceive rather than warn them of his attack; and think ye he would declare war against you before he began it, and that while you are willing to be deceived? Impossible. He would be the silliest of mankind, if, while you the injured parties make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own countrymen, he should terminate your intestine strife and jealousies, warn you to turn against him, and remove the pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to amuse you, that he makes no war upon Athens. O heavens! would any rational being judge by words, rather than by actions, who is at peace with him and who at war? Surely none. Well, then; Philip immediately after the peace, before Diopithes was in command or the settlers in the Chersonese had been sent out, took Serrium and Doriscus, and expelled from Serrium and the Sacred Mount the troops whom your general had stationed there.² What do you call such conduct? He had sworn the peace. Don't say—what does it signify? how is the

¹ When he established his creature Philistides in the government of Oreus, as mentioned in the last oration and at the end of this.

² This general was Chares, to whom Cerobeles had intrusted the defence of those places. The Sacred Mount was a fortified position on the northern coast of the Hellespont. It was here that Miltocithes intrenched himself, when he rebelled against Cotys; and Philip took possession of it just before the peace with Athens was concluded, as being important to his operations against Cerobeles. The statement of Demosthenes, that the oaths had then been taken, is incorrect; for they were sworn afterward in Thessaly. But the argument is substantially the same; for the peace had been agreed to, and the ratification was purposely delayed by Philip, to gain time for the completion of his designs.
state concerned?—Whether it be a trifling matter, or of no concernment to you, is a different question: religion and justice have the same obligation, be the subject of the offence great or small. Tell me now; when he sends mercenaries into Chersonesus, which the king and all the Greeks have acknowledged to be yours, when he avows himself an auxiliary and writes us word so, what are such proceedings? He says he is not at war; I cannot, however, admit such conduct to be an observance of the peace; far otherwise: I say, by his attempt on Megara, by his setting up despotism in Euboea, by his present advance into Thrace, by his intrigues in Peloponnesus, by the whole course of operations with his army, he has been breaking the peace and making war upon you; unless, indeed, you will say that those who establish batteries are not at war, until they apply them to the walls. But that you will not say: for whoever contrives and prepares the means for my conquest, is at war with me, before he darts or draws the bow. What, if anything should happen, is the risk you run? The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of Megara and Euboea to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnesians with him. Then can I allow that one who sets such an engine at work against Athens is at peace with her? Quite the contrary. From the day that he destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend yourselves instantly,

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8 Not long before this oration was delivered, Philip was suspected of a design to seize Megara. Demosthenes gives an account of a conspiracy between two Megarians, Ptoleodorus and Periades, to introduce Macedonian troops into the city. Phocion was sent by the Athenians to Megara, with the consent of the Megarian people, to protect them against foreign attack. He fortified the city and port, connecting them by long walls, and put them in security. The occupation of Megara by Philip must have been most perilous to Athens, especially while Euboea and Thebes were in his interest; he would thus have inclosed her as it were in a net.
and I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may wish in vain to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other counsellors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion about Chersonesus or Byzantium out of place. Succor them—I advise that—watch that no harm befalls them, send all necessary supplies to your troops in that quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as being in the utmost peril. I must tell you why I am so alarmed at the state of our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct, you may share them, and make some provision at least for yourselves, however disinclined to do so for others: but if, in your judgment, I talk nonsense and absurdity, you may treat me as crazed, and not listen to me, either now or in future.

That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown mighty, that the Greeks are jealous and quarrelling among themselves, that it was far more wonderful for him to rise from that insignificance, than it would now be, after so many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I observe that all people, beginning with you, have conceded to him a right, which in former times has been the subject of contest in every Grecian war. And what is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing and pillaging the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three years, the Lacedæmonians for twenty-nine; and the Thebans had some power in these latter times after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you, my countrymen, nor Thebans nor Lacedæmonians, were ever licensed by the Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise. When you, or rather the Athenians of that time, appeared to be
DEMOSTHENES

dealing harshly with certain people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens, thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her. So, when the Lacedaemonians became masters and succeeded to your empire, on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations,¹ a general war was declared against them, even by such as had no cause of complaint. But wherefore mention other people? We ourselves and the Lacedaemonians, although at the outset we could not allege any mutual injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done to our neighbors. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of Athens, than the wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip has been uppermost, he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay, they are scarcely a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in a few words. Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all which he has so cruelly destroyed that a visitor could hardly tell if they were ever inhabited: and of the Phocians, so considerable a people exterminated, I say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to parcel her out, not only by cities, but also by provinces, for subjection? Are not the Euboean states governed now by

¹ The Spartans, whose severe military discipline rendered them far the best soldiers in Greece, were totally unfit to manage the empire, at the head of which they found themselves after the humiliation of Athens. Their attempt to force an oligarchy upon every dependent state was an unwise policy, which made them generally odious. The demesnirates of Lyssander, and the governors established in various Greek cities to maintain Lacedaemonian influence, were regarded as instruments of tyranny. It was found that Spartan governors and generals, when away from home, gave loose to their vicious inclinations, as if to indemnify themselves for the strictness of domestic discipline.
despots, and that in an island near to Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Nor does he write so and not act accordingly. He is gone to the Hellespont; he marched formerly against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he possesses; he plotted lately to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains the man's ambition. And we, the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending embassies to one another about it and expressing indignation, are in such a miserable state, so intrenched in our separate towns, that to this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we cannot combine, or form any association for succor and alliance; we look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving (methinks) to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or striving for the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant that Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is coming even on those that yet seem very far removed. And you must be sensible that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedæmonians or from us, was at least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune, committed some fault or error in the management of it; on that ground one would consider him open to censure and reproach, yet it could not be said that he was an alien, and not heir to the property which he so dealt with.

* That is to say, a Macedonian faction prevailed in Elis. The democratical party had some time before endeavored to regain the ascendancy, by aid of the Phocian mercenaries of Phalereus; but they had been defeated by the troops of Arcadia and Elis.
But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what he had no interest in—heavens! how much more heinous and hateful would all have pronounced it! And yet in regard to Philip and his conduct they feel not this, although he is not only no Greek and nowise akin to Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honorable to mention; in fact, a vile fellow of Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not be purchased formerly.

What is wanting to make his insolence complete? Besides his destruction of Grecian cities, does he not hold the Pythian games, the common festival of Greece, and, if he comes not himself, send his vassals to preside? Is he not master of Thermopylæ and the passes into Greece, and holds he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole Amphictyonic body, and got preaudience of the oracle, to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Does he not write to the Thessalians, what form of government to adopt? send mercenaries to Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler? Yet the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as they would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on himself, none trying to prevent it. And not only are the outrages which he does to Greece submitted to, but even the private wrongs of every people:

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6 This privilege, which had belonged to the Phocians, was transferred to Philip. It was considered an advantage as well as an honor in ancient times; for there were only certain days appointed in every month when the oracle could be consulted, and the order of consultation was determined by lot in common cases. The Delphians used to confer the right of preconsultation on particular states or persons as a reward for some service or act of piety. Thus the Spartans received it; and Croesus, king of Lydia, for the magnificent presents which he sent to the temple.

7 Porthmus was the port of Eretria, on the strait, opposite Athens. The circumstances are stated by Demothenes at the latter end of the speech.
nothing can go beyond this! Has he not wronged the Corinthians by attacking Ambracia⁸ and Leucas? the Achaians, by swearing to give Naupactus⁹ to the Ætolians? from the Thebans taken Echinus?¹⁰ Is he not marching against the Byzantines his allies? From us—I omit the rest—but keeps he not Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese? Still under these indignities we are all slack and disheartened, and look toward our neighbors, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And how think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how will he act, when he gets each separately under his control?

But what has caused the mischief? There must be some cause, some good reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are eager for servitude. There was something, men of Athens, something in the hearts of the multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof has ruined all, and thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this? Nothing subtle or clever: simply that whoever took money from the aspirants for power or the corrupters of Greece were universally detested: it was dreadful to be convicted of bribery;

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⁸ Divers colonies were planted on the northwestern coast of Greece by the Corinthians, and also by the Corecyreans, who were themselves colonists from Corinth. Among them were Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Leucas afterward became insular, by cutting through the isthmus. Philip's meditated attack was in B.C. 343, after the conquest of Cassopia. Leucas, by its insular position, would have been convenient for a descent on Peloponnnesus. We have seen that this design of Philip was baffled by the exertions of Demoethenes.

⁹ Naupactus, now Lepanto, lay on the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it came into the hands of the Achaians, from whom it was taken by Epaminondas, but after his death they regained it. The Ætolians got possession of the town some time after, perhaps by Macedonian assistance.

¹⁰ The Echinus here mentioned was a city on the northern coast of the Malian gulf in Thessaly.
the severest punishment was inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The favorable moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against those that discharge all their duty, could not be bought from orators or generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor anything of the kind. But now all such principles have been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange by which Greece is ruined and diseased. What are they? Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter if he confesses it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those that denounce the crime; all the usual attendants upon corruption. For as to ships and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be reckoned as constituting national strength—assuredly the Greeks of our day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless, unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these traffickers.

That such is the present state of things, you must see, without requiring my testimony: that it was different in former times, I will demonstrate, not by speaking my own words, but by showing an inscription of your ancestors, which they graved on a brazen column and deposited in the citadel, not for their own benefit (they were right-minded enough without such records), but for a memorial and example to instruct you, how seriously such conduct should be taken up. What says the inscription then? It says: "Let Arthmius, son of Pythonax the Zelite," be de-

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11 He glances more particularly at Philocrates, Demades and Æschines.
12 Zolea is a town in Mysia. Arthmius was sent by Artaxerxes into Peloponnesus to stir up a war against the Athenians, who had irritated him by the assistance which they lent to Egypt.
clared an outlaw, and an enemy of the Athenian people and their allies, him and his family." Then the cause is written why this was done: because he brought the Median gold into Peloponnesus. That is the inscription. By the gods! only consider and reflect among yourselves, what must have been the spirit, what the dignity of those Athenians who acted so. One Arthmius a Zelite, subject of the king (for Zelea is in Asia), because in his master's service he brought gold into Peloponnesus, not to Athens, they proclaimed an enemy of the Athenians and their allies, him and his family, and outlawed. That is, not the outlawry commonly spoken of: for what would a Zelite care, to be excluded from Athenian franchises? It means not that; but in the statutes of homicide it is written, in cases where a prosecution for murder is not allowed, but killing is sanctioned, "and let him die an outlaw," says the legislator: by which he means that whoever kills such a person shall be unpolluted." Therefore they considered that the preservation of all Greece was their own concern (but for such opinion they would not have cared whether people in Peloponnesus were bought and corrupted): and whomsoever they discovered taking bribes, they chastised and punished so severely as to record their names in brass. The natural result was that Greece was formidable to the Barbarian, not the Barbarian to Greece. 'Tis not so now: since neither in this nor in other respects are your sentiments the same. But what are they? You know yourselves: why am I to upbraid you with everything? The Greeks in general are alike and no better than you. Therefore I say, our present affairs demand earnest attention and

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18 That is, his act being justifiable homicide, he shall not be deemed (in a religious point of view) impure.
wholesome counsel. Shall I say what? Do you bid me, and won't you be angry?

[Here is read the public document which Demosthenes produces, after which he resumes his address 14]

There is a foolish saying of persons who wish to make us easy, that Philip is not yet as powerful as the Lacedæmonians were formerly, who ruled everywhere by land and sea, and had the king for their ally, and nothing withstood them; yet Athens resisted even that nation, and was not destroyed. I myself believe, that, while everything has received great improvement, and the present bears no resemblance to the past, nothing has been so changed and improved as the practice of war. For anciently, as I am informed, the Lacedæmonians and all Grecian people would for four or five months, during the season 15 only, invade and ravage the land of their enemies with heavy-armed and national troops, and return home again: and their ideas were so old-fashioned, or rather national, they never purchased an advantage from any; theirs was a legitimate and open warfare. But now you doubtless perceive that the majority of disasters have been effected by treason; nothing is done in fair field or combat. You hear of Philip marching where he pleases, not because he commands troops of the line, but because he has attached to him a host of skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and the like. When with these he falls upon a people in civil dissension,

14 The Secretary of the Assembly stood by the side of the orator, and read any public documents, such as statutes, decrees, bills and the like, which the orator desired to refer to or to verify. It does not appear what the document was which Demosthenes caused to be read here.

15 The campaigning season, during the summer and fine time of the year. The Peloponnesians generally invaded Attica when the corn was ripe, burning and plundering all in their route. Thucydides in his history divides the year into two parts, summer and winter.
and none (for mistrust) will march out to defend the coun-
try, he applies engines and besieges them. I need not
mention that he makes no difference between winter and
summer, that he has no stated season of repose. You,
knowing these things, reflecting on them, must not let the
war approach your territories, nor get your necks broken,
relying on the simplicity of the old war with the Lacedæ-
monians, but take the longest time beforehand for defen-
sive measures and preparations, see that he stirs not from
home, avoid any decisive engagement. For a war, if we
choose, men of Athens, to pursue a right course, we have
many natural advantages; such as the position of his king-
dom, which we may extensively plunder and ravage, and
a thousand more; but for a battle he is better trained than
we are.

Nor is it enough to adopt these resolutions and oppose
him by warlike measures: you must on calculation and on
principle abhor his advocates here, remembering that it is
impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you
have chastised those who are his ministers within the city.
Which, by Jupiter and all the gods, you cannot and will
not do! You have arrived at such a pitch of folly or mad-
ness or—I know not what to call it: I am tempted often
to think that some evil genius is driving you to ruin—for
the sake of scandal or envy or jest or any other cause, you
command hirings to speak (some of whom would not deny
themselves to be hirings), and laugh when they abuse
people. And this, bad as it is, is not the worst: you have
allowed these persons more liberty for their political con-
duct than your faithful counsellors: and see what evils are
caused by listening to such men with indulgence. I will
mention facts that you will all remember.
In Olynthus some of the statesmen were in Philip's interest, doing everything for him; some were on the honest side, aiming to preserve their fellow-citizens from slavery. Which party now destroyed their country? or which betrayed the cavalry,\(^8\) by whose betrayal Olynthus fell? The creatures of Philip; they that, while the city stood, slandered and calumniated the honest counsellors so effectually that the Olynthian people were induced to banish Apollonides.

Nor is it there only, and nowhere else, that such practice has been ruinous. In Eretria, when, after riddance of Plutarch\(^1\) and his mercenaries, the people got possession of their city and of Porthmus, some were for bringing the government over to you, others to Philip. His partisans were generally, rather exclusively, attended to by the wretched and unfortunate Eretrians, who at length were persuaded to expel their faithful advisers. Philip, their ally and friend, sent Hipponious and a thousand mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus, and established three rulers, Hipparchus, Automedon, Clitarchus. Since that he has driven them out of the country, twice attempting their deliverance: once he sent the troops with Eurylochus, afterward those of Parmenio.

What need of many words? In Oreus Philip's agents were Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapæus, who now hold the government: that was quite notorious: one Euphræus, a man that formerly dwelt here among you, was laboring for freedom and independence. How this

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\(^8\) After Olynthus was besieged by Philip, various sallies were made from the city, some of which were successful. But the treachery of Lathenes and his accomplices ruined all. A body of five hundred horse were led by him into an ambuscade, and captured by the besiegers.

\(^1\) When he was expelled by Phocion after the battle of Tamynæ, B.C. 354.
man was in other respects insulted and trampled on by the people of Oreus, were long to tell: but a year before the capture, discovering what Phileistides and his accomplices were about, he laid an information against them for treason. A multitude then combining, having Philip for their paymaster, and acting under his direction, take Euphræus off to prison as a disturber of the public peace. Seeing which, the people of Oreus, instead of assisting the one and beating the others to death, with them were not angry, but said his punishment was just and rejoiced at it. So the conspirators, having full liberty of action, laid their schemes and took their measures for the surrender of the city; if any of the people observed it, they were silent and intimidated, remembering the treatment of Euphræus; and so wretched was their condition that on the approach of such a calamity none dared to utter a word, until the enemy drew up before the walls: then some were for defence, others for betrayal. Since the city was thus basely and wickedly taken, the traitors have held despotic rule; people who formerly rescued them, and were ready for any maltreatment of Euphræus, they have either banished or put to death; Euphræus killed himself, proving by deed that he had resisted Philip honestly and purely for the good of his countrymen.

What can be the reason—perhaps you wonder—why the Olynthians and Eretrians and Orites were more indulgent to Philip's advocates than to their own? The same which operates with you. They who advise for the best cannot always gratify their audience, though they would; for the safety of the state must be attended to: their opponents by the very counsel which is agreeable advance Philip's interest. One party required contribution; the
other said there was no necessity: one was for war and mistrust; the other for peace, until they were ensnared. And so on for everything else (not to dwell on particulars); the one made speeches to please for the moment, and gave no annoyance; the other offered salutary counsel that was offensive. Many rights did the people surrender at last, not from any such motive of indulgence or ignorance, but submitting in the belief that all was lost. Which, by Jupiter and Apollo, I fear will be your case, when on calculation you see that nothing can be done. I pray, men of Athens, it may never come to this! Better die a thousand deaths than render homage to Philip, or sacrifice any of your faithful counsellors. A fine recompense have the people of Oreus got, for trusting themselves to Philip's friends and spurning Euphræus! Finely are the Eretrian commons rewarded, for having driven away your ambassadors and yielded to Clitarchus! Yes; they are slaves, exposed to the lash and the torture. Finely he spared the Olynthians, who appointed Lasthenes to command their horse, and expelled Apollonides! It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, and, while you take evil counsel and shirk every duty, and even listen to those who plead for your enemies, to think you inhabit a city of such magnitude, that you cannot suffer any serious misfortune. Yea, and it is disgraceful to exclaim on any occurrence, when it is too late, "Who would have expected it? However—this or that should have been done, the other left undone." Many things could the Olynthians mention now, which, if foreseen at the time, would have prevented their destruction. Many could the Orites mention, many the Phocians, and each of the ruined states. But what would it avail them? As long as the vessel is
safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every man in turn should exert himself, and prevent its being overturned either by accident or design: but when the sea hath rolled over it, their efforts are vain. And we, likewise, O Athenians, while we are safe, with a magnificent city, plentiful resources, lofty reputation—what must we do? Many of you, I dare say, have been longing to ask. Well then, I will tell you; I will move a resolution: pass it, if you please.

First, let us prepare for our own defence; provide ourselves, I mean, with ships, money, and troops—for surely, though all other people consented to be slaves, we at least ought to struggle for freedom. When we have completed our own preparations and made them apparent to the Greeks, then let us invite the rest, and send our ambassadors everywhere with the intelligence, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king, I say (for it concerns his interests not to let Philip make universal conquest); that, if you prevail, you may have partners of your dangers and expenses, in case of necessity, or at all events that you may delay the operations. For, since the war is against an individual, not against the collected power of a state, even this may be useful; as were the embassies last year to Peloponnesus, and the remonstrances with which I and Polyeuctus, that excellent man, and Hегesippus, and Climomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other envoys went round and arrested Philip's progress, so that he neither attacked

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18 Smead remarks here on the adroitness of the orator, who, instead of applying the simile of the ship to the administration of the state, which he felt that his quick-minded hearers had already done, suddenly interrupts himself with a question, which would naturally occur to the audience.

19 Because a state is a permanent power; a single man is liable to a variety of accidents, and his power terminates with his life.
Ambracia nor started for Peloponnesus. I say not, however, that you should invite the rest without adopting measures to protect yourselves: it would be folly, while you sacrifice your own interest, to profess a regard for that of strangers, or to alarm others about the future, while for the present you are unconcerned. I advise not this: I bid you send supplies to the troops in Chersonesus, and do what else they require; prepare yourselves and make every effort first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of the Greeks. That is the duty of a state possessing a dignity such as yours. If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece, while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong. Well for any of those people if they are safe themselves. This work belongs to you: this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many perilous exertions. But if every one will sit seeking his pleasure, and studying to be idle himself, never will he find others to do his work, and more than this, I fear we shall be under the necessity of doing all that we like not at one time. Were proxies to be had, our inactivity would have found them long ago; but they are not.

Such are the measures which I advise, which I propose: adopt them, and even yet, I believe, our prosperity may be re-established. If any man has better advice to offer, let him communicate it openly. Whatever you determine, I pray to all the gods for a happy result.
THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

THE subject of this oration is the same as the last; viz., the necessity of resistance to Philip. The time of its delivery would appear to have been a little later, while Philip was yet in Thrace, and before he commenced the siege of the Propontine towns. No new event is alluded to, except the seizure of Hermias by the satrap Mentor, the exact date of which is uncertain. The orator urges here, still more strongly than he had done in the third Philippic, the necessity of applying to Persia for assistance. His advice was followed, and a negotiation was opened with that monarchy, which led to the effective relief of Perinthus. There is a remarkable passage in this speech, on the importance of general unanimity, which seems to imply that disputes had arisen between the richer and poorer classes, chiefly in regard to the application of the public revenue. The view which is here taken on the subject of the Theoric distributions is so different from the argument in the Olynthiacs, that modern critics have generally considered this oration to be spurious. Another ground for such opinion is, that it contains various passages borrowed from other speeches, and not very skilfully put together. Yet the genuineness seems not to have been doubted by any of the ancient grammarians.

BELIEVING, men of Athens, that the subject of your consultation is serious and momentous to the state,

I will endeavor to advise what I think important. Many have been the faults, accumulated for some time past, which have brought us to this wretched condition; but none is under the circumstances so distressing as this, men of Athens; that your minds are alienated from public business; you are attentive just while you sit listening to some news, afterward you all go away, and, so far from caring for what you heard, you forget it altogether.

Well; of the extent of Philip's arrogance and ambition, as evinced in his dealings with every people, you have been informed. That it is not possible to restrain him in such course by speeches and harangues, no man can be
ignorant; or, if other reasons fail to convince you, reflect on this. Whenever we have had to discuss our claims, on no occasion have we been worsted or judged in the wrong; we have still beaten and got the better of all in argument. But do his affairs go badly on this account, or ours well? By no means. For as Philip immediately proceeds, with arms in his hand, to put all he possesses boldly at stake, while with our equities, speakers as well as hearers, we are sitting still, actions (naturally enough) outstrip words, and people attend not to what we have argued or may argue, but to what we do. And our doings are not likely to protect any of our injured neighbors: I need not say more upon the subject. Therefore, as the states are divided into two parties, one that would neither hold arbitrary government nor submit to it, but live under free and equal laws; another desiring to govern their fellow-citizens, and be subject to some third power, by whose assistance they hope to accomplish that object; the partisans of Philip, who desire tyranny and despotism, have everywhere prevailed, and I know not whether there is any state left, besides our own, with a popular constitution firmly established. And those that hold the government through him have prevailed by all the means efficacious in worldly affairs; principally and mainly, by having a person to bribe the corruptible; secondly, a point no less important, by having at their command, at whatever season they required, an army to put down their opponents. We, men of Athens, are not only in these respects behindhand; we cannot even be awakened; like men that have drunk mandrake or some other sleeping potion; and methinks—for

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1 Used for a powerful opiate by the ancients. It is called Mandragora also in English.
THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

I judged the truth must be spoken—we are by reason thereof held in such disrepute and contempt, that, among the states in imminent danger, some dispute with us for the lead, some for the place of congress; others have resolved to defend themselves separately rather than in union with us.

Why am I so particular in mentioning these things? I seek not to give offence; so help me all the powers of heaven! I wish, men of Athens, to make it clear and manifest to you all, that habitual sloth and indolence, the same in public matters as in private life, is not immediately felt on every occasion of neglect, but shows itself in the general result. Look at Serrium and Doriscus; which were first disregarded after the peace. Their names, perhaps, are unknown to many of you: yet your careless abandonment of these lost Thrace and Cersobleptes, your ally. Again, seeing these places neglected and unsupported by you, he demolished Porthmus, and raised a tyrant in Euboea like a fortress against Attica. This being disregarded, Megara was very nearly taken. You were insensible, indifferent to all his aggressions; gave no intimation that you would not permit their continuance. He purchased Antrones,¹ and not long after had got Oreus into his power. Many transactions I omit; Pherae; the march against Ambracia, the massacres at Elis,²

¹ A town in Thessaly. We do not know all the details of Philip's proceedings in that country, but we have seen enough to show, that under the guise of a protector he was not far short of being the master of the Thessalian people. Some of their towns were actually in his possession, as Pherae and Pagasae. But that the Thessalians were never entirely subdued to Macedonia, and still retained a hankering after independence, was proved at a later period by their desertion of Antipater.
² The Elean exiles, having engaged in their service a body of the Phocian mercenaries, made an irruption into Elis, but were defeated. A large number of prisoners were taken and put to death. This happened B.C. 343. The government of Elis was at that time in the hands of a Macedonian party.
and numberless others: for I have not entered upon these
details to enumerate the people whom Philip has op-
pressed and wronged, but to show you that Philip will
not desist from wronging all people and pursuing his
conquests, until an effort is made to prevent him.

There are persons whose custom it is, before they hear
any speech in the debate, to ask immediately—"What
must we do?—not with the intention of doing what they
are told (or they would be the most serviceable of men),
but in order to get rid of the speaker. Nevertheless, you
should be advised what to do. First, O my countrymen,
you must be firmly convinced in your minds that Philip
is at war with our state, and has broken the peace; that,
while he is inimical and hostile to the whole of Athens,
to the ground of Athens, and, I may add, to the gods in
Athens (may they exterminate him!), there is nothing
which he strives and plots against so much as our con-
stitution, nothing in the world that he is so anxious about
as its destruction. And thereunto he is driven in some
sort by necessity. Consider. He wishes for empire: he
believes you to be his only opponents. He has been a
long time injuring you, as his own conscience best in-
forms him; for by means of your possessions, which he
is able to enjoy, he secures all the rest of his kingdom:
had he given up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not
have deemed himself safe even in Macedonia. He knows,
therefore, both that he is plotting against you, and that
you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have common-
sense, he judges that you detest him as you ought. Be-
sides these important considerations, he is assured that,
though he became master of everything else, nothing can
be safe for him while you are under popular government:
should any reverse ever befall him (and many may happen to a man), all who are now under constraint will come for refuge to you. For you are not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; but famous rather for checking the usurper or depriving him of his conquests, ever ready to molest the aspirants for empire, and vindicate the liberty of all nations. He would not like that a free spirit should proceed from Athens, to watch the occasions of his weakness; nor is such reasoning foolish or idle. First, then, you must assume that he is an irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy; secondly, you must be convinced that all his operations and contrivances are designed for the injury of our state. None of you can be so silly as to suppose that Philip covets those miseries in Thrace (for what else can one call Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira and the places which he is said now to occupy?), and that to get possession of them he endures hardships and winters and the utmost peril, but covets not the harbors of Athens, the docks, the galleys, the silver mines, the revenues of such value, the place and the glory—never may he or any other man obtain these by the conquest of our city!—or that he will suffer you to keep these things, while for the sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in the midst of horrors. Impossible. The object of that and every other enterprise of Philip is to become master here.

So should every man be persuaded and convinced; and, therefore, I say, should not call upon your faithful and upright counsellor to move a resolution for war: *such were

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4 He deprecates here, as elsewhere, the factious proceedings of certain opponents, who sought to fasten the responsibility of a war on the orator, by forcing him to propose a decree. This, argues Demosthenes, was unnecessary, as they were at war already.
the part of men seeking an enemy to fight with, not men forwarding the interests of the state. Only see. Suppose for the first breach of the treaty by Philip, or for the second or third (for there is a series of breaches), any one had made a motion for war with him, and Philip, just as he has now without such motion, had aided the Cardians, would not the mover have been sacrificed? would not all have imputed Philip's aid of the Cardians to that cause? Don't, then, look for a person to vent your anger on for Philip's trespasses, to throw to Philip's hirelings to be torn in pieces. Do not, after yourselves voting for war, dispute with each other whether you ought or ought not to have done so. As Philip conducts the war, so resist him: furnish those who are resisting him now with money and what else they demand; pay your contributions, men of Athens, provide an army, swift-sailing galleys, horses, transports, all the materials of war. Our present mode of operation is ridiculous; and, by the gods, I believe that Philip could not wish our republic to take any other course than what ye now pursue. You miss your time, waste your money, look for a person to manage your affairs, are discontented, accuse one another. How all this comes about, I will explain, and how it may cease, I will inform you.

Nothing, O men of Athens, have you ever set on foot or contrived rightly in the beginning: you always follow the event, stop when you are too late, on any new occurrence prepare and bustle again. But that is not the way of proceeding. It is never possible with sudden levies to perform any essential service. You must establish an

* Referring to Diopithes and his troops in the Chersonese.
army, provide maintenance for it, and paymasters, and
commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care be
taken of your funds; demand from those officers an ac-
count of the expenditure, from your general an account
of the campaign; and leave not the general any excuse
for sailing elsewhere or prosecuting another enterprise.
If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel
Philip to observe a just peace and remain in his own
country, or will contend with him on equal terms; and,
perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now inquire what
Philip is doing, and whither marching, so he may be
anxious to learn whither the troops of Athens are bound,
and where they will make their appearance.

Should any man think that these are affairs of great
expense and toil and difficulty, he thinks rightly enough:
but let him consider what the consequences to Athens
must be, if she refuse so to act, and he will find it is our
interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose you
had some god for your surety—for certainly no mortal
could guarantee a thing so fortunate—that, although you
kept quiet and sacrificed everything, Philip would not at-
tack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all the gods, it would
be disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the dignity of
your state, and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake
of selfish indolence to abandon the rest of Greece to serv-
itude. For my part, I would rather die than have advised
such a course: however, if any other man advises it, and
can prevail on you, be it so; make no defence, abandon
all. But if no man holds such an opinion, if, on the con-
trary, we all foresee that, the more we permit Philip to
conquer, the more fierce and formidable an enemy we
shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse
for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to act as becomes us? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of free-men is not only come, but past long ago; and that of slaves you must surely deprecate. What is the difference? To a freeman shame for what is occurring is the strongest necessity; I know of none stronger that can be mentioned: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to name!

To be backward, men of Athens, in performing those services to which the person and property of every one are liable, is wrong; very wrong, and yet it admits of some excuse; but refusing even to hear what is necessary to be heard, and fit to be considered, this calls for the severest censure. Your practice, however, is neither to attend until the business actually presses, as it does now, nor to deliberate about anything at leisure. When Philip is preparing, you, instead of doing the like and making counter-preparation, remain listless, and, if any one speaks a word, clamor him down: when you receive news that any place is lost or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to have heard and consulted was then when you declined; the time to act and employ your preparations is now that you are hearing. Such being your habits, you are the only people who adopt this singular course: others deliberate usually before action, you delibere after action.

One thing* remains, which should have been done long ago, but even yet is not too late: I will mention it. Nothing in the world does Athens need so much as money for

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* He means negotiation with Persia, to obtain pecuniary assistance.
approaching exigencies. Lucky events have occurred, and if we rightly improve them, perhaps good service may be done. In the first place, those whom the king trusts and regards as his benefactors are at enmity and war with Philip. Secondly, the agent and confidant of all Philip’s preparations against the king has been snatched off, and the king will hear all the proceedings, not from Athenian accusers, whom he might consider to be speaking for their own interests, but from the acting minister himself; the charges, therefore, will be credible, and the only remaining argument for our ambassadors will be, one which the Persian monarch will rejoice to hear, that we should take common vengeance on the injurer of both, and that Philip is much more formidable to the king if he attack us first; for, should we be left in the lurch and suffer any mishap, he will march against the king without fear. On all these matters, then, I advise that you despatch an embassy to confer with the king, and put aside that nonsense which has so often damaged you—“the barbarian,” forsooth, “the common enemy”—and the like. I confess, when I see a man alarmed at a prince in Susa and Ecbatana, and declaring him to be an enemy of Athens, him that formerly assisted in re-establishing her power, and lately made overtures—if you did not accept them,

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1 The Thracians, who had always been regarded as benefactors of the Persian king since they assisted Darius on his invasion of Scythia. Philip was making war in Thrace at this time, and had subjected a considerable part of the country.

2 Hermias, governor of Atarneus in Mysia, who for his treasonable practices against Artaxerxes was seized by Mentor and sent in chains to Susa, where he was put to death. He was a friend of Aristotle, who was at his court when he was taken prisoner. The philosopher afterward married his sister.

9 In the confederate war, when the Persian fleet enabled Conon to defeat the Lacedaemonians at Cnidus, B.C. 394.

10 Artaxerxes had applied both to Athens and Lacedaemon to aid him in the
but voted refusal, the fault is not his—while the same man speaks a different language of one who is close at our doors, and growing up in the centre of Greece to be the plunderer of her people; I marvel, I dread this man, whoever he is, because he dreads not Philip.

There is another thing, too, the attacking of which by unjust reproach and improper language hurts the state, and affords an excuse to men who are unwilling to perform any public duty: indeed you will find that every failure to discharge the obligation of a citizen is attributable to this. I am really afraid to discuss the matter; however, I will speak out.

I believe I can suggest, for the advantage of the state, a plea for the poor against the rich, and for men of property against the indigent; could we remove the clamor which some persons unfairly raise about the theatric fund, and the fear that it cannot stand without some signal mischief. No greater help to our affairs could we introduce; none that would more strengthen the whole community. Look at it thus. I will commence on behalf of those who are considered the needy class. There was a time with us, not long ago, when only a hundred and

recovery of Egypt, which for many years had been held in a state of revolt. Both these states refused to assist him. He then applied to Thebes and Argos, each of which sent an auxiliary force.

11 A different view is here taken on the subject of the Theoric fund than that which Demosthenes had expressed in the Olynthiacs. It is possible that circumstances may have induced him to modify his opinion, or he may have thought it dangerous to meddle with the law of Eubulus at the present crisis, which called for the greatest unanimity among all classes. We may partly gather from this speech, that there had been some agitation among the lower classes, occasioned by the complaints of the wealthy against this law. Any agitation tending to a spirit of communism must have been extremely dangerous at Athens, where the people had such power of mutiling the higher classes by their votes in the popular assembly and courts of justice. It might therefore be better to let the people alone with their theatrical treats, their fees and largesses, than to provoke retaliation by abridging such enjoyments.

12 Viz., than the removal of this clamor and alarm about the theatric fund.
thirty talents came into the state;" and among the persons qualified to command ships or pay property-tax, there was not one who claimed exemption from his duty because no surplus existed: galleys sailed, money was forthcoming, everything needful was done. Since that time fortune happily has increased the revenue, and four hundred talents come in instead of one, without loss to any men of property, but with gain to them; for all the wealthy come for their share of the fund, and they are welcome to it.14 Why, then, do we reproach one another on this account, and make it an excuse for declining our duties, unless we grudge the relief given by fortune to the poor? I would be sorry to blame them myself, and I think it not right. In private families I never see a young man behaving so to his elders, so unfeeling or so unreasonable, as to refuse to do anything himself; unless all the rest will do what he does. Such a person would certainly be amenable to the laws against undutiful conduct: 15 for I ween there is a tribute assigned to parents both by nature and by law, which ought to be cheerfully offered and amply paid. Accordingly, as each individual among us hath a parent, so should we regard the whole people as parents of the state, and, so far from depriving them of what the state bestows, we ought, in the absence of such bounty, to find other means to keep them from destitution. If the rich will adopt this principle, I think they will act both justly and wisely; for to deprive any class of a necessary provis-

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13 This must be understood of the tribute only, which came in from the allies. The total revenue of Athens must have greatly exceeded this.

14 I.e., the Theoric fund, in which every member of the commonwealth had a right to share.

15 Maltreatment was a technical term of the Attic law, denoting a failure of duty on the part of husbands, children or guardians, toward their wives, parents or wards, for which they were liable to be tried and punished.
ion is to unite them in disaffection to the commonwealth. To the poor I would recommend that they remove the cause, which makes men of property discontented with the present system, and excites their just complaints. I shall take the same course on behalf of the wealthy as I did just now, and not hesitate to speak the truth. There cannot, I believe, be found a wretch so hardhearted—I will not say among Athenians, but among any other people—who would be sorry to see poor men, men without the necessaries of life, receiving these bounties. Where, then, is the pinch of the matter? where the difficulty? When they see certain persons transferring the usage established for the public revenue to private property, and the orator becoming immediately powerful with you, yea (so far as privilege can make him), immortal, and your secret vote contradicting your public clamor. Hence arises mistrust, hence indignation. We ought, O ye men of Athens, to have a just communion of political rights; the opulent holding themselves secure in their fortunes, and without fear of losing them, yet in time of danger imparting their substance freely for the defence of their country; while the rest consider the public revenue as public, and receive their share, but look on private property as belonging to the individual owner. Thus it is that a small commonwealth becomes great, and a great one is preserved. To speak generally, then, such are the obligations of each class; to

16 Having admonished the higher classes to pay their property-tax and perform their public services cheerfully, and without seeking to be relieved at the expense of the public revenue, he proceeds to remind the lower classes of their duty. He warns them that, while they receive a benefit from the funds of the state, they must not endeavor to increase those funds unduly by an invasion of the rights of property. His language is not open, but would easily be understood by his audience. The Athenians ought not to promote lawsuits to increase court fees; not to encourage prosecutions against wealthy citizens, in order to obtain fines and confiscations.
insure their performance according to law, some regulation should be made.

The causes of our present troubles and embarrassment are many and of ancient date: if you are willing to hear, I will declare them. You have quitted, O Athenians, the position in which your ancestors left you; you have been persuaded by these politicians that, to stand foremost of the Greeks, to keep a permanent force and redress injured nations, is all vanity and idle expense; you imagine that to live in quiet, to perform no duty, to abandon one thing after another and let strangers seize on all, brings with it marvellous welfare and abundant security. By such means a stranger has advanced to the post which you ought to have occupied, has become prosperous and great, and made large conquests; naturally enough. A prize there was, noble, great, and glorious, one for which the mightiest states were contending all along; but as the Lacedæmonians were humbled, the Thebans had their hands full through the Phocian war, and we took no regard, he carried it off without competition. The result has been, to others terror, to him a vast alliance and extended power; while difficulties so many and so distressing surround the Greeks that even advice is not easy to be found.

Yet, perilous as I conceive the present crisis to be for all, no people are in such danger as you, men of Athens; not only because Philip's designs are especially aimed at you, but because of all people you are the most remiss. If, seeing the abundance of commodities and cheapness in your market, you are beguiled into a belief that the state is in no danger, your judgment is neither becoming nor correct. A market or a fair one may, from such appearances, judge to be well or ill supplied: but for a state,
which every aspirant for the empire of Greece has deemed to be alone capable of opposing him, and defending the liberty of all—for such a state! verily her marketable commodities are not the test of prosperity, but this—whether she can depend on the goodwill of her allies; whether she is puissant in arms. On behalf of such a state these are the things to be considered; and in these respects your condition is wretched and deplorable. You will understand it by a simple reflection. When have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion? No other time could any man point out but the present. In former times Greece was divided into two parties, that of the Lacedæmonians and ours: some of the Greeks were subject to us, some to them. The Persian, on his own account, was mistrusted equally by all, but he used to make friends of the vanquished parties, and retain their confidence, until he put them on an equality with the other side; after which those that he succored would hate him as much as his original enemies. Now, however, the king is on friendly terms with all the Greeks though least friendly with us, unless we put matters right. Now, too, there are protectors17 springing up in every quarter, and all claim the precedence, though some, indeed, have abandoned the cause, or envy and distrust each other—more shame for them—and every state is isolated, Argives, Thebans, Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Arcadians, and ourselves. But, divided as Greece is among so many parties and so many leaderships, if I must speak the truth freely, there is no state whose offices and halls

17 This is said with some irony: many states offer to come forward as protectors, but only on condition of taking the lead: they will not join the common cause on fair terms.
of council appear more deserted by Grecian politics than ours. And no wonder; when neither friendship, nor confidence, nor fear leads any to negotiate with us.

This, ye men of Athens, has come not from any single cause (or you might easily mend it), but from a great variety and long series of errors. I will not stop to recount them, but will mention one, to which all may be referred, beseeching you not to be offended, if I boldly speak the truth.

Your interests are sold on every favorable opportunity: you partake of the idleness and ease, under the charm whereof you resent not your wrongs; while other persons get the reward. Into all these cases I could not enter now, but when any question about Philip arises, some one starts up directly and says—"We must have no trifling, no proposal of war"—and then goes on to say—"What a blessing it is to be at peace! what a grievance to maintain a large army!"—and again—"Certain persons wish to plunder the treasury"—and other arguments they urge, no doubt, in the full conviction of their truth." But surely there is no need of persuading you to observe peace, you that sit here persuaded already. It is Philip (who is making war) that needs persuasion: prevail on him, and all is ready on your part. We should consider as grievous, not what we expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of refusal. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by devising a plan for its safe custody, not by abandoning our interests. Yet this very thing makes me indignant, that some of

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18 There is no difficulty in this, if we understand it to be ironical, and need of any amendment.

Oration—**15—Vol. I.**
you are pained at the thought of your treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to guard it and to punish the criminal, but are not pained to see Philip plundering Greece, plundering, as he does, one people after another to forward his designs upon you.

How comes it, ye men of Athens, that of this flagrant aggressor, this capturer of cities, no one has ever declared that he commits hostility or injustice, while those who counsel against submission and sacrifice are charged as the authors of war? The reason is that people wish to cast upon your faithful counsellors the blame of any untoward events in the war; for war must necessarily be attended with many misfortunes. They believe that if you resist Philip with one heart and mind, you will prevail against him, and they can be hirelings no longer; but that if on the first outcry you arraign certain persons and bring them to trial, they, by accusing such persons, will gain a double advantage; repute among the Athenians and recompense from Philip; and that you will punish your friendly advisers for a cause for which you ought to punish the traitors. Such are the hopes, such the contrivance of these charges, "that certain persons wish to kindle a war." I am sure, however, that, without any Athenian moving a declaration of war, Philip has taken many of our possessions, and has recently sent succor to Cardia. If we choose to assume that he is not making war against us, he would be the simplest of mankind to convince us of our mistake: for when the sufferers disclaim the injury, what should the offenders do? But when he marches to attack us, what shall we say then? He will assure us that he is not making war, as he assured the Orites when his troops were in their country,
as he assured the Phocaeans before he assaulted their walls, and the Olynthians in the first instance, until he was in their territories with his army. Shall we then say that persons who bid us defend ourselves kindle a war? If so, we must be slaves; for nothing else remains.

But remember: you have more at stake than some other people. Philip desires not to subjugate your city, but to destroy it utterly. He is convinced you will not submit to be slaves; if you were inclined you would not know how, having been accustomed to command: you will be able, should occasion offer, to give him more trouble than any people in the world. For this reason he will show us no mercy if he gets us into his power: and, therefore, you must make up your minds that the struggle will be one for life and death. These persons, who have openly sold themselves to Philip, you must execrate, you must beat their brains out: for it is impossible, I say impossible, to vanquish your foreign enemies, until you have punished your enemies within the city: these are the stumbling blocks that must cripple your efforts against the foreigner.

From what cause, do ye think, Philip insults you now (for his conduct, in my judgment, amounts to nothing less); and while he deceives other people by doing them services—this, at least, is something—you he threatens already? For example, the Thessalians, by many benefits, he seduced into their present servitude: no man can tell how he cheated the poor Olynthians, giving them first Potidæa and many other places: now he is luring the Thebans, having delivered up Boeotia to them, and freed them from a tedious and harassing war. Of these people,
who each got a certain advantage, some have suffered what is notorious to all, others have yet to suffer what may befall them. As to yourselves, the amount of your losses I do not mention: but in the very making of the peace how have you been deceived! how plundered! Lost you not the Phocians, Thermopylae, country toward Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? Holds he not Cardia now, and avows it? Why, then, does he behave thus to other people, and in a different way to you? Because our city is the only one where liberty is allowed to speak for the enemy, where a man taking a bribe may safely address the people, though they have been deprived of their possessions. It was not safe at Olynthus to advocate Philip's cause without the Olyanthian people sharing the benefit by possession of Potidæa. It was not safe to advocate Philip's cause in Thessaly without the people of Thessaly sharing the benefit by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylæan Synod. It was not safe at Thebes until he restored Boëotia to them, and destroyed the Phocians. But at Athens, though Philip has taken from you Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, and is even turning Eubœa into a hostile post, and advancing to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip's behalf. Yea, among these men, some have risen rapidly from poverty to wealth, from meanness and obscurity to repute and honor, while you, on the contrary, have fallen from honor to obscurity, from wealth to indigence. For the riches of a state I consider to be allies, confidence, goodwill; of all which you are destitute. And by your neglecting these things, and suffering your interests thus to be swept away, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are forlorn and abject, in the
THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

abundance of your market magnificent, but in your national defences ridiculous."

Some of our orators, I observe, take not the same thought for you as for themselves. They say that you should keep quiet, though you are injured; but they cannot themselves keep quiet among you, though no one injures them. Come, raillery apart, suppose you were thus questioned, Aristodemus "—"Tell me, as you know perfectly well, what every one else knows, that the life of private men is secure and free from trouble and danger, while that of statesmen is exposed to scandal and misfortune, full of trials and hardships every day, how comes it that you prefer, not the quiet and easy life, but the one surrounded with peril?"—what should you say? If we admitted the truth of what would be your best possible answer, namely, that all you do is for honor and renown, I wonder what puts it into your head that you ought from such motives to exert yourself and undergo toil and danger, while you advise the state to give up exertion and remain idle. You cannot surely allege that Aristodemus ought to be of importance at Athens, and Athens to be of no account among the Greeks. Nor, again, do I see that for the commonwealth it is safe to mind her own affairs only, and hazardous for you, not to be a superlative busybody. On the contrary, to you I see the utmost peril from your meddling and overmeddling, to the commonwealth peril

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90 The whole of the foregoing passage is taken, with some little variation, from the speech on the Chersonese. It certainly would seem strange, if this oration had been forged by any grammarian, that he should have borrowed thus by wholesale from Demosthenes. There is perhaps less difficulty in the supposition that Demosthenes repeated his own words.

90 This man was a tragic actor, and charged by Demosthenes with being a partisan of Philip. He was the first person who proposed peace with Macedonia, shortly before the embassy of ten.
from her inactivity. But I suppose you inherit a reputation from your father and grandfather, which it were disgraceful in your own person to extinguish, whereas the ancestry of the state was ignoble and mean. This, again, is not so. Your father was a thief, if he resembled you, whereas by the ancestors of the commonwealth, as all men know, the Greeks have twice been rescued from the brink of destruction. Truly, the behavior of some persons, in private and in public, is neither equitable nor constitutional. How is it equitable that certain of these men, returned from prison, should not know themselves, while the state, that once protected all Greece and held the foremost place, is sunk in ignominy and humiliation?

Much could I add on many points, but I will forbear. It is not, I believe, to lack of words that our distresses have been owing either now or heretofore. The mischief is when you, after listening to sound arguments, and all agreeing in their justice, sit to hear with equal favor those who try to defeat and pervert them; not that you are ignorant of the men (you are certain at the first glance, who speak for hire and are Philip’s political agents, and who speak sincerely for your good); your object is to find fault with these, turn the thing into laughter and raillery, and escape the performance of your duty.

Such is the truth, spoken with perfect freedom, purely from goodwill and for the best: not a speech fraught with flattery and mischief and deceit, to earn money for the speaker, and to put the commonwealth into the hands of our enemies. I say, you must either desist from these practices, or blame none but yourselves for the wretched condition of your affairs.
THE ORATION ON THE LETTER

THE ARGUMENT

The Athenians had been persuaded by the advice of Demosthenes to solicit the aid of Persia. This was accorded, and events had happened on the Propontine coast, which made it peculiarly needful. Toward the close of the year B.C. 342 Philip commenced the siege of Selymbria, and early in the following year, that city having been taken, laid siege to Perinthus. But here he met with an obstinate resistance; Perinthus was strong by nature and well fortified. The satraps of western Asia had supplied it with a stock of provisions and ammunition, and a large body of Greek mercenaries. Byzantium also had sent assistance. Philip, after making great efforts to take Perinthus by storm, turned the siege into a blockade, and marched northward against Byzantium. Here he was no more successful than he had been at Perinthus. The Byzantines had well prepared themselves to resist his attack, and received powerful aid not only from their old allies of Cos, Chios, and Rhodes, but also from other parts of Greece, and especially from Athens. In order to reconcile the Byzantines to his countrymen, with whom they had been at variance ever since the Social war, Demosthenes himself undertook a voyage to the Bosphorus. By his exertions an alliance was concluded, and an Athenian fleet was sent under the command of Charis; but Charis being feared and disliked by the Byzantines, they refused to admit him into the town; and afterward Phocion was despatched with a hundred and twenty ships and a considerable body of troops. The result of these effective measures was, that Philip was baffled in his attempts on both cities, and compelled to raise the siege.

In the meantime important operations had taken place elsewhere. An expedition had been sent under the command of Phocion to Euboea, of which we have no detailed account, but the result was, that the Macedonian party was overpowered, and Clitarchus and Phillistoea, the partisans of Philip, were expelled from the island. A fleet was then sent by the Athenians into the Pagassian bay, which took some Thessalian towns, and seized Macedonian merchantmen on the coast. The island of Halonaeus was recovered from Philip by a sudden incursion of the Pephretians. This was revenged by Philip, who ravaged Peparuthus, and compelled the islanders to restore their conquest.

Philip saw that peace with Athens could no longer be preserved even in name. Under this conviction, and not, as Mitford says, in alarm at the fourth Philippic, he wrote a letter to the Athenians (the letter which follows this oration) in which he reproaches them with the various acts of hostility which they had committed, and concludes with a virtual declaration
of war. An assembly was held, at which this letter was read, and Demosthenes is supposed to have delivered the following speech in reply to it. The exact time when the letter was received is uncertain; but it would appear, from the internal evidence, to have been after the siege of Perinthus had commenced, and before that of Byzantium. The arguments of Philip produced no effect; things had gone too far for reconciliation; and it was not difficult for Demosthenes to obtain a decree for the vigorous prosecution of the war.

It will be seen on a perusal of the letter and answer, that the orator does not attempt to meet the specific charges and complaints of Philip. We have nothing but the old arguments, showing the necessity of succoring Perinthus and Byzantium, as formerly of succoring Olympus; the real weakness of Philip's empire, and the good chance that by vigorous measures it might be overturned. Mitford considers that it was impossible to confute the reasoning of Philip, and therefore that bold invective was the only thing that remained for the orator. And even Leland says, it would have been difficult to answer the letter particularly, because, though Athens had the better cause, she had committed many irregularities. I cannot agree with this view of the question. If Philip had been the good-natured easy person that Mitford represents, who was raised to the surface of Greek affairs by the merest accident, and rather had greatness thrust upon him by the opposition of the Athenians, than either sought or desired it himself, then indeed the acts of hostility which Philip complains of might justly be regarded as breaches of good faith, and violations by Athens of the law of nations. But I read the history of the times very differently. Philip had been for many years pursuing his career of conquest steadily and successfully. The Chersonese, Euboea, all the possessions of the Athenians, their commerce and their corn trade, were at this time in imminent danger. War between Athens and Macedonla, if not open, was understood; argument was out of the question.

But why should Philip address a letter of complaint to a people so bent on hostilities? Why did the wolf complain of the lamb? An aggressive power has never lacked a pretext for making war in either ancient times or modern. It was a part of Philip's system, not only in his dealings with Athens, but with other states, to make friendly overtures and pacific professions, when he meditated some decisive blow. By this means he gained credit for moderation with neutral states, and he created a party for himself within the state which he had designs upon. He put colorable arguments into the mouths of his adherents, distracted the efforts of the people, and at all events gained time for the prosecution of his schemes. It is argued with much force and justice in the exordium of the Oration on Haloneus, that the tendency of such correspondence was, to deter the adversaries of Philip from expressing their opinions freely.

But for motives of this kind, Philip would hardly have adopted the strain of remonstrance which we read in the Letter. He could never seriously believe,
that the Athenians would resign their claims on Amphipolis, because it belonged to Macedonia in very early times, or would give up the Persian alliance because it was a disgraceful connection. It should be observed however that the Athenians afforded him a handle for using such arguments, by declaiming in the same style themselves when it suited them; and Philip perhaps was pleased at the idea of beating them with their own weapons. The language of the epistle is simple and dignified, and may be regarded as a good specimen of a diplomatic paper. The pith lies in the last clause, which contains a threat of war.

For these reasons it could scarcely have been worth while for the orator to answer every particular charge contained in the Letter. Nor can such omission be deemed an argument against the genuineness of the Oration. This however has been doubted by many critics; and it may be allowed, that a good part of the speech is not very suitable to the occasion upon which it purports to have been spoken.

ATHENIANS! that Philip, instead of concluding peace with us, only deferred the war, has now become manifest to you all. Ever since he gave Halus to the Pharsalians, and settled the Phocian business, and subdued all Thrace, making fictitious charges and inventing unjust pretexts, he has been actually carrying on war against Athens; and now in the letter which he has sent he avowedly declares it. That it becomes you, neither to fear his power nor to withstand him ignobly, but with men and money and ships, in short, with all you have unsparingly to prosecute the war, I will endeavor to show.

In the first place, O Athenians, you may expect that the gods are your greatest allies and defenders, when Philip, violating his faith and disregarding his oaths to them, has perfidiously broken the peace. In the second

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1 Parmenio was besieging Halus in Thessaly during the first embassy of the Athenians for peace. Philip told the ambassadors, he desired their mediation between the people of Halus and Pharsalus. He afterward took the former city, and gave it up to the Pharsalians, who were his devoted allies.
place, he has exhausted all the tricks by which he once rose to greatness, continually deceiving some people and promising them signal benefits. It is understood by the Perinthians and Byzantines and their allies, that he wishes to deal with them in the same manner that he dealt with the Olynthians formerly; it escapes not the Thessalians, that he designs to be the master of his allies and not their chief: he is suspected by the Thebans, for holding Nicæa\(^2\) with a garrison, for having crept into the Amphictyonic council, for drawing to himself the embassies from Pelo-
ponnesus,\(^1\) and stealing their confederacy from them: so that of his former friends some are at war with him irre-
concilably, some are no longer hearty auxiliaries, all are jealous and complaining of him. Besides—what is of no small moment—the satraps of Asia have just thrown in mercenary troops for the relief of Perinthus, and now that hostility has begun between them, and the peril is immi-
nent if Byzantium should be reduced, not only will they assist us with alacrity themselves, but they will urge the Persian king to supply us with money; and he possesses greater wealth than all nations put together; he has such influence over proceedings here, that in our former wars with Lacedæmon, whichever side he joined, he caused them to vanquish their opponents, and now siding with us he will easily beat down the power of Philip.

With these advantages, I will not deny, that Philip has by favor of the peace snatched from us many for-
tresses and harbors and other like conveniences for war;

\(^2\) On account of its neighborhood to the pass of Thermopylæ.

\(^1\) The Messenians and Arcadians. See the Argument to the second Philip-
pic. Those people had been the allies of the Thebans since the time of Epami-
nondas, but were now more inclined to Philip, as being better able to protect them.
yet I observe, that if an alliance is consolidated by goodwill, and all who take part in the wars have a common interest, the union is firm and lasting; whereas, if it be kept up by deceit and violence, with insidious and ambitious views (as this of Philip is), any slight pretence, any accidental failure, shakes to pieces and destroys it all in a moment. And by much consideration, men of Athens, I find, not only that the allies of Philip have come to distrust and dislike him, but that even his own subjects are not well-disposed or loyal, or what people imagine. Generally speaking, the Macedonian power, as an auxiliary, is important and useful, but by itself it is feeble, and ridiculously disproportioned to these gigantic enterprises. Moreover this very man by his wars, his expeditions, and all the proceedings which may seem to establish his greatness, has rendered it more precarious for himself. Don't suppose, men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects delight in the same things. Bear in mind, that he desires glory, they security; he cannot gain his object without hazard; they want not to leave parents, wives, and children at home, to wear themselves out and risk their lives for him every day.

Hence one may judge, what the feelings of the Macedonian people toward Philip are. As to his guards and the leaders of his mercenaries, you will find they have a reputation for courage, yet live in greater terror than men of no repute. For those are in danger only from the enemy; these fear flatterers and calumniators more than battles: those together with the whole army fight their opponents in the field; these have their full share in the hardships of war, and it is also their peculiar lot to dread the humors of the king. Besides, if any common soldier
does wrong, he is punished according to his desert; but with these men, it is when they have achieved the most signal success that they are most outrageously vilified and abused. No reasonable man can disbelieve this statement; for he is reported by those who have lived with him to be so covetous of honor, that, wishing all the noblest exploits to be considered his own, he is more offended with the generals and officers who have achieved anything praiseworthy, than with those who have altogether miscarried.

How then, under such circumstances, have they for a long time faithfully adhered to him? Because for the present, men of Athens, success throws a shade over all this: good fortune covers the faults of men, screens them wonderfully: but let him fail in something, and all will be fully revealed. It is the same as in the human body. When a man is healthy, he has no feeling of local disorders; but when he falls ill, every sore is felt, whether he has a rupture, or a sprain, or any member not perfectly sound. Just so with monarchies or other states: while they are successful in war, their weaknesses are imperceptible to most men; but when they have suffered a reverse (which Philip very likely will, having taken on him a burden beyond his strength), all their difficulties become manifest to the world.

Yet if any Athenian, seeing that Philip has been fortunate, therefore thinks it hard and terrible to contend with him, such person, I grant, exercises a prudent forethought. For indeed fortune is the prime—nay, the sole mover in all the business of mankind. Nevertheless in many respects might our good fortune be preferred to Philip's. The leadership that we have received from our
ancestors takes its date, not before Philip only, but (let me say roundly) before all the kings that ever reigned in Macedonia. They have paid tribute to the Athenians, but Athens has never paid tribute to any nation. We have more title than Philip to the favor of the gods, inasmuch as we have invariably shown more regard to religion and justice.

How comes it, then, that Philip has obtained more successes than you in the former war? Because, O men of Athens (I will tell you candidly), he takes the field himself, he toils, he faces the danger, letting slip no opportunity, omitting no season of the year; while we—the truth must be spoken—sit idling here, delayed always and voting and asking in the market-place if there is any news. But what greater news could there be than a man of Macedonia containing Athenians, and daring to send such an epistle as you have just heard? Again; he keeps soldiers in his pay, ay, and some of our orators besides, who, imagining they carry his presents home, are not ashamed to live for Philip, and perceive not that they are selling for petty lucre all that belongs to their country and themselves. We neither attempt to disturb any of his proceedings, nor like to maintain mercenaries, nor dare to take the field in person. It is no wonder, then, that he has gained advantages over us in the former war: it is rather strange that we, doing nothing that becomes a people at war, expect to vanquish one who pursues all the measures necessary to conquest.

You must reflect on all this, men of Athens, consider that we have not even the power of saying we are at peace—since Philip has now declared war and commenced it in earnest—spare not any treasures, public or private;
march eagerly all to battle, wherever occasion calls; and employ better generals than before. Let none of you suppose that by the same proceedings which have damaged the commonwealth it can again recover and improve. Imagine not, that while you are as remiss as you have been, others will strive zealously for your welfare. Bear in mind how disgraceful it is, that your fathers underwent numerous hardships and fearful dangers warring with the Lacedaemonians, while you will not courageously defend even the well-earned honors which they bequeathed you; and that a man springing from Macedonia is so enamoured of danger, that, to enlarge his empire, he has been wounded all over his body fighting with the enemy, while Athenians, whose birthright it is to submit to none, but to conquer all in war, through slackness or effeminacy desert the conduct of their ancestors and the interests of their country.

Not to be tedious, I say we must all prepare ourselves for war; the Greeks we must invite, not by words but by deeds, to espouse our alliance. All speech is idle, unattended by action; and Athenian speech the more so on this account, that we are reputed more dexterous in the use of it than any of the Greeks.
THE LETTER OF PHILIP

THE ARGUMENT

This is the Letter to which the preceding oration purports to be a reply. For the circumstances which gave rise to it, see the Argument of the Oration.

PHILIP to the senate and people of Athens greeting:

Whereas I have frequently sent ambassadors, that we may abide by our oaths and agreements, and you paid them no regard, I thought proper to write to you concerning the matters in which I consider myself aggrieved. Marvel not at the length of this epistle; for, there being many articles of complaint, it is necessary to explain myself clearly upon all.

First then; after Nicias the herald was snatched from my dominions, you chastised not the culprits, but imprisoned the injured party for ten months; and my letters, of which he was the bearer, you read on the hustings.¹

Secondly, when the Thasians were receiving in their port the Byzantine galleys and all pirates that chose to enter, you took no notice, although the treaty expressly declares, that whoever act thus shall be enemies.

Again, about the same time Diopithes made an irruption into my territory, carried off the inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis² for slaves, and ravaged the adjacent parts of Thrace; proceeding to such lawless extremities

¹ It is mentioned by Plutarch that a letter from Philip to his Queen Olympias, which fell into the hands of the Athenians, was returned unopened. But whether it was on this or another occasion does not appear.
² Crobyle must have been in Thrace. Tiristasis is mentioned by Pliny as a place in the Chersonese. Probably then it was near Cardis, not far from the isthmus.
that he seized Amphilocthus, who came to negotiate about
the prisoners, and, after putting on him the hardest dur-
ance, took from him a ransom of nine talents. And this
he did with the approbation of the people. Howbeit, to
offer violence to a herald and ambassadors is considered
impious by all nations, and especially by you. Certain it
is, when the Megarians killed Anthemocritus, your people
went so far as to exclude them from the mysteries, and
erect a statue before their gates for a monument of the
crime. Then is it not shameful that you are seen com-
mitting the same offence, for which, when you were the
sufferers, you so detested the authors?

Further, Callias your general took all the towns situ-
ate in the Pegasian bay, towns under treaty with you
and in alliance with me; and sold all people bound for
Macedonia, adjudging them enemies; and on this account
you praised him in your decrees. So that I am puzzled to

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8 The Athenians, having charged the people of Megara with profaning a
piece of consecrated ground, sent Anthemocritus to admonish them to desist
from the sacrilege. The Megarians put him to death, and drew upon them-
sew the wrath of their powerful neighbors, who passed the decree of excom-
munication here referred to. The monument which recorded their impiety was
to be seen in the time of Pausanias, on the sacred road leading from Athens to
Eleusis.

4 This is the same Callias, ruler of Chalcis, who opposed the Athenians at
the time when Phocion was sent to assist Phutarch of Eretria. At the battle
of Tamynae Callias had been aided by Macedonian troops; but after the depart-
ure of Phocion, and the decline of the Athenian interest in Euboea, he formed
the scheme of bringing the whole island under his own sway, or at least of
making it independent. This did not suit the views of Philip, and Callias, hav-
ing lost his favor, tried to form a connection with the Thebans. Failing in this
attempt, he determined to unite himself to Athens, and accordingly came over
and concerted with Demosthenes and his party a plan for a revolution in Euboea.
It was not possible to accomplish this by negotiation, owing to the strength of
Macedonian influence, which was confirmed by the occurrences at Oreus and
Eretria. At length, by the exertions of Demosthenes, a decree was passed to
send troops into Euboea; and Phocion, to whom the command was intrusted,
overpowered the Macedonian garrisons, and expelled Clitharchus and Philistides
from the island. This was B.C. 341. Afterward, it seems, an Athenian force,
under the command of Callias, crossed the narrow strait that separates the north
of Euboea from Thessaly, and made the attack, which Philip here speaks of, on
the towns in the bay of Pagasae.
think, what worse could happen, if you were confessedly at war with me: for when we were in open hostility, you used to send out privateers and sell people sailing to our coast, you assisted my enemies, infested my country.

Yet more; you have carried your animosity and violence so far, that you have even sent ambassadors to the Persian, to persuade him to make war against me: a thing which is most surprising: for before he gained Egypt and Phoenicia, you resolved, in case of any aggression on his part, to invite me as well as the other Greeks to oppose him; but now you have such an overflow of malice against me, as to negotiate with him for an offensive alliance. Anciently, as I am informed, your ancestors condemned the Pisistratids for bringing the Persian to invade Greece: yet you are not ashamed of doing the same thing, for which you continue to reproach the tyrants.

In addition to other matters, you write in your decrees, commanding me to let Teres and Cersobleptes rule in Thrace, because they are Athenians. I know nothing of them as being included in the treaty of peace with you, or as inscribed on the pillars, or as being Athenians; I know, however, that Teres took arms with me against you, and that Cersobleptes was anxious to take the oaths separately to my ambassadors, but was prevented by your generals pronouncing him an enemy of Athens. How can it be equitable or just, when it suits your purpose, to call

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5 The time referred to is B.C. 354, when there was a rumor of a Persian invasion, and a proposal at Athens to declare war against Artaxerxes, upon which Demosthenes made the speech de Symmoritis. Phoenicia and Egypt were recovered some years after that. The argument of Philip is, that since the recovery of those provinces Persia was more dangerous than before, and therefore it was more disgraceful for a Greek state to be connected with that monarchy.

6 Of Teres nothing is known but from this passage: he must have been a prince in the interior of Thrace.
him an enemy of the state, and when you desire to calumniate me, to declare the same person your citizen—and on the death of Sitalces, to whom you imparted the freedom of your city, to make friendship immediately with his murderer, but on behalf of Cersobleptes to espouse a war with me?—knowing too as you must, that, of the persons who receive such gifts, none has the least regard for your laws or decrees? However—to omit all else and be concise—you bestowed citizenship on Evagoras of Cyprus, and Dionysius of Syracuse, and their descendants. If

1 It is impossible that this can refer to the Sitalces, King of the Odryse, and ally of the Athenians, whose wars and death are related by Thucydides. He fell in a battle with the Triballi, and was succeeded by his nephew Seuthes. It was his son Sadocus, and not he, that was made a citizen of Athens. Taurinell tries to get over the difficulty by suggesting that Seuthes was suspected of murdering him; but there is no evidence that the Athenians entered into treaty with Seuthes till long afterward. However, the circumstances here mentioned exactly apply to Cotys, father of Cersobleptes, who had the honor of Athenian citizenship conferred on him, for which he showed very little gratitude in his subsequent conduct, and accordingly, when he was murdered by Python and Heraclides of Æa, the Athenians rewarded them with citizenship and a golden crown. Sitalces therefore may have been a mistake, or a slip of the pen, for Cotys.

2 Evagoras, the friend of Conon, who assisted the Athenians in the re-establishment of their independence, was made a citizen of Athens, and statues of him and of Conon were placed side by side in the Ceramicus. He aimed at becoming absolute master of Cyprus, and was engaged in a long war against the Persian king, in which he was ultimately overpowered, but, on submission to Artaxerxes, was permitted to rule in Salamis. On his death, B.C. 374, he was succeeded by his son Nicocles, who was father of the Evagoras here referred to. Nicocles did not reign long, and the young Evagoras was afterward driven from Salamis by a successful usurper. Cyprus was at this period divided among several princes, who afterward joined the great rebellion of Phenicia and Egypt against Artaxerxes. Meanwhile Evagoras had passed into the service of the Persian king, and was perhaps dwelling in Caria, when Idreus the prince of Caria appointed him, together with Phocion the Athenian, to command the armament collected for the reduction of Cyprus. This was B.C. 361. Cyprus was reduced in the following year; but Evagoras, instead of being rewarded, as he expected, with the principality of his native town, was appointed to a government in Asia. In this he misconducted himself, and fled to Cyprus, where he was arrested and put to death. The honor which it appears he received, of Athenian citizenship, may have been owing to respect to his grandfather's memory and his connection with Phocion. Or perhaps the honor inherited from his grandfather may be referred to or possibly Philip may be confounding the elder and younger Evagoras. At all events, the comparison is not a happy one.

3 This refers to the younger Dionysius, twice expelled from Syracuse, first
you can persuade the people who expelled each of those princes to reinstate them in their government, then recover Thrace from me, all that Teres and Cersobleptes reigned over. But if against the parties, who mastered Evagoras and Dionysius, you will not utter a word of complaint, and yet continue to annoy me, how can I be wrong in resisting you?

On this head I have many arguments yet remaining, which I purposely omit. But as to the Cardians, I avow myself their auxiliary; for I was allied to them before the peace, and you refused to come to an arbitration, although I made many offers, and they are not a few. Surely I should be the basest of men, if, deserting my allies, I paid more regard to you, who have harassed me all along, than to those who have always been my steadfast friends.

Another thing I must not leave unnoticed. You have arrived at such a pitch of arrogance that, while formerly you did but remonstrate with me on the matters aforesaid, in the recent case, where the Peparethians complained of harsh treatment, you ordered your general to obtain satisfaction from me on their account. Yet I punished them less severely than they deserved. For they in time of peace seized Halonnesus, and would restore neither the place nor the garrison, though I sent many times about them. You objected not to the injury which the Peparethians had done me, but only to their punishment, well knowing that I took the island neither from them nor

by Dion, B.C. 356, afterward by Timoleon, B.C. 343. He was in alliance with Sparta, and sent troops to her assistance against Epaminondas. His connection with Athens began after she had made common cause with Sparta: from that time many Athenians resorted to his court, and (among others) Plato is said to have visited him.

Peparethus is in the same group of islands with Halonnesus. Philip’s ravaging of Peparethus is spoken of in the Oration on the Crown.
from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If now you declare that you gave it up to Sostratus, you acknowledge to having commissioned pirates; but if he got possession against your will, what hardship have you suffered by my taking it and rendering the coast safe for navigators? I had such regard for your state that I offered you the island; yet your orators would not let you accept it, but counselled you to obtain restitution, in order that, if I submitted to your command, I might confess my occupation to be unlawful, if I refused to abandon the place your commonalty might suspect me. Perceiving which, I challenged you to a reference of the question, so that, if it were decided to be mine, the place should be given by me to you, if it were adjudged yours, then I should restore it to the people. This I frequently urged; you would not listen; and the Peparethians seized the island. What, then, became it me to do? Not to punish the violators of their oaths? not to avenge myself on the perpetrators of these gross outrages? If the island belonged to the Peparethians, what business had Athenians to demand it? If it was yours, why resent you not their unlawful seizure?

To such a degree of enmity have we advanced that, wishing to pass with my ships into the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort them along the coast through the Chersonese with my army, as your colonists, according to the resolution of Polycrates, were making war against me, and you were sanctioning it by your decrees, and your general was inviting the Byzantines to join him, and proclaiming everywhere that he had your instructions to commence war on the first opportunity. Notwithstanding these injuries, I refrained from attacking
either your fleet or your territory," though I was in a condition to take the greater part, if not all; and I have persisted in offering to submit our mutual complaints to arbitration. Consider, now, whether it is fairer to decide by arms or by argument, to pronounce the award yourselves or persuade others to do so: reflect, also, how unreasonable it is that Athens should compel Thasians and Maronites to a judicial settlement of their claims to Stryme," yet refuse to determine her disputes with me in the same manner, especially when you know that, if beaten, you will lose nothing, if successful, you will get what is in my possession.

The most unaccountable thing of all, in my opinion, is this—when I sent ambassadors from the whole confederacy," that they might be witnesses, and desired to make a just arrangement with you on behalf of the Greeks, you would not even hear what the deputies had to propose on the subject, though it was in your power, either to secure against all danger the parties mistrustful of me, or plainly to prove me the basest of mankind. That was the interest of the people, but it suited not the orators. To them—as persons acquainted with your gov-

11 There is, apparently, no reference here to any measures against Attica or the city of Athens, nor to any other hostilities against her but such as might have been taken in the neighborhood of the Hellespont. Philip says: "I did not attack either the ships or the territory of your state"; that is, "I neither attacked your fleet which was watching in the Hellespont to prevent the passage of mine into the Propontis, nor did I commit any hostilities in the Chersonese, but only marched through it, as a measure of necessity, passing along the coast to protect my fleet."—The presence of a land force on the coast, to protect a fleet, was not uncommon in Greek warfare.

12 Maronea and Stryme were neighboring towns, on the coast of Thrace, northeast of the Island of Thasos. Stryme was founded by the Thasians, whom the Maronites endeavored to deprive of their colony.

13 This seems to have been the embassy that led to the second Philippic. See the argument to that oration. By "the whole confederacy," he means the Amphictyonic union, and affects to treat the Athenians as belonging to it.
ernment say—peace is war, and war is peace: for they always get something from the generals, either by supporting or calumniating them, and also, by railing on your hustings at the most eminent citizens and most illustrious foreigners, they acquire credit with the multitude for being friends of the constitution.

Easy were it for me, at a very small expense, to silence their invectives, and make them pronounce my panegyric. But I should be ashamed to purchase your goodwill from these men, who—besides other things—have reached such a point of assurance as to contest Amphipolis with me, to which I conceive I have a far juster title than the claimants. For if it belongs to the earliest conquerors, how can my right be questioned, when Alexander, my ancestor, first occupied the place, from which, as the firstfruits of the captive Medes, he brought the offering of a golden statue to Delphi? Or, should this be disputed, and the argument be that it belongs to the last possessors, so likewise I have the best title; for I besieged and took the place from a people

14 This observation laid Philip open to a severe retort. What experience had he of the facility of bribing orators at Athens or elsewhere? If he had none, it was a gratuitous piece of slander, and an insult to the Athenians, to suppose their leading statesmen so corruptible. If he spoke from experience, he proved the justice of what Demostenes asserted of him, and the danger to be apprehended from his intrigues.

15 Auger has justly remarked, that Philip's assertion here is contrary to the historical evidence which has been handed down to us. The city of Amphipolis did not exist in the time of this Alexander, but was founded many years after by Hagnon the Athenian. Nor is there any account of his having gained a victory over the Persians, though Herodotus speaks of the golden statue which he erected at Delphi. He was at first compelled to follow in the train of Xerxes, though he afterward came over to the Greeks, and his descent was considered by them as highly meritorious. It is not unlikely, that there were traditions concerning him in Macedonia, unknown to the southern Greeks, and Philip himself might well put faith in them. Supposing the facts here asserted to be true, the argument, as against the Athenians, who set up a prior title in point of time, was conclusive. But, except as an argumentum ad hominem, it could be worth little or nothing.
who expelled you and were planted by the Lacedæmonians. 18 But we all hold cities either by inheritance from our ancestors, or by conquest in war. You claim this city, not being either the first occupants or the present possessors, having abode for a very short period in the district, and after having yourselves given the strongest testimony in my favor. For I have frequently written in letters concerning it, and you have acknowledged the justice of my tenure, first by making the peace while I held the city, and next by concluding alliance on the same terms. How can any property stand on a firmer title than this, which was left to me originally by my forefathers, has again become mine in war, and, thirdly, has been conceded by you, who are accustomed to claim what you have not the least pretensions to?

Such are the complaints which I prefer. As you are the aggressors, as by reason of my forbearance you are making new encroachments, and doing me all the mischief you can, I will, in a just cause, defend myself, and, calling the gods to witness, bring the quarrel between us to an issue.

18 After the death of Brasidas, the Amphipolitans paid divine honors to his memory, and treated him as their founder, destroying every vestige of Hagnon the Athenian. Therefore they are spoken of as being a Lacedæmonian colony.
THE ORATION ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE

THE ARGUMENT

The object of this oration is, to show the necessity of making a proper application of the public revenue, and compelling every citizen to perform service to the state. With respect to the first point, the advice given in the first and third Olynthiacs is in substance repeated, viz., that the theoretic distributions should be put on a different footing; that the fund should either not be distributed at all, or that every man should accept his share as a remuneration for service in the army and navy, or the discharge of some other duty. This was but a circuitous way of proposing (as before observed) that the law of Eubulus should be repealed. It is here further recommended, that the duties required by the state should be systematically divided among all classes, and performed with regularity.

At what time or on what occasion this speech was delivered, we cannot determine. It is mentioned in the exordium, that an assembly of the people was held to consider how certain public moneys should be disposed of. But this gives us no clew to the circumstances. There is no mention of Philip, or of any historical event in connection with the subject. It is stated by the orator, that he had discussed the same question before; and perhaps it may be inferred from hence, that the present speech was later than the Olynthiacs. Again, it may be presumed to have been earlier than the fourth Philippic, in which Demosthenes appears to have changed or modified his views on the subject of the theoretic fund. If, however, the fourth Philippic be not genuine, as some persons contend, the last argument can have no weight.

With respect to the present money and the purpose for which you held the assembly, men of Athens, it appears to me that two courses are equally easy; either to condemn those who distribute and give away the public funds, to gain their esteem who think the commonwealth is injured by such means, or to advocate and recommend the system of allowances, to gratify those who are pressingly in need of them. Both parties praise or blame the practice, not out of regard to the public interest, but according to their several condi-
tions of indigence or affluence. For my part, I would neither propose that the allowances be discontinued, nor speak against them; yet I advise you to consider and reflect in your minds that this money about which you are deliberating is a trifle, but the usage that grows up with it is important. If you will ordain it so that your allowances be associated with the performance of duty, so far from injuring, you will signal benefit the commonwealth and yourselves. But if for your allowances a festival or any excuse be sufficient, while about your further obligations you will not even hear a word, beware lest what you now consider a right practice you may hereafter deem a grievous error.

My opinion is—don’t clamor at what I am going to say, but hear and judge—that, as we appointed an assembly for the receiving of money, so should we appoint an assembly for the regulation of duties and the making provision for war; and every man should exhibit not only a willingness to hear the discussion, but a readiness to act, that you may derive your hopes of advantage from yourselves, Athenians, and not be inquiring what this or that person is about. All the revenue of the state, what you now expend out of your private fortunes to no purpose, and what is obtained from your allies, I say you ought to receive, every man his share, those of the military age as pay, those exempt from the roll ¹ as inspection-money, ² or what you please to call it; but you must take the field yourselves, yield that privilege to none; the force of the state

¹ The roll in which were inscribed the names of all citizens qualified to serve in the cavalry or heavy-armed infantry. Men past the military age were exempt.
² It would be the duty of those persons who received such fees to inspect the militia roll, see that it was complete, that all the qualified citizens took their turns of service, were properly armed and equipped, etc.

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must be native, and provided from these resources; that you may want for nothing while you perform your obligations. And the general should command that force, so that you, Athenians, may experience not the same results as at present—you try the generals, and the issue of your affairs is, "Such a one, the son of such a one, impeached such a one"; nothing else—but what results?—first, that your allies may be attached to you not by garrisons, but by community of interest; secondly, that your generals may not have mercenaries to plunder the allies, without even seeing the enemy (a course from which the emoluments are theirs in private, while the odium and reproach fall upon the whole country), but have citizens to follow them, and do unto the enemy what they now do unto your friends. Besides, many operations require your presence, and (not to mention the advantage of employing our own army for our own wars) it is necessary also for other purposes. If indeed you were content to be quiet, and not to meddle with the politics of Greece, it would be a different matter: but you assume to take the lead and determine the rights of others, and yet have not provided, nor endeavor to provide for yourselves, a force to guard and maintain that superiority. While you never stirred, while you kept entirely aloof, the people of Mitylene have lost their constitution; while you never stirred, the Rhodians have lost theirs—our enemies, it may be said, true, men of Athens; but a strife with oligarchies for the principle of government should be considered more deadly than a strife with popular states on any account whatsoever.

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* I.e., really and effectually command it; not be reduced by their necessities to relax the discipline of the troops, or to employ them on a service foreign to the interests of Athens.
But let me return to the point—I say, your duties must be marshalled; there must be the same rule for receiving money and performing what service is required. I have discussed this question with you before, and shown the method of arranging you all, you of the heavy-armed, you of the cavalry, and you that are neither, and how to make a common provision for all. But what has caused me the greatest despondency, I will tell you without reserve. Amid such a number of important and noble objects, no man remembers any of the rest, but all remember the two obols. Yet two obols can never be worth more than two obols; while what I proposed in connection therewith is worth the treasures of the Persian king—that a state possessing such a force of infantry, such a navy, cavalry, and revenue, should be put in order and preparation.

Why, it may be asked, do I mention these things now? For this reason. There are men shocked at the idea of enlisting all the citizens on hire, while the advantage of order and preparation is universally acknowledged. Here then, I say, you should begin, and permit any person that pleases to deliver his opinion upon the subject. For thus it is. If you can be persuaded to believe that now is the time for making arrangements, when you come to want them, they will be ready: but if you neglect the present time as unseasonable, you will be compelled to make preparations when you have occasion for their use.

It has been said before now, I believe, Athenians, not by you the multitude, but by persons who would burst if these measures were carried into effect—"What benefit

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4 The sum distributed as the price of admittance to the theatres.
have we got from the harangues of Demosthenes? He comes forward when he likes, he stuffs our ears with declamation, he abuses the present state of things, he praises our forefathers, he excites and puffs up our imaginations, and then sits down." I can only say, could I persuade you to follow some of my counsels, I should confer upon the state such important benefits as, if I now attempted to describe them, would appear incredible to many, as exceeding possibility. Yet even this I conceive to be no small advantage, if I accustom you to hear the best advice. For it is necessary, O men of Athens, that whosoever desires to render your commonwealth a service should begin by curing your ears. They are corrupted: so many falsehoods have you been accustomed to hear, anything indeed rather than what is salutary. For instance—let me not be interrupted by clamor, before I have finished—certain persons lately, you know, broke open the treasury: and all the orators cried out, that the democracy was overthrown, the laws were annihilated; or to that effect. Now, ye men of Athens—only see whether I speak truly—the guilty parties committed a crime worthy of death; but the democracy is not overthrown by such means. Again, some oars were stolen: and people clamored for stripes and torture, saying the democracy was in danger. But what do I say? I agree with them that the thief merits death; but I deny that the constitution is by such means overturned. How indeed it is in danger of subversion, no man is bold enough to tell you; but I will declare. It is when you, men of Athens, are under bad leading, a helpless multitude, without arms, without order, without unanimity; when neither general nor any other person pays regard to your resolutions, no one will inform
you of your errors, or correct them, or endeavor to effect a change. This it is that happens now.

And by Jupiter, O Athenians, another sort of language is current among you, false and most injurious to the constitution; such as this, that your safety lies in the courts of justice, and you must guard the constitution by your votes. It is true, these courts are public tribunals for the decision of your mutual rights; but by arms must your enemies be vanquished, by arms the safety of the constitution must be maintained. Voting will not make your soldiers victorious, but they who by soldiership have overcome the enemy provide you with liberty and security for voting and doing what you please. In arms you should be terrible, in courts of justice humane.

If any one thinks I talk a language above my position, this very quality of the speech is laudable. An oration to be spoken for a state so illustrious, and on affairs so important, should transcend the character of the speaker, whoever he be; it should approximate to your dignity rather than his. Why none of your favorites speak in such a style, I will explain to you. The candidates for office and employment go about and cringe to the voting interest, each ambitious to be created general, not to perform any manlike deed. Or if there be a man capable of noble enterprise, he thinks now, that starting with the name and reputation of the state, profiting by the absence of opponents, holding out hopes to you, and nothing else, he shall himself inherit your advantages—which really happens—whereas, if you did everything by yourselves, you would share with the rest, not in the actions only, but also in their results. Your politicians and that class of men, neglecting to give you honest advice, ally them-
selves to the former class: and as you once had boards for taxes, so now you have boards for politics; an orator presiding, a general under him, and three hundred men to shout on either side; while the rest of you are attached some to one party, some to the other. Accordingly—this is what you get by the system—such and such a person has a brazen statue; here and there is an individual more thriving than the commonwealth; you, the people, sit as witnesses of their good fortune, abandoning to them for an ephemeral indolence your great and glorious heritage of prosperity.

But see how it was in the time of your ancestors; for by domestic (not foreign) examples you may learn your lesson of duty. Themistocles who commanded in the sea-fight at Salamis, and Miltiades who led at Marathon, and many others, who performed services unlike the generals of the present day—assuredly they were not set up in brass nor overvalued by your forefathers, who honored them, but only as persons on a level with themselves. Your forefathers, O my countrymen, surrendered not their part in any of those glories. There is no man who will attribute the victory of Salamis to Themistocles, but to the Athenians; nor the battle of Marathon to Miltiades, but to the republic. But now people say that Timotheus took Corcyra, and Iphicrates cut off the Spartan division, and

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5 Timotheus brought back Corcyra to the Athenian alliance, B.C. 376. The Lacedaemonians attempted to recover it three years after, but were defeated.
6 At Lecheum near Corinth. The division of the Lacedaemonian army which Iphicrates defeated was little more than four hundred men. The fame of the exploit, so disproportioned to the numbers engaged, was owing, partly to the great renown of the Spartan infantry, which had not been defeated in a pitched battle for a long period before, and partly to the new kind of troops employed by the Athenian general. These were the *petalistas* or *tartessae*, who were something between heavy-armed and light-armed soldiers, combining in some degree the advantages of both. Their shield (*petis*) was lighter, their
Chabrias won the naval victory at Naxos: for you seem to resign the merit of these actions, by the extravagance of the honors which you have bestowed on their account upon each of the commanders.

So wisely did the Athenians of that day confer political rewards; so improperly do you. But how the rewards of foreigners? To Menon the Pharsalian, who gave twelve talents in money for the war at Eion by Amphipolis, and assisted them with two hundred horsemen of his own retainers, the Athenians then voted not the freedom of their city, but only granted immunity from imposts. And in earlier times to Perdiccas, who reigned in Macedonia during the invasion of the Barbarian—when he had destroyed the Persians who retreated from Plataea after

spear and sword were longer. Until this occasion they had never been fairly tried against the heavy troops of the line. Afterward they came into more general use.

1 Which annihilated the Spartan navy, B.C. 376. In this battle Phocion first distinguished himself.

2 Eion is a city on the Strymon below Amphipolis. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, when Brasidas had taken Amphipolis, he sailed down the Strymon to attack Eion, but the town had been put in a posture of defence by Thucydides the historian, who came to its relief with some ships from Thasos. There is no mention in Thucydides of Menon the Pharsalian. Brasidas had partisans in Pharsalus, and marched through Thessaly on his expedition to Chalcidice, aided by some of the nobles of that country. But the Thessalian people in general sided with the Athenians, and an endeavor was made to prevent his march. Afterward they stopped the passage of the Spartan reinforcements. We can have no difficulty therefore in believing this story of Menon. There was little regular government in Thessaly; and the great families, among whom it was parcelled, would not always agree in their policy and alliances.

3 The Pentesik of Thessaly were serfs or vassals, whose condition was somewhat like, though superior to, that of the Laconian Helots. They were in fact the ancient inhabitants, reduced to a state of dependence by the Thessalian conquerors.

4 Such an immunity, when granted to a foreigner, would exempt him from customs and harbor dues. In the case of a person like Menon, it would be little more than an honorary distinction. But to a citizen or a foreigner residing at Athens an exemption from duties and taxes would be more important.

5 It was Alexander who reigned in Macedonia at this time. This then is either a mistake of the orator, or we may suppose, with Lucchesini, that Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, was governor of a principality, and therefore dignified with the kingly title.
their defeat, and completed the disaster of the king—they voted not the freedom of their city, but only granted immunity from imposts; doubtless, esteeming their country to be of high value, honor, and dignity, surpassing all possible obligation. But now, ye men of Athens, ye adopt the vilest of mankind, menials and the sons of menials, to be your citizens, receiving a price as for any other salable commodity. And you have fallen into such a practice, not because your natures are inferior to your ancestors, but because they were in a condition to think highly of themselves, while from you, men of Athens, this power is taken away. It can never be, methinks, that your spirit is generous and noble, while you are engaged in petty and mean employments; no more than you can be abject and mean-spirited, while your actions are honorable and glorious. Whatever be the pursuits of men, their sentiments must necessarily be similar.

Mark what a summary view may be taken of the deeds performed by your ancestors and by you. Possibly from such comparison you may rise superior to yourselves. They, for a period of five-and-forty years, took the lead of the Greeks by general consent, and carried up more than ten thousand talents into the citadel; and many glorious trophies they erected for victories by land and sea, wherein even yet we take a pride. And, remember, they erected these, not merely that we may survey them with admiration, but also that we may emulate the virtues of the dedicators. 19 Such was their conduct: but for ours—

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19 The trophy, which consisted of armor and spoils taken from the enemy, was hung up, usually on a tree, near the field of battle, and consecrated to some god, with an inscription showing the names of the conquerors and the conquered. But sometimes pillars of brass and stone were erected, as lasting memorials of important victories.
fallen as we have on a solitude" manifest to you all—look if it bears any resemblance. Have not more than fifteen hundred talents been lavished ineffectually on the distressed people of Greece? 14 Have not all private fortunes, the revenues of the state, the contributions from our allies, been squandered? Have not the allies, whom we gained in the war, been lost recently in the peace? But, forsooth, in these respects only was it better anciently than now, in other respects worse. Very far from that! Let us examine what instances you please. The edifices which they left, the ornaments of the city in temples, harbors, and the like, were so magnificent and beautiful that room is not left for any succeeding generation to surpass them: yonder gateway; 15 the Parthenon, docks, porticoes, and other structures, which they adorned the city withal and bequeathed to us. The private houses of the men in power were so modest and in accordance with the name of the constitution that if any one knows the style of house which Themistocles occupied, or Cimon, or Aristides, or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, he perceives it to be no grander than that of the neighbors. But now, ye men of Athens—as regards public measures—our government is content to furnish roads, fountains, whitewashing, and trumpery; not that I blame the author of these works; far otherwise; I blame you, if you suppose that such measures are all you have to execute. As re-

13 I.e. an absence of competitors.
14 What this refers to is unknown. It has been suggested that Athens may have sent supplies of corn for the relief of certain Greek cities.
15 The Propylaeum, which could be seen from the Pnyx, where the people assembled, and were pointed to by the orator. This was an ornamental fortification in front of the Acropolis, considered the most beautiful structure in Athens. It was constructed of white marble, at an immense expense, in the time of Pericles, and took five years in building.
gards individual conduct—your men in office have (some of them) made their private houses, not only more ostenta
tious than the multitude, but more splendid than the public buildings; others are farming land which they have purchased of such an extent as once they never hoped for in a dream.

The cause of this difference is that formerly the people were lords and masters of all; any individual citizen was glad to receive from them his share of honor, office, or profit. Now, on the contrary, these persons are the disposers of emoluments; everything is done by their agency; the people are treated as underlings and dependants, and you are happy to take what these men allow you for your portion.

Accordingly, the affairs of the republic are in such a state that, if any one read your decrees and recounted your actions directly afterward, no man would believe that both came from the same persons. Take, for example, the decrees that you passed against the accursed Megarians, when they were cultivating the sacred ground; that you would sally forth and prevent and not allow it: your decrees in regard to the Phliasians, when they were driven lately into exile; that you would assist, and not abandon them to the murderers, and invite the Peloponnesians who were inclined to join you. All these were honorable, men of Athens, and just and worthy of the country: but the deeds that followed them utterly worthless. Thus by decrees you manifest your hostility, yet cannot execute a single undertaking: for your decrees are proportioned to the dignity of the state, while your power corresponds not with them. I would advise you—and let no man be angry with me—to lower your pride and be
content with minding your own business, or to provide yourselves with a greater force. If I knew you to be Siphnians or Cythnians⁰ or any other people of that sort, I would have advised you to lower your pride; but, as you are Athenians, I recommend the providing a force. It were disgraceful, men of Athens, disgraceful, to desert that post of magnanimity which your ancestors bequeathed to you. Besides, even should you desire to withdraw from Grecian affairs, it is not in your power. For many feats have been performed by you from the earliest time; and your established friends it were disgraceful to abandon, your enemies you cannot trust and suffer to become great. In short, the position which your statesmen hold relative to you—they cannot retire when they choose—is precisely that which you have arrived at: for you have interfered in the politics of Greece.

I can sum up all that has been spoken, men of Athens. Your orators never make you either vicious or good, but you make them whichever you please: for you aim not at what they desire, but they at what they suppose to be your objects. You, therefore, must begin by having noble purposes, and all will be well. Either men will abstain from unworthy counsels, or will gain nothing by them, having none to follow their advice.

⁰ Siphnos and Cythnos are small islands in the Ægean Sea.
THE ORATION ON THE NAVY BOARDS

THE ARGUMENT

This was (according to Dionysius) the first speech delivered by Demosthenes before the popular assembly. The date of it was B.C. 354.

In this speech there is no effort to make a display of eloquence; it is confined to the giving of useful and simple advice. A definite plan is proposed for the regulation of the Athenian navy, by which the number of ships might be increased to three hundred, and a provision made for their speedy and punctual equipment. To effect this object, Demosthenes proposes a reform, from which the oration takes its title, in the system of Symmoria, or Boards for the Management of the Trierarchy. The details of the proposed scheme are plainly set forth in the oration itself.

Here is struck the keynote of that which for many years continued to be the policy of this great man; viz., to uphold the dignity of Athens on the basis of wise laws, to maintain her independence by the spirit and exertions of her own people, to rally round her, for empire and for safety, a host of willing confederates, united by the bonds of common interest, mutual confidence and esteem.

It appears to me, O Athenians, that the men who praise your ancestors adopt a flattering language, not a course beneficial to the people whom they eulogize. For attempting to speak on subjects which no man can fully reach by words, they carry away the reputation of clever speakers themselves, but cause the glory of those ancients to fall below its estimation in the minds of the hearers. For my part, I consider the highest praise of our ancestors to be the length of time which has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to excel the pattern of their deeds. I will myself endeavor to show in what way, according to my judgment, your preparations may most conveniently be made. For thus it is. Though all of us who intend to speak should
prove ourselves capital orators, your affairs, I am certain, would prosper none the more: but if any person whomsoever came forward, and could show and convince you what kind and what amount of force will be serviceable to the state, and from what resources it should be provided, all our present apprehensions would be removed. This will I endeavor to do, as far as I am able, first briefly informing you what my opinion is concerning our relations with the king.

I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet not on this account would I advise you, without the rest, to undertake a war against him. For I do not observe that the Greeks themselves are common friends to one another; on the contrary, some have more confidence in him than in certain of their own people. Such being the case, I deem it expedient for you to look that the cause of war be equitable and just, that all necessary preparations should be made, and that this should be the groundwork of your resolution. For I think, men of Athens, if there were any clear and manifest proof that the Persian king was about to attack the Greeks, they would join alliance and be exceedingly grateful to those who sided with and defended them against him; but if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are declared, I fear, men of Athens, we shall be driven to a war with both the king and the people whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend his designs—if he really has resolved to attack the Greeks—will give money to some of them and promise friendship; they, desiring to carry on their private wars with better success, and intent

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1 This is a modest allusion to himself.
on projects of that kind, will disregard the common safety of all.

I beseech you not to betray our country into such embarrassment and folly. For you, I see, cannot adopt the same principles of action in reference to the king as the other Greeks can. It is open, I conceive, to many of them, to prosecute their selfish interests and neglect the body of the nation: it would be dishonorable in you, though you had suffered wrong, to punish the offenders in such a way as to let any of them fall under the power of the barbarian.

Under these circumstances, we must take care that we ourselves engage not in the war upon unequal terms, and that he, whom we suppose to entertain designs upon the Greeks, do not gain the credit of appearing their friend. How can it be managed? By giving proof to the world that the forces of our state are mustered and prepared, and that possessing such forces we espouse sentiments of justice. To the over-daring, who are vehement in urging you to war, I have this to say: It is not difficult, in the season for deliberation, to earn the repute of courage, or, when danger is nigh, to be exceeding eloquent: it is however both difficult and becoming, in the hour of danger to exhibit courage, in counsel to find better advice than other men.

It is my opinion, men of Athens, that a war with the king would distress our republic, though any action in the course of the war would be an easy affair. Why so? Because, methinks, every war necessarily requires a fleet and money and posts; and of all these things I perceive that he has a greater abundance than ourselves: but for action, I observe, nothing is so much needed as brave
soldiers, and of these, I imagine, we and our confederates have the greater number. My advice therefore is, that we should by no means begin the war, though for action we ought to be fully prepared. If indeed there were one description of force wherewith barbarians could be resisted, and another wherewith Greeks, we might reasonably perhaps be regarded as arraying ourselves against Persia; but since all arming is of the same character, and your force must amount to the same thing, namely, the means of resisting your enemies, of succoring your allies, of preserving your valuable possessions; why, when we have professed enemies, do we look out for others? why do we not rather prepare ourselves against the former, and be ready to resist the king also, if he attempt to injure us?

And now you invite the Greeks to join you. But if you will not act as they desire, some of them having no goodwill toward you, how can you expect they will obey your call? Because, forsooth, they will hear from you that the Persian has designs against them. And pray, do you imagine they don't foresee it themselves? I believe they do: but at present this fear outweighs not the enmity which some of them bear toward you and toward each other. Your ambassadors then will only travel round and rhapsodize. But when the time comes, if what we now expect be really brought to pass, I fancy none of the Greek community rate themselves so high, that, when they see you possessed of a thousand horse, as many infantry

9 This refers principally to the Thebans, between whom and the Athenians an enmity had subsisted ever since the severance of their alliance, when the Athenians, jealous of the growing power of Thebes under Epaminondas, went over to the side of Sparta. This enmity was increased by the events of the Sacred war, which had now been raging for two years, and in which the Thebans were engaged as principals on one side, while the Phocians received assistance from Athens and Lacedæmon.
soldiers as one could desire, and three hundred ships, they would not come with entreaties, and regard such aid as their surest means of deliverance. The consequences then are—by inviting them now, you are suppliants, and, if your petition be not granted, you fail: whereas, by waiting your time and completing your preparations, you save men at their own request, and are sure they will all come over to you.

Swayed by these and the like considerations, men of Athens, I sought not to compose a bold harangue of tedious length: but have taken exceeding pains in devising a plan, the best and the speediest, for getting your forces ready. It will be for you, to hear it, and, if it meet your approval, to vote for its adoption.

The first and most essential part of preparation, men of Athens, is to be so disposed in your minds, that every citizen is willing and earnest to perform his duty. For you see, O Athenians: whenever you have had a common wish, and every man has thought afterward, that the accomplishment belonged to himself, nothing has ever escaped you; but when you have wished only, and then looked to one another, each expecting to be idle while his neighbor did the work, none of your designs has been executed.

You being so animated and determined, I advise that we fill up the twelve hundred and make two thousand, adding eight hundred to them: for if you appoint that number, I reckon that after deducting the heiresses and wards, and holders of allotments and partnership property, and persons in reduced circumstances, you will still have your twelve hundred members. Of them I think you should make twenty boards, as at present, each having
sixty members. Each of these boards I would have you divide into five sections of twelve men, putting always with the wealthiest person some of the least wealth, to preserve equality. And thus I say the members ought to be arranged: the reason you will understand, when you have heard the whole scheme of arrangement. But how about the ships? I recommend you to fix the whole number at three hundred, and form twenty divisions of fifteen vessels each, giving five of the first hundred and five of the second hundred and five of the third hundred to each division; then allot one division of fifteen ships to every board of men, and let the board assign three ships to each of their own sections.

When these regulations have been made, I propose—as the ratable capital of the country is six thousand talents—in order that your supplies may be apportioned, you should divide this capital and make a hundred parts of sixty talents each; then allot five of these hundredth parts to each of the twenty larger boards, and let the board assign one hundredth part to each of their own sections; so that, if you have need of a hundred ships, sixty talents may be applied 3 to the expense, and there may be twelve to serve as commanders; if of two hundred, there may be thirty talents applied to the expense, and six persons to serve; if of three hundred, there may be twenty talents defraying the expense, and four persons to serve.

In the same manner, O Athenians, I advise that all the furniture of the ships, which is out on loan, 4 should

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3 *I.e.* that shall be the proportion of the whole ratable capital, upon which a tax shall be levied to meet the expense. *It is a short way of expressing this.*

4 *It was customary for individuals to borrow the naval implements and stores from the public arsenal, when the state had no occasion for them.*
be valued according to the register, and divided into twenty parts; that you then allot one good portion to every large board; that every board distribute equal shares among their own sections; that the twelve in each section call their implements in, and get the ships which are severally allotted to them in readiness. Thus do I think the supplies, the vessels, the commanders, and the collection of implements, may be most effectually provided and arranged. How the manning may be made sure and easy, I proceed to explain.

I say the generals should divide the dockyards into ten departments, taking care that there be thirty docks in each as near as possible to one another; and when they have done this, let them attach two boards and thirty ships to each of these departments, then allot the tribes and the several commanders to each dockyard, so that there may be two boards, thirty ships, one tribe. And whichever department be allotted to a tribe, let them divide it in three and the ships likewise, and then allot the third of a tribe to each, so that of the whole dockyards there may be one division belonging to every tribe, and the third of a tribe may have the third part of every division, and you may know, in case of necessity, first, where the tribe is stationed, next, where the third of the tribe, next, who are the commanders and how many ships there are; and the tribe may have thirty ships, and every third of a tribe have ten. Let the system be only put in train, and though we should forget something now—for it is difficult to make all the details perfect—it will be ascertained in the working; and there will be one arrangement for all the ships and every division.

In regard to money and real supplies, I know that I
ON THE NAVY BOARDS

am about to make an extraordinary statement, yet still it shall be made; for I am persuaded that, on a correct view, I alone shall be found to have declared and predicted the truth. I say, we ought not at present to speak of money: a supply there is, if occasion require it, ample, honorable, and just: if we look for it immediately, we shall not think we have it even in reserve; so far shall we be from providing it now; but if we leave it alone, we shall have it. What, then, is this supply, which hath no being now, but will exist hereafter?—for certainly it is like a riddle. I will explain.

You see the extent of this city, men of Athens. It contains treasures equal, I may almost say, to the rest of the states put together. But the owners are so minded that—if all your orators alarmed them with intelligence that the king was coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was inevitable—if, besides the orators; an equal number of persons gave oracular warning—so far from contributing, they would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge the possession. Yet if they knew that these proceedings, so terrible in report, were actually begun, there is not a man so foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost to contribute. For who would rather perish with all his possessions than contribute a part of his possessions to preserve himself and the remainder? Thus, I say, we have money against the time of actual need, but not before. And, therefore, I advise you not to search for it now. Indeed, what you would raise, if you determined to raise it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at all. For example:—Let a tax be proposed of one per cent—there are sixty talents. Let twice as much, namely, two per cent, be proposed—there are a hundred
and twenty. But what is this to the twelve hundred camels, which, these men say, carry the king's gold? Let me suppose, however, that we contributed the twelfth of our property, five hundred talents. This you would not submit to; but if you did pay it, the sum would be insufficient for the war. Your proper course, then, is to complete your other preparations; let the owners retain their money for the present (it cannot be in better keeping for the state); and should the occasion ever arrive then take it from them in voluntary contributions.

These, O my countrymen, are practicable measures, these are honorable and advantageous, fit to be reported as your proceedings to the king; and by them no little terror would be excited in him. He knows right well that by three hundred galleys, whereof we furnished a hundred, his ancestors lost a thousand ships; and he will hear that we ourselves have now equipped three hundred; so that, were he ever so mad, he could hardly deem it a light matter to provoke the hostility of our republic. Should he, however, entertain an overweening confidence in his wealth, even this he will find to be a weaker support than yours. He is coming, they say, with gold. But if he give it away, he will lack supplies: for even wells and fountains are apt to fail, if you draw from them constantly and by wholesale. He will hear that the valuation of our land is a capital of six thousand talents. That we shall defend it against invaders from that quarter, his ancestors who were at Marathon would know best: and certainly, as long as we are victorious, money can never fail us.

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5 Direct taxation in time of peace, when there is no urgent necessity, is like killing the goose for the golden eggs.
Nor is there, as it appears to me, any ground for what some persons fear, that having money he will collect a large body of mercenaries. I do, indeed, believe, that against Egypt and Orontes, and any other barbarians, many of the Greeks would be willing to serve in his pay, not that he may subdue any of those adversaries, but in order to obtain supplies for themselves to relieve their several necessities. Against Greece, however, I do not believe that any Grecian would march. For whither could he betake himself afterward? Go to Phrygia and be a slave?—Remember, a war with the barbarian can be for no other stake than for country and life and customs and freedom and everything of the kind. Who, then, is so wretched that he would sacrifice himself, parents, sepulchres, fatherland, for the sake of a paltry pittance? I believe, no man. But further—it is not even the king’s interest that mercenaries should conquer the Greeks. For they that conquer us must have been his masters already: and he desires, not to subdue us and then be dependent on others, but to rule, if possible, over all; if that be not possible, at least over his present subjects.

Should any one think the Thebans will be on his side—I know it is difficult to speak to you about that people: you hate them so, you will not like to hear even the truth or anything favorable of them—however, men who are considering important questions must not omit any useful argument on any pretext. My opinion, then is, the Thebans,

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4 Orontes was satrap of Mysia in the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon. He joined the great conspiracy of the satraps and the king of Egypt in the year B.C. 362. He was chosen to command their forces, and intrusted with a large fund which had been collected to carry on the war. He was induced however to change sides; and the trust which had been reposed in him enabled him to betray his party to the king most effectually.
so far from being likely to join him in any attack upon Greece, would give a large sum of money, if they had it, for the opportunity of repairing their former offences against her. But supposing the Thebans to be so utterly wrongheaded, of this at least you are all aware, that if the Thebans are in his interest, their enemies must necessarily be in the interest of the Greeks.

I believe, then, that our cause (the cause of justice) and its adherents will be better armed against all adversaries than the traitors and the barbarian can be. And therefore my advice is—be not over-alarmed at the war; neither be led on to commence it. I do not see indeed that any other people of Greece have reason to fear this war. For which of them is ignorant, that while, looking on the Persian as a common enemy, they were in concord among themselves, they enjoyed many advantages; but since they have regarded him as a friend and quarrelled about private disputes with each other, they have suffered greater calamities than could have been wished in pronouncing a curse upon them? Then should we fear a man whom fortune and heaven declare to be unprofitable as a friend, and useful as an enemy? Let us do no such thing! Yet do him no injustice either; having regard to ourselves, and to the disturbances and jealousies among the other people of Greece. If it were possible with one heart and with combined forces to attack him alone, such an injury I would not have pronounced an injustice. But since this cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford the king a pretence for vindicating the rights of the other Greeks. As long as we remain quiet, any such attempt on his part

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1 The Thebans had always been reproached for siding with Xerxes against the Greeks.
would awaken suspicion; but if we are the first to commence hostilities, it will naturally be thought that he courts their friendship because of his enmity with us.

Do not expose the melancholy condition of Greece, by convoking her people when you cannot persuade them, and making war when you cannot carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and prepare yourselves. Let it be reported of you to the king—not (for heaven’s sake) that all the Greeks and the Athenians are in distress and alarm and confusion; which is very far from the truth—but that, if falsehood and perjury were not considered as disgraceful by the Greeks, as by him they are considered honorable, you would have marched against him long ago; that you will forbear to do this for your own sakes, but you pray unto all the gods, that he may be inspired with the same madness that his ancestors were formerly. Should he come to reflect on these matters, he will find that your resolutions are taken with prudence. He knows assuredly, that Athens by her wars with his ancestors became prosperous and great, while by the repose which she enjoyed before, she was not raised above any Grecian state so much as she is at present. And as to the Greeks, he perceives that they stand in need of some mediator, either a voluntary or an involuntary one; and he knows that he should himself step in as such a mediator, if he stirred up war. Therefore the accounts that he will receive from his informants will be intelligible and credible.

Not to trouble you, men of Athens, with over-many words, I will give a summary of my advice and retire. I bid you prepare yourselves against existing enemies, and I declare that with this same force you should resist the king and all other people, if they attempt to injure you;
but never commence an injustice either in word or deed. Let us look that our actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course, you will do service, not only to yourselves, but also to them who give the opposite counsel; since you will not be angry with them afterward for your errors committed now.  

8 The speech of Demosthenes was so far successful, that it calmed the excitement of the Athenians; and they were content to make a show of preparation, without adopting any actual measures of war. In the following oration he refers with some satisfaction to this result.
ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

THE ORATION ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

THE ARGUMENT

This oration was delivered B.C. 351 on the following occasion.

In the island of Rhodes, as in divers other of the Grecian states, there had been many contests between the democratical party and the oligarchical. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it was in the hands of an oligarchy, under the protection of Lacedaemon. About the year 396 Conon, being at the head of a considerable fleet in that part of the Ægean, drove the Peloponnesians from the port of Rhodes, and compelled the islanders to renew their connection with Athens. Democracy was then re-established; but four years afterward the opposite faction again prevailed, a Spartan fleet made its appearance, the popular leaders and the friends of Athens were banished or put to death. For the next thirty years or more following that event little is known of Rhodian history. After the destruction of the Spartan navy, Rhodes with most of the Ægean isles returned to the Athenian confederacy, and we may fairly presume that a new democratical revolution was effected in the island during that period. But in the year 358 a rupture of a most serious kind took place between Rhodes and Athens, pregnant with disastrous consequences to both. This was the breaking out of the Social war.

We learn from various parts of Demosthenes how the Athenian commanders at this period, sent out with inadequate forces and supplies, were tempted or driven to commit irregularities, amounting often to acts of plunder and violence, in order to maintain their armaments or carry on their wars. Not confining their aggressions to the enemies of Athens, or even to neutrals, they harassed the allies, by extorting from them loans and contributions, and thus brought the name of their country into general odium and discredit. It seems that Chares, having the command of a fleet destined to act against Amphipolis, sailed to Rhodes, and by his vexatious and arbitrary proceedings so irritated the people, that they were ready on the first opportunity to throw off their connection with Athens. They entered into a league with Byzantium, and raising a fleet powerful enough set the Athenians at defiance, commenced the Social war, which, after a three years’ continuance, was terminated by a peace humiliating to Athens, B.C. 355.

In the course of this war the allies received assistance from Mausolus, king of Caria. He had formed the design of annexing Rhodes to his own dominions, to which it was so conveniently adjacent; but there was little hope of accomplishing this purpose, unless he could sever it from the Athenian Orations—*17—Vol. I.
alliance. The oligarchical party in Rhodes, still watching for a new revolution, were easily brought over to his views; and at the close of the war a Carian garrison was introduced into the island, which established the oligarchy, and in effect brought the island in subjection to a foreign yoke. The Rhodians had no hopes of recovering their liberty; they had lost the protection of a powerful state; while Mausolus could obtain effectual aid from the Persian king, whose vassal he was, and to whom it was important to acquire any of the islands near Asia Minor. Mausolus died in the year B.C. 353, and was succeeded by his queen Artemisia. In her reign the government of Rhodes became oppressive to the people; who at length resolving to throw off their yoke, sent a deputation to Athens, to implore her assistance. These petitioners, who were not very favorably received at Athens, found an advocate in Demosthenes.

It was natural to expect, that there would be a strong feeling at Athens against a people who had deeply injured her. A very few years had elapsed since the Social war, and the events were fresh in the memory of all. To overcome this feeling of resentment was the principal difficulty which an advocate of the Rhodian people had to encounter. Demosthenes appeals to the higher and nobler feelings of his countrymen. Motives of honor, generosity and compassion should influence Athenians: it was not worth while to remember the wrongs done them by so insignificant a people as the Rhodian; they should consider only what was due from them to Athens and to Greece.

I THINK, men of Athens, that on a consultation of such moment you ought to grant liberty of speech to every one of your advisers. For my own part, I have never thought it difficult to make you understand right counsel—for to speak plainly, you seem all to possess the knowledge yourselves—but to persuade you to follow it I have found difficult; for when any measure has been voted and resolved, you are then as far from the performance as you were from the resolution before.

One of the events, for which I consider you should be thankful to the gods, is that a people, who to gratify their own insolence went to war with you not long ago, now place their hopes of safety in you alone. Well may we be rejoiced at the present crisis: for if your measures there-
ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

upon be wisely taken, the result will be that the calumnies of those who traduce our country you will practically and with credit and honor refute. The Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians accused us of a design to oppress them, and therefore combined to make the last war against us. It will turn out that Mausolus, who contrived and instigated these proceedings, pretending to be a friend of the Rhodians, has deprived them of their liberty; the Chians and Byzantines, who called them allies, have not aided them in misfortune; while you, whom they dreaded, are the only people who have wrought their deliverance. And, this being seen by all the world, you will cause the people in every state to regard your friendship as the token of their security: nor can there be a greater blessing for you, than thus to obtain from all men a voluntary attachment and confidence.

I marvel to see the same persons advising you to oppose the king on behalf of the Egyptians, and afraid of him in the matter of the Rhodian people. All men know that the latter are Greeks, the former a portion of his subjects. And I think some of you remember that, when you were debating about the king's business, I first came forward and advised—nay, I was the only one, or one of two, that gave such counsel—that your prudent course in my opinion was, not to allege your quarrel with the king as the excuse for your arming, but to arm against your existing enemies, and defend yourselves against him also, if he attempted to injure you. Nor did I offer this advice without obtaining your approval; for you agreed with me. Well then: my reasoning of to-day is consistent with the argument on that occasion. For, would the king take me to his counsels, I should advise him as I advise you, in
defence of his own possessions to make war upon any Greeks that opposed him, but not to think of claiming dominions to which he had no manner of title. If now it be your general determination, Athenians, to surrender to the king all places that he gets possession of, whether by surprise, or by deluding certain of the inhabitants, you have determined, in my judgment, unwisely: but if in the cause of justice you esteem it your duty, either to make war, if needful, or to suffer any extremity; in the first place, there will be the less necessity for such trials, in proportion as you are resolved to meet them; and secondly, you will manifest a spirit that becomes you.

That I suggest nothing new, in urging you to liberate the Rhodians—that you will do nothing new, in following my counsel—will appear, if I remind you of certain measures that succeeded. Once, O Athenians, you sent Timotheus out to assist Ariobarzanes,1 annexing to the decree, "that he was not to infringe your treaty with the king." Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from the king, and that Samos was garrisoned by Cypro-

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1 Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, was concerned in the rebellion of B.C. 362. It seems that, in soliciting Athenian aid, which he obtained the more easily on account of his connection with the state—he having received the honor of citizenship—Ariobarzanes had concealed the object of his preparations; and therefore the Athenians, in sending Timotheus, took the precaution of restricting his powers in the way mentioned by the orator. Timotheus, in return for some service which he had done, was helped by the satrap to get possession of Sestus and Orthote in the Chersonese. Cornelius Nepos praises the Athenian general, because, instead of getting any private recompense from Ariobarzanes, he had looked only to the advantage of his country; while Agesilaus, who had gone out on the same service, took a pecuniary reward for himself. Timotheus then proceeded to besiege Samos, which was occupied by a Persian garrison, and took it in the course of the following year. Isocrates, the orator, who acted as the secretary of Timotheus, was at the siege of Samos, and praises the general for having taken it with little or no cost to Athens.

The occupation of Samos by the Persians was an infringement of the peace of Antalcidas, by the terms of which the Greek islands were to be independent. Therefore the conduct of Timotheus, in wrestling Samos from Persia, afforded an apt illustration for the argument of Demosthenes.
themis, under the appointment of Tigranes, the king’s deputy, renounced the intention of assisting Ariobarzanes, but invested the island with his forces and delivered it. And to this day there has been no war against you on that account. Men will not fight for aggressive purposes so readily as for defensive. To resist spoliation they strive with all their might; not so to gratify ambition: this they will attempt, if there be none to hinder them; but, if prevented, they regard not their opponents as having done them an injury.

My belief is that Artemisia would not even oppose this enterprise now, if our state were embarked in the measure. Attend a moment and see whether my calculation be right or wrong. I consider—were the king succeeding in all his designs in Egypt, Artemisia would make a strenuous effort to get Rhodes into his power, not from affection to the king, but from a desire, while he tarried in her neighborhood, to confer an important obligation upon him, so that he might give her the most friendly reception: but since he fares as they report, having miscarried in his attempts, she judges that this island—and so the fact is—would be of no further use to the king at present, but only a fortress to overawe her kingdom and prevent disturbances. Therefore, it seems to me, she would rather you had the island, without her appearing to have surrendered it, than that he should obtain possession. I think, indeed, she will send no succors at all, but, if she do, they will be scanty and feeble. As to the king—what he will do I cannot pretend to know; but this I will maintain, that it is expedient for Athens to have it immediately understood whether he means to claim the Rhodian city or not: for, if he should, you will have to deliberate not on the con-
cerns of Rhodes only, but on those of Athens and all Greece.

Even if the Rhodians, who are now in the government, had held it by themselves, I would not have advised you to espouse their cause; not though they promised to do everything for you. But I see, that in the beginning, in order to put down the democracy, they gained over a certain number of citizens, and afterward banished those very men when they had accomplished their purpose. I think, therefore, that people who have been false to two parties* would be no steadier allies to you. And never would I have proffered this counsel, had I thought it would benefit the Rhodian people only; for I am not their state-friend, nor is any one of them connected with me by ties of private hospitality. And, even if both these causes had existed, I would not have spoken, unless I had considered it for your advantage. Indeed, as far as the Rhodians are concerned, if the advocate for their deliverance may be allowed to say so, I am rejoiced at what has happened—that, after grudging to you the recovery of your rights, they have lost their own liberty; and, when they might have had an alliance on equal terms with Greeks and their betters, they are under subjection to barbarians and slaves, whom they have admitted into their fortresses.9 I would

9 I.e. to the people at large, and to the select few whom they associated with themselves in the first instance.

9 Vitruvius relates a stratagem, by which Artemisia got complete dominion of Rhodes. The Rhodians had plotted with a party in Halicarnassus to overthrow the Carian government, and sent a fleet with troops to assist in the execution of their design. The troops landed and advanced to the city, where the inhabitants were ranged under the walls as if to give them a friendly reception. But this was done by order of Artemisia, who had discovered the plot and laid an ambush for the Rhodians. They were surrounded and slain. Artemisia took their ships, and put a Carian force on board, which sailing to Rhodes, and being mistaken by the people for their own armament returning, got possession of the Rhodian capital.
almost say that, if you determine to assist them, these events have turned out for their good. For, during prosperity, I doubt whether they would have learned discretion, being Rhodians; but since they are taught by experience, that folly is mightily injurious to men, they may possibly perhaps become wiser for the future; and this I think would be no small advantage to them. I say, therefore, you should endeavor to rescue these people, and not harbor resentment, considering that you too have often been deceived by miscreants, but for no such deceit would you allow that you merited punishment yourselves.

Observe also, men of Athens, that you have waged many wars both against democracies and against oligarchies—this indeed you know without my telling—but for what cause you have been at war with either, perhaps not one of you considers. What are the causes? Against democratical states your wars have been either for private grievances, when you could not make public satisfaction, or for territory, or boundaries, or a point of honor, or the leadership: against oligarchies, for none of these matters, but for your constitution and freedom. Therefore I would not hesitate to say, I think it better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with a popular government than your friends under oligarchal. For with freemen I consider you would have no difficulty in making peace when you chose; but with people under an oligarchy even friendship I hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the lovers of constitutional equality.

I marvel none of you conceive—when the Chians and Mitylenæans are governed by oligarchies, when the Rhodians and nearly all people are about being drawn into
this slavery—that our constitution is in the same peril: and none consider it is impossible, if all establishments are on the principle of oligarchy, that they will let your democracy alone. They know too well that no other people will bring things back to the state of liberty: therefore they will wish to destroy a government from which they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary doers of wrong you may regard as enemies to the sufferers only: they that subvert constitutions and transform them into oligarchies must be looked upon, I say, as the common enemies to all lovers of freedom. And besides, men of Athens, it is right that you, living under self-government, should show the same feeling for a free people in misfortune that you would expect others to have for you in case of a similar calamity; which, I trust, may never befall! Though, indeed, it may be said that the Rhodians have had their deserts, the occasion is not a fit one for triumph: the fortunate should always be seen to interest themselves for the benefit of the unfortunate, since the future is uncertain to all men.

I often hear it said before this assembly that, when our commonwealth was in misfortune, certain people were solicitous for its preservation; among whom—I will here mention a little circumstance of the Argives alone. I would not have you, famous as you have ever been for succoring the distressed, appear in a matter of this kind inferior to the Argives: who, inhabiting a country adjacent to the Lacedæmonians, seeing them to have dominion over land and sea, did not fear or hesitate to show their

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4 This occurred soon after the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was under the dominion of the thirty tyrants, and a large number of Athenian citizens were compelled to seek safety in exile.
attachment to you, but even passed a vote—when ambas-
sadors had come from Lacedæmon (as we are told) to
demand certain Athenian refugees—that, unless they de-
parted before sunset, they should be adjudged enemies.
Would it not be disgraceful, my countrymen, if, when
the commons of Argos dreaded not the power and em-
pire of the Lacedæmonians in those times, you, who are
Athenians, should be frightened at a person of barbarian
origin, and a woman, too? They, indeed, might allege
that they have often been defeated by the Lacedæmoni-
ans: whereas you have often vanquished the king, and
not once been defeated either by the king himself or by
his subjects; for, if ever the king has obtained an advan-
tage over our state, he has obtained it in this way—and
in no other—by bribing the betrayers of Greece and the
basest of her people. And even such advantage has not
benefited him. At the very time, when he had enfeebled
Athens by aid of the Lacedæmonians, you will find him
struggling for his kingdom with Clearchus and Cyrus. 9
Thus he has neither beaten us openly, nor done himself
any good by his intrigues. There are some, I observe,
who are used to slight Philip ¹ as a person of no account,
but dread the king as an enemy terrible to any that he

5 It was to the pecuniary assistance of Persia, obtained by the management
of Lysander, that the Spartans were mainly indebted for their success in the
Peloponnesian war. A few years afterward Cyrus, who had been most active
in the Spartan cause, marched from his province in Asia Minor to contend for
the crown with his brother Artaxerxes. Clearchus commanded the Greek mer-
cenaries in his service. The death of Cyrus, who was slain charging at the head
of his troops in the battle of Cunaxa, delivered Artaxerxes and his kingdom from
further danger.

6 About a year only had elapsed since the speaking of the first Philippic. 
Whatever effect that speech may have produced at the time, it seems to have
made no lasting impression. The inaction of Philip in the two following years
relieved the Athenians from any immediate apprehension of danger. They were
roused to new alarm by the rupture of Philip with Olynthus.
chooses. However, if we are not to oppose the one, because he is contemptible, and yield everything to the other, because he is formidable, against whom shall we take the field, O Athenians?

There are persons here, men of Athens, famous for advocating the rights of others against you; to whom I would give one little piece of advice—to undertake the defence of your rights against others that they may set an example of dutiful conduct. It is absurd for any one to instruct you in the principles of justice, without acting justly himself: and it is not just that a citizen should have considered the arguments against you, and not the arguments in your favor. Look you, I pray! How happens it there is none in Byzantium, who will admonish them not to take possession of Chalcedon, which belongs to the king, and you held it once, and by no manner of title is it there?—also that they are not to make Selymbria, a city formerly in your alliance, tributary to themselves, and that Byzantium is not to determine the limits of the Selymbrian territory, contrary to the oaths and the treaties by which it is declared that the cities shall be independent? And none has there been to advise Mausolus in his lifetime, none since his death to advise Artemisia, not to seize upon Cos and Rhodes and other Grecian cities, which the

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7 Chalcedon, founded by the Megarians on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, was called the city of the blind, because the settlers had overlooked the more beautiful spot on the European coast, where afterward Byzantium (site of the modern Constantinople) was built. The fate of Chalcedon, like many other towns similarly situated, was to fall alternately under the dominion of Persia, Athens, and Lacedaemon. It was taken from the Lacedaemonians by Alcibiades, but surrendered to Lysander after the decisive battle of Ægos-Potamos. The peace of Antalcidas restored it to Persia.

8 Selymbria is on the Propontine coast, between Byzantium and Perinthus.

9 The island of Cos, celebrated as the birthplace of Hippocrates the physician and Apelles the painter, lies a little off the coast of Caria, not far from Halicarnassus.
king, their master, ceded by his treaty to the Greeks, and for which the Greeks of that period sustained numerous perils and honorable contests. Or, if they have both of them* such a monitor, yet seemingly there is none to follow his advice.

I esteem it a just measure to restore the Rhodian democracy: yet, granting it were not just, when I look at the conduct of these people, I conceive it right to advise the measure. And why? Because, O Athenians, if all men were inclined to observe justice, it would be disgraceful for us alone to refuse; but, when all the rest are seeking the power to do wrong, for us to profess high principle and undertake no enterprise, would, in my opinion, be not justice, but cowardice. I see that men have their rights allowed them in proportion to their power: of which I can produce an example familiar to you all. There are two treaties between the Greeks and the king; that which our republic made, which is universally praised, and this latter one, concluded by the Lacedaemonians, which is the subject of complaint. And the definition of rights in both the treaties is not the same. For, although private political rights are granted by the laws impartially to all, the same for the weak as for the strong; the rule of Hellenic right is prescribed by the greater powers to the less.

Since then it is your fixed resolution to pursue a just policy, you must look that you have the means to carry it out. Such means you will possess, if you are supposed to be the common protectors of Grecian liberty. It is, doubtless, very difficult for you to adopt proper measures. The rest of mankind have one battle to fight, namely,

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10 *I.e. the Byzantines and Artemisia.
against their avowed enemies: if they conquer those, nothing hinders them accomplishing their desires. You, Athenians, have a double contest; that which the rest have, and also another, prior to that, and more arduous: for you must in council overcome a faction, who act among you in systematic opposition to the state. Since therefore through these men it is impossible for any good measure to be effected without a struggle, the natural consequence is that you lose many advantages. Perhaps the chief cause why so many adopt this line of politics without scruple, is the support afforded them by their hirers: at the same time you are yourselves chargeable with blame. You ought, O Athenians, to hold the same opinion concerning the post of civil duty, as you hold concerning the military. What is that? You consider that one, who deserts the post assigned by his general, should be degraded and deprived of constitutional privileges. It is right, therefore, that men who desert the political post received from their ancestors, and support oligarchical measures, should be disabled to act as your counsellors. Among your allies you regard those to be the most attached, who have sworn to have the same friends and enemies with yourselves; and yet of your statesmen you esteem those the most faithful, who to your certain knowledge have sided with the enemies of Athens.

However—matter of accusation against these men, matter of censure against the people, is not hard to discover: the difficulty is to know, by what counsels or what conduct our present evils may be repaired. This perhaps is not the occasion to speak of all: could you only give effect to your policy by some useful effort, things in general perhaps, one after another, would go on improving. My
opinion is, that you should take this enterprise vigorously in hand, and act worthily of the state, remembering that you love to hear men praise your ancestors and recount their exploits and speak of their trophies. Consider then, your forefathers erected these, not that you may view and admire them only, but that you may imitate also the virtues of the dedicators.\[11\]

\[11\] The speech of Demosthenes produced no effect. Athens abstained from interference; the Rhodians continued under the government of an oligarchy, and subjection to Caria.
THE ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

THE ARGUMENT

Megalopolis was an Arcadian city near the frontiers of Laconia. It was founded in the year B.C. 371, and, being designed for the metropolis of the whole Arcadian people, who then united themselves into one body, it was built on a scale of magnitude corresponding with that purpose, having a circumference of more than six miles, and received the name of the great city. Next to Athens, it is said to have been the most beautiful city in Greece. The population was obtained by migration from the existing Arcadian towns, no less than forty of which were required to contribute to it. Most of these were entirely deserted by their inhabitants, others were reduced to the condition of villages dependent on Megalopolis. A supreme council of ten thousand, taken from the whole Arcadian body, held their public deliberations in the capital. About half a century afterward, when it was besieged by Polysperchon, there were found to be fifteen thousand citizens capable of bearing arms in its defence.

The chief object of building this metropolis was to establish a permanent union among the Arcadians and preserve their national independence. Before that time, the Arcadians as a body had very little influence in the affairs of Peloponnesus, though they occupied a large portion of its territory. They had generally been in the alliance of Sparta, whose armies they strengthened by a brave and hardy race of soldiers. It was therefore the policy of Sparta to keep them feeble and divided among themselves. In the time of the Peloponnesian war Mantinea, then the principal city of Arcadia, formed a small confederacy among her neighbors, renounced her connection with the Lacedæmonians, and joined an offensive alliance with Athens and Argos. But this was soon put an end to. The Mantineans were compelled, by the success of the Lacedæmonian arms, to abandon their confederacy; and at a later period, B.C. 387, paid dearly for their disaffection to Sparta, by having their city dismantled and being dispersed into villages.

The defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra changed the aspect of affairs in Greece. The prestige of ancient victory was gone; and it was soon found that the vast alliance, of which Sparta had been the head, and which had enabled her for many years to give the law to Greece, would crumble almost entirely away. One of the first effects of this change in Peloponnesus was the rebuilding of Mantinea, which was soon followed by the establishment of Megalopolis. But the heaviest blow to the pride and power of Lacedæmon was the loss of her ancient province of Messenia, which for more than three
centuries had been the fairest portion of her domain. Whether the Arcadians could have maintained their independence against Sparta without foreign aid may perhaps be doubted; but this last revolution was wholly due to the arms of Thebes and the genius of Epaminondas.

That general, having assembled a large army in Boeotia, marched across the isthmus and was joined in Arcadia by his Peloponnesian allies. At the head of an overpowering force he invaded and ravaged Laconia. Troops of divers people—who not many years before had followed the Lacedaemonians in their wars, or would hardly have dared to face them in the field—Thebans, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Thessalians, Acarnanians, Argives, Arcadians, Eleans, marched now almost without opposition to the gates of Sparta; and nothing but the shadow of the Spartan name preserved that haughty capital from destruction. Epaminondas did not venture to make a general assault upon the town, but, after continuing his ravages for some time longer, proceeded to execute his well-laid scheme, which he rightly judged would reduce Sparta to the condition of a second or third rate power in Greece.

The Messenian population had long been, like the Laconian helots, in a state of vassalage to Sparta, but were ripe for insurrection at any favorable opportunity, as they had proved during the Athenian occupation of Pylos. The march of Epaminondas into Laconia was the signal for a universal rising of that people, who were now again to form a nation, and to build a capital city under the protection of the Theban general. But it was not only the existing inhabitants of the country, by whom this task, of reconstituting the nation, was to be accomplished; for which, after their long servitude, they might not have been so well fitted by themselves. Messenian exiles from every quarter, and especially those of Naupactus, who had been expelled after the Peloponnesian war, and migrated to Sicily and Africa, were invited to return to their ancient home, and assist in the glorious restoration. It has been mentioned as a remarkable example of the love of country that these exiles, during so long an absence, had jealously preserved their ancestral usages and the purity of their original language. They returned in great numbers and formed the nucleus of a Messenian government. The new city was founded on the site of the ancient Ithome, Epaminondas laying the first stone, and received the name of Messene. This was B.C. 369.

The humiliation of Sparta was now complete. She had no power to disturb the new settlement. She was hemmed in by a chain of enemies, who cut off her communication with Peloponnesus; by the Messenians on the west, the Arcadians and Argives on the north. Her war with Thebes continued for eight more years. The succor of Athens and her few remaining allies saved her from further disasters; and the death of her great enemy, Epaminondas, brought on a general peace, B.C. 361.

From the negotiations of this peace the Lacedaemonians kept aloof, refusing to acknowledge the independence of Messenia, which they regarded as a deep
disgrace to themselves. Their spirit, though depressed, was not extinguished; and they only waited for an opportunity of recovering their lost dominion. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, who had acquired honor in the late war by the tearless victory (in which he defeated the Arcadians and Argives without losing a single Spartan life), kept alive the ambitious hopes of his countrymen, and continually stimulated them to fresh exertions. He was a man of ardent character; to recover Messenia was the principal object of his desire; in which he had even been encouraged by a pamphlet of Isocrates, entitled Archidamus, and still extant. In the course of seven or eight years events occurred which favored the views of this prince. There had been disturbances in Arcadia. The Sacred war had broken out, in which the principal parties were Phocis and Thebes. An obstinate struggle was yet going on; neither party had gained any decisive advantage, and both were greatly weakened. The Phocian generals had carried the war into the enemy's country; some of the Boeotian towns had been taken; and the Thebans, distressed at home, and burdened with heavy expenses, seemed no longer in a condition to assist their Peloponnesian allies.

Under these circumstances, about the year 353, Archidamus thought the time had arrived to effect a counter-revolution, which should restore the influence of his country. His real aim was the destruction of Megalopolis and Messene. But to avow this purpose, or attempt to execute it without further pretext than the desire to satisfy Spartan ambition, might have drawn on him the hostility of those states which were unconnected with the Theban alliance. Accordingly, he conceived the idea of announcing a principle, which would secure certain advantages to the states hostile to Thebes, and induce them to concur in his own scheme of aggrandizement. He gave it out that ancient rights ought to be resumed; that Athens should have Oropus, the towns of Thebes, Platea, and Orchomenus should be restored; Elis and Phlius should have certain claims conceded to them. While he published these declarations, he kept in the background that portion of the scheme in which Sparta was interested, viz., the recovery of Messenia and the dissolution of the Arcadian union.

Notwithstanding all the care which Archidamus took to conceal his views, they could not fail to be apparent; and it was soon understood that the warlike preparations in Laconia were designed against Megalopolis. Two embassies were sent at the same time to Athens, one by the Spartans, and one by the Megalopolitans, each to solicit assistance in the approaching war. The Spartan ambassadors reminded the Athenians of their former alliance, and showed what advantage would accrue to them from the plan of Archidamus, by which Thebes, their old enemy, would be depressed. The Megalopolitan deputes urged the justice of their own cause, and the danger that would result from the revival of Spartan supremacy.

There were many speakers on both sides in the Athenian assembly. Demosthenes espoused the cause of the Megalopolitans, and delivered what
Auger pronounces to be one of the most subtle of his orations. He begins by condemning the warmth with which both parties had assailed their adversaries. It became them (he argues), without any feeling or prejudice for or against either of the contending states, to decide the question by reference to justice and the good of Athens. Justice required that no people should be oppressed by another. Their alliance with Sparta had been based on that principle, and they had saved her from ruin; but if Sparta commenced ambitious enterprises inconsistent with the spirit of their alliance, they were justified in breaking it off. It was the interest of Athens that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too powerful. The dissolution of Megalopolis would lead to the reconquest of Messenia, and that would destroy the balance of power in Peloponnesus. The advantage offered to Athens might be obtained in a more honorable manner, without sacrificing the Peloponnesians; and as to Thebes, it was better to weaken her by conferring an obligation upon her allies, and attaching them to Athens, than by allowing them to suffer injustice.

It appears to me, O Athenians, that both are in fault, they who have spoken for the Arcadians and they who have spoken for the Lacedaemonians. For as if they were deputies from either people, not citizens of Athens, to which both direct their embassies, they accuse and attack one another. This might be the duty of the envoys; but to speak independently on the question, and consider your interests dispassionately, was the part of men who presume to offer counsel here. I really think—setting aside the knowledge of their persons and their Attic tongue—many would take them for either Arcadians or Laconians.

I see how vexatious a thing it is to advise for the best. For when you are carried away by delusion, some taking one view and some another, if any man attempts to advise a middle course, and you are too impatient to listen, he will please neither party and fall into disgrace with both. However, if this be my case, I will rather myself be thought a babbler, than leave you to be misled by certain
people, contrary to my notion of Athenian interests. On other points I will speak, with your permission, afterward; but will begin with principles admitted by all, and explain what I consider your wisest course.

Well then: no man will deny it to be good for Athens, that both the Lacedæmonians and our Theban neighbors should be weak. But things are in this sort of position, if we may form a conjecture from the statements repeatedly made in our assembly—the Thebans will be weakened by the re-establishment of Orchomenus, Thebæ, and Platæa; the Lacedæmonians will grow powerful again, if they subdue Arcadia and take Megalopolis. We must mind, therefore, that we suffer not the one people to wax mighty and formidable, before the other has become weak; that the power of Lacedæmon do not increase (unremarked by us) in a greater degree than it is well for that of Thebes to be reduced. For we shall hardly say this, that we should like to have Lacedæmonians instead of Thebans for our rivals. It is not this we are anxious for, but that neither may have the means of injuring us: so shall we enjoy the best security.

But granting this ought to be so—it were scandalous forsooth, to take those men for allies, against whom we were arrayed at Mantinea, and then to assist them against the people, with whom we shared the peril of that day. I think so, too, but with one addition—"provided the others are willing to act justly." If all will choose to observe peace, we shall not help the Megalopolitans; for

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1 The Boeotian cities were at an early period connected by a federal union, each having an independent government. Thebes was at their head, and received a council of deputies from the league.

2 Viz., that neither Lacedæmonians nor Thebans should be powerful, etc.
there will be no necessity; and thus we shall be in no opposition to our fellows in arms: one people are, as they profess, our allies already, the other will become so now. And what more could we desire? But should they attempt injustice and determine on war—then—if this be the only question, whether we ought or ought not to abandon Megalopolis to the Lacedæmonians, although it would be unjust, I concede the point; let things take their course, don't oppose your former partners in danger: but if you all know that after taking that city they will march to attack Messene, let any of the speakers who are now so hard upon the Megalopolitans tell me what in that case he will advise us to do. None will declare. However, you all know, that you would be obliged to support them, whether these men recommend it or not, both by the oaths that we have sworn to the Messenians, and because it is expedient that their city should be preserved. Reflect therefore in your minds, whether it would be more noble and generous to begin your resistance to Lacedæmonian aggression with the defence of Megalopolis, or with that of Messene. You will now be considered as protectors of the Arcadians, and striving for the maintenance of that peace, for which you exposed yourselves in the battlefield: whereas then it will be manifest to the world that you desire Messene to stand not so much for the sake of justice as for fear of Lacedæmon. Our purposes and our actions should always be just; but we must also be careful that they are attended with advantage.

3 I.e., the Lacedæmonians; whom the orator does not expressly name, because they are uppermost in his mind.

4 This engagement was probably entered into at the general peace, which was concluded after the battle of Mantinea, and by which the Athenians, as well as other states of Greece, recognized the independence of Messenia.
There is an argument of this kind urged by my opponents, that we should attempt to recover Oropus, and, if we now make enemies of the men who would assist us to gain it, we shall have no allies. I also say, we should try to recover Oropus: but, that Lacedæmon will be our enemy, if we join alliance with the Arcadians who wish to be our friends, they of all men, I consider, are not at liberty to assert, who persuaded you to assist the Lacedæmonians in their hour of danger. The men who argue thus actually persuaded you—when all the Peloponnesians came to Athens and desired to march with you against the Lacedæmonians—to reject their overtures (on which account, as a last resource, they applied to Thebes), and to contribute money and risk your lives for the safety of Lacedæmon. You would hardly, I think, have been disposed to save them, had they told you, that after their deliverance, unless you suffered them to have their own

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5 Oropus was on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, on the coast opposite Eretria in Euboea. It anciently belonged to Athens, but frequently changed masters. In the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war it was betrayed to the Boeotians and Eretrians. It became independent at the close of the war; but a few years after, the Thebans took advantage of some internal disturbances to seize upon the city, which they removed nearly a mile from the coast, and annexed to the Boeotian confederacy. A new revolution some time after restored it to Athens. But in the year 366 B.C. Themison, ruler of Eretria, got possession of it by the aid of some exiles. The Athenians marched against him, but, the Thebans also making their appearance with an army, they were induced to leave Oropus under Theban protection, until the dispute could be amicably settled. The Thebans however kept it in their own hands; and so it remained until after the battle of Chaeronea, when Philip gave it up to the Athenians.

6 This statement accords not with the narrative of Xenophon, who makes no mention of such an application to Athens; though he states that the Athenians invited a congress to their own city, which was attended by many of the Peloponnesians. Diodorus however relates, that in the second year after the battle of Leuctra the Spartans sent a force into Arcadia and took possession of Orchomenus; that they were afterward defeated by Lycomedes of Mantinea, but the Arcadians, still fearing the power of Sparta, even after they had been joined by the Eleans and Argives, sent an embassy for assistance to Athens. The Athenians having refused their request, they applied to the Thebans, who sent an army under Epaminondas and Pelopidas.
way and commit injustice again, they should owe you no thanks for your protection. And, indeed, however repugnant it may be to the designs of the Spartans, that we should adopt the Arcadian alliance, surely their gratitude, for having been saved by us in a crisis of extreme peril, ought to outweigh their resentment for being checked in their aggression now. How then can they avoid assisting you to gain Oropus, or being thought the basest of mankind? By the gods I cannot see.

I wonder also to hear it argued that, if we espouse the Arcadian alliance and adopt these measures, our state will be chargeable with inconstancy and bad faith. It seems to me, O Athenians, the reverse. Why? Because no man, I apprehend, will question that in defending the Lacedæmonians, and the Thebans' before them, and lastly the Eubœans,¹ and making them afterward her allies, our republic has always had one and the same object. What is that? To protect the injured. If this be so, the inconstancy will not be ours, but theirs who refuse to adhere to justice; and it will appear, that while circumstances change, through people continually encroaching, Athens changes not.

It seems to me, the Lacedæmonians are acting the part of very crafty men. For now they say that the Eleans ought to recover a certain part of Triphilia, the Phliasians Tricaranum, certain other Arcadians their territory, and we Oropus: not from a desire to see us each possessing our own—far from this—it would be late for them to have become generous—but to make it appear as if they helped

¹ He alludes to the war that followed the seizure of the Cadmea, commenced by the invasion of Oeombrotus B.C. 378.
² When the Thebans attempted to get possession of the island.
all to recover their claims, so that, when they march themselves to attack Messene, all these people may readily join and assist them, or be deemed ungrateful, after having obtained their concurrence in the question of their own several claims, for not returning the obligation. My opinion is, first, that our state, even without sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedæmonians, may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are willing to be just, and that of others who hold that Theban usurpation ought not to be tolerated. Secondly, supposing it were evident to us, that, unless we permit the Lacedæmonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we cannot obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I deem it more advisable to let Oropus alone than to abandon Messene and Peloponnesus to the Lacedæmonians. I imagine the question between us and them would soon be about other matters. However—I will forbear to say what occurs to me—only I think, we should in many respects be endangered.

As to what the Megalopolitans have done against you (as they say) under the influence of Thebes, it is absurd to bring that now as a charge against them, and yet, when they proffer their friendship, with an intention of doing you good instead of harm, to mistrust and look for an excuse to reject them, without considering that, the more zealous they prove this people to have been in the Theban cause, the more will they themselves deserve your anger for having deprived Athens of such allies, when they applied to her before they applied to Thebes. It looks, indeed, as if they wished a second time to turn these people to another alliance.

I am sure—to judge from rational observation—and I think most Athenians will agree with me, that, if the
Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis, Messene will be in danger; and, if they take that also, I predict that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is much better and more honorable for us to receive the Theban confederacy as our friends, and resist Lacedæmonian ambition, than, out of reluctance to preserve the allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have afterward to preserve Thebes herself, and be in fear also for our own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our state should the Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis, and again become strong. For I see they have undertaken this war, not to defend themselves, but to recover their ancient power: what were their designs when they possessed that power, you, perhaps, know better than I, and, therefore, may have reason to be alarmed.

I would fain ask the men who tell us and say they detest the Thebans and the Lacedæmonians, whether they detest whom they detest respectively out of regard to you and your interests, or detest Thebans for the sake of Lacedæmonians, and Lacedæmonians for the sake of Thebans. If for their sakes, to neither as rational beings ought you to listen: if they say for your sake, wherefore do they exalt either people unduly? It is possible, surely possible, to humble Thebes without increasing the power of Lacedæmon. Ay; and it is much easier, too. I will endeavor to show you how.

It is well known that up to a certain point all men (however disinclined) are ashamed not to observe justice, and that they openly oppose the transgressors, especially where any people suffer damage: it will be found, moreover, that what mars everything, and originates every mischief, is the unwillingness to observe justice uni-
formly. Therefore, that no such obstacles may arise to the depression of Thebes, let us declare that Thebæ and Orchomenus and Platæa ought to be re-established, and let us co-operate with their people and call on others to assist us—just and honorable were this, not to regard with indifference the extermination of ancient cities—but let us not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to the aggressors, nor, on the pretence of Thebæ and Platæa, suffer existing and flourishing cities to be annihilated. If such be your declared policy, every one will desire that Thebes should no longer hold her neighbor’s dominion. If not—in the first place, we may expect to find these men oppose the other scheme, when they see that the establishment of those towns would be their own ruin: secondly, we shall have an interminable business of it ourselves; for where, indeed, can it end, if we continually allow existing cities to be destroyed, and require those which are in ruins to be restored?

It is urged by the most plausible speakers that the pillars* of their treaty with Thebes must be taken down, if they mean to be our steadfast allies. These people say that with them it is not pillars, but interest that binds friendship, and they consider those who assist them to be allies. Granting such to be their views, my notion is this. I say we should both require of them the destruction of the pillars, and of the Lacedæmonians the observance of peace; if either party refuse to comply, whichever it be, we should side immediately with those that will. Should

* It was the practice among Grecian states to inscribe their treaties on pillars of stone or brass, which, so long as the treaties remained in force, were religiously preserved, and exposed to view in temples and other public places. And it was frequently provided in the treaty itself, where the pillars recording it should be deposited.
the Megalopolitans, notwithstanding the maintenance of peace, adhere to the Theban alliance, it will surely be evident to all that they favor the ambition of the Thebans instead of justice. On the other hand, if the Megalopolitans in good faith espouse our alliance, and the Lacedaemonians do not choose to observe peace, they will surely prove to the world that they are striving not only for the restoration of Thespiae, but for an opportunity of conquering Peloponnesus while the Thebans are entangled in this war. One thing in certain men surprises me; that they dread the enemies of Lacedaemon becoming allies of Thebes, and yet see no danger in the Lacedaemonians conquering them; although we have actual experience furnished by the past that the Thebans always use these allies against Lacedaemon, whereas the Lacedaemonians, while they had the same people, used them against us.

I think, further, you ought to consider this. If you reject the Megalopolitans—should their city be destroyed and themselves dispersed,10 the Lacedaemonians at once become powerful: should they chance to escape (as unhoped-for events do happen), they will in justice be steadfast allies of the Thebans.11 If you accept them for allies,

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10 Into villages
11 The event proved the justice of this remark. Demosthenes could not prevail on the Athenians to follow his counsel. They joined the alliance of neither party. Archidamius commenced war against the Arcadians, who were assisted by Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. In the course of the same year, Philip having defeated Onomarchus in the great battle of Pegasus, the Thebans were enabled to send forces to the succor of their old allies. On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians were reinforced by some Phocian mercenaries; and the war was carried on for two years with various success, and at length terminated by a truce. The Arcadian confederacy, however, were alienated from Athens, and the bad effects of this were discovered some time after, when, alarmed at the designs of Sparta, they applied not to Athens, but to Philip, for assistance, and thus caused Macedonian influence to extend itself in Peloponnesus.

Oration —*18—Vol. I.
the immediate consequence to them will be deliverance by your means—but passing from their case—let us consider what may be looked for and apprehended with reference to Thebes and Lacedæmon. Well, then: if the Thebans be vanquished in war, as they ought to be, the Lacedæmonians will not be unduly great, having these Arcadians for their rivals living near them. If the Thebans chance to recover and come off safe they will, at all events, be the weaker for these men having become our allies and been preserved through us. So that in every point of view it is expedient that we should not abandon the Arcadians, and that they should not appear (in case they do escape) to have owed their deliverance to themselves, or to any other people but you.

I have spoken, O Athenians (heaven is my witness), not from private affection or malice toward either party, but what I consider advantageous for you: and I exhort you not to abandon the Megalopolitans, nor, indeed, any other of the weaker states to the stronger.
ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER

THE ARGUMENT

This is one of the orations which has generally been considered spurious, yet as it is published in Becker's and other editions of Demosthenes, it finds a place in this translation.

It purports to be an address to the Athenian people, rousing them to take arms against Alexander, king of Macedon, and shake off the ignominious yoke to which they were subjected, on account of certain injurious acts committed by that monarch in violation of his engagements. It appears that in the year B.C. 335, a treaty was entered into between Alexander and the Greek states, according to which a general peace was to be maintained by all the members of the Greek community, both with Macedonia and among themselves, every state enjoying political independence, and Alexander being the common protector of all. It is alleged that Alexander had broken the treaty by sundry acts of interference with Greek cities, more especially Messene, where the sons of Philades had by his influence regained possession of the government. Another complaint is, that some Athenian ships returning from the Euxine had been seized by Macedonian officers; and that Athens had been insulted by a Macedonian galley sailing into the Piraeus without leave.

The date of the speech may have been B.C. 334, after Alexander had crossed over into Asia.

IT IS right, O Athenians, that those who bid you observe your oaths and engagements should, if they do so from conviction, have your entire concurrence. For I think nothing so becomes a people who enjoy self-government, as to be regardful of equity and justice. The persons then, who are so vehement in urging this course, should not trouble you with declamations on the principle, while their conduct is directly opposite; but should submit to inquiry now, and either have you under their direction in such matters for the future, or retire and leave you to advisers who expound the rules of justice.
more truly—so that you may either tamely endure your wrongs, and let the aggressor have his way, or, preferring justice to every other consideration, you may be above all reproach, and consult your own interest without delay. From the very terms of the treaty, from the oaths by which the common peace was ratified, you may see at once who the transgressors are—in what important particulars, I will briefly explain.

Were you asked, men of Athens, what would most strongly excite your indignation, methinks you would all say, that if you were constrained—I mean, if the Pisistratids were alive at this day, and an attempt were made to reinstate them by force—you would snatch up your arms and encounter every peril rather than receive them; or, yielding, you must be slaves, like those that are purchased in the market—and far worse, inasmuch as no man will kill a servant wantonly, while the subjects of tyrants are notoriously destroyed without trial, and have outrages also committed upon their wives and children. Well then—Alexander has, contrary to his oath and the express conditions of the general peace, brought back to Messene the sons of Philiades, her tyrants. In so doing has he paid regard to justice—or has he not rather acted on his own arbitrary principles, in contempt of you and the common agreement? If then such violence done to

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1 *i.e.* by taking arms against Alexander, which is a measure of prudence as well as justice.

2 Philiades was tyrant of Messene in the lifetime of Philip. His sons, Neon and Thrasylochus, were expelled for oppressive conduct, but afterward restored by Alexander. They are mentioned in the Oration on the Crown among the list of traitors, by whom, as Demosthenes contends, Grecian liberty was sold to Macedonia. Polybius however maintains that the reproaches of Demosthenes were unjust, and that the connection of these men with Macedonia was for their country's benefit.
yourselves would rouse your utmost resentment, you ought not to remain passive, when it has been committed elsewhere in violation of the oaths taken to you: nor should certain persons here require us to observe the oaths, yet leave to men who have so flagrantly broken them a liberty like this. It cannot indeed be permitted, if you mean to do your duty: for it is further declared in the articles, that whoever acts as Alexander has done shall be deemed an enemy by all parties to the peace, himself and his country, and that all shall take arms against him. Therefore, if we perform our engagements, we shall treat the restorer of these exiles as an enemy.

Perhaps these friends of tyranny may say, that the sons of Philiades reigned in Messene before the treaty was made, and therefore Alexander restores them. But the argument is ridiculous—to expel tyrants from Lesbos, who reigned before the treaty, that is, the tyrants of Antissa and Eresus,1 on the plea that such form of government is oppressive; yet hold that it makes no difference in Messene, when the same nuisance is established!

Besides—the treaty prescribes in the very commencement, that the Greeks shall be free and independent. Would it not be the height of absurdity, that the clause making them free and independent should stand first in the treaty, yet that one who reduces them to servitude should not be deemed to have violated the compact? If then, O men of Athens, we mean to abide by our oaths and covenants, and do that act of justice which they require of you, as I just now mentioned, we must certainly take up arms and march against the offenders with such

1 Antissa and Eresus are cities in Lesbos.
allies as will join us. Or think ye that opportunity has such force sometimes as to carry out policy without right—and now, when opportunity and policy meet together for the same right, will ye wait for any other time, to assert your own freedom and the freedom of all Greece?

I come to another point under the articles. It is written, that if any persons subvert the constitutions, which existed in the several states when they swore the oaths of ratification, they shall be deemed enemies by all parties to the peace. Now consider, men of Athens: the Achaians, of Peloponnesus, were living under popular government. Among them, the Macedonian has overthrown the democracy of Pellene, expelling most of the citizens: their property he has given to their servants, and set up Chæron the wrestler as tyrant. We are parties to the treaty, which directs us to regard as enemies the authors of such proceedings. Then must we obey this article of the convention, and treat them as enemies—or will any of these hirelings be impudent enough to say no—these hirelings of the Macedonian, who have grown rich by betraying you? For assuredly they are not ignorant of these proceedings: but they have arrived at such a pitch of insolence, that, guarded by the armies of the tyrant, they exhort you to abide by the violated oaths, as if perjury were his prerogative; they compel you to abolish your own laws, releasing persons who have been condemned in courts of justice, and forcing you into numerous other unconstitutional acts. Naturally enough. It is impossible that men who have sold themselves to oppose their country's interests, should care for laws or oaths: they use their empty names to cajole people who assemble here for pastime, not for discussion, and who little think that the
ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER

On the moment will lead to strange disturbances hereafter. I repeat, as I declared at the outset—hearken to them who advise you to observe the treaty: unless they consider, in recommending observance of the oaths, that they forbid not the commission of injustice, or suppose that the establishment of despotism instead of democracy and the subversion of constitutional governments will be felt by none.

But what is yet more ridiculous—it is in the articles that all members of the congress, all guardians of the public safety, shall see that in the confederating states there be no bloodshed or banishment contrary to the laws established in each, no confiscations of property, nor divisions of land, nor abolishing of debts, nor liberating of slaves for revolutionary purposes. They however—so far from checking any of such proceedings—even help to bring them about. Are they not worthy of death, when they promote such plagues in our cities, plagues which (because they are so grievous) the whole body were commissioned to prevent?

I will show you a further breach of the articles. It is declared that it shall not be lawful for exiles to make an excursion with arms from any cities included in the peace, to attack any other city comprehended in the peace; if they do, the city from which they start shall be excluded from the treaty. Well! The Macedonian has carried his arms about with so little scruple that he has never yet laid

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4 Which met at Corinth, where the treaty was made.
5 From most of the Greek cities there were exiles, banished for political causes, and ready to take advantage of any revolution, to return to their country. If these were many in number, more especially if they were connected with a party at home, or supported by a foreign power, they would cause considerable uneasiness to the government.
them down, but still marches wherever he can with arms in hand, and more now than before, inasmuch as by an edict he has restored various exiles in different places, and the wrestling-master in Sicyon. If we are bound then to obey the terms of the convention, as these men declare, the states guilty of such conduct are under treaty with us no longer. I allow, if the truth is to be suppressed, we must not say they are the Macedonian: but when these traitorous ministers of Macedonia never cease urging you to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, let us hearken to their counsel, as it is just, and let us deliberate—putting them under your ban, as the oath requires—how to treat people whose tempers are so imperious and insolent, who are always either forming or executing some designs, and making a mockery of the peace. How can my opponents dispute the propriety of this? Do they require the clauses against our country to be in force, and not allow those which are for our protection? Does this appear to be justice? Will they confirm whatever is against us in the oaths and favorable to our adversaries—yet think proper continually to oppose any fair advantage that is secured to us against them?

To convince you still more clearly, that the Greeks will never charge you with infringing any part of the convention, but will even thank you for taking upon yourselves to expose the guilty parties—I will, as the articles are numerous, glance cursorily at a few points.

I believe one article is that all the contracting parties may navigate the sea, that none shall molest them, that none of them shall force a vessel into port; that whoever breaks this condition shall be deemed an enemy by all parties. Now, men of Athens, you know perfectly well
that this has been done by the Macedonians. They have come to be so lawless, that they carried into Tenedos all our vessels from the Euxine, and under pretences refused to release them, until you determined to man a hundred ships of war and launch them immediately, and appointed Menestheus to the command. Is it not absurd, when the wrongs done by others are of such number and magnitude that their friends here, instead of restraining them the transgressors, should advise us to observe a compact so little regarded? As if it were further declared that trespass should be allowed to one party, and not even resistance to the other! Were not their acts both lawless and senseless, when they violated their oaths to such an extent as had wellnigh justly deprived them of their maritime supremacy? And as it is, they have left you this plea beyond a question, when you choose to enforce it: for assuredly they have not the less broken the convention, because they left off committing trespasses: they are only fortunate in profiting by your indolence, that will not even take advantage of a right.

The most humiliating circumstance is this—that while all others, Greeks and barbarians, dread your enmity, these upstarts alone compel you to despise yourselves, either persuading or forcing you into measures, as if they were statesmen of Abdera or Maronea, not of Athens. At the same time they weaken your power and strengthen that of your adversaries; and yet (without perceiving it)

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* Alexander having by the treaty been declared generalissimo of the Greeks, a supremacy both on land and sea was accorded to Macedonia, although that kingdom did not actually possess so large a fleet as Athens. The Athenians furnished twenty galleys to the armament which conveyed Alexander across the Hellespont.

† These were cities in Thrace. Abdera was famous for the stupidity of the inhabitants, though it produced Democritus the philosopher.
acknowledge our republic to be irresistible; for they forbid her to maintain justice justly, as though she could easily vanquish her enemies if she chose to consult her own interests. And their notion is reasonable. For as long as we can be indisputably masters of the sea alone, we may find other defences for the land, in addition to our existing force, especially if by good fortune these men, who are now guarded by the tyrant’s armies, should be put down, some of them destroyed, some proved to be utterly worthless.

So grave an offence (in addition to what I have mentioned before) has the Macedonian committed in the affair of the ships. But the most outrageous and overbearing act of the Macedonians is what has lately occurred—their daring to sail into the Pireus contrary to our convention with them. And you must not regard it as a light matter, men of Athens, because there was only one ship; but as an experiment on our patience, that they may have liberty to do it with more, and a contempt of the agreement, as in the former instances. That they meant to creep along by degrees, and accustom us to tolerate such intrusions, is evident from this only—the commander who put into port (who ought with his galley to have been instantly destroyed by you) asked permission to build small boats in our harbors—does it not show that their contrivance was, instead of sailing into port, to be inside at once? And if we allow small boats, we shall shortly allow vessels of war; if a small number at first, very soon a large. It is impossible, you know, to make this excuse, that in Athens there is plenty of ship-timber (which is brought

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8 Because they recommend that the Athenians should observe the treaty, and the Macedonians be allowed to break it.
with trouble from a distance) and a scarcity in Macedonia (which supplies it at the cheapest rate to all purchasers). No. They looked both to build vessels here, and to man them in the same harbor, although it was expressed in the treaty that nothing of the kind should be allowed. And these liberties will increase more and more. With such contempt in every way do they treat our republic, through their instructors here, who suggest to them what course to pursue. And such is the estimate which, in common with these men, they have formed of Athens, that she is inexpressibly feeble and imbecile, that she has no forethought for the future, nor takes any account how the tyrant observes the treaty.

That treaty, O Athenians, I exhort you to obey, in such manner as I explained, insisting (under the privilege of my age) that you might at the same time exercise your rights without reproach, and use without danger the opportunities which impel you to your good. For there is a further addition to the articles—"if we will be parties to the common peace." This, "if we will," means also a different thing—"if we ever ought to cease shamefully following others, and forgetting those honors, of which we, beyond all people, have won so many from the earliest time." Therefore, with your permission, men of Athens, I will move, as the treaty commands, to make war upon the transgressors."

9 Almost all critics, ancient and modern, have pronounced this oration to be spurious. Libanius ascribes it to Hyperides, Ulpian to Hesegippus. History affords no confirmation of the fact that such a speech ever was made. And it would also be strange, if Demosthenes had purposed to make war against Alexander, that there should be no allusion to it in either of the speeches on the Crown.

Francis says: "Our editors have preserved to us the Orations upon Halonnessus and Alexander's treaty with Athens, even while they hold them written
by other authors, and unworthy of our orator’s character. The translator therefore hopes to be forgiven his not attempting to preserve what in themselves are confessedly spurious, and, if they were genuine, would be injurious to the reputation of his author. A painting would do little honor to the cabinet of the curious, merely because ignorance and false taste had once given it to the divine Raphael.”

The only commentator who maintains the genuineness of this oration is Leland. It is but fair to hear his reasons: “Critics seem willing to ascribe this oration to Hegesippus, or to Hyperides. It is observed that the style is diffuse, languid, and disgraced by some affected phrases; and that the whole composition by no means breathes that spirit of boldness and freedom which appears in the orations of Demosthenes. But these differences may possibly be accounted for, without ascribing it to another author. Dejection and vexation, a consciousness of the fallen condition of his country, despair and terror at the view of the Macedonian power, might have naturally produced an alteration in the style and manner of the orator’s address. A great epic genius, when in its decline, is said by Longinus to fall naturally into the fabulous. In like manner, a great popular speaker, when hopeless and desponding, checked and controlled by his fears, may find leisure to coin words, and naturally recur to affected expressions, when the torrent of his native eloquence is stopped. Nor is the oration now before us entirely destitute of force and spirit. It appears strong and vehement, but embarrassed. The fire of Demosthenes sometimes breaks forth through all obstacles, but is instantly allayed and suppressed, as if by fear and caution. The author, as Ulpian expresses it, speaks freely, and not freely; he encourages the citizens to war, and yet scruples to move for war in form; as if his mind was distracted between fear and confidence. In a word, I regard this Oration on the Treaty with Alexander as the real work of Demosthenes, but of Demosthenes dejected and terrified, willing to speak consistently with himself, yet not daring to speak all that he feels. It may be compared to the performance of an eminent painter, necessarily executed at a time when his hands or eyes labored under some disorder, in which we find the traces of his genius and abilities obscured by many marks of his present infirmity.”
ISOCRATES

ISOCRATES, one of the ten most famous Attic orators, was born in 486 B.C. His father was an Athenian citizen possessed of considerable wealth. He himself tells us that his father was careful to provide for him the best education which Athens could afford. He took no active part in the public life of Athens, being disqualified by the weakness of his voice for the contests of the popular assembly or of the law courts. For very many years he conducted a school of oratory in his native city, and wrote speeches to be spoken by others either in legal proceedings or at political meetings. The speech which we here reproduce is interesting not only in itself, but because it was imitated by Milton in his "Areopagitica." Isocrates died, at the age of ninety-eight, a few days after the Battle of Cheronaea, but there is probably no truth in the tradition that he killed himself from grief at "that dishonest victory fatal to liberty."

THE AREOPAGIC ORATION WRITTEN TO PERSUADE ATHENS TO RETURN TO THE CONSTITUTION OF SOLON

I THINK many of you wonder whatever is the idea that has led me to come forward to speak concerning the public safety, as if the city were in peril, or its affairs in a dangerous condition, instead of being the owner of more than two hundred triremes, at peace in Attica and the neighborhood, mistress of the sea, and still in a position to command the support of many allies who will be ready to assist us in time of need, and of a still larger number who pay contributions and obey our orders; while we possess all these advantages, one would say that we might reasonably be of good courage as being out of reach of danger, and that it is rather our
enemies who ought to be afraid and to take counsel for their own safety.

I know well that you, adopting this line of argument, despise my appearance here, and expect to maintain your authority over the whole of Greece with your present resources; whereas this is just the reason why I am afraid. For I see that those cities which think they are most prosperous adopt the worst counsels, and that those which feel the greatest confidence fall into the greatest dangers. The reason of this is, that no good or evil falls to the lot of man by itself alone, but, while wealth and power are attended and followed by want of sense, accompanied by license, want and a humble position bring with them prudence and moderation, so that it is hard to decide which of these two lots one would prefer to leave as a legacy to his children. For we should find that, starting from that which seems to be worse, things generally improve; while, as the result of that which is apparently better, they usually deteriorate. . . .

A city's soul is nothing else but its political principle, which has as great influence as understanding in a man's body. For this it is that counsels concerning everything, and, while preserving prosperity, avoids misfortune. It is this that laws, orators, and individuals must naturally resemble, and fare according to the principles they hold. We, however, pay no heed to its destruction, and give no thought how we shall recover it; but, sitting in our shops, we abuse the present constitution, and assert that we were never worse governed under a democracy, while in our acts and thoughts we show ourselves more attached to it than to that bequeathed to us by our ancestors. It is on behalf of the latter that I propose to speak, and have
given notice in writing of my intention to do so. For I
see that this will be the only means of averting future
dangers and getting rid of our present evils, if, namely,
we be willing to restore that democracy which Solon, the
devoted friend of the people, introduced, and which Cleis-
thenes, who drove out the despots and restored the rights
of the people, re-established in its original form. We
should not find a constitution more favorable to the peo-
ple or more beneficial to the state than that. The strong-
est proof whereof is that those who lived under it, having
wrought many noble deeds and gained universal renown,
received the headship from the Hellenes of their own free
will, while those who are enamored of the present consti-
tution, hated by all, after having undergone dreadful suffer-
ings, have only just escaped being involved in the direst
calamities. Surely it cannot be right to acquiesce in or be
content with this constitution, which has been the cause
of so many evils in former times, and is now every year
growing worse. Ought we not rather to fear that if our
misfortunes increase to such an extent, we may at last
run aground upon more grievous troubles than those that
then befell us?

In order that you may make your choice and decide
between the two Constitutions, not merely after having
heard a general statement, but from accurate knowledge,
it is your duty to give your earnest attention to what I
say, while I endeavor, as briefly as possible, to give you
an account of both.

Those who conducted the affairs of the city at that time
[the time of Solon] established a constitution that was not
merely in name most mild and impartial, while in reality
it did not show itself such to those who lived under it—a
constitution that did not train its citizens in such a manner that they considered license democracy, lawlessness liberty, insolence of speech equality, and the power of acting in this manner happiness, but which, by hating and punishing men of such character, made all the citizens better and more modest. And what chiefly assisted them in managing the state aright was this: of the two recognized principles of equality, the one assigning the same to all, the other their due to individuals, they were not ignorant which was the more useful, but rejected as unjust that which considered that good and bad had equal claims, and preferred that which honored and punished each man according to his deserts; and governed the state on these principles, not appointing magistrates from the general body of citizens by lot, but selecting the best and most capable to fill each office. For they hoped that the rest of the citizens would behave themselves like those at the head of affairs. In the next place, they thought that this method of appointing to office was more to the advantage of the people than appointment by lot, since, in appointing by lot, chance would have the decision, and supporters of oligarchy would often obtain offices, while, in selecting the most respectable citizens, the people would be able to choose those who were most favorably disposed toward the established constitution. And the reason why the majority were contented with this arrangement, and why public offices were not objects of contention, was that they had learned to work and economize, and not to neglect their own property while entertaining designs on that of others, nor again to supply their own needs at the expense of the public funds, but rather to assist the treasury, if necessary, out of their own means, and not to have a
more accurate knowledge of the income arising from public offices than of that produced by their own property. So severely did they keep their hands off the state revenues, that during those times it was harder to find men willing to undertake office than it is now to find men who have no desire for office at all; for they regarded the care of public affairs not as a lucrative business, but as a public charge, and they did not from the very day they took office consider whether the former holders of office had left anything to be gained, but rather whether they had neglected anything that pressed for a settlement. In short, they had made up their minds that the people, like an absolute master, ought to control the public offices, punish offenders and settle disputed points, and that those who were able to enjoy ease and possessed sufficient means should attend to public affairs like servants, and, if they acted justly, should be praised and rest contented with this recognition of their services, while, if they managed affairs badly, they should meet with no mercy, but should be visited with the severest penalties. And how would it be possible to find a democracy more just or more secure than one which set the most influential citizens at the head of public affairs, and at the same time invested the people with sovereign control over these same officials?

Such was the arrangement of the constitution adopted by them; and it is easy to understand from this that in their every-day life they always acted with uprightness and in accordance with the laws. For, when men have adopted right principles in regard to affairs in general, single departments of the same must of necessity resemble the whole. . . .
In a similar manner they behaved in their relations toward one another. For they were not only in accord upon public matters, but, in regard to their private life, they showed such consideration for one another as befits men of sense and members of one and the same fatherland. Far from the poorer citizens envying the richer, they were as anxious about the wealthy families as about their own, considering their prosperity to be a source of advantage to themselves; while those who were possessed of means, not only did not look down upon those who were in a humbler position, but, considering it disgraceful to themselves that the citizens should be in want, relieved their needs, handing over plots of land to some at a moderate rental, sending others out on business, and advancing capital to others for other occupations. For they were not afraid either of losing all, or with great difficulty recovering only a part of what had been lent, but felt as safe about the money put out as if it had been stored away at home. For they saw that those who decided claims for debt did not err on the side of leniency, but obeyed the laws, not making use of the suits of others in order to make it easy for them to act dishonestly themselves, but feeling more anger against those who cheated even than those who were themselves wronged, thinking that the poor sustained more injury than the rich by the act of those who did not faithfully observe their agreements; for the latter, if they were to give up lending money, would only lose a small portion of their income, while the former, if they should be without any to assist them, would be reduced to the greatest distress. Since all shared this opinion, no one either concealed the amount of his property or shrank from lending money, but all were more
pleased to see borrowers than payers. For two things happened to them, which sensible men would desire: they both benefited their fellow-citizens and laid out their money to advantage. In short, as the result of their honorable social intercourse, their property was secured to those to whom it by right belonged, and the enjoyment of it was open to all the citizens who stood in need of it.

Perhaps some one may object to my statements that, while I praise the condition of affairs at that time, I give no explanation of the causes which made their relations among themselves so satisfactory and their administration of the city so successful; wherefore, although I think that I have already said something on this point, I will endeavor to give a fuller and clearer account of them. While, in their early training they had many instructors, they were not allowed, when they reached manhood, to do as they pleased, but it was just in the prime of life that they were more carefully looked after than during their boyhood. For our ancestors paid such attention to virtue that they charged the council of Areopagus with the maintenance of decorum, to the membership of which body only those were admitted who were of noble birth, and who had shown distinguished virtue and sobriety in their lives, so that naturally it stood before all the other assemblies of Hellas.

From what takes place at the present day, we may draw inferences concerning the institutions of that period; for even now, when everything connected with the election and scrutiny of magistrates is neglected, we should find that men, whose conduct in other respects is insufferable, when once they have become members of the Areopa-
gus, shrink from following their natural bent, and conform to the regulations of the council rather than indulge their own vicious propensities—so great was the dread with which it inspired the vicious, and such the memorial of virtue and sobriety that it left behind in that place.

Such was the authority to which, as I have said, they intrusted the maintenance of good order, which considered that those were in error who imagined that a community, in which the laws were framed with the greatest exactness, produced the best men; for, if this were so, there would be nothing to prevent all the Hellenes being on the same level, so far as the facility of adopting one another’s written laws is concerned. They, on the contrary, knew that virtue is not promoted by the laws, but by the habits of daily life, and that most people turn out men of like character to those in whose midst they have severally been brought up. For, where there are a number of laws drawn up with great exactitude, it is a proof that the city is badly administered; for the inhabitants are compelled to frame laws in great numbers as a barrier against offences. Those, however, who are rightly governed should not cover the walls of the porticoes with copies of the laws, but preserve justice in their hearts; for it is not by decrees, but by manners, that cities are well governed, and, while those who have been badly brought up will venture to transgress laws drawn up even with the greatest exactitude, those who have been well educated will be ready to abide by laws framed in the simplest terms. With these ideas they did not first consider how they should punish the disorderly, but by what means they should induce them to refrain from committing any offence deserving of punishment; for
they considered that this was their mission, but that
eagerness to inflict punishment was a matter of malevo-
lence!

They were careful of the welfare of all the citizens,
but especially the younger. For they saw that, at their
time of life, they were most disposed to turbulence and
full of desires, and that their minds needed to be es-
pecially trained and exercised in honorable pursuits and
work accompanied by enjoyment, since those who have
been brought up in a liberal spirit, and are accustomed
to entertain high thoughts, would abide by these alone.
It was impossible to direct all toward the same pursuits,
as their positions in life were not the same; but they order
them to follow occupations in conformity with their means.
Those who were less well off than others they employed in
agriculture and mercantile pursuits, knowing that want of
means arises from idleness, and vicious habits from want
of means; thus, by removing the source of these evils,
they thought to keep them from the other offences that
follow in its train... .

Further, under the influence of that excellently ordered
administration, the citizens were so trained to virtue that
they did not injure one another, but fought and overcame
all those who invaded their territory. With us it is quite
the contrary, for we let no day pass without doing harm to
one another, and have so neglected military matters that we
cannot even bring ourselves to attend drill unless we receive
pay. And—what is most important of all—at that time
none of the citizens was in want of the necessaries of life,
nor by asking alms from passers-by brought disgrace upon
the city, whereas now the needy outnumber the well-to-do;
so that we ought freely to excuse them, if they take no
thought for the interests of the state, but only consider whence they are to procure their daily bread.

It is because I think that, if we follow the example of our forefathers, we shall both be rid of these evils and become the saviors, not only of the city, but of all the Hellenes, that I have come forward to speak and have said what I have; do you, then, weighing all this carefully, vote for whatever seems to you likely to prove most conducive to the welfare of the state.