

**The Problem
of the Sentience of Plants
in Earliest Buddhism**

Lambert Schmithausen

Studia Philologica Buddhica
Monograph Series
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Foreword

In a previous study of the problem of Buddhism and Nature (Schmithausen 1985), I already touched upon the question of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism. But later I found that this problem requires being dealt with more carefully. Between 1987 and 1990, I have reconsidered the matter several times on the occasion of giving lectures on it in various places (Munich, Tübingen, Vienna, Oslo, La Trobe, Canberra, Bangkok, Kyoto and Tokyo), and I take the opportunity to express my sincere thanks to all those who raised objections, made suggestions or drew my attention to useful materials. Yet, I am fully aware of the fact that not only an earlier and much shorter paper (which is being published as Basham Lecture 1989 by the A.N.U., Canberra) but even the present study is still merely a preliminary attempt, far from being exhaustive. For, firstly a comprehensive treatment of the issue should perhaps, with due caution, also investigate similes, poetical imagery, narrative literature and artistic representations, etc., referring to plants; but this would by far have exceeded the limits of the present study. Secondly, even within these limits I may still have overlooked or misinterpreted important evidence, especially in the field of Vinaya in which I am anything but a specialist. In spite of this, I have decided to present the essay as it stands, hoping that at any rate it provides a relatively sound basis for discussion, and one reason for my decision has been that the problem dealt with is of more than merely academic relevance.

In order to spare the less specialized reader all too many details, I have deliberately relegated documentation and discussion of specific matters to the notes.

My deepest thanks are due to M. Maithri Murthi and A. Wezler for valuable information and advice, to S. A. Srinivasan, who, in addition, also corrected my faulty English with untiring patience, to Dr. Akira Yuyama for kindly accepting this study for publication, and to B. Quessel for his constant help in preparing the final printout.

Contents

I.	The Problem and its Context	1
II.	General Prohibition to Injure Seeds and Plants	5
II.A	Text and Literal Meaning	5
II.B	Closer Examination of Terminology and Context as to their Significance for the Question of Plant Sentience	17
III.	Further Vinaya Material, Concerning	
III.A	Plants	23
III.B	Fruits, Raw Grain and Garlic	36
III.C	Earth, Water and Fire	46
IV.	Further Suttapiṭaka Material	58
V.	Evaluation of the Evidence	66
VI.	Later Developments	79
VII.	Later Arguments against Plant Sentience	83
VIII.	Postface	105
	Abbreviations	107
	Modern Authors	112
	Index	116

1.1 In connection with the requirement of a non-anthropocentric ethics encompassing all creatures, or nature as a whole,¹ the Buddhist precept — valid for monks and nuns as well as lay followers — to abstain from killing any living, animate being (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*),² occasionally³ supplanted or supplemented by the injunction not to injure them (*ahiṃsā*), is no doubt very important. Even though in everyday practice the ideal is rarely fulfilled and although the present ecological situation has created additional complications,⁴ the precept does seem to have had some protective influence in at least some traditional Buddhist societies.⁵

1.2 However, being a living or animate being (e.g. *p(r)āṇa/p(r)āṇin*, *satt(v)a*, *jīva*,⁶ *bhūta*)⁷ is, in India, at any rate in theoretical contexts, by and large equated

¹ I take the liberty to intuitively *p r e s u p p o s e* this requirement, without entering into the philosophical problems involved. But I find it necessary to disclose the motive that inspired me to embark on this subject. One reason is that I cannot of course exclude that my motive may after all have influenced the results of my historical investigation, even though I have tried my best to interpret the sources as objectively as possible. The second reason is my hope that this article may not only be a scholarly contribution to the understanding of the history of Buddhist thought and practice but also arouse or strengthen sensitivity and sympathy towards our fellow beings, including plants, which is badly needed.

² E.g. DN III 235; 269; AN V 274ff; Vin I 83 (*sāmaṇera*); Härtel 1956, p. 54 (*upāsaka*); the earlier, fuller formulation (*pāṇātipātāṃ pahāyapāṇātipātāpaṭivirato... sabba-pāṇabhūta-hitānukampī* ...) e.g. DN I 4; I 63 (ascetic or monk); AN II 66; III 203; 211f (layman). That in the term '*p(r)āṇātipātā*' '*p(r)āṇa*' has, as elsewhere in Buddhist (and Jaina) texts, the same meaning as '*p(r)āṇin*' is confirmed, e.g., by Sūy I.8.4 *ativāyā pāṇiṇaṃ*. Cp. also the explicit statement at Sv 69,21f: *pāṇo ti c' ettha vohārato satto, paramatthato jīvitindriyaṃ*. The meaning of '*atipātā*' is corroborated by verbal expressions in the context of the five or ten precepts, e.g. Sn 394 *pāṇaṃ na hane*; DN I 123 *pāṇaṃ pi haneyya*; cp. also Härtel, loc. cit. (*prāṇī ... jīvitān na vyaparopayitavya(h)*).

³ E.g. AN III 213: *na hiṃse pāṇabhūtāni* (versified version of the first precept for lay followers); MN I 42 (*avihiṃsaka* prefixed to the series *pāṇātipātā paṭivirato*, etc.).

⁴ Cp. *Add.* I.A and I.B.

⁵ For a detailed and well-balanced description of the situation in the traditional society of Sri Lanka, see Maithri Murthi 1986.

⁶ For '*jīva*' in the sense of "living being" in Jaina sources see § 6.2.2 + n. 106 and § 20.1 + ns. 342 and 344. For an example in a Hindu text, see Rāmacandra ad Manu X.84.

⁷ In order to distinguish the different terms in translation, I consistently render '*p(r)āṇa*' by "animate being", '*jīva*' by "living being", '*satt(v)a*' by "[sentient] being" or "sentient being", and '*bhūta*' (even if used as a quasi-synonym of '*p(r)āṇa*', etc.) simply by "being". — As far as I can see, '*jīva*', which in some contexts means "soul", is largely avoided in the Early Buddhist texts in the sense of "living being" except when the view of "people" or non-Buddhists is referred to, as in the

with being sentient⁸ ((sa)cetana,⁹ sacittaka,¹⁰ cittamaṃta,¹¹ etc.), with being, to a certain extent at least, capable of perception and sensation, and in doctrinally developed Buddhism it is, apart from men and mythological beings, only animals that are regarded as sentient beings.¹² Except for certain developments in the Far East¹³ and perhaps Tantric Buddhism (which requires special investigation), plants are not admitted in Buddhism as sentient beings, let alone crystals, stones, earth, water or other inorganic things. These are hence not, at least not directly, protected by the precept to abstain from killing/injuring animate beings.

passages discussed in §§ 5.4-5.5, 8, 9.1-9.2, 10.1 and 15.2, or at MN I 407 (see n. 342). In most of these contexts, 'jīva' refers to plants or the earth, regarded as living by people or non-Buddhists, or is at least interpreted so by post-canonical commentaries (e.g. Ps III 120, 11f [ad MN I 407]). On the other hand, the use of 'bhūta' as more or less equivalent to 'pāṇa' and/or 'satta' does not seem to be problematic from the Buddhist point of view: cp., e.g., Sn 394 (see ns. 348 and 361), or Vin II 110 = AN II 73 (see n. 341; note that in contrast to MN I 407 'sabbe jīvā' is missing here). — For 'p(ṛ)āṇa'/'p(ṛ)āṇin' often denoting only animals, or men and animals (i.e. breathing beings) see §§ 6.2.2 and 7.3 + n. 116; cp. also n. 107). — For a special use of 'bhūta' see § 4.2.1.

⁸ Explicitly so: TBV 651,36 (*caitanyaḥlakṣaṇaṃ jīvaṭvaṃ*); cp. also VĀvBh 1753 (*jīvaṇa* as one of the reasons for sentience; cp. Kir 39,21).

⁹ E.g. NBi III.59; TBV 651,35; 652,1; Wezler 1986, 431; 436; 440; 442ff. For a more restricted use of 'cetana' in the sense of "possessing intellect" see Thieme, KISchr, 377 (and Wezler 1986, 466 n. 4). Cp. the similar ambiguity of the term 'saṃjñin' in Jainism (Wezler 1987b, 125f [fn. 63]). — Actually, at least five positions may be distinguished:

- a) lifeless and insentient;
- b) living but entirely insentient (rare in Indian thought; but cp. § 30);
- c) living and sentient in the sense of being capable of rudimentary forms of perception or sensation, e.g. possessing only the sense of touch (as, e.g., element beings and plants in Jainism);
- d) also possessing higher faculties of perception (as, e.g., lower animals in Jainism);
- e) also possessing intellect.

In theoretical contexts, '(sa)cetana' etc. are usually employed from c onward, but sometimes they seem to imply even e (cp. Thieme, loc. cit.; TJv 354b5ff [see n. 493]) or at least d (as, e.g., at MBh 12.177.10-18).

¹⁰ E.g. MHṛd IX.140ff.

¹¹ E.g. Āyār, p. 41,5; Dasav 4 (p. 5,15ff).

¹² Cp. TRD 159,21f for a statement that sentience of animals is undisputed among the Indian systems of thought.

¹³ See BN § 30.1-3.

2 The question is, however, whether this restriction of living, sentient beings, in the sphere of nature, to animals only was the position of Buddhism from the outset. Actually, from what we know about other Indian religions prior to or contemporary with earliest Buddhism, such a position would seem to have been anything but a matter of course.

2.1 As for Vedic religion, there is sufficient evidence that not only animals but also plants as well as seeds and even water and earth were, more or less naively, believed to be living and even sentient,¹⁴ and fire and wind had at least a personalized, divine aspect (viz. the gods Agni on the one hand, and Vāyu and Vāta on the other; cp. also the idea of water and fire as principles of life in late Vedic thought). Even in post-Vedic Hinduism, at least the view that plants and seeds capable of germination are sentient beings is still well documented,¹⁵ although some circles and authors disagree.¹⁶ Occasionally, even stones, water or the earth are admitted as living or sentient.¹⁷

2.2 In Jainism the view that plants and seeds are sentient beings is clearly expressed and undisputed,¹⁸ and according to the view prevailing in Jaina sources even earth, water, wind and fire are alive,¹⁹ i.e., consist of minute living beings

¹⁴ E.g., ŚB 11.6.1 (trees, plants, water); 3.3.1.7 and 6.4.3.1ff (earth); 3.8.5.9f (plants, trees, water); 1.2.2.11 (grain); 11.1.2.1f (grain, plant (*soma*)). [Some of these passages I owe to C. Nenninger.] Cp. Schmidt 1968, 644-648. Cp. also ChU VI.11.1-2 (tree as living (*jīva*)).

¹⁵ E.g., MBh 12.177.10-18; Yogavāsiṣṭha 7.62.7 (tree perceiving its leaves, flowers and fruits with the "eye" of self-perception [personal communication from Dr. W. Slaje]). For seeds: Gautama-Dharmasūtra 3.22: *varjayed bīja-vadham*; MBh 3.199.20 (*dhānyabījāni ... jīvāni*). Cp. Wezler 1986, 432ff and 455ff (plants); 439 and 458f (seeds); id. 1987a, 335ff; id. 1987b, 111ff; Halbfass 1980, 291f and 301; 1991, 317f and 327; Slaje 1989, 151ff.

¹⁶ Cp. Halbfass 1980, 291f and 1991, 317f (Praśastapāda and others); Wezler 1986, 460f and 476 n. 74 (pointing out a certain tendency, at least in certain circles, to abandon the idea of the sentience of plants in the course of time); Wezler 1987b, 129f; Slaje 1989, 152 (Abhinavagupta).

¹⁷ Slaje 1989, 152 (Śaiva author Bhāskara, 18th century: water and earth) and 157 (Yogavāsiṣṭha: stones but not atoms and elements); cp. also Rāmānuja on BhG 14.18 (rebirth as a stone or clod). Yogavāsiṣṭha 7.62.8 (ocean perceiving all aquatic animals [personal communication from Dr. W. Slaje]).

¹⁸ E.g., Āyār, pp. 4,26-31 (cp. Bhatt 1989, 136 and 138) and 41,4; Dasav 4 (p. 6,3-8); 8.2 (... *taṇa rukkhā sabhiyagā ... jīva tti ii vuttaṃ mahesiṇā*); 10.3; Sūy I.11.7-8; cp. Schubring 1935, 133ff.

¹⁹ Thus, e.g., Āyār, p. 41,3-5; Dasav 4 (p. 5,12-6,3); 8.2 (*puḍhavi daga agaṇi māruya ... jīva tti ii vuttaṃ mahesiṇā*); Sūy I.11.7-8; I.7.7a (*puḍhavi vi jīvā āu vi jīvā*). — According to B. Bhatt (1989, 135ff), in the earliest source (viz. Āyār I.1) the view that the elements themselves are living, animate beings is still absent; cp. also § 17.2 and n. 338, but also n. 316. At a later point, the sentience of the elements themselves is expressly rejected in the Nīlakēci (371), for which see n. 472.

possessing, like plants, the sense of touch.²⁰

3.1 Against this background, it appears natural to raise the question whether in earliest Buddhism, too, at least plants and seeds (but perhaps even earth and water) may still have been viewed as living, sentient beings, in spite of the later rejection of such a view. To be sure, in this case it would be necessary to explain how the later view arose. But in the opposite case, too, one would have to search for a reason why the Buddhists, or the Buddha, abandoned the view, current at their time, that plants are sentient beings.

3.2 It would be easy to determine the status of plants and seeds in earliest Buddhism if the canonical Buddhist texts, and especially such layers as can be regarded as comparatively old, did contain fully explicit statements either rejecting or asserting the sentience of plants. But there are none, as far as I can see. Hence, the matter has to be decided by induction. In view of the later doctrinal position of Buddhism that plants (etc.) are not sentient beings, the *onus probandi* is, of course, incumbent on him who maintains that in earliest Buddhism the situation was different. Therefore, I shall, in the following chapters (II-IV), discuss passages which may indicate that in earliest Buddhism plants were still regarded as living, sentient beings, or at least not yet definitely considered to be lifeless and insentient.

²⁰ Cp., e.g., Schubring 1935, 133; Frauwallner 1956a, 266f.

II. General Prohibition to Injure Seeds and Plants

II.A. Text and Literal Meaning

4.1 Let me start with a passage in the *P ā ṭ i m o k k h a s u t t a*, viz. *Pācittiya* 11:

"If [a monk or nun] is ruthless with regard to plants, this is an offence to be atoned" (*bhūtagāmapātavyatāya pācittiyam*).²¹

4.2 Before asking what this rule suggests as regards the status of plants, a few philological problems have to be discussed.

4.2.1 Firstly, in '*bhūta-gāma*' (Skt. *bhūta-grāma*),²² '*gāma*' originally means "multitude", "mass"²³ and is little more than a suffix of collectivity. For '*bhūta*', the special meaning "(sprouted or fully developed green, fresh, uncult and uneradicated, 'living'²⁴)²⁵ p l a n t " ²⁶ is suggested by the fact that in Buddhist texts the term

²¹ Vin IV 34; cp. V 38 (*bhūtagāmaṃ pātento* ...). Cp. T vol. 24, 905c12 斫鬼村 (Upāliparipucchā; cp. Stache-Rosen 1984, 63; for probable affiliation of the text to the Abhayagiri school, ib. 12ff and 28ff); Mī.: T vol. 22, 41c17 and 23f: 殺生草木, but 42a6 and 85b24: 伐鬼村; Mā.: 339a17 = 552b6 = 560a6: 壞種子破鬼村; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 20 (= Pachow/Mishra 1956, p. 22): *bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātāpanake* (see n. 39) *pācattikam*; Dh.: 641c13f = 1026b8: 壞鬼神村; Sa.: Finot 1913, 504, and v. Simson 1986, 49 and 88: *bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātānāt pātayantikā* (v. Simson, p. 88, has *patanāt*, which is probably a scribal error or misprint); T vol. 23, 75a22 [Vin.Sa.] (= 482c29 [Prāt.Bhī.Sa.]): 斫拔 (/伐) 鬼村種子村 (v.l. om. 村); 474b7 [Prāt.Sa.]: 殺衆草木; same text in a Tunhuang fragment of Prāt.Bhī.Sa., probably also by Kumārajīva (Yuyama 1979, p. 4, § 1.12.C.2): see upper col., line 28, of the facs. in Ōtani Gakuō 9.2/1928, 27ff; vol. 24 (T 1464, a Vinayavibhaṅga of the Sa. transl. by Chu Fo-nien in 383 A.D. acc. to Yuyama 1979, p. 7, § 1.15.C.1), 879c5: 自斫樹教他斫; Prāt.Sa._{Th} (Yabuki 1930, fol. 40, upper col., line 35; Inoguchi 1981, 196 [No. 185]): 滅生草花葉斷斫樹木 (Tunhuang ms., dated 405 A.D., of yet another early version of Prāt.Sa.: cp. Yuyama 1979, p. 2, § 1.11.C.2); Mū.: GBM(FacEd) I, p. 31, fol. 51, line 4, and II, p. 77, fol. 142, line 1: *bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātana-pātāpanāt pāyattikā*; Vin.Mū., je 260a3: *sa bon gyi tshogs dan/ 'byuñ po'i gnas 'jig gam/ 'jig tu 'dzud* (D,R: 'jud) *na ltuñ byed do//*; T vol. 23, 776b5f (= vol. 24, 504a18): 自壞種子有憐村及令他壞; cp. MVy no. 8431: *bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-vināśanam* (cp. Vin.Mū., je 265a7: *sa bon dan skye ba 'jig pa...*; T vol. 23, 775c10: 壞生種); Kā.: T vol. 24, 662b10: 壞種子鬼神村. — Cp. also T vol. 24 (T 1463: *Vinayamātrkā, see § 12.4 + n. 218), 823b28f (felling of a *cāitya* tree is *pācittiya*).

²² Cp. Sugimoto 1978, 623ff.

²³ Cp. Sp 761: *rāsi*; Paṭis-a 690: *samūha*; cp. also T vol. 23, 474b7 (see n. 21) 衆 and Vin.Mū., ce 249b5f (Vin.Mū.) *tshogs* (but je 260a3 and 7 has *gnas*). Cp. also the analogous cpd. '*bija-g(r)āma*' (see §§ 4.3-4.4 and 5.2 + ns. 63 and 64).

²⁴ Cp. Sp 898 (*j ī v a -rukka*). Cp. also n. 179.

²⁵ Cp. n. 30.

'*bhūtag(r)āma*' usually and, so it seems, originally²⁷ occurs in complementary opposition to '*bīja-g(r)āma*' ("multitude of seeds")²⁸ and by the fact that in canonical Jaina sources we find, in similar contexts, the pair "seeds and green [plants]" (*bīya/hariya*, = *bīja/harita*).²⁹ It is furthermore confirmed by the commentaries³⁰ as well as by some Chinese translations,³¹ and also by some parallel passages,³² and

²⁶ Cp. also CPD s.v. *amūlaka-bhūtagāma* ("plants without root"). — Buddhaghosa's etymological remark (Sp 761: *jāyanti vadḍhanti jātā vadḍhitā cā ti attho*) may not be far off the mark; cp. M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefaßtes Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* (Heidelberg 1956-1980), mentioning, s.v. *bhavati*, Armenian *boys* "Schößling, Pflanze"; cp. also German "Gewächs", mainly used for plants. — The phraseology of Pāc. 11 does not necessarily presuppose a habitual use of '*bhūta*' in the special sense of "plants". It is possible if not probable that '*bhūta(g(r)āma)*' acquired this special meaning only in this special context, viz. by being used, for want of a specific word for plants in general, in complementary opposition to *bīja(g(r)āma)* (see §§ 4.3-4.4), i. e. in the sense of "what has arisen or grown up [from seeds]", just as '*harita*' in the Jaina sources (see n. 29).

²⁷ See § 4.4.

²⁸ See §§ 4.3 and 4.4.

²⁹ Cp., e.g., Āyār, p. 41,4; 37,24; Āyār II.1.1.1; Dasav 4.11 (p. 13,11+13); 5.1.3; 5.1.26; 5.1.29; 5.1.57; 8.11b; 10.3. Sūy I.7.8-9 even has *hariyāṇi b h ū y ā ṇ i* (JĀS ed. §§ 388: *haritāṇi bhūtāṇi*) besides *bīya*.

³⁰ E.g., Sp 761 (*paṭiṭṭhita-harita-tiṇarukkhādī*); Sv I 77 (*alla-tiṇarukkhādika*); Spk III 134 (*paṇṇa-sampannaṃ nīlabhāvato paṭṭhāya*); Mp IV 51 (*nikkhanta-mūla-paṇṇaṃ haritakam*); T vol. 23, 75a26f. — Irrespective of the interpretation of the components, all versions of the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga agree in that the c o m p o u n d '*bhūtag(r)āma*' as a whole is taken to refer to p l a n t s : cp. T vol. 22, 339a19 (Vin.Mā.); 641c14f (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 75a23 (Vin.Sa.); 776b19f (Vin.Mū.; Vin.Mū, je 260a8: *gnas* [i.e. (*bhūta*-)grāma] *śes bya ba ni siṅ ljon pa la sogs pa'o*), and implicitly also Vin.Mī. (cp. 42a2f and 7ff). — In the Pāli Suttavibhaṅga (Vin IV 34f), *bhūtagāma* is explained as the "five kinds of seeds (or rather: parts of plants capable of propagation)" (*pañca bīja-jātāṇi*), viz. *mūla-bīja*, etc., which at first glance looks like (and in Vin.Mā. [T vol. 22, 339a18f], Vin.Sa. [vol. 23, 75a28f] and Vin.Mū. [776b7ff; Vin.Mū, je 260a3f] in fact is) an explanation of *bīja-gāma*, not *bhūta-gāma* (cp. also the casuistics at Vin IV 35: *bīje bījasaṅgāṇi*, etc.). But actually these *pañca bījjātāṇi* are further explained as five groups of p l a n t s , distinguished according to their way of propagation (cp. also T vol. 22, 42a2f; 641c14ff; vol. 23, 75a29ff). Accordingly, Buddhaghosa (Sp 761) explains *bīja-jāta* as "a r i s e n f r o m s e e d s" or "seeds that have developed [into plants]" (cp. also his explanation of *bīja* in the casuistics as *bījato sambhūto bhūtagāmo* (Sp 762)). At DN I 5 the same five *bījjātāṇi* are used to explain the c o m p o u n d '*bījagāma-bhūtagāma*', and Buddhaghosa (Sv I 81,22-26) may be right in indicating that in this passage both the propagating parts and the plants arising from them are meant, which would be possible if the expressions *mūla-bīja*, etc., are understood both as *karmadhārayas* ("root as a propagating part") and as *bahuvrīhis* ("propagated from roots").

³¹ See n. 21: T vol. 22, 41c17 (Vin.Mī.): 生草木 "fresh/growing/living herbs and trees"; T vol.

even by a Jaina commentary³³ specifying, in a quite different context, *bhūta* as trees.³⁴

4.2.2 As for '*pātavyatā*', its derivation is doubtful,³⁵ and my rendering "ruthlessness" is not much more than a guess. In order to cover also other contexts, like *kāmesu pātavyatā*,³⁶ one could start from a meaning like "lack of restraint". In the case of sensual pleasures (*kāma*), lack of restraint would mean indulging in them. In the present case, however, as also when referring to animate beings (*pāṇesu pātavyatā*),³⁷ lack of restraint would rather be ruthless, destructive behaviour; and

23, 474b7 (Prāt.Sa._K): 衆草木 "all herbs and trees"; T vol. 24 (no. 1464), 879c5: 樹 "trees"; Prāt.Sa._{Th} (see n. 21): "fresh/growing/living grass, flowers and leaves" (生草花葉) and "trees" (樹木).

³² MN I 230: *ye kec' ime bījagāma-bhūtagāmā vuddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjanti, sabbe te paṭhavīṃ nissāya paṭhavīṃ patiṭṭhāya*; SN V 46; AN IV 100: *deve ... avassante ye kec' ime bījagāma-bhūtagāmā* (B*: cp. CPD II 791) *osadhi-tiṇa-vanappatayo, te sabbe ussussanti visussanti na bhavanti* (where *osadhi-tiṇa-vanappatayo* is best taken as a gloss on *bhūtagāma*); similarly SHT IV, 100f; Śikṣ 206,10: *trṇauśadhi-bhūta-gaṇa* (with *gaṇa* for *grāma*, and "grass and herbs" concretizing *bhūta* which otherwise would probably have been misunderstood by the audience); Sad-dharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (ed. Vaidya) 84,20f (where *bīja-grāma* is accompanied by *ośadhi-grāma* instead of *bhūta-grāma*).

³³ ĀyārViv 47,34 and 47,37 (verse quotation: *bhūtās tu taravaḥ smṛtāḥ*) (ad Āyār_s p. 5,6).

³⁴ In Hindu sources, '*bhūtagrāma*' is mostly used in the less specific sense of "multitude, or totality, of creatures" (cp. PW), including both stationary and mobile beings, thus at any rate plants as well as animals and even men; see, e.g., Yāska, Nirukta 14.4; MBh 12.249.6-7; 14.42.19; Śaṅkara on Brahmasūtra 3.1.20 and on BhG 8.19; cp. Sugimoto 1978, 625. A likewise comprehensive use is found at Samavāya 14.1 (JĀS ed., p. 351); cp. Avassaya 4.15-16; Utt 5.8; Sūy II.6.21. Occasionally, '*bhūtagrāma*' means "assemblage of the elements" (e.g., Śaṅkara on Brahmasūtra 3.3.35 (as one of two alternatives)); Sarvatobhadra ad BhG 17.6.

³⁵ O. von Hinüber, Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick, Wien 1986, § 255. Buddhaghosa takes '*pātavya*' as a gerundivum in the sense of either *pivitaḥ*, i.e. (*pari*)*bhuñjitaḥ/sevitaḥ* (Sp 761; Ps II 371; Mp II 369,6; Sv III 869,31) or *ghaṃsitaḥ* (Sp 288). But in this case the expression '*pātavyatam ā-pad*' would have to be taken to mean "to regard as something to be enjoyed, or to be crushed" (cp. Sp 288 [ad Vin III 42, see below]: *mā pāṇe pātabbe ghaṃsitaḥ eva m a ṇ i*), which is highly improbable since *ā-pad* rather means "to fall into, undergo, commit" (CPD) or, with the acc. of an abstract of x, "to become x". Hence, the explanation of '*pātavyatā*' as the abstract of a gerundivum is hardly acceptable.

³⁶ Vin V 123; MN I 305 (*eke ... evaṃdiṭṭhino: "natthi kāmesu doso" ti; te kāmesu pātavyatam āpajjanti*); 307; AN I 266; 295; cp. also DN III 89 (*asmiṃ asaddhamme, i.e. methunē*).

³⁷ Vin III 42, reporting the case of a monk who had been a potter and had built for himself a hut out of clay which he had then baked with fire — an action displaying lack of compassion (*anudayā*,

as the commentaries³⁸ as well as the Sanskrit versions³⁹ and Chinese translations⁴⁰ suggest, this would, in the case of plants, consist in cutting, felling, splitting, etc.

4.3 This is also confirmed by a parallel in the Suttapīṭaka,⁴¹ where a monk's morality (*sīla*) is said to include abstention from killing or injuring seeds and plants (*bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambha*).⁴² By some later sources⁴³ and by a contem-

anukampā) and of the attitude of not injuring (*avihesā*). The monk is reproached lest future generations might become ruthless towards animate beings (*mā pacchimā janatā pāṇesu pātavyataṃ āpajjī*). In this passage, the meaning of *pātavyatā* appears to be opposed to "compassion" and come close to "injuring" (*vihesā ≈ hiṃsā*).

³⁸ Sp 761: *chedanabhedanādīni*; cp. Vin IV 35: *chindati ... bhindati ... pacati*. Cp. also Vin.Mū., je 260a8f (T vol. 23, 776b20f), explaining *pātana* ('jig pa, "to destroy") as "to pull out, throw down(?; Ch. break), cut, pierce, and chop" ('byin pa dan/ sñol [P,D,R; read sñil?]) *ba dan/ gcod pa dan/ 'big pa dan/ 'tshog* (R: 'chag) pa).

³⁹ Prāt.Sa. (see n. 21) °*pātanā* "felling" or, in a more general sense "destroying" (cp. MW s.v. *pat*, caus.); Prāt.Mū. (see n. 21) °*pātana-pātāpanā*. Prāt.Mā.Lok. (see ib.) °*pātāpanake* is rather obscure. Cp. also *pātenī* in Vin V 38.

⁴⁰ See n. 21, e.g. T vol. 22, 41c17: 斫 "chopping"; 42a6: 伐 "felling"; 552b6: 破 "breaking"; 641c13: 壞 "destroying"; vol. 23, 75a22: 拔 "pulling out"; 474b7: 殺 "killing"; Prāt.Sa._{Th} (see n. 21) 滅 "destroying" and 斷斫 "cutting and chopping".

⁴¹ DN I 5; 64; MN I 180; 268; III 34; AN II 209; V 205; cp. SN V 470.

⁴² This (minor) precept is missing in the parallel versions known to me (Saṅghabh II, 233,6ff = Vin.Mū., ce 249a2ff; T vol. 1, 83c27ff, 89a5ff, 264c4ff and 273a8ff [Dīrghāgama]; 657b6ff and 733b20ff [Madhyamāgama]), some of which have abstention from drinking wine instead. K. Meisig (Das Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra, Wiesbaden 1987, 58) thinks that the latter is the original item and that the first part of the series of precepts to which it belongs is modelled on the latter part of the ten *śikṣāpadas* for lay followers practising *uposatha*. But it is more probable that special *uposatha* rules for lay followers were moulded after the monastic precepts and that in this connection the precept not to injure plants and seeds was ignored because it was impracticable for lay people (see § 26.1). On the other hand, if the precept not to drink alcohol was originally missing in the monastic precepts, it is understandable that it was introduced later on, since monks too should not of course drink wine, as is clear from Pāc. 51. At any rate, it is quite difficult to see why the Theravāda tradition should have removed the prohibition to drink alcohol, which has hardly lost its importance in later times, and should have replaced it by the archaic rule to abstain from injuring seeds and plants. If, however, we start from the assumption that the latter is the original one, it is quite easy to understand that when it had become more or less obsolete it came to be replaced by the more topical precept not to drink alcohol, which was missed (cp. also SN V 467 where this precept has been incorporated but still remains outside the traditional series (ib. 468-474)). This way of looking at things is, by the way, supported also by another fact: In some Sūtras (DN I 5ff; 64ff) the series of precepts under discussion is followed by another one, which Meisig (op. cit., 59) supposes to be a kind of "commentarial extension". Now, this latter series, too, starts with a paragraph criticizing ascetics injuring seeds and

porary German Buddhist,⁴⁴ this rule is understood as a prohibition of agriculture.⁴⁵ Though '*samārambha*' can have the meaning "undertaking" or "effort", Buddhaghosa is certainly right in preferring the meaning "injuring".⁴⁶ At Sn 311, '*samārambha*' unambiguously means the slaughtering of cattle (in a Vedic ritual). In this sense, '*samārabhati*' as well as '*ārabhati*'⁴⁷ continue Vedic '*ālabhate*' "to seize", used as a euphemism for "to kill [a victim in sacrificial ritual]".⁴⁸ It seems, however, that in Pāli '*ā-rabh*' is also used for profane killing for the sake of food, without reference to Vedic ritual,⁴⁹ and this is perhaps also true of '*ā-labh/ā-rabh*' in the Aśoka inscriptions.⁵⁰ In the canonical Jaina sources, '*sam-ā-rabh*' is preferred and

plants, and, what is more, this paragraph is found also in some versions where the precept not to injure seeds and plants is missing in the preceding series (T vol. 1, 84a9-11 and 89a17-19; Saṅghabh II 234,3-7).

⁴³ Vin. Mū., cc 249b5 and 7: *rtsom pa* "undertaking". Cp. also T vol. 1, 84a10 and 89a18, prohibiting monks from sowing or planting trees which may become the abode (**grāma*) of demons or spirits (**bhūta*) (see § 5.3). — One reason for a reinterpretation may have been that at any rate in the case of '*sam-ārambha*' the meaning "killing", "injuring" had fallen into oblivion in at least some currents of continental Buddhism (cp., e.g., the fact that there is no example for such a use in AKBh-I).

⁴⁴ Hellmuth Hecker, *Die Ethik des Buddha* (Hamburg 1976), 218.

⁴⁵ In earliest Buddhism, there was hardly any need for such a prohibition since the monks and nuns had no fixed residence outside the rainy season. Some Vinaya texts expressly allow sowing/-planting, e.g. T vol. 23, 601a4ff (sowing trees for the sake of shade or flowers). Cp. also T vol. 22, 496b15ff and 875a12-14. The matter would seem to require special investigation.

⁴⁶ As 146,5f: *bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambhā paṭivirato hoti ti ettha chedanabhañjanādīnāṃ* (read °*dinā*) *vikopanaṃ* (see § 7.1); Sv I 77 (*samārambhā chedana-bhedana-pacanādi-bhāvena vikopanaṃ paṭivirato hoti*). Cp. also Mp II 267 (ad AN I 169): *pīḷa* - (read °*lā*?) - *saṃkhāto samārambho*.

⁴⁷ CPD s.v. ²*ārabhati*. Cp. also SN I 76 and AN II 43: (*mahāyaññā*) *mahārambhā ... ajeḷakā ca gāvo ca vividhā yattha haññare* (cp. H. Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, Berlin 1954, p. 34; BoBh 82,24f: ... *mahārambheṣu, yeṣu bahavaṃ prāñinaḥ ... jīvītād vyaparopyante*).

⁴⁸ H. Oertel, *Kasus und Adjektivum des Götternamens bei den ai. Verben des Darbringens vap + nis und labh + ā*, in: *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung* 62/1935, 145ff; id., *Euphemismen in der vedischen Prosa und euphemistische Varianten in den Mantras* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1942), 7ff. [I have to thank Prof. M. Hara for kindly reminding me of Oertel's articles.] Cp. also T. Gotō, *rabh-, labh- + ā* in der vedischen Literatur, in: IBK XXIV.2 (1976), (29)f.

⁴⁹ MN I 368: *samaṇaṃ Gotamaṃ uddissa paṇaṃ ārabhanti, taṃ so ... māṃsaṃ paribhuñjati*.

⁵⁰ RE I.B: *no kichi jīve/jīvaṃ ālabhitu pajohitaviye* (probably referring to Vedic ritual); I.F: *pule*

used for a n y kind of killing or injuring.⁵¹ Therefore, this Suttapiṭaka passage refers to the same issue as Pācittiya 11, viz. (abstention from) destroying or injuring plants.

4.4 The only essential difference is that the Suttapiṭaka passage speaks of s e e d s a n d plants, whereas the Pāṭimokkha rule mentions only plants. But this discrepancy may not be original. For, among the Prātimokṣasūtra versions of other Buddhist schools, preserved in Sanskrit and Chinese, a majority speaks not of plants only but, just as the Suttapiṭaka passage, of s e e d s a n d plants.⁵² In view of the Suttapiṭaka parallel,⁵³ this reading is likely to be the original one; the more so since the versions containing it stem from schools unrelated to each other,⁵⁴ whereas the versions omitting the seeds belong, as far as I can see, to closely related schools.⁵⁵ It would, moreover, seem to be more difficult to conceive of a reason for

māhānasasi ... Piyadasine lājine ... pānasatasahasāni ālabhiyisu sūpaṭhāye (for food, without, at least without explicit, reference to ritual [but see H.-P. Schmidt, *Ahiṃsā und Wiedergeburt* (forthcoming), ch. II]; cp. also I.G.); (not specified:) III.D *pānānaṃ anālaṃbhe*; IV.A *pānālaṃbhe*; etc.

⁵¹ E.g., Āyārṣ 15,17 (*no pāṇiṇaṃ pāṇe samārabhejjāsi*) beside Jā I 168 (*na pāṇo pāṇiṇaṃ h a ṇ ṇ e*); Dasav 6.29 (*puḍhaviḥkāya-samārambha* [comm.: *ālekhanādī*]; similarly afterwards: *āukāya*-, *vaṇassai*- and *tasakāya-samārambha*) beside 6.27, etc. (*puḍhaviḥkāyaṃ* etc. ... *hiṃsanti*); Sūy I.1.2.28 (*puttaṃ ... samārabbha āhārejjā*; text acc. to Bollé 1977); Utt 12.41: *chajjivakāe asaṃārabhantā* (cp. Alsdorf 1961, 604: "... nicht verletzend"); Viyāh VII 1^{3b} (Deleu 1970, 131): *tasapāṇa-samārambha*; ĀyārViv 23,7 and 10 (ad ĀyārN 102): *samārabhate* = *vyāpādayati*. Cp. also Jain 1983, 70f (*samārambha* = injuring or killing the six classes of living beings). — Even when *samārambha* or *sam-ā-rabh* is used in the sense of "seizing" or "undertaking/committing [an act]", the meaning is in most cases, explicitly or implicitly, that of "seizing a w e a p o n" or "committing v i o l e n c e" (cp., e.g., Āyārṣ pp. 2,10f; 2,31f; 8,1ff; 33,28ff). In all these cases, the connotation of injury and violence seems to have become an integral part of the meaning. Nor do I see any reason why '(sam)-ā-rabh' should, in Jainism, still have a euphemistic function. Hence Schubring's rendering "to have to do with ..." (e.g., Schubring, KISchr 217 [transl. of Dasav 6.29, etc.]) is hardly felicitous.

⁵² See n. 21 (Mā., Mā.Lok., part of Sa. [cp. also n. 55], Mū., Kā.).

⁵³ Cp. also the above-mentioned fact (see § 4.2.1 + n. 29) that in Jaina sources, too, the combination of green plants (*harita*) with s e e d s (*bīya*, *bīja*) is not infrequently met with, and in similar contexts at that.

⁵⁴ There is no special relationship or close connection between the Mahāsāṅghikas, Mūlasarvāstivādins and Kāśyāpiyas. As for the Sarvāstivādins, their Vinaya- and Sūtrapiṭaka has, to be sure, many features in common with that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, but this may be due to close contact from a certain time onward, and not to original relationship. According to E. Frauwallner (1956b, 24ff), the Sarvāstivādins originally rather belong to the same group as the Theravādins. Actually, the reading of the older versions of their Prātimokṣasūtra goes with that group (see n. 55).

⁵⁵ Viz. Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, and Sarvāstivādins (see n. 21). As for the

a later addition of the seeds than to account for their omission.⁵⁶

5 There can thus be hardly any doubt that what the Pāṭimokkhasutta declares to be a *pācittiya* offence, just like killing animals (Pāc. 61), and that abstention from which the Suttapiṭaka parallel lists as an element of a monk's morality, is in fact injuring or destroying plants, and originally probably even seeds. The question is, however, whether destroying plants and seeds was prohibited because in earliest Buddhism plants and seeds were still considered as living, maybe even sentient beings, just as in Vedic religion and Jainism, or whether there is some other explanation.

5.1 One might, e.g., suppose that the seeds and plants monks and nuns should not injure are *crops* and *cultivated plants*, and that destroying or injuring them is interdicted, of course, because of the damage it would inflict upon the *owner*.⁵⁷ To be sure, such an argument is in fact occasionally met with in *specific contexts*.⁵⁸ But there is no indication of such a restriction in the case of the *general prohibition* under discussion, nor has the latter, as far as I can see, ever been understood in such a sense in the exegetic tradition. On the contrary, the exegetic tradition defines "(seeds and) plants" by what appears to be meant as a comprehensive classification (viz. *mūla-bīja*, etc.: see n. 30), and occasionally even

close relationship of these schools, see Frauwallner 1956b, 8ff. As regards the Sarvāstivādins, it is, to be sure, only in some versions that the reference to seeds is missing: viz. in Kumārajīva's translation of Prāt.Sa. (somewhat after 404 A.D.: Yuyama 1979, p. 1, § 1.11.C.1) and in the Tunhuang version of his (?) translation of Prāt.Bhī.Sa. (see n. 21), in a Vinayavibhaṅga of this school transl. in 383 (see *ibid.*), and in a Tun-huang ms., dated 405 A.D., of yet another version of Prāt.Sa. (see *ibid.*). In view of their early date these documents may well represent an earlier tradition of the school; for the Skt. fragments are probably somewhat later, and the "official" Chinese Vin.Sa. has been revised (Yuyama 1979, p. 8, § 1.15-19.C.2; cp. also L. Schmithausen in: H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, 2. Teil, Göttingen 1987, 315ff).

⁵⁶ One might be tempted to see a connection between the omission of the seeds and the explanation of the precept in terms of plants as a habitation of deities or spirits (see below § 5.3), since '*bīja-grāma*' does not allow of a similar reinterpretation. But the problem is that this secondary explanation of the *sūtra* is missing in at least one of the Vinayas of those schools which omit the seeds from the precept (see § 5.3 + n. 75). Hence, this omission may, in the community from which these schools derive (see n. 55), have preceded the attempts to reinterpret it, and may have been motivated by the fact that non-injuring of *seeds* was found too cumbersome and no longer required by society. But I admit that the matter requires further investigation.

⁵⁷ Cp. Wezler 1986 for this kind of motivation in grammatical literature (436ff: as an alternative to that of the sentience of plants; cp. also 451ff) and Dharmaśāstra (446ff).

⁵⁸ E.g., Vin IV 47 (monks destroying the barley field of a brahmin: cp. n. 190); III 51 (*vanappatti*: felling a tree owned and used by somebody is "theft", hence a *pārājika* offence); T vol. 22, 495c9ff (Vin.Mā.: prohibition to fell flower and fruit trees; the introductory story stresses the interests of the *donor*). Cp. also §§ 11.3 and 14.4.

explicitly states that a n y plant is included,⁵⁹ provided it is green⁶⁰ and fresh. And when discussing details, some commentaries expressly mention plants that are not utilized or owned by man, like moss.⁶¹ Hence, it is not, or at least not primarily, human interest that constituted the original motive for the prohibition to injure (seeds and) plants; the more so as it would be unintelligible that such a motivation, though perfectly fitting in with the later view — noticeable, as a tendency at least, already in the Suttavibhaṅga (see § 5.5) — that plants are not sentient beings, is nevertheless entirely ignored in our sources.

5.2 Similar objections would arise against the suggestion that the original motive behind the prohibition to destroy or injure plants might have been an e c o l o g i c a l one, viz. the fact that plants are the b a s i s of a n i m a l life. Actually, there are a few commentarial passages indicating such a motive in that they explain '*bhūta-grāma*' as "village" (*grāma*), i.e. abode, of beings (*bhūta*), i.e. insects and other animals.⁶² This is doubtless a secondary interpretation of the expression '*bhūta-g(r)āma*' — secondary not only as a kind of *interpretatio faciliior* but also because it is either asymmetric to the complementary '*bīja-g(r)āma*'⁶³ or would render the latter redundant.⁶⁴ Moreover, in this case, too, it would be difficult to see

⁵⁹ Spk III 303 (ad SN V 470): *y a s s a k a s s a c i nīla-tiṇa-rukkḥādikassa bhūta-gāmassa*.

⁶⁰ This explains why m u s h r o o m s and m o u l d or mildew are border-line cases, and injuring them only a minor offence or none at all (cp. Sp 765; T vol. 22, 340a24 [Vin.Mā.]; vol. 23, 777a8ff [= Vin.Mū., je 265a6f] and 975a4ff). Cp. also the fact that at Āyārṣ p. 41,4 mould (*panaga*) appears as a category of its own between the elements and plants-and-seeds.

⁶¹ E.g., T vol. 23, 777a5ff (= Vin.Mū., je 264b5ff: *śa bal* = "moss") and 974c29ff (Vin.Mū.-Bhī.).

⁶² T vol. 23, 75a23ff (Vin.Sa.); 776b18ff (Vin.Mū.; here as well as at 776b5 [= Pāc. 11], '*bhūtagrāma*' is rendered by 有情村, i.e. "village/abode of s e n t i e n t beings"); Vin.Mū., je 260a7f: '*byuñ po* (= *bhūta*) *ḥes bya ba ni grog sbur* (= *pipīlikā*) *dag dañ/ phye ma leb* (= *pataṅga*) *dag dañ/ sbrañ bu dag dañ/ til dañ phub ma za ba dag dañ/ sbrul* (= *sarpa* or *ahi*) *dag dañ/ sdig pa* (= *vr̥ścika*) *dag dañ/ sbrañ bu trem[a] bu ka* (= *trembuka/tryambuka* "wasp": see Ch. Lindtner in: A Green Leaf, Papers in Honour of Jes P. Asmussen [Acta Iranica 28, Leiden 1988], 440) *dag dañ/ tre la ta ga* (R: *tre'i la ta ka*, = *trailāṭaka*) *dag go//*; T vol. 24, 577a16-18. Cp. Rosen 1959, 138. Cp. also Sn-a I 154,23f (see n. 204) and VinMañj 201, justifying the Pāṭimokkha rule that destroying or injuring plants is an offence by (among other things) the need to protect the beings dwelling in them (*kasmā bhūtagāmassa pātabyatāya pācitti icchitā ti? ... tannissitasattānurakkhanato*), though in the context of the Pāli Vinaya (see § 5.3) the [sentient] beings (*satta*) have perhaps to be understood, primarily at least, as deities, not animals.

⁶³ In fact, as regards the meaning of '*grāma*' in t h i s cpd., the Chinese sources referred to in n. 62 do not seem to deviate in their explanation from Buddhaghosa's explanation of '°gāma' in '*bhūta-gāma*' (see § 4.2.1 + n. 23). T vol 24, 577a6 expressly states that '*grāma*' in '*bījagrāma*' means "assemblage, multitude" (衆).

⁶⁴ Viz. if '*bījagrāma*' were interpreted in the sense of "[plants as] the abode of seeds". But I have

why this motive, in harmony as it is with the later view that plants themselves are not sentient beings, should have come to be ignored by the majority of the sources. Besides, (in case the cpd. 'bija-grāma' is not also re-interpreted) this motivation too would not easily account for the prohibition to injure seeds, nor would it explain the fact that tradition unanimously limits the prohibition to green, unwithered plants⁶⁵ (for animals inhabit "dead" plants as well)⁶⁶ or that the prohibition includes the tearing off of single leaves, buds or fruits.⁶⁷ Hence, it seems that this motivation is most likely a later attempt to justify the prohibition to injure plants on the basis of the dogmatic denial of their sentience.

5.3 For all rules of the Pāṭimokkha, the canonical commentary (Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga) relates an introductory story of the event (or events) supposed to have led to the enunciation of the respective rule. In the case of the prohibition to injure plants, the Pāli version of this story⁶⁸ discloses two different motives, which strictly speaking belong to two different stories.⁶⁹ One of them relates that a monk by felling a tree hit the arm of the child of the deity inhabiting that tree. According to other versions,⁷⁰ the effect was merely that the deity loses her abode. According to this explanation, destroying or injuring plants would have been prohibited because they are the abode (*g(r)āma*) of spirits (*bhūta*) or deities.⁷¹ Hence, this motivation, like the preceding one (§ 5.2), appears to be linked to a secondary interpretation of '*bhūtag(r)āma*'. And similar to the preceding one it can, to be sure, explain a prohibition to fell or injure trees, at best plants in general (if, as a few passages suggest,⁷² even grass and herbs are inhabited by deities); but it can hardly

not found this in any text.

⁶⁵ Cp. Sp 761, etc. (see n. 30), and the casuistics in T vol. 22, 42a7ff (Vin.Mī.), 340a12-14 (Vin.Mā.), 642a2ff (Vin.Dh.; a12f: cutting a withered plant is no offence), vol. 23, 75c7ff (Vin.Sa.), and 776b25ff = Vin.Mū., je 260b3ff.

⁶⁶ Cp. Aśoka, PE V.E, prohibiting to burn *chaff* containing living beings (*ruse saṃjīve no jhāpayitaviye*).

⁶⁷ T vol. 22, 340a8ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 23, 776 c 24-27 (Vin.Mū.). Cp. also n. 76.

⁶⁸ Vin IV 34.

⁶⁹ As is actually the case in Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c22ff) and especially in Vin.Mū. (T vol. 23, 775c11-776a7 and 776a24-b3 (Vin.Mū., je 258a6-259a3 and 259b2-260a2). Cp. also the story discussed in § 10.1.

⁷⁰ T vol. 23, 75a2ff, esp. 6ff (Vin.Sa.); 775c11ff, esp. 18ff (Vin.Mū.); Vin.Mū., je 258a6ff, esp. b2f. Cp. also n. 149.

⁷¹ Cp. T vol. 23, 75a23f (Vin.Sa.); vol. 24, 577a16 (Mū.). Cp. also the rendering of '*bhūtagrāma*' in Pāc. 11 by 鬼(神)村 (see n. 21).

⁷² MN I 306; SN IV 302. Cp. also T vol. 24, 879b29ff, esp. c4 ("in all herbs (*oṣadhi),

explain the prohibition to injure *seeds*. Hence, it too appears to be secondary. Actually, it is, in the Pāli version, easily recognizable as intercalated,⁷³ and it is in fact missing in both the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas⁷⁴ and at least one of the Śthavira branch.⁷⁵

5.4 The original motivation as recorded in the Suttavibhaṅga must hence be contained in the other story, which relates that when monks felled a tree⁷⁶ this action was disapproved by people as an act of injuring because they regard *trees* as living beings (*jīvasaṇṇīno ... rukkhasmiṃ*)⁷⁷, more precisely as living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*)⁷⁸. In fact, this motivation is, more or less

grasses and trees, there are spirits/deities").

⁷³ Cp. the repetition of the act of felling, first ascribed to the monks of Āḷavi (plural!) and then again to a single monk. It is with the latter that the story of the tree deity (*devatā*) is connected. After this story, the text returns to the plural (*samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā ... chindissanti*). There is no further mention of the deity, not even in the Buddha's reproof of the monks' (pl.) behaviour. If the "*devatā* block" is athetized, the remaining text is fully consistent in both form and content. Should there still be any doubt, it is removed by a glance at the introductory story to Pāc. 10 (on digging the earth), the structure of which is exactly the same as that of the one under discussion if cleared of the "*devatā* block".— In Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c22ff), too, the intercalatedness of the "*devatā* block", though partly disguised by redactional additions (esp. 75a2), is still recognizable, for 75a21f does not fit in with the "*devatā* story" but resumes the preceding one (cp. 75a1f). Cp. also n. 148.

⁷⁴ T vol. 22, 339a.

⁷⁵ Viz. in that of the Mahīśāsakas (T vol. 22, 41c), where a similar combination as in Vin I 34 is, however, found in the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 (see n. 148). The *devatā* story is, in the introduction to Pāc. 11, also missing in the version of the Dharmaguptakas (T vol. 22, 641c5ff), but this version does not offer conclusive evidence since it gives the impression of having a considerable lacuna (in line 5). However, when interpreting the wording of the *sūtra* it explains *bhūta* as "demon" (**amanuṣya*) (641c14), which may indicate that this version did contain the *devatā* story (cp. n. 148).

⁷⁶ Vin.Mī. (T vol. 22, 41c8) adds cutting grass, Vin.Mā (339a7) chopping branches and leaves and plucking flowers and fruits; Vin.Sa. (T vol. 74c22ff and 75a19f) has pulling out grass in the cloister walk and plucking flowers but omits felling trees; Vin.Mū. (776a25f; Vin.Mū., je 259b2f): felling trees, cutting green grass and plucking flowers.

⁷⁷ Similarly T vol. 22, 41c14f (Vin.Mī.: 草木之中人生命想) and vol. 23, 74c24 (Vin.Sa.: 於草木中生有命想; "grass and trees" = plants); cp. also vol. 22, 339a9f (Vin.Mā.): "although they (viz. the Buddhist monks) praise not killing living beings, yet they are now, by their own hands, felling trees and plucking flowers, [thereby] injuring and killing living creatures". Cp. also 830b22 (Vin.Dh., corresponding to the passage discussed in §§ 9.1-9.2).

⁷⁸ This specific expression, which reminds one of the terminology of the Jains, does not seem

explicitly,⁷⁹ found both in the Vinayas of the Sthavira branch⁸⁰ (except for two dubious exceptions)⁸¹ and in that of the Mahāsāṅghikas⁸² as well as in that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins,⁸³ and it is doubtless applicable to all plants and seeds and hence perfectly suited to explain the prohibition as it stands; for as was stated above⁸⁴ at least the Jainas consider all plants as well as seeds to be living beings with one sense-faculty, and a similar belief (though not necessarily using the same terminology) was probably still widespread in early post-Vedic India,⁸⁵ perhaps even among Buddhist lay followers. For I was told by a Burmese scholar⁸⁶ that in Burma people (i.e. Buddhists) still regard plants as living beings and speak of *rukka-jīva*, etc.; and M. Maithri Murthi⁸⁷ writes the same about Sri Lanka where, as he states, the idea of plants as living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya-pāṇin*) is still found in popular Buddhism. Cp., in this connection, also traditional popular Buddhist texts like the Bhaddasāla-jātaka⁸⁸ where the tree deity shows characteristic features of a tree soul since she (or: he?) is so closely connected with the tree she inhabits that she has to die when it is felled, and since she even calls it her body and the saplings her children.⁸⁹

to have an equivalent in any of the Chinese and Tibetan versions except Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c25, to be read as 殺一根衆生 with v.l.). Cp. also ns. 122, 130, 146 and 281.

⁷⁹ As for Vin.Mū. (see n. 83), it contains the story but does not explicitly state the motive why people (or rather, in this version, non-Buddhists (see n. 91)) object to the monks' felling trees, etc.

⁸⁰ I.e., apart from the Pāli version, T vol. 22, 41c5ff (Vin.Mī.); vol. 23, 74c22ff (Vin.Sa.).

⁸¹ T vol. 22, 641c5ff (Vin.Dh.) appears to have a considerable lacuna (see n. 75); T vol. 24, no. 1464 (Sa., see n. 21), 879b27ff shows no trace of this explanation, but this text may not be a complete and literal translation.

⁸² T vol. 22, 339a6ff.

⁸³ T vol. 23, 776a24ff; Vin.Mū., je 259b2ff.

⁸⁴ See ns. 18 and 20.

⁸⁵ See n. 15. Cp. also Wezler 1986, 461 and 476 n. 72.

⁸⁶ In a discussion after a lecture on the present subject which I delivered at the Australian National University, Canberra, on Oct. 26, 1989. I cannot but apologize for not having noted down his name.

⁸⁷ Maithri Murthi 1986, 62.

⁸⁸ Jā IV 144ff, esp. 153ff; cp. Henrichs 1979, 103; Maithri Murthi 1986, 65.

⁸⁹ Cp. also the fact that in some Sri Lankan temple wall paintings trees are represented with a face in the branches (Maithri Murthi 1986, 65, referring to A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Mediæval Sinhalese Art*, New York 1956, 123).

5.5 According to the explanation of the Suttavibhaṅga under discussion (§ 5.4), it would, however, be only in order to allow for such a view of people (*manussa*), i.e. other people (be it ordinary, lay people⁹⁰ or adherents of other religions⁹¹ like Jainism), that a monk should not injure or destroy plants (and seeds). In view of the fact that, e.g., in the case of killing an animal such a reference to people's belief in sentience is missing, its presence in the case of plants seems to imply that the monks themselves do not share the belief in plants (and seeds) being living, sentient beings.⁹² Hence, not to injure plants would not be an element of moral, or ethically motivated, conduct in the strict sense but, at least from the point of view of the monk, rather a matter of ascetic decorum.⁹³ There is no intrinsic contradiction in such a view because one of the main purposes of the the Pāṭimokkha (though some of its prohibitions do also refer to morality proper) is no doubt, besides internal harmony, the correct and decorous behaviour of the Order and its members in society.⁹⁴ If — as appears

⁹⁰ Cp. T vol. 22, 41c6f (Vin.Mī.): 居士 (perhaps not Buddhists); 339a7 (Vin.Mā.): 世人; vol. 23, 74c24 (Vin.Sa.): 居士. Cp. also vol. 22, 129a7 (Vin.Mī.), 450c4 (Vin.Mā.) and 830b8 (Vin.Dh.), in the context of the passage discussed in §§ 9.1-9.2).

⁹¹ Cp. Vin.Mū., je 259b3 (= T vol. 23, 776a26): *gāṇ mu stegs can dag = anyatīrthikāh*. Cp. also T vol. 23, 173b5 (Vin.Sa.), in the context of the passage discussed in §§ 9.1-9.2).

⁹² Thus explicitly T vol. 22, 339a13 (Vin.Mā.).

⁹³ I.e., a case of *paññatti-vajja/prajñapti-sāvadya* ("fault because [the Buddha] has declared or decided it to be so [for monks]") or *pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya* and not of *loka(/pakati)-vajja* or *prakṛti-sāvadya* ("fault by nature, or for ordinary people [too]") (Mil 266, 18ff; Sp 228; BoBh 112, 20ff and 113, 17; AKBh 218, 15ff). Cp. also Max Weber's (1978, 244) concept of "Anstandsregeln". Actually, destroying or injuring plants is explicitly stated to be *paññatti-vajja* at Mil 266, 21 + 26f and Sp 769. — It may however be necessary to distinguish between various (though sometimes overlapping) types or grades of (in)decorum, esp.: (in)decorum because, in the eyes of people, an ethical or religious aspect (e.g. *ahimsā*) is involved; (in)decorum from the point of view of ascetic standards ("rules of ascetic decorum"); (in)decorum from the point of view of everyday standards ("rules of mere decorum").

⁹⁴ Cp. the stereotyped formula that the misbehaviour prohibited by the respective Pāṭimokkha rule does not serve to engender or increase a favourable disposition (/faith) [towards Buddhism, or the Buddhist Order, in people] but has the contrary effect (*n'etaṃ appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya*, etc.: e.g. Vin III 21; cp. T vol. 22, 3b14f [Vin.Mī.], but as far as I can see missing in the other versions). Engendering and increasing a favourable disposition [towards Buddhism in people] (*appasannānaṃ pasādāya*, *pasannānaṃ bhīyyobhāvāya*) are also contained in another, more complex stereotyped formula of ten purposes of proclaiming the Prātimokṣa rules (also found at Vin III 21; for parallels in other versions see Waldschmidt 1926, 49), besides others like excellence, well-being and solidarity of the Order. Cp. also Buddhaghosa's (Sp 225) interpretation of the item *ditṭhadhammikaṇaṃ āsavānaṃ samvarāya* as meaning that following the Pāṭimokkha rules protects from trouble in this life

to have been the case — many people still believed plants and seeds to be sentient beings and hence considered not to injure or destroy them as part of the proper behaviour of an ascetic (who in contrast to a layman is expected to practise complete *ahimsā*),⁹⁵ then it makes good sense that Buddhist monks, too, were enjoined not to injure plants and seeds even if they themselves no longer shared this belief. As a historian, however, I cannot be sure that this explanation given by the Suttavibhaṅga, doubtless possible, does indeed represent the original situation. For, modern scholars have good reasons to consider the Suttavibhaṅga, as we have it, to be of somewhat later origin than the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself, and there is conclusive evidence that its explanations and motivations do not always represent the original purport of the Pāṭimokkha rules themselves.⁹⁶ Hence it cannot be excluded *a priori* that the Suttavibhaṅga has reduced to a mere rule of decorum what originally had (at least also) an ethical dimension;⁹⁷ for, the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself would make equally good sense if originally also the monks themselves, and even the Buddha, still somehow held the view that plants and seeds were living beings. In order to decide this fundamental question, I shall first (viz. in ch. II.B) examine more closely the terminology and the context of the Pāṭimokkha rule on seeds and plants and of its parallel in the Suttapiṭaka (see § 4.3), and then (in chs. III-IV) turn to additional textual evidence.

II.B. Closer Examination of Terminology and Context as to their Significance for the Question of Plant Sentience

6.1 As for the Pāṭimokkha rule on plants (and seeds), viz. Pāc. 11, the meaning of the term used, in the Pāli version, for designating misbehaviour towards plants, viz. *pātavyatā*, is not certain (see § 4.2.2), but at any rate it can be used for misbehaviour towards living beings (see ib. + n. 37). Yet, it is also used with other complements (see ib. + n. 36). And even on the (doubtful) condition that in the meaning of "ruthless behaviour" the complement is usually living beings we cannot exclude the possibility that its employment in the case of plants is an extended or metaphorical one. As for *pātana* which replaces *pātavyatā* in some Skt. versions (see n. 39), it appears to be a kind of *lectio facillior*, and no less ambiguous at that,

like being beaten, mutilated or disgraced, i.e. from coming into conflict with society. Cp. also Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, A Comparative Study of Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha, Varanasi/Delhi 1984, 157f.

⁹⁵ Cp. Mil 266,21ff: *katamaṃ paṇṇattivajjaṃ* (as e.g. destroying or injuring plants: see n. 93)? *yaṃ ... samaññānaṃ ananucchavikaṃ ananulomikaṃ, gihīnaṃ anavajjaṃ ...*; VinMañj 201: *kasmā bhūtagāmassa pātabyatāya pācitti icchitā ti. samañña - a - āruppatō*.

⁹⁶ Cp., especially, Schlingloff 1963; v. Hinüber 1989, 40; 53.

⁹⁷ In this case, the motivations discussed in §§ 5.2 and 5.3, though doubtless secondary as to their specific content, would still have preserved or restored an essential original feature, viz. the ethical dimension of the prohibition.

since it may mean "felling" or "destroying" as well as "killing".⁹⁸

6.2.1 As for the c o n t e x t of Pāc. 11, though in the Prātimokṣa sometimes rules form groups dealing with more or less closely related matters, t e x t u a l vicinity does not always seem to be grounded on an affinity of content. At any rate, the rules following Pāc. 11 are concerned with entirely different matters. The rule preceding it, viz. not to dig the earth (see § 15.1), points, to be sure, to the same sphere of problems but is placed before Pāc. 11 only in the Pāli version and the closely related one of the Dharmaguptakas, whereas in all the other versions it occupies a completely different position.⁹⁹ On the other hand, if s y s t e m a t i - c a l l y related rules are taken into consideration, one could argue that seeds and plants were obviously n o t regarded as living beings by the Buddhist monks or even the Buddha himself since killing an animate being (*pāṇa*) is prohibited in a s e p a r a t e rule, viz. Pāc. 61.¹⁰⁰ If plants too had been regarded as living beings, this latter rule would have included them, and hence it would have been superfluous to issue a special rule to prohibit destroying plants (and seeds).

6.2.2 Yet, one could respond that it is not only seeds and plants that are not included among the animate beings (*pāṇa*) at Pāc. 61 but a l s o m a n ; for killing a man is not a *pācittiya* but a *pārājika* offence, an offence entailing expulsion from the Order.¹⁰¹ Hence, man, though doubtless an animate being, cannot be comprised in

⁹⁸ Cp. PTSD s.v. *pātana* and *pāṭeti*, Tib. 'jig (*pa*) (Vin.Mū., je 260a3) and Ch. 壞 (Vin.Mū.), 斫伐 (Prāt.Bhī.Sa.), 滅 and 斷斫 (Prāt.Sa.-T.) besides 殺 (Prāt.Sā.g) (see n. 21), though we cannot be absolutely sure that the two latter sources actually presuppose **pātana*.

⁹⁹ See Rosen¹⁹⁵⁹, 45+48, and Hirakawa¹⁹⁷⁰, 453+456. — The rules preceding Pāc. 11 in the other versions do not show any affinity of content to it.

¹⁰⁰ *yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitaṃ voropeyya, pācittiyaṃ* (Vin IV 124; cp. also Vin I 97). Prāt.Sa: *yaḥ punar bhikṣuḥ saṃcintya tīryagyonigataṃ prāṇinaṃ jīvitaṃ vyaparopayet, pā°* (v. Simson 1986, esp. 126, 155, 175 and 261). Similarly (with *vyava°* instead of *vyapa°*) Prāt.Mū. (kindly communicated to me by O. v. Hinüber; the *sūtra* is not preserved in GBM(FacEd)). Prāt.Mā.Lok. (p. 25): *yo puna bhikṣuḥ saṃcintya tīryagyonigataṃ prāṇinaṃ jīvitaṃ vyaparopeya, pācattikaṃ*. For versions of other schools, cp. Rosen 1959, 48.

¹⁰¹ *Pārājika 3: yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca manussaviggahaṃ jīvitaṃ voropeyya ..., ayaṃ pi pārājiko hoti ...* (Vin III 71). — It would be hardly justified to conclude, from the considerable difference in gravity of offence between killing a man and killing an animal in the V i n a y a context (cp. also Härtel 1956, 90; T vol. 23, 157a22f), that the difference is equally great from the e t h i c a l point of view. If it were, it would be inexplicable that not to kill animals (regardless of their utility to man (cp. *Add.* § 39.3)!) is part of the first moral precept. The reason for the considerable difference of gravity in the Vinaya is rather that killing a man was considered by s o c i e t y as a criminal act and would have entailed public sanctions against the Order, whereas killing an animal was, to be sure, judged by society as being discreditable for an ascetic, but (unless the animal was somebody's property) not regarded as a crime, especially if the animal belonged to a less appreciated or detested species (like crows, which are the example in the introductory story to Pāc. 61).

the *pāṇa* of Pāc. 61. Actually, '*pāṇa*' appears to be used, quite frequently, in the special sense of "animal",¹⁰² and in some versions of Pāc.61¹⁰³ it is explicitly specified to refer to animals (*tiryagyonigata*) only. Therefore, if at Pāc 61 plants are not included in the *pāṇa*, this need not necessarily exclude them from the realm of living beings. This is confirmed by the fact that in early Jaina sources, too, '*pāṇa*' is not unfrequently reserved for the mobile, breathing¹⁰⁴ living beings, i.e. men¹⁰⁵ and — in the *ahiṃsā* context — especially animals, in contrast to plants (and elements) which are nevertheless in these contexts expressly declared to be living, nay sentient beings (*jīva, cittamaṃṭa*), too.¹⁰⁶ A similar use of '*prāṇin*' is also found in Brahmanical literature.¹⁰⁷ But although we thus cannot derive, from the fact that in the Pāṭimokkhasutta plants are not included in the *pāṇa*, that they are not living, still less sentient beings, we do not have any positive clue to their sentience either, and we have to admit that the phraseology of the Pāṭimokkhasutta is also compatible with an exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the sphere of living beings. At any rate, this phraseology would seem to indicate a certain awareness of the difference between animals and plants. This appears to be underlined by the fact that the expression used for killing animals is the same unambiguous one as in the case of killing men (viz. *jīvītā voropeti*), whereas in order to denote destructive behaviour against plants a less unambiguous one (viz. *pātavyatā*: see § 4.2.2) is used.

7.1 In the case of the Suttapiṭaka parallel to Pāc. 11 (*bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambhā paṭivirato hoti*), we doubtless have to take '*samārambha*' as referring to acts of violence, as at Sn 311, where it means "killing" or "slaughtering" cows (see § 4.3). But this does not necessarily imply that in the present passage, too, its implication is that seeds and plants are living beings. For we cannot exclude the possibility that "killing" is applied to seeds and plants only by way of a metaphor or by extension (e.g., for want of a better term), or that a current idiom, or an idiom current in a certain group (like ascetics), was kept irrespective of the belief underlying it. The more so since in Jaina sources the use of '*samārambha*' and '*sam-ā-rabh*' in

¹⁰² Thus, e.g., also at Pāc. 20 and 62 (see § 16.3). Cp. also BHSD s.v. *prāṇa* and *prāṇaka*.

¹⁰³ See n. 100.

¹⁰⁴ For this connotation of the word '*pāṇa/prāṇin*' see Thieme, KISchr, 377 n. 5; cp. also Sv-pt I 288: *pāṇanato assasana-passasana-vasena pavattiya pāṇā*.

¹⁰⁵ Heavenly beings and beings of hell may be disregarded in the present discussion.

¹⁰⁶ Cp., e.g., Kapp 4.28 ≈ Āyār_s p. 37,23f ≈ Āyār II.1.1.1 (*ahiṃsā* context!): *appa'ande appa-p ā ṇ e appa-bie appa-harie app'ose app'udae ...*; Dasav 4 (p. 5,15-6,17); 5.1.3; 6.27ff; 8.2: *puḍhavi daga aṇaṇi māruya taṇa rukkhā sa-bīyagā / taṣā ya p ā ṇ ā jīva tti ii vuttaṃ mahesiṇā //*; Sūy I.7.1 (see n. 371) + 7 (*puḍhavi vi jīvā āu vi jīvā, pāṇā* [animals!] *ya sampātima ...*); I.11.7-8.

¹⁰⁷ Thieme, KISchr, 377 n. 5; Medhātithi ad Manu I.49 (cp. Wezler 1987b, 114).

the sense of "slaughtering, killing" appears to have coalesced with that of "seizing [a weapon]" or "committing [acts of violence]"¹⁰⁸ so as to cover both killing and injuring or damaging. Such a broader use could of course still more easily be extended to insentient objects,¹⁰⁹ and it seems to be such an extension that Buddhaghosa has in mind when he takes '*samārambha*' in the present passage to mean *vikopana*,¹¹⁰ which may mean "disturbing",¹¹¹ but also "destroying"¹¹² and perhaps also "injuring, damaging"¹¹³.

7.2 As for the context of the Suttapiṭaka passage under discussion, it is moral (sīla). Therefore, one might think that destroying seeds and plants is a morally bad action. This, however, would be hardly intelligible unless seeds and plants themselves are, somehow, affected by that action, hence living if not sentient beings. But the context is not simply morals, but morals or sīla of a monk, and may hence include matters of ascetic decorum,¹¹⁴ or at least points considered as immoral not by the monks themselves but only by (a significant part of) society.

7.3 One could even argue that as in the Pāṭimokkhasutta so in this case too abstention from killing animate beings (*pāṇa*) is stated separately, viz. in the beginning of the list of the primary moral precepts¹¹⁵ which precedes the one starting with abstention from destroying seeds and plants, and that this means that seeds and plants are not comprised in animate beings. But although in this context the animate beings (*pāṇa*) from killing which a monk abstains no doubt also

¹⁰⁸ See n. 51.

¹⁰⁹ Thus explicitly Thāṇa (JĀS, 1985), § 571, where, among other things, violence (*samārambha*) is stated to be sevenfold, viz. referring to any of the six kinds of living beings (those having earth bodies, etc.) and to inanimate matter (*ajīvakāya*).

¹¹⁰ See n. 46.

¹¹¹ Cp. BHSD s. v. *vikopayati*.

¹¹² Cp. PTSD s.v. *vikopeti*; CPD s.v. *avikopana*; VisM XXIII.35 (*vikuppati* = *vinassati*); XXIII.34 *avikopana* explained as *avināsa* by the Paramatthamañjūsā; Mil 266,26 *bhūtagāma-vikopanaṃ* beside MVy 8431 °*bhūtagāma-vināsanam*. Cp. also the Tibetan rendering by *ñams pa* (MVy 9326 and AKBh-I s.v. *vikopana*) and the Chinese equivalent (毀) 壞 in Wogihara 1988, 1201.

¹¹³ Cp. PTSD s.v. *vikopana* and *vikopeti*, and the Ch. rendering 無損 for *avikopita* (Wogihara 1988, 148). Cp. also Sp 756 (*sukhuma-rajam*) and 759 (*pathaviṃ*).

¹¹⁴ At least later on, *sīla* is often understood to include *pāṭimokkha-saṃvara* (e.g., VisM I.18; Nidd I 188).

¹¹⁵ See n. 2.

include man,¹¹⁶ in view of what was said (in § 6.2.2) about the use of 'pāṇa'/'prāṇin' we still cannot be sure that what is not comprised in it is not a living, sentient being. Besides, the two precepts belong to different series, which form part of a larger literary unit which, albeit, perhaps, fairly old, yet appears to be composed of components some of which originally may well have had an independent existence. Hence we can hardly *a priori* be sure that the second series of precepts (the one beginning with abstention from destroying seeds and plants) was conceived from its very beginning as a supplement to the series of the primary precepts. And even if it was,¹¹⁷ the motive for adding, to the precept to abstain from killing animate beings, the one not to destroy seeds and plants need not necessarily have been that seeds and plants were not considered to be comprised in the animate beings (*pāṇa*) and hence required a separate precept. The addition could also be accounted for by assuming that seeds and plants were felt to be a kind of border-line case, and that in the case of monks (in contrast to lay people) it had to be made explicit that they too should not be killed or injured.¹¹⁸ But of course this is nothing but a possibility;

¹¹⁶ This is made explicit at Dharmaskandha (ed. S. Dietz, Göttingen 1984), 82f. Cp. also AN III 208f, where *pāṇātīpāta* = *itthiṃ vā purisaṃ vā jīvitaṃ voropesi*. For 'pāṇa' being used also in the sense of "man" cp. also Vin III 52: *pāṇo nāma manussapāṇo vuccati*.

¹¹⁷ At any rate the similarity of phraseological structure would fit in quite well with such an assumption.

¹¹⁸ It is, perhaps worth noting that the sequence of the items under discussion in the Suttapiṭaka text on *sīla* (abstention from killing animate beings (*pāṇa*) in the beginning, abstention from damaging seeds and plants later) is the reverse of the sequence in the Pāṭimokkhasutta (where the prohibition to damage plants precedes the prohibition to kill animals (*pāṇa*)). Likewise, in the Suttapiṭaka text abstention from killing precedes abstention from stealing, which in its turn precedes abstention from sexual misbehaviour, whereas in the Pārājika section of the Pāṭimokkhasutta it is just the other way round. This may be explained by the assumption that in the Pārājika the principle of sequence is not moral gravity (nor even gravity of the offence in the eyes of society) but rather the greater probability of occurrence of the respective misbehaviour (or even the temporal sequence of actual occurrences of such misbehaviour in the early Order). If this is true [but for a different suggestion see: C. Caillat in: Yamamoto 1984, I, 201f], and in case it could be extended to the relation between the prohibition to destroy plants (and seeds) and that to kill animals, this would suggest the possibility that in the Prātimokkhasūtra (and in all its versions at that) the prohibition to destroy plants (and seeds) precedes the prohibition to kill animals because violence against plants (or seeds) was more probable or had occurred earlier. In this case, Pāc. 61 may (but, of course, need not) be a kind of *a fortiori* extension of Pāc. 11, and this would mean that Pāc. 61 does not intend (and need not even tacitly presuppose) an exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the sphere of the *pāṇa*, let alone of living beings as such. — At any rate, the mere fact that there is a separate rule concerning plants besides the one concerning the *pāṇa* does not *eo ipso* prove that these two rules must necessarily refer to mutually exclusive spheres, since this is not true in other cases either, namely in the case of the rules prohibiting sprinkling and drinking water containing tiny animals (Pāc. 20 and 62: see ns. 311 and 312), which are doubtless nothing but border-line cases falling under the general rule not to kill animals (and, by the way, precede the latter in all or, in the case of Pāc. 62, at least

beside the other and perhaps more probable one that seeds and plants were *n o t* felt to form part of the "animate beings" (*pāṇa*) (though not necessarily, for that reason, entirely insentient).¹¹⁹ Hence, as for the status of seeds and plants, this passage is as inconclusive as Pācittiya 11. Therefore, I shall now turn to additional evidence, first from Vinaya materials (ch. III), and then from the Suttapīṭaka (ch. IV), without, of course, claiming to be exhaustive.

in most versions [i.e. all except Pāli and Dh.; cp. Rosen 1959, 46-48; T 1460: vol. 24, 662b19f + c21 + 663b1]). I do not of course want to say that *t h e r e f o r e* Pāc. 11, too, *m u s t* be taken as an explication of another, still less obvious border-line case of the *pāṇa* of Pāc 61, but we cannot *a priori* preclude this possibility. And even if we could preclude it, this would, as shown in § 6.2.2, not necessarily exclude plants (and seeds) from the sphere of living beings as such.

¹¹⁹ In this text, too, the fact that different terms for killing/destroying are used (*atipāta* versus *samārambha*) may be taken to indicate that there was at any rate a clear feeling of the difference between men and animals on the one hand and plants on the other.

III. Further Vinaya Material

As for the evidence from Vinaya materials (including, to be sure, a few related Suttapitāka passages), I shall first (ch. III.A) discuss additional evidence concerning plants, and then (ch. III.B), for the sake of comparison or contrast, some materials concerning earth, water and fire.

III.A. Plants

8 Apart from the general prohibition to destroy or injure plants (and seeds), the Vinaya materials contain several more specific rules concerning seeds and plants. Some of them are motivated in a way similar to the original motivation of the general rule in the Suttavibhaṅga (see § 5.4). E.g., in the Khandhaka section of the Vinayapitāka monks are blamed by the Buddha because they had young palmyra (*Borassus flabellifer*)¹²⁰ leaves (*tāla-taruṇa*, *tāla-patta*) or bamboo leaves (*veḷu-taruṇa*, *veḷu-patta*) cut off in order to wear them as sandals.¹²¹ Here, too, the reason adduced is that people consider trees to be living beings (*jīvasaṃbhūto hi manussā rukkhasmiṃ*), more precisely: living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*)¹²², and hence object to the monks cutting off shoots — which wither, i.e. die, after having been cut off¹²³ — as an act of injuring (*vi-heṭṭh*) a living being. Here, too, the implication seems to be that the Buddhist monks themselves do not believe in the sentience of the plants concerned, but once again this need not have been the position of earliest Buddhism since the Khandhaka, like the Suttavibhaṅga, was composed at a somewhat later date.¹²⁴

9 An interesting case is the motivation of the prescription to have a fixed residence during the rainy season without wandering around. This rule is not contained in the Prātimokṣasūtra except as a rule for nuns;¹²⁵ as a general rule valid

¹²⁰ Syed 1990, 308ff.

¹²¹ Vin I 189. Cp. T vol. 22, 847b12ff (Vin.Dh.). — Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 693b12) seems to be the only version to motivate also the rule not to upholster a couch with cotton (Pāc. 88) by the view of people that such an act would disclose lack of pity since it involves killing living beings.

¹²² No corresponding expression in Vin.Dh. (which merely reports people saying that the monks destroy life: 斷絕生命 [T vol. 22, 847b14]). Cp. ns. 130 and 146, but also ns. 78 and 281.

¹²³ Acc. to Vin.Dh. 847b13 and 16 it is the tree that withers.

¹²⁴ Cp. Frauwallner 1956b, 67; v. Hinüber 1989, 24; 42. — Besides, as far as I can see after an admittedly cursory investigation, the episode under discussion does not seem to form part of all the transmitted Vinayas.

¹²⁵ Pāc.Bhī. 39 (Vin IV 296f): *yā pana bhikkhunī antovassam cārikaṃ careyya, pā°*. For parallels, cp. Hirakawa 1982, 359 n. 179; Waldschmidt 1926, 124f (= 1979, 128f); Prāt.Bhī.Mū., the 20b6f. — I for one do not know why the rule is found only in the Pāṭimokkha for nuns. Vin.Mī. (T vol. 22,

for monks (too), it is, however, found in the Khandhaka.¹²⁶

9.1 In the latter passage and — probably secondarily¹²⁷ — also in some versions of the Vinayavibhaṅga on the former,¹²⁸ the rule is motivated by the fact that people disapprove of the monks wandering around during the rainy season (i.e. during the vegetation period) because thereby they crush green grasses (*haritāni tiṇāni sammadantā*),¹²⁹ injure a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhenta*),¹³⁰ and kill many tiny animals (*bahū khuddake paṇe*

89b4) suggests problems with robbers or fire(!), but at T vol. 22, 542b12f (Vin.Mā.; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 360; Roth 1970, p. 283f) fear of robbers, etc., or anything menacing life or chastity, is, on the contrary, adduced as a legitimate reason for moving to another place.

¹²⁶ Vin I 137: *anujānāmi, bhikkhave, vassaṃ upagantum*; for parallels, see Frauwallner 1956b, 82; Vin.Mū., khe 223b3ff.

¹²⁷ Cp. O. v. Hinüber, Sprachliche Beobachtungen zum Aufbau des Pāli-Kanons, in: StII 2/1976, 34.

¹²⁸ Viz. Vin IV 296; Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 746a13ff), Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 322b24ff) and Vin.Mū. (1003b10ff), but not in Vin.Bhī. (the 244b6-8).

¹²⁹ In the Skandhaka passage (T vol. 22, 450c4), Vin.Mā. does not specify what is injured by trampling; in its comm. on Pāc.Bhī 39 (in Vin.Mā.: 134), it does not mention injuring beings by trampling on them at all (Hirakawa 1982, 359; Roth 1970, p. 283); in Vin.Mū., at both places (T vol. 23, 1041b3 and 4f, and 1003b13, respectively), only injuring or killing tiny animals (1003b15 has "sentient [beings]" (含識) instead) is mentioned; similarly Vin.Mū., khe 223b5: *srog chags phra mo daṅ śin tu phra mo maṅ po'i tshogs rnams brdzis* (R) *nas srog daṅ bral bar byas so*.

¹³⁰ Not in any of the other versions (cp. ns. 122 and 146, but also ns. 78 and 281). But Vin.Dh. (830b22) explicitly states that householders consider plants to have life-force (命根, **jīvitendriya*; in its structure and purport, the sentence seems to correspond to the Pāli expression *jīvasaṅgāni hi manussā rukkhasmiṇ* of Vin IV 34 and I 189, but on the other hand the occurrence of **indriya* in connection with "life" reminds one of the expression *ekindriya jīva*). Besides, several versions speak of "growing or living or fresh (i.e. unwithered and not eradicated) plants" (生草 (木): T vol. 22, 830b7f etc. and 746a16 etc. [Vin.Dh.]; vol. 23, 173b5 etc. and 322b27 etc. [Vin.Sa.]) or seem to refer to them, too, as "living beings" (T vol. 22, 129a10f [Vin.Mī.]; T vol. 23, 173b9f [Vin.Sa.]).

saṅghātaṃ āpādentā).¹³¹ Even non-Buddhist ascetics¹³² — so the people's complaint — do not leave their residence during this season, and even small birds build nests and stay there.

9.2 It is probable that, just as in the motivation of Pāc. 11 (see § 5.4), so in the present passage, too, the expression "living being with one sense-faculty" (*ekindriya jīva*), in spite of the surprising singular,¹³³ refers to the plants mentioned just before and is hence a kind of explanatory addition.¹³⁴ At the same time, here too, what is described in this way is only what people think (and in the present passage surely: common people,¹³⁵ not non-Buddhist ascetics, since the latter are expressly referred to as another group (see § 9.1)). But in the present case there is an important difference in so far as not only plants but also tiny animals are referred to, and these are at any rate regarded as living beings by the Buddhist monks and nuns too. Hence, if it were the mere fact of killing that constituted an offence, this would hold good for the Buddhist monks and nuns as well, irrespective of whether they regarded plants too as living beings or not. If, then, as the text in fact appears to suggest, wandering around during the rainy season was prohibited in order not to scandalize people, i.e. as a rule of decorum, the decisive difference of view must, in the present case, have consisted in something else. In fact, for the Buddhist monks and nuns it is only intentional killing of a living being — whatever its size¹³⁶ — that

¹³¹ In Vin.Dh., at both places animals are not mentioned at all (T vol. 22, 830b7f and 9 踏殺生草木, and 746a15f and 23f 踏殺生草, respectively); consequently, when this version, somewhat later (830b12; 14f; 17f; 746a17 and 20), adds, after having mentioned the crushing-killing of growing/living/fresh plants, the phrase "destroying the life-force of others / of living beings", this phrase, too, must refer to plants and cannot but be an explication of the former, the more so since this version explicitly states that people consider plants to be living beings (see n. 130).

¹³² Cp. Kapp 1.36; Āyār II.3.1.1 (JĀS ed. § 464).

¹³³ Perhaps the expression was mechanically taken over from another context like Vin IV 34 (see § 5.4) where the sg. fits the context, referring as it does to *rukkhāṃ*, or even Vin IV 32 (see § 15.2) where it refers to the earth (*pathavī*).

¹³⁴ As for the fact that there is, in this passage, no (at least no reliable) equivalent for this sentence in any of the Chinese translations, see n. 130.

¹³⁵ Thus all Ch. versions except Vin.Sa. and Vin.Mū., but even these have "non-Buddhist (ascetics)" only in the Skandhaka passage (T vol. 23, 173b5 and 1041b3; Vin.Mū., khe 223b3f: *mu stegs can rnams*), whereas in the comm. on Pāc.Bhī. 39 Vin.Sa. has "householders" (322b27), and Vin.Mū. has both "householders" and "non-Buddhists" (1003b11f).

¹³⁶ Cp. Sp 864 (*taṃ khuddakaṃ pi mahantaṃ pi mārentassa āpattinānākaraṇaṃ natthi*; cp. also the sentence next but one stating that even the conscious crushing of the egg of a bug, due to lack of compassion, is a *pācittiya* offence. From the moral point of view, however, there is a difference since in the case of a larger animals the aggressive act is usually more complex. Cp. *Add.* n. 93.

constitutes an offence (both from the ethical and from the disciplinary point of view)¹³⁷. But destroying or killing plants and tiny animals while walking around during the rainy season is, of course, unintentional, and hence, from the Buddhist point of view, not by itself an offence, not even in the case of animals.¹³⁸ From the point of view of people, on the other hand, it is, as in Jainism, obviously the fact of killing as such that counts, irrespective of the intention. The more so since in the case of wandering around in the rainy season such killing is inevitable and hence foreseeable — an aspect which the Buddhists too could not easily ignore.¹³⁹ At any rate, since animals are also involved, it would not, in the present case, make a difference, and hence it cannot be decided from the present context, whether also the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves regarded plants, too, as living beings or not. It is, at best (i.e. provided that we can exclude mere stylistic reasons), the phraseology of the text, viz. the fact that it uses "killing" (*saṃghātaṃ āpādentā*)¹⁴⁰ only with regard to the tiny animals but prefers "crushing" (*saṃmaddantā*) in the case of the grasses,¹⁴¹ that may, perhaps, be taken to indicate that at any rate the (Buddhist) author or redactor of the text on his part advocated an essential difference of status between animals and plants. But even if this is correct, it would not, in view of the somewhat later date of the Khandhaka,¹⁴² be evidential of the situation in earliest Buddhism.

10 In the rules regulating how a monk has a hut or a larger building constructed for himself (Saṅgh. 6 and 7)¹⁴³ it is specified that the site (*vatthu*) where the

¹³⁷ For the latter, Pāc 61 (see n. 100).

¹³⁸ Cp. T vol. 22, 677a21ff and b6ff. Accordingly, Pāc.Bhī. 39 is, according to Buddhaghosa (Sp 933), merely *paṇṇatti-vajja* (see n. 93).

¹³⁹ Cp. Sp 865, enjoining carefulness based on compassion even in the case of tiny animals or even eggs of animals: *tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu kāruṇṇaṃ upaṭṭhapervā a p p a m a t t e n a vattaṃ kātābbaṃ*.

¹⁴⁰ An intr. pendant to this expression also Āyār_s p. 4,11, obviously, here too, with reference to tiny animals. Cp. also § 16.4.

¹⁴¹ In the Chinese versions, this distinction is preserved only at T vol. 23, 173b4f, [Vin.Sa.], whereas in other passages both "crushing" and "killing" (vol. 22, 129a7 [Vin.Mī.]) or "killing" alone (vol. 23, 322b27 [Vin.Sa.]) are connected with both grasses and tiny animals. At T vol. 22, 830b7f and 746a15f [Vin.Dh., see n. 131] "crushing-killing" even refers to plants/grasses only.

¹⁴² See n. 124.

¹⁴³ Vin III 149 and 156 (... *vatthu desetabbaṃ anāraṃbhaṃ saparikkamaṇaṃ* ...); Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 9 (... *vastu deśayitavyaṃ anāraṃbhaṃ saparikramaṇaṃ* ...); Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson 1986), pp. 81, 101, 130, 150f: ... *vāstu deśayitavyaṃ anāraṃbhaṃ saparākramaṇaṃ* ...; cp. Rosen 1959, 63f); Prāt.Mū. (GBM(FacEd) I, p. 19, fol. 28,6: ... *vāstu draṣṭavyaṃ anāraṃbhaṃ saparākramaṇaṃ* ...); Vin.Mū., che 221b4f and 229a2 (*gēi r u ñ b a daṇ/ rtsod pa med pa daṇ/ brtsam du ruñ bar blta*

hut may be erected must be "free from damage or trouble"¹⁴⁴ (*anārambha*).

10.1 The second of these rules is motivated in the Pāli version¹⁴⁵ by the story of a monk who in order to clear the ground for his building had a holy tree (*cetiya-rukkha*) felled — an act which people (*manussā*), who regard the tree as a living being (*jīvasaññino ... rukkhasmiṃ*), mind as an act of injuring (*vi-heṭṭh*) a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*).¹⁴⁶ Here, too, the fact that what is reported is only the belief of people suggests that the monks themselves do not share this belief, but once again we have to bear in mind that the Suttavibhaṅga does not belong to the oldest stratum of Buddhist literature.¹⁴⁷ Besides, the fact that the tree felled is not just a tree¹⁴⁸ but a *cetiya-rukkha* would seem to indicate that it is, in this case, not so much the felling of a n y tree as a living being but rather the felling of this s p e c i a l tree as an object of religious veneration (*-pūjita*) that upsets people, and

bar bya'o//) has an additional adjective (**kalpika?*); cp. T vol. 23, 688b15f and 691a19f (Vin.Mū.); other versions: T vol. 22, 14a17f and c28f (Vin.Mī.); 277c17f and 280a4 (Vin.Mā.); 550a17f and 550a21f (Prāt.Mā.); 585b15 and 586b29 (Vin.Dh.); 1024a6f and 11 (Prāt.Dh.); T vol. 23, 20c8 and 21b24f (Vin.Sa.); 471b17 and 22 (Prāt.Sa._g); T vol. 24, 660a28f and b4 (Prāt.Kā.); cp. 866b27 (Sa.?₂; see n. 21) and Prāt.Sa._{Th} (Inoguchi 1981, 191 Nos. 23-25).

¹⁴⁴ Thus CPD s.v. *'anārambha*; cp. Schlingloff 1963, 543 + n. 40.

¹⁴⁵ Vin III 155f.

¹⁴⁶ The only versions in which we find at least the idea that householders disapprove of the felling of the *cetiya* tree as an act of killing a living being are Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 586b10f: 斷衆生命) and T vol. 24, 823b26 (**Vinayamātrkā*: see n. 218): ... 諸人皆以此樹有命之想. As for the lack of an equivalent of *ekindriya jīva*, see ns. 122 and 130, but also ns. 78 and 281.

¹⁴⁷ See § 5.5 + n. 96.

¹⁴⁸ As in the original introductory story to Pac. 11 (see § 5.4). Cp. also the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 in Vin.Mī. (T vol. 22, 13a12ff), reporting that the monks, after having strained, by excessive begging for building materials, the nerves of lay people who start clearing off as soon as the monks show up, began to cut grass, fell trees and dig the earth by themselves (a15). — By the way, the reaction of the monks, though not ununderstandable, is, in this context, not confirmed by the majority of the other versions (it is found only in Vin.Dh. and T 1463 (**Vinayamātrkā*: see n. 218)). It is indeed, at least in Vin.Mī. and Vin.Dh., superfluous in the wider context (relating how Mahākassapa, entering the place for alms, is astonished at the unusual behaviour of lay people and, after learning the reason, reports the matter to the Buddha), and may hence to be an intrusion. Interestingly enough, it is followed (15a15-24) by another intrusive element which is almost the same as the intercalated story in the Pāli version of the introduction to Pāc. 11 (see § 5.3). In Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 584a24-b7), it is only this story (but without the incident of hurting the deity's child) that has been inserted into the introduction to Saṅgh. 6. This is also true of T vol. 24, 823b13ff (**Vinayamātrkā*), where it has entirely supplanted the continuation of what appears to have been the original introductory story to Saṅgh. 6.

this is actually what we find in the versions of some other schools.¹⁴⁹

10.2 On the other hand, one cannot but note that both forms of the introductory story do not easily fit in with the wording of the Prātimokṣa rule itself.¹⁵⁰ For according to the story it would be the *procedure* of constructing the building that should be free from damage, i.e. not involve injuring or damaging the holy tree or other living beings¹⁵¹ or highly esteemed objects.¹⁵² According to the wording of the Prātimokṣasūtra, however, it is the *site* that should be "free from damage or trouble". To be sure, it may not be impossible to take the attribute to mean that the site should be one the choice of which as a site for the building would not *entail* damaging a *caitya* tree (as the introductory story takes it) or small animals dwelling there (as Buddhaghosa suggests)¹⁵³. But the Suttavibhaṅga proper, i.e. the word-by-word explanation of the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, suggests an entirely different explanation. According to it,¹⁵⁴ the site should not contain a nest of ants, termites, rats, snakes, scorpions or centipedes¹⁵⁵ nor the lair of animals like

¹⁴⁹ T vol. 22, 14b28ff, esp. c16ff (Vin.Mī., expressly mentioning the existence of a deity in the tree, and stating that felling the tree means injuring a heavenly being (or gods and men?) (天人)); 279b10ff (Vin.Mā.: felled tree inhabited by a deity whose family is deprived of its shelter); T vol. 24, 866c2ff (T 1464, Sa. [see n. 21]: felled tree inhabited by a deity); T vol. 23, 21b9ff (Vin.Sa., only mentioning the felling of a *caitya* tree); 690b19ff, esp. c15f (= Vin.Mū., che 227a8ff, esp. 228a4: only reporting the felling of a large tree under which a brahmin had taught his students). In most versions, it is people who are upset, but in Vin.Mā. and T 1464 it is the deity that complains to the Buddha, just as in the story intercalated into the introduction to Pāc 11 (see § 5.3) and into some versions of the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 (see n. 148). But in the present context, we do not read that one of the deity's children is hurt by the blow. It is only into one version of the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 that this form of the story has found its way (cp. n. 148).

¹⁵⁰ Cp., in this connection, the fact that the *Vinayamātrkā (T vol. 24, 823b28f) inserts, before the rule concerning the construction of a building, another one declaring the felling of a *caitya* tree to be a *pācittiya* offence.

¹⁵¹ Cp. CPD s.v. *anārambha*, supplementing "(scil. to different living creatures)".

¹⁵² Cp., in this connection, Pāc. 19 (difficult rule, cp. Schlingloff 1963, 542, and, for the pertinent words, esp. v. Hinüber 1968, p. 164 n. 4), perhaps stating that a monk who has a large hut constructed may supervise (?) a part of the construction work while standing at a spot where there are, if possible, no green plants (*appaharite*, cp. § 11.1 + n. 171): surely in order not to injure or destroy them; but cp. also n. 190.

¹⁵³ See below + n. 163.

¹⁵⁴ Vin III 151.

¹⁵⁵ Similar list T vol. 23, 20c17f (Vin.Sa.); cp. T vol. 22, 276b9 (Vin.Mā., only insects and snakes); 585b22 (Vin.Dh., abbreviated list, ending with ants); cp. also Vin.Mū., che 222a3f = 229b5f (T vol. 23, 688b29f; in connection not with *anārambha* but with **kalpika* (see n. 143)).

elephants, lions, tigers, etc.,¹⁵⁶ nor should it be situated near¹⁵⁷ a field of cereals or vegetables,¹⁵⁸ or near a slaughtering-place, place of execution, prison, cemetery, king's estate, public park, tavern, carriage road, crossroad or the like.¹⁵⁹ One of the other versions states that there should not be trees bearing flowers or fruits either,¹⁶⁰ and others even exclude the presence of a large or excellent tree¹⁶¹ or a *caitya* tree¹⁶². But it is not probable that the purport is that these items should be absent because the monk might injure or damage them by building his hut (though this is in fact what Buddhaghosa suggests in the case of the first series of animals, viz. ants, etc.)¹⁶³. On the contrary, one version expressly enjoins the monk to have trees or thorny shrubs removed.¹⁶⁴ The damage or trouble from which the site should be free is rather, as the list of animals, which are all animals troublesome or dangerous¹⁶⁵ to man, and especially the last group of items,¹⁶⁶ viz. slaughter-house, etc.,¹⁶⁷ indicate, the trouble they would all create for the monk,

¹⁵⁶ Similar list T vol. 22, 14a25f (Vin.Mī.) and 585b21f (Vin.Dh.).

¹⁵⁷ Thus CPD s.v. *aparaṇṇa-nissita*, following Sp 570,1f.

¹⁵⁸ Cp. also T vol. 22, 14a27.

¹⁵⁹ Similar lists: T vol. 22, 14a24f (Vin.Mī.); vol. 23, 20c21-23 (Vin.Sa., though not in connection with *anārambha* but with *saparākrama*); Vin.Mū., che 222a4f = 229b6f (= T vol. 23, 688c2f); cp. also vol. 22, 585b25f (Vin.Dh.).

¹⁶⁰ T vol. 22, 278b8f (Vin.Mā.).

¹⁶¹ T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mī.); Vin.Mū., che 222a5 = 229b7 (= T vol. 23, 688c3f): tree that would have to be felled; T vol. 23, 20c20 (Vin.Sa., in connection with *saparākrama* (see n. 159)).

¹⁶² T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mī.).

¹⁶³ Sp 569: *imāni tāva cha ṭhānāni* (viz. from ants to centipedes) *sattānuddayāya paṭikkhitāni*.

¹⁶⁴ T vol. 22, 585b23f (Vin.Dh.).

¹⁶⁵ Thus Buddhaghosa with reference to elephants, etc. (Sp 569: *imāni satta ṭhānāni sapapaṭibhayāni* ...).

¹⁶⁶ Some versions have still another series, viz. dangerous or uncomfortable forms of nature, like cliffs, stones, pits, dangerous rivers or ponds, or thorny shrubs: T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mī.); 585b24 (Vin.Dh.); cp. also vol. 23, 20c20 (Vin.Sa.) and Vin.Mū., che 222a6 = 229b7f (T vol. 688c5f: in connection with *saparākrama*: cp. n. 159).

¹⁶⁷ With reference to these, Buddhaghosa says: "The rest entails trouble in the form of several kinds of trouble" (Sp 569: *sesāni nānā-upaddavehi sa-upaddavāni*).

as is, once again, made explicit by one of the other versions:¹⁶⁸ trouble in the form of danger or nuisance, or merely — as in the case of cultivated fields, a public park, trees bearing flowers or fruits or a *caitya* tree — by attracting people disturbing his solitude and meditation. If such was in fact the original purport of the expression "free from damage" in the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, it would seem to have little if any evidential value for the problem of the status of plants in earliest Buddhism.

11.1 In the Khandhaka¹⁶⁹ as well as in a few passages of the Suttapiṭaka¹⁷⁰ it is stated that remnants of food should be either thrown away [at a spot of the ground] where there are, if possible, no green plants (*appaharite*),¹⁷¹ or dropped into water free from animate beings, i.e. tiny animals (*appāṇake*¹⁷² *udake*). At least the latter alternative is hardly intelligible unless one supposes that throwing remnants of food into water containing tiny animals is conceived of as *injuring* these animals. This becomes clear from other passages¹⁷³ where it is not just remnants of food but remnants of a *dangerous* dish indigestible for any being except the Buddha and his followers that are ordered to be either thrown away at a spot free from green plants or dropped into water free of tiny animals. In view of the *para*l-

¹⁶⁸ T vol. 22, 585b22f; cp. also the fact that most Chinese translations render *ārambha* in this context by 難 (處) ("difficulties").

¹⁶⁹ Vin I 157; 352; II 216; I have, so far, found parallels only in Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 802b1f; 835c26-28; 904c21f; 933b26f; 934c6-8) and Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 165a14f; 187a8f); but cp. also n. 173 (Vin.Mī).

¹⁷⁰ MN I 13 (T vol. 1, 570a11f [MĀ₁], with "clean (i.e. bare) ground" for *appaharite*); cp. also n. 173 (Sn and SN). — Completely different view AN I 161: throwing the water with which a cooking-pot or dish has been washed into a dirty village pool as food for the animals living in it is *meritorious*).

¹⁷¹ For *appa*° coming close to *a*° or *nis*° see CPD s.v. *appa* and *appa-harita*; v. Hinüber 1968, p. 273f. Cp. Spk I 236,3: *appa-harite ti aharite*. Sn-a I 154,20f says that *appa*° may either be understood as "few" or in a privative sense: *appa-harite ti paritta-harita-tiṇe a-pparūḍha-harita-tiṇe vā pāsāṇa-piṭṭhi-sadise*; but Ps I 94,19ff, though giving only the explanation *apparūḍhaharite*, does not understand it as "where no green grass grows, as on the surface of a stone", but rather as "where there is no [freshly] grown (i.e. young, tender) grass", in opposition to both a place free of grass and one where the grass is so strong that it is not destroyed by any amount of remnants of food. — For *harita* in Jaina sources see § 4.2.1 + n. 29.

¹⁷² It appears difficult to decide whether °*ka* is bahuvrīhi-marker or (as BHSD s. v. *prāṇaka* suggests) diminutive-suffix (as it is, e.g., taken at Sn-a I 154 [see n. 204]).

¹⁷³ Vin I 225 (with parallels in T vol. 22, 149b17 [Vin.Mī.]; Jaworski 1931, 70), 627b28f [Vin.Dh., Sūtravibhaṅga!]; 870a10 [Vin.Dh.]; vol. 23, 189b11 [Vin.Sa.]; Sn p. 14; SN I 169 (≈ T vol. 2, 320c21 [SĀ₁]; 409b6f [SĀ₂]) has only an equivalent for *appāṇake udake* but not for *appaharite*).

l e l i s m between (tiny) animals and green plants, however, the latter, too, are obviously regarded as being damaged by the food remnants.¹⁷⁴ Since in the case of the tiny animals no human interests are involved, there is good reason to assume that this holds good also in the case of the green plants, and that it is these plants themselves that would suffer injury; but this, in its turn, would, in the Indian context, hardly make good sense unless they are regarded as living, sentient beings.¹⁷⁵ To be sure, at least in the Khandhaka (i.e. Vinaya) passages this may not be the view of the Buddhist monks themselves but rather the belief of p e o p l e , which has to be taken into account by them, just as in the case of the prohibition to wander about during the rainy season (see § 9(1-2)); but in the Suttapiṭaka passage we can hardly be sure of this.

11.2 Yet, the situation is more complicated. For there is a similar rule (more precisely: a pair of rules) in the Prātimokṣasūtra.¹⁷⁶ To be sure, it primarily deals

¹⁷⁴ This is expressly corroborated by the post-canonical commentaries: Sn-a I 154,23f (... *tiṇānaṃ pāṇakānaṃ ca anurakkhaṇaṃ tthāya*); Spk I 236,3f (*sace hi haritesu tiṇesu pakkhipeyya, ... tiṇāni pūṇi (C*) bhaveyyum*); Ps I 94,20f (*yasmiṃ ṭhāne piṇḍapātotttharaṇena vinassanadhammāni tiṇāni n'atthi*) and 23f (*bhūtagāma-sikkhāpadassa [i.e. Pāc. 11] hi avikopana-ttham etaṃ vuttaṃ*). Cp. also Vidyāsāgara ad MBh 12.177.15: *vyādhīnām* (sc. of plants) *naramūtreṇa mūladattenā janitānām darśanāt*.

¹⁷⁵ Cp. Wezler 1986, 455 and 457f.

¹⁷⁶ A) Bhikṣu-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Sekhiya/Śaikṣa: Pāli: Vin IV 205f, Sekh. 74: *na harite agilāno uccāraṃ vā passāvaṃ vā kheḷaṃ vā karissāmi ti sikkhā karaṇīyā* and 75: *na uduke ...*; Upāliparipī-ccā (see n. 21): T vol. 24, 910a28 and b1 (Stache-Rosen 1984, 110); Mī.: T vol. 22, 76c5 and 12f; Mā.: T vol. 22, 411c25f and 555a18f; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 34, nos. 65: *na harite tṛṇe uccāraṃ vā prasrāvaṃ vā kheḷaṃ* (Pachow/Mishra 1956: *kheḍḍaṃ*) *vā siṅghāṇaṃ vā agilāno kariṣyāmi ti śikṣā karaṇīyā* and 66: *na uduke ...*; Dh.: T vol. 22, 709b12f and c5f; 1029a22f; Sa.: T vol. 23, 140c4 and 141a6f; 478a24f (Prāt.Sa.); cp. also T vol. 24, 899a12 and 15 and Prāt.Sa.-m (Inoguchi 1981) 202, Nos. 392-393; the reconstructed Skt. version in Rosen 1959, 225 and 228 (taken from Finot 1913, 537) looks like Mū. (see below), not Sa., for fragments of which see v. Simson 1986, 59 (suggesting a restoration to *na ... <udake pāribho> gīye uccāraprasrā <vaṃ> ...*); 95; 169 (*///harita uccāraprasrā <ā> va <m> kh///* and *///raprasrāvaṃ kheḷaṃ siṅghāṇakaṃ///*); 224 (*///haritaṃ tṛṇa .. glāna* (em. to *ta- or *te tṛṇa aglāna?) *uccāraprasrāvaṃ khe///*, suggesting a different version); Mū.: GBM(FacEd) I, p. 33, fol. 56, l. 2-4: *nāglāna uduke uccāraprasrāvaṃ kheḷaṃ siṅghāṇakaṃ vāntaṃ viriktaṃ chorayiṣyāmi ti śikṣā karaṇīyā* and *nāglāna saharite prthivipradeṣe ...*; cp. MVy nos. 8627f; Prāt.Mū., che 17a3f; Vin.Mū., che 251a4f; T vol. 23, 904 a 17f and 22 (Vin.); vol. 24, 507a26-29 (Prāt.); Kā.: T vol. 24, 664c25-27. — B) Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Pācittiya: Pāli: Vin IV 266, Pāc.Bhī. 9: *yā pana bhikkhuni uccāraṃ vā passāvaṃ vā saṅkāraṃ vā vighāsaṃ vā harite chaḍḍeyya ...*; Mī.: T vol. 22, 94a21f and 27f (two rules, one concerning excrements, etc., and another one concerning rubbish and food remnants); Mā.: 543a28f; 563a29f; Hirakawa 1982, 366f; Mā.Lok.: Roth 1970, p. 290: *yā puna bhikṣuṇī harite tṛṇe uccāraṃ vā prasrāvaṃ vā kheḷaṃ vā siṅghāṇakaṃ vā kuryāt, pācatikaṃ and: yā puna ... uduke ...*; Dh.: 739c9f; Sa.: T vol. 23, 319b1f (throwing excrements and urine on plants) and 344b9 (defecating and

with evacuating or pouring out excrements, urine, phlegm and snot,¹⁷⁷ and only some of its versions¹⁷⁸ mention food remnants (*vighāsa*) and other rubbish (*saṃkāra*), but this does not seem to make an essential difference. What does make a difference is that in the Prātimokṣa passages we find, as the places where one should not drop the above-mentioned substances, not [ground] where there are green plants and water containing a n i m a l s but green plants (*harita*)¹⁷⁹ and j u s t water (*udaka*)¹⁸⁰. Thus, in these passages, there is no parallelism between green plants and animals but one between green plants and w a t e r . This evidence would n o t hence favour the assumption that at that time Buddhists too still regarded plants as sentient beings. For as far as I can see, in the case of w a t e r the evidence of the early Buddhist texts rather suggests that sentience was n o longer accepted or was at least largely ignored (see §§ 16.3f). Therefore, it is not improbable that the Prātimokṣa rule against dropping excrements, etc., into water is a mere rule of decorum. Actually, it is, in the case of monks¹⁸¹ and in most versions¹⁸² also in

urinating on plants); Mū.: Prāt.Bhī.Mū., the 21a1f: *yañ dge sloñ ma gañ rtswa sñon po'i steñ du bśaṅ gci 'dor na ltuñ byed do*; cp. Vin.Bhī., 238a1f: ... *ni'u bśiñ* (R: *ne'u gśiñ*) *sñon po la bśaṅ ba 'dor na ...*; T vol. 998c28f (Vin.Bhī.); vol. 24, 514a15f (Prāt.Bhī.); — C Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Śaikṣa: Mī.: 100c20f (Vin.: two rules, concerning water a n d p l a n t s , respectively; but v.l. omits the one concerning plants); 213a29f (Prāt.Bhī.: water a n d p l a n t s); Dh.: 1039b26f (Prāt.Bhī.: water a n d p l a n t s); Sa.: T vol. 23, 487c7f (Prāt.Bhī.: water a n d p l a n t s , but in the case of plants only mentioning phlegm and snot, dropping of excrements and urine being *pācittiya* (see B)); Mū.: Prāt.Bhī.Mū., the 23a8: ... *chu'i nañ du bśaṅ gci dan/ mchil ma dan/ snabs dan/ skyugs pa dan/ rlugs pa mi dor bar ...*; T vol. 23, 1019b23 (Vin.) and vol. 24, 516c8f (Prāt.Bhī.) (water only; but Vin.Bhī., includes, before the *śaikṣa* rule for nuns concerning water, another one concerning plants (the 288a1 and 3f), which is, however, missing in R (ñā 440a5)).

¹⁷⁷ The versions of Pāc.Bhī. 9 (see n. 176, B) except those of Mā./Mā.Lok. (and the Chin. version of Mū.) omit phlegm (*kheṭa*) and snot (*siṅghāna*(*ka*)). In the *śaikṣa* rules, the Pāli version (n. 176, A) lacks snot (but cp. Sp 898: *kheṭena c'ettha siṅghānikā pi saṅgahitā*), and the Mī. version (n. 176, A and C) both snot and phlegm, whereas the Skt. Mū. version and Prāt.Kā. add vomit (*vānta*) and excretions through purging (*virikta*; Prāt.Kā.: "...(?) blood"); for the special case of the Sa. version of the *śaikṣa* rule for nuns concerning plants, see n. 176, C. — The tetrad *uccāra*, *passāva*, *kheṭa* and *siṅghāna* is also found in Jaina sources: cp., e.g., Kapp 1.19; Dasav 8.18; Utt 24.15.

¹⁷⁸ Viz. the Pāli and Mī. versions of Pāc.Bhī. 9 (see n. 176, B).

¹⁷⁹ The variants "on green grass" (*harite tṛṇe*, esp. Mā.Lok., see n. 176) and "on a spot of the ground where there are green plants" (*saharite pṛthivipradese*, Prāt.Mū., see ib.) look explicative; cp. T vol. 23, 999a1f, explaining "fresh grass(/plants)" as "a place where green, living (𑖦𑖳𑖨) grass(/plants) grow(s)". — That *harite* in this strand is the positive pendant to *appaharite* in the other strand (§ 9.1) is also evident from Sp 898 where both terms are used in a complementary way.

¹⁸⁰ Some Ch. versions (esp. most Mī. and Dh. witnesses as well as T 1465 (Sa.?) and Prāt.Sa.™ (see n. 176, A) have "pure water". For *pāribhogika udaka*, see n. 200.

¹⁸¹ See n. 176, A.

the case of nuns, merely considered as a *sekhiya* or *śaikṣa* rule, i.e. a mere pattern of decorous behaviour breaking which is no offence, or at least not an offence requiring atonement.¹⁸³ Likewise, the rule not to evacuate or drop excrements, etc., on green plants is, in the case of monks, merely a *sekhiya/śaikṣa* rule.¹⁸⁴ In the case of nuns, however, it is reckoned among the *pācittiya* offences.¹⁸⁵ This may indicate that this rule was taken slightly more seriously than the one concerning water,¹⁸⁶ and this may (but of course need not) mean that the sentence of plants was, in earliest Buddhism, or at least among the "people" whose opinion had to be respected, less obsolete than the sentence of water.

11.3 It is only in the canonical commentary on the Prātimokṣasūtra of the Mahāsaṅghikas that plants and water where excrements, etc., should not be dropped are explained as including all [green] plants¹⁸⁷ and all kinds of water¹⁸⁸. And it is only in a few passages that one or the other version of the canonical commentary points out that throwing excrements, etc., on plants may injure or kill them.¹⁸⁹ But

¹⁸² I.e. except in the Mā./Mā.Lok. tradition (see n. 176, B), where defecating, etc., into water, too, is, in the case of nuns, regarded as a *pācittiya* offence.

¹⁸³ In the terminology of the Suttavibhaṅga, it is a *dukkata* offence (Vin IV 206; T vol. 23, 141a7f [Vin.Sa.]; with some differentiation: T vol. 22, 709c6ff [Vin.Dh.]).

¹⁸⁴ See n. 176, A.

¹⁸⁵ Cp. n. 176, B. Strangely enough (perhaps due to inadvertency when supplementing the special Prātimokṣa rules for nuns by those they had in common with the monks?), in some schools (Mī., Dh., Sa.: see n. 176, C) it occurs also among the *śaikṣa* rules for nuns, which of course constitutes a contradiction. It is only in the Sa. version that this contradiction has been resolved by referring the two rules concerning the pollution of plants by nuns to different polluting substances (see n. 176, C).

¹⁸⁶ This does not, however, explain why defecating, etc., on green plants was considered a more serious offence in the case of nuns than in the case of monks. I have not been able to decide so far whether the different grouping of the rule is merely the effect of a certain heterogeneity in the formation of the two sets (viz. the rules for monks and the special rules for nuns), and of lack of harmonization, or an expression of a general view that in the case of nuns stricter rules of decorous behaviour have to be applied, or whether there is any other reason.

¹⁸⁷ T vol. 22, 543b1: 草著一切草; but Vin.Mā.Lok. (Roth 1970, p. 290,23) explains green plants as "green grass (*śāḍvala*) not cut or mowed (*a-cchinna-lūna*)". Cp., however, also Sp 898 where Buddhaghosa includes, into *harita*, the roots of "living" trees (*jīva-rukkha*) in the ground as far as they are perceived, as well as branches hanging down to the ground; cp. T vol. 24, 788a14f (Ch. version of Sp).

¹⁸⁸ Roth 1970, p. 290,23ff (ten kinds of water, including even that of the ocean).

¹⁸⁹ T vol. 22, 739b21 and 29f (Vin.Dh.); T vol. 23, 140b26 and 319a22f (Vin.Sa.). Cp. also T vol. 24, 829c22ff (*Vinayamātrkā: see n. 218), where the tree deity becomes annoyed because

on the whole the explanation and motivation offered by the canonical commentary for the rules under discussion is decidedly *anthropocentric*. In the introductory stories, what is spoilt by some nasty monks or nuns is cereals in a field¹⁹⁰ or vegetables in a garden,¹⁹¹ or the grass of a lawn where people meet¹⁹² or of a park where the harem of a king enjoy themselves,¹⁹³ and water used by people for bathing or washing themselves,¹⁹⁴ drinking,¹⁹⁵ or washing clothes;¹⁹⁶ and what is violated by such acts is the interest of the human owner or user(s).¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, in the Pāli Suttavibhaṅga the plants concerned are expressly

a monk defecates on a tree.

¹⁹⁰ Vin IV 266. Cp. in this connection also the way *appaharite* at Pāc. 19 (see n. 152) is understood in the introductory story: here, too, the green plants that are (but ought not to be) injured by the monk are taken to be barley on a field belonging to a brahmin (Vin IV 47; cp. also T vol. 22, 44c11 [Vin.Mī.]); hence, here too it seems to be primarily human interests that are at stake; but T vol. 22, 345b24f (Vin.Mā.) merely states that people, being upset and flocking together around the building under construction, "injur and kill fresh grass/plants", with no sign of human interest being involved.

¹⁹¹ T vol. 23, 140b22ff (Vin.Sa.; cp. Rosen 1959, 224); Vin.Mū., te 250b3ff (= T vol. 23, 904a13ff); vol. 24, 899a11f (Sa.?). All these passages introduce the *śaikṣa* rule for monks. The *śaikṣa* rule for nuns concerning plants in Vin.Bhī., (the 288a4ff; only in P, not in R!) has a somewhat different introduction.

¹⁹² T vol. 22, 94a13ff (Vin.Mī.); 739b15ff (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 319a16ff (Vin.Sa.); 998c15ff (Vin.Mū.); Vin.Bhī., the 237b5ff. All these passages introduce the *pācittiya* rule for nuns (cp. Waldschmidt 1926, 163 (= 1979, 167)).

¹⁹³ T vol. 22, 411c4ff and 543a15ff (cp. Hirakawa 1982, 366); Roth 1970, p. 289f. — Mā./Mā.Lok. tradition, introductory story to both the *pācittiya* rule for nuns and the *śaikṣa* rule for monks.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ T vol. 24, 899a13 (Sa.?): cp. also T vol. 23, 140c22ff (Vin.Sa.), reporting that monks defecated, etc., into a large pond used by people; it is not quite clear for what purpose, but Skt. (Rosen 1959, 226 § 4) has *udapāna* "well", which would seem to suggest drinking water. — Both passages introduce the *śaikṣa* rule for monks.

¹⁹⁶ T vol. 23, 140b7ff (Vin.Sa.; see Rosen 1959, 225f); Vin.Mū., te 250a4ff (= T vol. 23, 904a19ff). Both passages introduce the *śaikṣa* rule for monks. Similar story at Vin.Bhī. the 288b4ff and T vol. 23, 1019b21f (introducing the *śaikṣa* rule for nuns).

¹⁹⁷ Cp., for the same tendency, also §§ 12.1, 13.3, 14.4 and 17.1; cp. also Schlingloff 1963, 539. I wonder whether this development may have been influenced by Hindu Dharmaśāstra, where the same tendency can be observed (cp. Wezler 1986, 446ff).

defined as cultivated plants — cereals and vegetables —,¹⁹⁸ and in Buddhaghosa's commentary¹⁹⁹ and even in one version of the *Prātimokṣasūtra*²⁰⁰ water is specified as water used [for drinking, etc.] (*paribhoga-udaka*).

11.4 It would exceed the limits of this paper to investigate in detail the situation in Jainism and early Hinduism (where comparable regulations can be found). But it seems that in Hinduism, too, aspects of decorum, hygiene and human interests intermingle with motives of *ahiṃsā* (and also such of various kinds of religious belief and awe).²⁰¹ In Jainism, the *ahiṃsā* motive is naturally prominent, but aspects of decorum, public hygiene and human interests are by no means absent.²⁰² It would

¹⁹⁸ Vin IV 267: *haritaṃ nāma pubbaṇṇaṃ aparāṇṇaṃ, yaṃ m a n u s s ā n a ṃ upabhoga-paribhogāṃ ropimaṃ*. Sp 924 includes cocoanut groves, etc. — As for the terms *upabhoga* and *paribhoga*, cp. their use in Jaina texts (Williams 1983, 102).

¹⁹⁹ Sp 898, as against toilet water and water of the ocean; cp. T vol. 24, 787a26f (Ch. version of Sp).

²⁰⁰ T vol. 23, 141a6f (Vin.Sa.) and 478a25 (Prāt.Sa.): 淨用水; cp. Rosen 1959, 226 (*udake pāribhogike*).

²⁰¹ Cp., e.g., Manu IV.45cd-52, esp. 46a (not urinating on a cultivated field or into water); 56 (not dropping urine, excrements, spittle, etc., into water). In the case of water, the motive appears to be complex (cp. in this connection, H. P. Duerr, *Nacktheit und Scham*, Frankfurt 1988, 216: the Dhodia avoiding defecating and urinating in a river or pond because it would offend the water-spirits; cp. T vol. 23, 604c4-6: water deity may be irritated at washing after easing nature). In the case of cultivated fields, human interests would seem to overweigh. Decorum is probably a major motive when it is, e.g., prohibited to urinate while standing (47b; cp. Vin IV 205: Sekh. 73); *ahiṃsā*: 47a, interdicting urinating into pits containing living beings (*na sasattveṣu garteṣu*; cp. Uttar 24.18: *bilavajjī*, and Āyār II.10.11 (JĀS § 656): *pagattāṇi*); special religious belief (and fear) is certainly involved when, e.g., urinating into an ant-hill is prohibited (46d; cp. D. König, *Das Tor zur Unterwelt: Mythologie und Kult des Termitenhügels in der schriftlichen und mündlichen Tradition Indiens*, Wiesbaden 1984, esp. p. 148 + n. 57).

²⁰² Cp., e.g., Utt 24.15-18 (decorum: that the place should not be frequented nor seen by others; *ahiṃsā*: e.g., that it should be free from animals and seeds and — as follows from *acirakālakayaṃṇi* — green plants); Āyār II.10 (JĀS §§ 645-668; decorum: e.g. not to ease nature on a pillar or roof, etc. [10.7 = § 652], or on pathways, entrances or courtyards [10.15-16 = § 660f]; human interests: not where people have sown or will sow rice, etc. [10.10 = § 655], not in gardens, parks or into wells [10.14 = § 659] or in a vegetable field [10.20 = § 665]; *ahiṃsā*: in a place where there are, if possible, no eggs or animals (*app'-aṇḍe appa-pāṇe*), no seeds or green plants (*appa-bīe a p p a - h a r i e*), no dew or water (*app'-ose app'-u d a e*) [10.1 = § 647; full wording see § 324], not on animate (*cittamaṃṭa*, i.e. still living) stones or clods, not on (dead) wood inhabited by living beings [10.8 = § 653]). — As for not spoiling (or injuring?) w a t e r, cp. Kapp 1.19 (excrements, etc., should not be deposited on the bank of water (*daga-tīraṃṣi*)). As for not injuring the e a r t h by excrements, etc., see n. 298.

explain the existence of the two different strands discussed above (§§ 11.1 and 11.3) if we suppose that in earliest Buddhism, too, the rule not to drop excrements, etc., on green plants and into water had such a mixed motivation, in the sense that the Buddha, or the Buddhist monks and nuns, were aware of, and made allowance for, both the *ahiṃsā* and the decorum or hygiene motive, although they themselves may not have shared the belief in the sentience of plants, let alone water, anymore, or may not have regarded pollution by excrements, etc., as a serious (or at least not an intentional: cp. § 9.2) form of injuring them. Later on, the two above-mentioned strands of (re-) interpretation developed: the purely anthropocentric one of the *Prātimokṣa* exegesis (§ 11.3), and the *ahiṃsā*-orientated one of the *Suttapiṭaka* and *Khandaka* materials (§ 11.1). In both of them, the rule concerning water is (re-)motivated in a way consonant with the view of the i n sentience of water by basing its protection on the interests of man and tiny animals, respectively. In the anthropocentric strand, the same procedure has been applied to the rule concerning p l a n t s , but even here, a few sources still testify to the idea that the plants t h e m s e l v e s are injured by the excrements, etc. In the *ahiṃsā*-orientated strand, however, there is n o re-motivation in the case of plants, except, though only indirectly, in a few Chinese translations²⁰³ and in a post-canonical source.²⁰⁴ This difference of treatment may indicate a certain difference in the status of water and of plants, though, it is true, perhaps only in the eyes of "people" and not necessarily of the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves.

III.B. Fruits, Raw Grain and Garlic

In the following paragraphs (§§12.1-14.5), I shall discuss some rules concerning food plants, though, once again, anything but exhaustively.

12.1 In a passage of the *Khandhaka*,²⁰⁵ the Buddha is stated to have prohibited monks to eat m a n g o f r u i t s . The preceding story motivates the prohibition by the fact that some monks misused the permission to gather mangos in the king's park to the extent that no fruits were left, and thereby violated the k i n g ' s inter-

²⁰³ T vol. 22, 627b28f [Vin.Dh.] has "clean (i.e. bare) ground" (淨地) instead, but cp. 835c27(f) [Vin.Dh.] where this is combined with 無草處 to render *appa-°/alpa-harite*.

²⁰⁴ Sn-a I 154,23f states that the injunction to drop the remnants of the dangerous dish either at a spot where there are only few green plants or into water without tiny animals has the purpose to protect the grasses a l o n g w i t h t h e a n i m a l s d w e l l i n g i n t h e m and the tiny animals [in water], respectively (*saha tiṇa-nissitehi pāṇehi tiṇānaṃ pāṇakānaṃ ca anurakkhanta-thāya*). Even this explanation does not necessarily imply that plants do not deserve protection for their own sake, but by referring a l s o to the a n i m a l s dwelling in them it indicates how this part of the injunction makes sense even when this is denied because of the view that plants are insentient (cp. § 5.2).

²⁰⁵ Vin II 108f; cp. T vol. 22, 170c24ff (Vin.Mī.); 478a20ff (Vin.Mā.); 953b11ff (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 268a22ff (Vin.Sa.); Vin.Mū, de 8b1ff = T vol. 24, 209c18ff.

ests.²⁰⁶ But why should the Buddha have prohibited the monks to eat mangos merely because some of them had, on one occasion, eaten too many? It would have been sufficient to blame unseemly greed. Hence, the motive for the prohibition must have been a different one.

12.2 One could imagine that eating mangos was prohibited because they were probably the most delicious fruit available, and might hence not have been regarded as suitable for ascetics who have renounced worldly pleasures.²⁰⁷ But on the whole Buddhism does not prohibit monks to accept delicious food when it is spontaneously offered to them; what is considered detrimental is only greed for such food. In fact, in the next paragraph of the text the Buddha does allow the acceptance of mango slices.²⁰⁸ Hence, it is hardly a matter of delicious taste either.

12.3 The fact that mango slices offered by a layman are allowed rather points to another direction. What is prohibited is that the monks eat fruits which they have plucked themselves²⁰⁹ and which have not been rendered fit [for ascetics] (*kappiya/kalpika*: kosher, so to speak) by a layman.²¹⁰ This point is made explicit by the third paragraph of the text, stating that monks are allowed to accept even whole mango fruits under the proviso that these fruits satisfy the five requirements [of food] for ascetics²¹¹ (*pañcahi samānakappehi*), viz. that they have been injured²¹² (*parijita*) by fire, or a knife, etc., or finger-nails, or²¹³ that they

²⁰⁶ The monks eat all fruits (Vin.Dh.); they eat some fruits, throw away some half-eaten and take the rest home (Vin.Mī., Vin.Mā.); they finish them while they are young (Pāli; cp. Vin.Mū., de 8b5f = T vol. 24, 209c29f, where however the mango grove has been donated to the Order); in Vin.Sa., the story has been remodeled so as to show the monks in a less unfavourable light.

²⁰⁷ Cp. the scruples of the monks expressed at T vol. 23, 268c1f.

²⁰⁸ Vin II 109: *anujānāmi ... ambapesikaṃ*. T vol. 23, 268b29-c3 (Vin.Sa.): mango soup (allowed if offered spontaneously); T vol. 22, 953b21-25 (Vin.Dh.): mango juice, fried mangos, thick mango juice. The remaining versions seem to lack a corresponding paragraph.

²⁰⁹ Cp. T vol. 23, 268a28ff and b6f (Vin.Sa.): prohibition to eat a mango fruit which one has received from a layman after having first touched it with one's own hand; cp. T vol. 22, 875b18 (Vin.Dh., general formulation). Acc. to Vin I 212, such a procedure is allowed only in case of need.

²¹⁰ In fact, in T vol. 22, 171a6 (Vin.Mī.) already the initial prohibition interdicts the consumption of fruits that have not yet been "purified" (i.e. rendered suitable for ascetics).

²¹¹ Or: "[have undergone] the five treatments [that make food fit] for ascetics". This rendering of the term would not, it is true, fit in with *abīja* nor with *nibbatta-bīja*, but the former is missing and the latter seems to have a causative equivalent in at least most of the other versions (cp. n. 215).

²¹² Cp. CPD s.v. *aggi-parijita*.

are free from seeds (*abīja*) or have discharged their seeds²¹⁴ (*nibbatta-bīja*).²¹⁵ At the same time, this rule is stated in a general form, valid for all kinds of fruits,²¹⁶ and in other texts it is even applied to seeds and other edible parts of plants capable of propagation.²¹⁷

12.4 On the doctrinal background of the prescription to eat only fruits conforming to the requirements of suitability for ascetics all versions of the passage under discussion remain silent, but it is made fully explicit in a *Vinaya-mātrkā of doubtful affiliation,²¹⁸ where it is stated that when monks ate fruits although these had not been rendered pure they were reproached by non-Buddhist ascetics with lack of compassion; for — so these ascetics (who may well be Jains)²¹⁹ — fruits are

²¹³ The last two items of the Pāli version of the list seem to refer not to human activity but to natural events (cp. Sp 767: *abīja-nibbattaḥabijāni sayam eva kappiyāni*), as is confirmed by Vin I 215 (cp. also n. 225), where the Buddha allows, under certain circumstances at least, to eat fruits that are free from seeds or have discharged their seeds even when they have not been rendered "suitable" [by a lay person] (*akaṭakappaṃ*).

²¹⁴ Thus PTC s.v. *nibbatta-bīja*; Sp 1093 (ad Vin I 215): "which can be eaten after [somebody] has removed (*nibbattetvā apanetvā*) the seed".

²¹⁵ Vin II 109: *anujānāmi ... pañcahi samaṇakappehi phalaṃ paribhuñjitum: aggi-parijitaṃ, sattha-parijitaṃ, nakha-parijitaṃ, abijaṃ, nibbattaḥabijāññeva* (v.l. *nibbatta°*) *pañcamam*. Cp. T vol. 22, 171a11f (Vin.Mi.): fire, knife, birds, injury [suffered by some accident], no seeds having developed; 478b10ff (Vin.Mā.): peeling, or at least scratching with a finger-nail; having been pecked by birds; having been injured in a vessel; removal of the kernel; fire; 875a18f (Vin.Dh., different context): fire, knife, wound, birds, containing no seeds; vol. 23, 268c4f (Vin.Sa.): fire, knife, finger-nail or claw, parrots, no seeds having developed; 826a20f (Vin.Mū., different context): fire, knife, finger-nail or claw, decaying or drying up, pecking by birds; cp. also vol. 24, 817b21f (*Vinaya-mātrkā, see n. 218): fire, knife, birds, spontaneous damage on the fruit, removal of the seeds. There is more material, and there are also other lists of methods for making edible plants suitable for ascetics, with some variation according to the type of vegetable food concerned (e.g., T vol. 22, 171a12ff; 339a21ff; 875a21f; vol. 24, 817b23f).

²¹⁶ The word used is now *phala*, not *amba* as in the preceding lines. Cp. also T vol. 22, 171a6; 478b10f; vol. 23, 268c3, and esp. b7f expressly stating that the rule concerning mangos has to be extended to all fruits. Cp. also T vol. 22, 875a17ff (Vin.Dh.), and vol. 23, 275c8-11 (Vin.Sa.).

²¹⁷ Cp., e.g., T vol. 22, 171a12-15; 339a21ff and c23-25; Sp 767f.

²¹⁸ Cp. Yuyama 1979, 44 (§ 1.05); Hirakawa ²1970, 262-264, according to whom both the ascription of the text, by some scholars like A. Bareau (Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saïgon 1955, 112), to the Haimavata school is not sufficiently established, nor affiliation, proposed by others on the basis of a certain doctrinal affinity, to the Dharmaguptakas. Cp. also de Jong 1979, 289 n. 6.

²¹⁹ Cp., e.g., Dasav 5.2.21, 23 and 24; Āyār II.1.8.4 and 6 (JĀS ed. §§ 377 and 379).

living beings, and hence eating them (unless they have already been killed by someone else) means eating (and killing) a living being.²²⁰ According to the *Vinayamāṭṭhā,²²¹ it is on account of such censure that the Buddha established the above restriction, allowing acceptance and consumption only under condition that they had already been injured by somebody else (or had at least burst or begun to rot by themselves) and had their seeds removed (since these were, in view of their germinative vitality, likewise considered to be living beings). It hence seems that this passage of the *Vinayamāṭṭhā, similar to other passages of the Khandhaka/Skandhaka and the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga (see §§ 5.4-5.5; 8; 9.1; 10.1), presupposes that it is only out of respect for the belief of others in the sentience of fruits (/seeds, plants) that the Buddhist monks are enjoined to abstain from injuring them, and that they themselves rather did not share this belief. But once again we cannot be sure that this was the original situation.

12.5 It may be worth noting that in the Pāli version of the Khandhaka and in at least one other version²²² a transgression of the prohibition to eat mango fruits (which have not been offered and made suitable for ascetics) is expressly stated to be a *dukkata* offence, whereas injuring the plant itself or the seeds is, according to Pāc. 11, a *pācittiya* offence. At least according to the relation of these terms established in the Suttavibhaṅga, injuring a fruit is thus considered less grave. Cp., perhaps,²²³ also the rule, found in the Khandhaka, that fruits may, in case of need,²²⁴ be eaten without having been rendered "suitable" if only they lack seeds or have discharged them,²²⁵ or have had their kernel removed.²²⁶ We can hardly be sure that such a different evaluation goes back to the earliest days of Buddhism and perhaps even indicates that if plants were indeed regarded as sentient the sentience of fruits was from the outset taken somewhat less seriously than that of plants proper and of seeds;

²²⁰ T vol. 24, 817b18-20. Cp. also T vol. 22, 875b11-16 (Vin.Dh.) where we read that lay people, seeing monks eating vegetables that had not been rendered "pure" (i.e. suitable for ascetics), resented it as killing a living being, the final effect being that the Buddha prescribes that vegetables have to be "purified" before they may be eaten by monks.

²²¹ T vol. 24, 817b20ff.

²²² T vol. 22, 171a6 (Vin.Mī.); cp. T vol. 23, 268b7 (Vin.Sa.).

²²³ The problem is whether the kernel or the seeds have to be absent or removed because their destruction is unnecessary or because they are, due to their sprouting capacity (which is absent in the rest of the fruit!) felt to have a higher degree of vitality.

²²⁴ I.e., if there is nobody to render it suitable, and, acc. to Vin.Mī., only in time of famine (T vol. 22, 148a12; cp. Jaworski 1931, 61); the rule is expressly declared not to be applicable under normal conditions (b4-9).

²²⁵ Vin I 215 (see n. 213).

²²⁶ T 22, 148a25-27.

but at least it would show a *d e v e l o p m e n t* in the direction of reducing the seriousness of injury inflicted upon fruits, and this means a decreasing significance of their sentience (or people's belief in it). This may have something to do with their importance for nutrition, as is confirmed by the fact that at least in the Theravāda tradition injuring seeds too — in the wider sense including all parts of plants separated from the mother plant and still capable of propagation, and hence a considerable part of vegetable food — has come to be regarded as being merely *dukkata*.²²⁷ Finally, the act of rendering fruits, seeds, etc., suitable for ascetics by cutting them with a knife, etc., becomes a mere formality, cutting or scratching one item being sufficient to render a whole heap of fruits, seeds, etc., suitable.²²⁸ At this stage, at the latest, the idea that even seeds and fruits are, somehow, living; sentient beings would seem to have definitely become obsolete in Buddhism, to say the least.

13.1 Among the minor moral precepts for monks in the Suttapiṭaka (cp. §§ 4.3 and 7.3), we find abstention from accepting *raw grain* (*āmaka-dhañña-paṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato*).²²⁹ This might be taken to aim at preventing the acceptance of an article of food especially suitable for storing or bargain, both of which are interdicted by other items of the same series of precepts. But a similar rule in the Pāṭimokkhasutta points to another direction. There, it is stated that a nun commits a *pācittiya* offence if she orders, or [expressly] begs for, *raw grain, roasts, pounds or cooks it or has others do so, and finally eats it*.²³⁰ This would seem to suggest that the primary motive is, in both cases, rather the fact that in order to use raw grain (i.e. seeds capable of germination) for food, the monk or nun has to destroy

²²⁷ Sp 762; Sv 81,26.

²²⁸ Cp., e.g., T vol. 22, 171a15f (Vin.Mī.); 339c25ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 24, 577b13f; Sp 767f. — It would seem that this procedure was developed in connection with edible seeds or small fruits since rendering them *kappiya* one by one was extremely time-consuming if not impracticable (hence originally raw grain was unacceptable for monks: cp. § 13.1).

²²⁹ See n. 41. Cp. also Saṅghabh II 233, 17 (*āmadhānyapratigrahāt prativirato bhavati*) and T vol. 1, 657b16 (MĀ, Sa.: 離受生稻麥豆). Cp. also T vol. 22, 431a1 and 478a14ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 24, 558b11 (Vin.Mū.).

²³⁰ Pāc.Bhī. 7 (Vin IV 264): *yā pana bhikkhunī āmakadhaññaṃ viññatvā* (v.l. *viññitvā* and *viññāpetvā*) *vā viññāpervā* (v.l. *viññāpāpervā*) *vā bhajjivā vā bhajjāpetvā vā koṭṭhetvā* (v.l. *°itvā*) *vā koṭṭhāpetvā vā pacitvā vā pacāpetvā vā bhuñjeyya, pācittiyaṃ*; Mī.: T vol. 22, 96c3f (preparing food by cooking raw stuff herself); Mā.: 530a10-12 (eating food after cooking, frying or stewing it again, or having others do so; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 263f); Mā.Lok.: Roth 1970, p. 215 (... *parāhṛtaṃ khādaniyaṃ vā bhojaniyaṃ vā puno puno pacitvā vā pacāpetvā vā bhrjivitvā vā ... kathitvā vā ... khādaye* (216: *khādeya*) *vā bhuñjeyya vā ...*); Dh.: 739b8 (begging raw grain); Sa.: vol. 23, 318b10 (like Mī.); Mū.: Prāt.Bhī., the 20a1 (... *rjen pa 'tshod na ...*; cp. Vin.Bhī., the 237a6: ... *rjen pa 'tshed par byed na ...*) = T vol. 24, 998b17 (cooking raw food herself). Cp. Waldschmidt 1926, 155 (= 1979, 159).

them by roasting, etc.,²³¹ and that this was regarded as an act of killing²³² a living, sentient being,²³³ though, once again, the belief in the sentience of seeds need not have been shared by the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves; they may only have been ordered to adjust their behaviour to common standards of ascetic decorum.²³⁴

²³¹ This is surely the normal way of preparing cereals like rice or barley for food. Hence, the prohibition is hardly an implicit permission to eat them in a raw state. — (Raw) grain is defined by the Suttavibhaṅga (cp. also Sv I 78) as rice, barley, etc., i.e. as what in other places (e.g. Sp 340) is equated with "primary food" (*pubbaṇṇa*), as opposed to sesame seed, beans, etc., called "secondary food" (*aparaṇṇa*). I do not, however, understand Vogel's statement (IIJ 13/1971, 20) that *pubbaṇṇa*, hence *āmakadhāṇṇa*, is food eaten in the natural (= raw) state, whereas *aparaṇṇa* is eaten in the cooked state. Who eats rice in the natural state? If the distinction between *pubba-* and *aparaṇṇa* has anything at all to do with the state in which food-stuffs are usually consumed, it would rather be sesame or beans (at least as long as they are young) and other vegetables that are often eaten in the raw state. — At any rate, as long as the rule not to accept raw grain is primarily motivated by considerations of seed *ahimsā*, it is difficult to see why it should not hold good also for beans, etc., and it would not matter whether they have to be cooked or may be eaten in the raw state. In fact, at T vol. 22, 739a22f (Vin.Dh.) beans are explicitly included among the things for begging which in a raw state the nuns are reproached. Cp. also the addition of "beans" (𑖀𑖦𑖡𑖩) in the translation of *āmakadhāṇṇa* at T vol. 1, 657b16, and T vol. 24, 558b11 (Vin.Mū.; but cp. also, for possible counter-evidence, Vin IV 265 and (?) T vol. 22, 478a18f). The reason why only the acceptance of raw grain is prohibited and not that of raw vegetables is probably that, roughly speaking, vegetables are big enough to be rendered "suitable" for ascetics (*kappiya*) one by one by the lay person, whereas grains are too small for such a procedure (a problem which was, later on, solved by making them "suitable" in a lump (see § 12.5)). Besides, when the main motive of the prohibition to accept (or beg and prepare) raw grain came to be seen in the cooking activity (see § 13.2.2), vegetables to be eaten in the raw state could be exempted, as is perhaps the intention of the *anāpatti* formula of the Suttavibhaṅga (Vin IV 265: *anāpatti ... aparāṇṇaṃ vīṇāpeti*). Interestingly enough, Buddhaghosa (Sp 924) suggests, besides the usual explanation as beans, etc. (*muggamāsādī*), an alternative interpretation of *aparaṇṇa* as bottle-gourds, etc., which hardly require cooking (and, by the way, can easily be made "suitable"). But the whole matter surely requires more careful investigation.

²³² The association of *āma(ka)*° with killing is also evoked by the fact that side by side with abstention from accepting raw grain (*āma(ka)-dhaṇṇa*), the Suttaṭṭhaka list of minor moral precepts (see n. 229) enjoins abstention from raw meat (*āma(ka)-māṃsa*); cp. also T vol. 22, 478a2ff. For the association of *āma* with injury cp. also Seyfort Rugg 1980, 240.

²³³ As is, of course, the Jaina point of view: cp., e.g., Dasav 3.7 (it is forbidden to eat raw seeds (*bīe āmage*) since they, too, are sentient (*saccitta*); cp. also DasavViv 235,5) and 8.10 (*ahimsā* context: a monk should not even think of obtaining raw seeds, expressly declared to be living beings (*jīva*) at 8.2).

²³⁴ This is, of course, the view of later sources: cp. Sp 924 classifying the matter as *pañṇatti-vajja* (see n. 93), or T vol 23, 998b20 (Vin.Mū.) stating that if the cooking is done for the monks in a hidden house where no outsider can see it, it is no offence (cp. also Vin.Bhī., the 237a7).

13.2 It is, however, worth noting that there are some interesting differences between the Pāṭimokkha rule and the Suttapiṭaka passage.

13.2.1 Firstly, the Pāṭimokkha rule prohibits [express] b e g g i n g (*viññatti*) for raw grain, whereas according to the Suttapiṭaka passage even a c c e p t a n c e (*paṭiggahaṇa*), which doubtless includes acceptance even of spontaneously given raw grain, has to be abandoned. Hence, the Suttapiṭaka rule is obviously the stricter one, coming close to the corresponding regulation for Jaina monks.²³⁵ Does this mean that it is more archaic, perhaps adopted from some pre-existing, non-Buddhist codex of ascetic behaviour? But it is also possible that the Pāṭimokkha rule was not meant to tacitly sanction acceptance of spontaneously offered raw grain²³⁶ but rather limited itself to stigmatize such forms of behaviour as were likely to scandalize lay people most, in that they disclosed a deliberate intention²³⁷ to violate or disregard accepted principles of ascetic life.

13.2.2 Such a consideration would seem to be corroborated by the second difference between the Pāṭimokkha and the Suttapiṭaka rule, namely that in the Pāṭimokkha the rule declaring begging, preparation and consumption of raw grain to be a *pācittiya* offence is found only among the (additional) monastic precepts for n u n s . It is, to be sure, not allowed to monks either,²³⁸ but in their case it is, according to the terminology of the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka, merely *dukkāṭa*.²³⁹ The reason suggesting itself is that for a nun the temptation to ask for raw grain in order to prepare a delicious dish was much greater, since cooking was, of course, a typically female activity. But what was natural for housewives was utterly unbecoming for a female ascetic,²⁴⁰ obliged to live on alms not only in order to avoid destruction of living beings (or of what was regarded so by people) but also because she had to be indifferent towards the quality of food. In the Mahāsāṅghika version of the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, which omits the reference to r a w food-stuff,²⁴¹ it even seems to be o n l y the effort to improve the quality of food that is reproved, as is made fully explicit in the Mahāsāṅghika(/-Lokottaravādin)

²³⁵ Cp., e.g., Dasav 8.10cd (see n. 233); Āyār II.1.8.11 (JĀS ed. § 384).

²³⁶ Though T vol. 22, 739b12f (Vin.Dh.) understands the rule to do precisely this.

²³⁷ Cp. Vin IV 264f: *b h u ṇ j i s s ā m ī t i paṭigaṇhāti, āpatti dukkaṭassa*.

²³⁸ Vin I 210f: ... *Ānando ... sāmaṃ tilaṃ pi taṇḍulaṃ pi muggaṃ pi viññāpetvā ... sāmaṃ pacitvā ... and na ... sāmaṃ pakkamaṃ paribhuñjitabbam; yo paribhuñjeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa*; cp. T vol. 22, 148a28ff (Vin.Mī.). Cp. also 477c20f (Vin.Mā.) and n. 239.

²³⁹ Vin I 211 (see n. 238); T vol. 22, 739b10 (Vin.Dh.); cp. Roth 1970, p. 216,12f (*vinayātikrama*).

²⁴⁰ Cp. T vol 22, 96b29f.

²⁴¹ See n. 230.

version of the introductory story.²⁴²

13.3 Thus, the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion shows a clear tendency towards shifting emphasis from the *ahimsā* aspect towards matters of ascetic decorum. In some versions of the introductory story,²⁴³ a nun's (or nuns') cooking is even taken to infringe upon the economic interests of people,²⁴⁴ viz. the interests of the kitchen personnel or of a professional cook. But such an interpretation is doubtless rather far-fetched. Nor is it probable that the inappropriateness, for an ascetic, of cooking as such, though explaining well why the prohibition is stricter in the case of nuns, was the primary reason from the outset. For as the Mahāsāṅghika(/-Lokottaravādin) version of the introductory story shows,²⁴⁵ even ready-made (alms-)food may be done up to make it more savoury. But apart from the Mahāsāṅghika(/-Lokottaravādin) version of the Prātimokṣa rule²⁴⁶ (which seems to be adapted to the case of doing up alms-food) all versions speak of cooking (or even only begging) raw food-stuff or raw grain,²⁴⁷ and in the Vinayavibhaṅga and Skandhaka re-cooking is occasionally expressly allowed,²⁴⁸ and this suggests that also in Buddhism the primary motive for the prohibition was that ascetics were expected not to injure intact seeds, which were believed to be living beings by people and other ascetics though, as stated above, not necessarily also by the Buddhist monks and nuns.

14.1 In the Khandhaka,²⁴⁹ the Buddhist monks are prohibited from eating *garlic* (except for medical purposes), transgression being a *dukkata* offence, and in the Pāṭimokkhasutta for nuns²⁵⁰ consumption of garlic is declared to be a *pācittiya*

²⁴² T vol. 22, 529c23ff (Hirakawa 1982, 262f); Roth 1970, 214f.

²⁴³ T vol. 22, 529c23ff, esp. 28ff (Hirakawa 1982, 263); Roth 1970, p. 214f (cp. de Jong 1979, 301), esp. 214,20ff (where one should probably read *paṇḍitavyaṃ* in l. 21); vol. 23, 318a21ff, esp. 29ff (Vin.Sa.); 998a27ff, esp. b11ff (Vin.Mū.; cp. also Vin.Bhī., the 236b1ff); in the Sa. and Mū. versions, the nun(s) cook(s) for other people.

²⁴⁴ Cp. also §§ 11.3, 12.1, 14.4 and ?.

²⁴⁵ See n. 242.

²⁴⁶ Cp. n. 230 (... *parāhṛtaṃ khādanīyaṃ vā bhojanīyaṃ vā puno puno pacitvā* ...).

²⁴⁷ See n. 230.

²⁴⁸ E.g., T vol. 23, 318b13 (Vin.Sa.); Vin I 211: *anujānāmi ... puna-pākaṃ pacituṃ*.

²⁴⁹ Vin II 140: *na, bhikkhave, lasuṇaṃ khāditabbaṃ; yo khādeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa*; T vol. 22, 176a14f (Vin.Mī.); 483b10f (Vin.Mā.); 956b18 (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 275b23f (Vin.Sa.); Vin.Mū., de 61b5 (cp. a5f) = T vol. 24, 230b2f (cp. a18f); T vol. 24, 826c10 (*Vinaya-māṭṛkā, see n. 218).

²⁵⁰ Prāt.Bhī., Pāc. 1 (Vin IV 259): *yā pana bhikkhunī lasuṇaṃ khādeyya, pācittiyaṃ*; Mī.: T vol.

offence. In view of the preceding paragraphs (especially §§ 12.4, 13.1 and 13.3) one might be inclined to assume, in this case, too, that the motive for the prohibition was, originally, the idea, at least of "people", that garlic is a living, sentient being that ought not to be injured.

14.2 In fact, in Jainism monks and nuns are not allowed to accept any bulbs, bulbous roots or other pieces of plants (like sugar-cane) capable of sprouting as long as they are not fully deprived of life by means of cutting or cooking.²⁵¹ This holds, of course, good also for garlic.²⁵² The reason is that they are animate, sentient beings,²⁵³ most of them containing, at least according to later canonical texts, even a plurality of souls.²⁵⁴ In Buddhist texts, too, such bulbs and rhizomes capable of germination are occasionally declared to require being rendered fit for ascetics (*kappiya*) before monks or nuns are allowed to eat them,²⁵⁵ and this surely presupposes the idea that such vegetables are living beings. But as in the case of fruits (§ 12.4) we cannot be sure whether the Buddhist monks and nuns still shared this belief since no explicit statement to this effect seems to occur.

14.3 The prohibition to eat garlic, however, does not seem to be motivated by this idea, not even in the sense that one had to show regard for the belief of others. For in this case one would have to assume that in these passages garlic stands for all kinds of edible bulbs (just as in the passage treated in § 12.1ff the mango represents fruits in general), but there is no indication of this.²⁵⁶ Besides, in this case

22, 86c20; Mā.: 530b22f (Hirakawa 1982, 267); Mā.Lok.: Roth 1970, p. 218,6; Dh.: 737b9f; Sa.: vol. 23, 317b19f ("If a nun eats raw garlic or cooked garlic, ..."); Mū.: Prāt.Bhī.Mū., the 20a3 (... *sgog skya za na* ...) = Vin.Bhī., the 234b6; T vol. 23, 997a25f. Cp. Waldschmidt 1926, 153 (= 1979, 157).

²⁵¹ Dasav 3.7; 5.1.70; 5.2.18(f); Āyār II.1.8.3 (JĀS ed. § 375).

²⁵² Āyār II.1.8.14 (JĀS ed. § 386).

²⁵³ Cp., e.g., Dasav 3.7: *kande mūle ya saccitte*.

²⁵⁴ Viyāh VII.3.3 (Deleu 1970, 135; JĀS ed., p. 285,16ff); Schubring 1935, 134f; Williams 1983, 113ff; J. F. Kohl, Pflanzen mit gemeinsamem Körper nach der Lehre der Jainas, in: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 78/1953, 91ff. — For this reason, even Jaina lay people should not eat such plants.

²⁵⁵ E.g., T vol. 22, 171a12-15 (Vin.Mī.); 339a21ff (Vin.Mā.).

²⁵⁶ Only the Skandhaka passage in Vin.Mū. (Vin.Mū., de 61a5f: ... *sgog skya dañ sku doñ* (MVy 5734: *palāṇḍu*) *dañ ki'u* (MVy 5733: *grñjanaka*) ...; T vol. 24, 230a18f) includes eating of onions and leek in the prohibition. But in their case too it is bad smell (cp. § 14.5) that is the motive. This is confirmed by the fact that the isolation prescribed in case of eating them lasts shorter than in the case of having eaten garlic (Vin.Mū., de 62a7f = T vol. 24, 230b19ff), which makes good sense if bad smell (which is less penetrating in the case of onions and leek) is the motive, but not if the reason were sentience, which would be the same in all the three.

the prohibition ought to refer to raw garlic only, but it is only in Buddhaghosa²⁵⁷ that such a qualification is found. As against this, several versions of the Vinayavibhaṅga and/or Skandhaka passage concerned²⁵⁸ and one Chinese version of the Prātimokṣa rule itself²⁵⁹ are unambiguous in stating that both raw and cooked garlic are included in the prohibition.

14.4 Yet, the motivation for the prohibition to eat garlic, reported in the introductory story to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns, by the economic interest of the owner²⁶⁰ is not the original one either. The story adduces the case of nuns who, being offered, or allowed to collect, garlic, misbehaved by taking too much or spoiling the rest, thereby impairing or even ruining the owner.²⁶¹ But, as has already been noted by Waldschmidt,²⁶² this explanation does not at all fit in with the precept itself; for just as in the case of the story meant to motivate the prohibition to eat mango fruits (§ 12.1) it would have been sufficient to recommend careful behaviour and condemn unseemly greed²⁶³ but not the very eating of garlic as such.

14.5 On the other hand, the introductory story to the Khandhaka passage²⁶⁴

²⁵⁷ Kaṅkhāvitaranī 172,9: *āma ka-bhaṇḍika-lasuna*.

²⁵⁸ T vol. 22, 86c7 and 176a11 (Vin.Mī.); 483b25, 487a25 and 530b24 (Vin.Mā.); Roth 1970, 218,9f: *āman na kṣamati, pakvan na kṣamati*; T vol. 22, 737b10f (Vin.Dh.). At T vol. 22, 86c21 (Vin.Mī.) it is stated that for a nun only eating raw garlic is a *pācittiya* offence, whereas eating cooked garlic is merely *dukkata*. But even this much would not make much sense if it were motivated by the sentience of garlic. On the other hand, it would seem to support bad smell (see § 14.5) as a motive since the effect of raw garlic is, as far as I know, significantly stronger. — I refrain from entering into a discussion of further sophistications of the rule found in some Vinayavibhaṅgas and subcommentaries.

²⁵⁹ Viz. the one in Vin.Sa. (see n. 250).

²⁶⁰ Cp. §§ 11.3 and 12.1; cp. also § 13.3.

²⁶¹ Vin IV 258f; T vol. 22, 86c11ff (Vin.Mī.); 530b14ff (Vin.Mā.; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 266f); Roth 1970, p. 217f; T vol. 22, 736c4ff (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 317a28ff (Vin.Sa.; in this version, the garlic is spontaneously given to the nuns by the cultivator, but it seems that their unrestrained acceptance is the cause of the ruin of his business: cp. b2 and b8); 997a6ff (Vin.Mū. (cp. Vin.Bhī., the 234a8ff); in this version, a nun takes garlic although only allowed to gather (other) vegetables). Cp. also T vol. 24, 826c18ff (Vin.māṭṭkā), and T vol. 22, 483b5-10 (see n. 264). See also Waldschmidt 1926, 153f, and, for Vin.Mū., Panglung 1981, 166f.

²⁶² Waldschmidt 1926, 153.

²⁶³ As is actually done in the inserted tale of the golden goose (Waldschmidt 1926, 153-155).

²⁶⁴ There are two types of stories: one according to which the monks have continually been eating

motivates the prohibition to eat garlic explicitly²⁶⁵ or implicitly²⁶⁶ by the bad smell annoying other people. This sounds plausible, and it would also be a plausible motive for the prohibition to eat garlic in the case of nuns.²⁶⁷ Yet, here too the question remains whether there is any specific reason why in the case of nuns a transgression of the rule was regarded to be a more serious offence (sc. *pācittiya*) than in the case of monks (sc. *dukkata*).²⁶⁸ Perhaps the real reason for this is that garlic is considered to be sexually stimulating;²⁶⁹ and since it is a truism in the Indian ascetic tradition that women are by nature particularly inclined to lasciviousness, this reason would best explain why in the Pāṭimokkhasutta eating garlic is prohibited for nuns only. At any rate, there is, in this case, no indication that the prohibition has any connection with the view that plants, and especially bulbous plants, are living, sentient beings.

III.C. Earth, Water and Fire

15 As for the status of the elements in terms of being alive or sentient, let us start with the earth.

15.1 In Pāc. 10, the Pāṭimokkhasutta states that digging the earth is a

garlic and scandalize the lay followers by the bad smell spreading wherever they stay or move around (T vol. 22, 176a11-14 [Vin.Mī.]; vol. 24, 230b7ff [Vin.Mū.]; cp. also n. 267), and another one according to which a monk (or a group of monks) who has eaten garlic does not come to the Buddha's preaching (T vol. 22, 176a16-20 [Vin.Mī.]) or stands aside (Vin II 140; T vol. 22, 483b11ff [Vin.Dh.]; 956b14ff. [Vin.Dh.]; vol. 23, 275b12ff [Vin.Sa.]; vol. 24, 826c11ff [Vin.māṭṭkā]) or is unconcentrated (Vin.Mū., de 60b6ff, esp. 8ff; T vol. 24, 230a6ff, esp. 9ff) because he fears that the bad smell may annoy others. — Vin.Mā. (T vol. 22, 483b5ff) has, in addition, adapted, to the present context, the introductory story to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns (see n. 261).

²⁶⁵ E.g. T vol. 22, 176a12f; 483b15; vol. 23, 275b14; Vin.Mū., de 61a1 and 62a3 = T vol. 24, 230a10 and b12f.

²⁶⁶ E.g., Vin II 140 (*mā bhikkhū vyābādhiṃsu*); T vol. 22, 956b15ff; vol. 24, 826c11ff.

²⁶⁷ In the Vinayavibhaṅga of the Mahīśāsakas there are three introductory stories to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns not to eat garlic, according to the first two of which the reason for the prohibition was in fact that the nuns had continually eaten garlic and scandalized the lay followers by the bad smell resulting therefrom (T vol. 22, 86c7-11; corresponding to the first type of the Khandhaka stories (see n. 264)).

²⁶⁸ See § 14.1 and ns. 249 and 250. Cp. also T vol. 22, 737b11.

²⁶⁹ Oral communication by M. Maithri Murthi. There is, however, to my knowledge no explicit statement to this effect in the sources; but cp., perhaps, the critical remark, by lay people, that the nuns eat garlic like lay women (T vol. 23, 317b11f).

pācittiya offence.²⁷⁰ The question is whether this rule has to be understood, like the rule not to injure or destroy plants (and seeds) which it in fact precedes in some versions,²⁷¹ as an expression of not injuring (*ahiṃsā*) the earth itself, — as is doubtless the primary purport of the almost identical rule for Jaina monks²⁷² and as was also a reason for reserves against agriculture in Hindu Dharmaśāstra²⁷³ —, and what consequences this would have for the question of sentience, both of the earth itself and of plants (and seeds).

15.2 From the later Buddhist point of view, it might suggest itself to understand the rule as referring to not injuring small animals living in the soil, like dew-worms. But although this aspect is clearly expressed (as an additional one) even in early Jaina²⁷⁴ and in Hindu²⁷⁵ sources, it is not even hinted at in any of the Vinayavibhaṅgas on the rule under discussion, except, perhaps, the Chinese translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda version.²⁷⁶ Nor is it probable that the main motive for the

²⁷⁰ Vin IV 33: *yo pana bhikkhu pathaviṃ khaṇeyya vā khaṇāpeyya vā, pācittiyaṃ*; Mī.: T vol. 22, 60c9; 15f; 21f; Mā.: 384c20f; 553c2f; 561b3f; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 26, No. 73: *yo puna bhikkṣuḥ svahastaṃ prthivīm khaṇeya vā khaṇāpeya vā antamaśato iha khaṇehīti vā* (Pachow/Mishra 1956, 31: *evam*) *vadeya, pācattikaṃ*; Dh.: T vol. 22, 641a26; b12f; 1026b7; Sa.: v. Simson 1986, pp. 68, 262 and 264: *yaḥ punar bhikkṣuḥ svahastaṃ prthivīm khaṇyāt khānayed vā imāṃ khaṇaivaṃ vadet, pā°*; on p. 221 a version omitting the boldfaced words; T vol. 23, 117b26f; 476a9f (Prāt.Sa.); vol. 24, 891a10f; Prāt.Sa.: Yabuki 1930, p. 40, 3rd col., line 34; Inoguchi 1981, 199, No. 287; Mū.: Lokesh Chandra 1960, p. 8: *yaḥ punar bhikkṣuḥ svahastaṃ prthivīm[t] khaṇet khānayed vā, pā°*; Prāt.Mū., che 13b8 = Vin.Mū., te 2a5; T vol. 23, 854a14.

²⁷¹ See § 6.2.1 + n. 99.

²⁷² Dasav 10.2a: *puḍhaviṃ na khaṇe na khaṇāvae*; 8.4 (*puḍhavi ... silaṃ leluṃ neva bhinde na saṃlihe*). The latter passage follows shortly after a verse (8.2) which expressly states that earth itself is a living being (*jīva*) and therefore must not be injured, at least primarily, in its own right (i.e. even when free of other living beings); cp. also Dasav 5.1.68c (*puḍhavi-jīve vi hiṃsejjā*); 4, opening portion (p. 5, 15f + 6, 20ff); 6.27. Williams 1983, 118; cp. ibid. 68 and 124f.

²⁷³ E.g., Manu X.83f; cp. also IV.70a.

²⁷⁴ Dasav 6.28: *puḍhaviḥkāyaṃ vihiṃsanto hiṃsā u tayaṃ sie / tase ya vivihe pāṇe cakkhuse ya acakkhuse*; 5.1.68: *puḍhavi-jīve vi hiṃsejjā je ya taṃ - nissiyā ja gā*; cp. Āyār p. 2,9-11: *puḍhavi-kammaṣamārambheṇaṃ ... ane v' aṇega-rūve pāṇe vihiṃsai* (cp. also Bhatt 1989, 135). Viyāh VII 1^{3b} (Deleu 1970, 131; JĀS ed. p. 274, 13-19) expressly mentions hurting animals and cutting the roots of plants while digging.

²⁷⁵ Manu X.84cd = MBh 12.254.44: *bhūmiṃ bhūmiśaya āṃś caiva hanti kṣāṭham ayomukham*; MBh 3.199.19.

²⁷⁶ Cp. the fact that according to this version the monks also damage ant-hills (T vol. 23, 854a8). But there is no equivalent in Vin.Mū., which has "digging [irrigation] channels" (*yur ba 'dren pa*) instead (te 1a2f).

prohibition to dig the earth was that bodily toil or peasants' activity was considered inappropriate for monks by the society of those days. For although such an idea is expressed in a few versions of the story introducing the rule,²⁷⁷ it would not explain the fact that the monk is also prohibited from ordering somebody else to dig the earth.²⁷⁸ Actually, the majority of the versions understand the rule as prohibiting digging the earth as an act of injury inflicted upon the earth herself, regarded as a living being. Yet, as in the case of plants (cp. § 5.5), it is only people (*manussā*)²⁷⁹ who are reported to have such a view (*jīva-saññino hi ... manussā pathaviyā*)²⁸⁰ and hence to mind the monks digging the earth as an act of injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (*kathaṃ hi nāma ... ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ vihetthessanti*).²⁸¹ Here too it seems to be implied that the monks themselves do not share this belief²⁸² but are nevertheless enjoined to behave as if they did

²⁷⁷ T vol. 24, 891a7-9 (Sa.; "... how are they different from peasants?!"); vol. 23, 854a9f (Vin.Mū.): "How [is it possible that] the monks, [although being] ascetics, do ordinary work?"; cp. Vin.Mū., te 1a4-7 (see n. 281). Cp. also vol. 24, 600b29 ("by dedicating themselves to vulgar work, they obstruct the correct [spiritual] practice").

²⁷⁸ See n. 270 (*khanāpeyya vā*, etc.).

²⁷⁹ Similarly most of the other versions (T vol. 22, 384c11 [Vin.Mā.] 世人; 641a12 [Vin.Dh.] 長者; vol. 23, 117b17 [Vin.Sa.] 居士). In the latter source, the lay people are, however, explicitly characterized as followers of non-Buddhist religious groups. In Vin.Mū. (Vin.Mū., te 1a3 = T vol. 23, 854a9), too, it is non-Buddhists (*gāṇ mu stegs can* = **anyatīrthika*) who blame the monks. — As regards the belief that earth is living or even sentient in Jainism and in the Vedic religion, see ns. 14 and 20. For the idea that earth is animate in tribal religion see, e.g., C. P. Zoller in: Rustomji-Randle 1990, 166f (Bangan; ploughing is, however, regarded by the agricultural Banganis as a purification of the earth, by means of killing demons, cobras and rats: *ibid.*, 168). — I disregard, in the present context, the fact that there are at least two different forms of belief in the animateness or sentience of the earth: one according to which earth as a whole is an animate being (thus the Bangani: Zoller, *op. cit.*, 166; cp. also Dasaviv 280,9: *iyam ca* (i.e. *prthivī*) ... *anekajīvā, na punar ekajīvā, yathā v a i d i k ā n ā m* ...), and one according to which the earth consists of a plurality or infinitude of minute living beings (as in Jainism).

²⁸⁰ Vin IV 32f; cp. T vol. 23, 117b18 (地中有命根).

²⁸¹ Explicitly so Vin IV 32; T vol. 22, 384c13 (with v.l.): 傷一根命 (Vin.Mā.), and vol. 23, 117b19f: 奪一根衆生命. At Vin.Dh. (vol. 22, 641a13) people only state that by digging the earth the monks destroy life or life-force (**jīvitendriya*, but cp. n. 130), and that this shows lack of pity (641b1). Similarly Vin.Mū. (T vol. 23, 854a10), but there is no corresponding phrase in Vin.Mū. Here (te 1a3-8), the non-Buddhists merely wonder if there is, in view of the monks' behaviour, any difference between them and "brahmins and householders". Similarly, in the old Sa. Vinaya T 1464 (vol. 24, 891a6ff), the householders only blame the monks for behaving like peasants (see n. 277) but do not mention destruction of life.

²⁸² Explicitly so T vol. 22, 384c16f (Vin.Mā.).

because this is what people, or s o c i e t y , expects from ascetics.

15.3 There is no reason to doubt that the (majority of the versions of the) introductory story is correct in so far as it regards the rule not to dig the earth to be, if only indirectly, motivated by the belief that earth should not be injured because she h e r s e l f i s l i v i n g , sentient. This is confirmed also by the fact that according to the Suttavibhaṅga it is not only digging but also other kinds of hurting the earth, like splitting, burning,²⁸³ scratching up,²⁸⁴ planting in a post or peg²⁸⁵ or causing a landslide on a steep river bank.²⁸⁶ Yet, in view of the fact that the Suttavibhaṅga does not belong to the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts²⁸⁷ we cannot be sure that the introductory story is also right in attributing the belief in the sentience of earth to people only. Without additional evidence, we may not be able to exclude the possibility that in the very earliest days the Buddhist monks and nuns, too, still shared this belief. And even if they did not, this would not necessarily imply that they had a l s o abandoned, already at the very beginning, the belief in the sentience of p l a n t s and seeds. The mere fact that the Suttavibhaṅga motivates both rules — the prohibition to dig the earth and the prohibition to injure (seeds and) plants — by means of the same pattern is hardly sufficient to prove that in terms of being alive and sentient the status of earth and plants must have been the same from the outset. Even in case the belief that earth is a living being had already been abandoned, belief in the sentience of plants may still have continued. Or there may at least have been a difference in the e x t e n t to which the sentience of the two had become o b s o l e t e . Without additional evidence, this is difficult to decide.

15.4 In this connection, it is interesting that the canonical word commentary on the rule not to dig the earth distinguishes two kinds of earth or soil, viz. *jāta* and *ajāta*,²⁸⁸ and some versions make explicit that it is only in the case of the former kind that digging or injuring constitutes a *pācittiya* offence.²⁸⁹ It is not easy to say

²⁸³ Vin IV 33 (*khaṇati ... bhindati ... dahati ...*); burning also T vol. 22, 641b17 (Vin.Dh.), and esp. 495a1ff (Vin.Mā., see § 17.1 + n. 332).

²⁸⁴ E.g. T vol. 22, 641b15f (Vin.Dh.); 385a4f (Vin.Mā.): if a monk sweeps the ground with the intention to level it, already a scratch of the size of a mosquito's leg constitutes a *pācittiya* offence.

²⁸⁵ T vol. 22, 385a16f; vol. 23, 854a27f = Vin.Mū., te 2b2 (... *sa la phur pa 'debs na ...*).

²⁸⁶ T vol. 22, 385a10f; vol. 23, 854b2f = Vin.Mū., te 2b3 (... *ñogs rtib par byed na ...*).

²⁸⁷ Cp. § 5.5 + n. 96.

²⁸⁸ Vin IV 33.

²⁸⁹ According to T vol. 23, 117c4-6 (Vin.Sa.) and Vin.Mū., te 2b1 (= T vol. 23, 854a25f), only digging *jāta* earth is, to be sure, *pāyattikā*, but digging *ajāta* earth is still *duṣkṛta*. On the other hand, Vin.Mū., te 2b7ff (= T vol. 23, 854b10-12) states that digging soil containing much earth (clay, loam) but few stones or little sand (i.e. *jātā pathavī* acc. to Vin IV 33) is *pāyattikā*, digging soil containing

what, precisely, "born" (*jāta*) and "not born" (*ajāta*) mean in this context; but it seems that two aspects intermingle: on the one hand the aspect of fertility (as of mould or clay) and barrenness (as of stones or sand),²⁹⁰ and on the other the aspect of "living", natural soil and of soil that is "dead" — as it is actually called in one Chinese version²⁹¹ — because it has been worked by digging²⁹² or ploughing²⁹³ or burnt by fire²⁹⁴ (until, after a certain time, it becomes "living" soil again)²⁹⁵. Unfortunately, the texts do not at all make clear what, precisely, the being "alive" of earth or soil means. But it would seem that the distinction is comparable to that of "living" (green, lush) and "dead" (withered) plants, and hence could be retained even when the belief in the sentience of the earth or of plants had been abandoned.

15.5 One might suggest that the rule not to dig the earth is of lesser significance than the rule not to injure plants (and seeds) because in contrast to the latter it has no counterpart in the list of minor moral precepts for monks in the Suttapiṭaka (see §§

little earth but many stones or much sand (i.e. *ajātā pathavī* acc. to Vin IV 33) is *duṣkṛta*, whereas digging soil consisting of nothing but stones or sand is no offence. Similarly T vol. 22, 385b17f (Vin.Mā.). Cp. also T vol. 23, 117c11-15, where also digging in metalliferous mines, jewel- and salt-mines is stated to be no offence.

²⁹⁰ Cp. the Ch. rendering 生 / 不生 ("producing / not producing": T vol. 23, 117b28 [Vin.Sa.]), and the explanation (b29f) that in areas with much rain the soil is productive for eight months, in areas with little rain for four months (cp. also Rosen 1959, 200f). It seems that Vin.Sa. regards ruined walls, stony ground, ant-hills and heaps of [dry?] earth (b28f) as similar to "not producing" soil (cp. c4-6).

²⁹¹ T vol. 22, 385a16, 19 and b3 (死) [Vin.Mā.]; at 384c26ff, the renderings 生 and 作 (something like "unworked" or "natural" and "cultivated" or "artificial") are used. T vol. 23, 854a16 (Vin.Mū.) says 生 and 非生, i.e., "living" and "not living", whereas Vin.Mū., (te 2a6) has "[soil] in its natural state" (*raṇ bñin can*, cp. the explanation 性 at T vol. 23, 854a17) and "[soil] that is not in his natural state" (*raṇ bñin can ma yin pa*), the former kind including also such soil as has recovered after having been dug, etc. (see n. 295); cp. also T vol. 24, 600c3ff. Finally, T vol. 22, 641b13f (Vin.Dh.) calls the two types of earth simply "dug" and "not yet dug".

²⁹² See n. 291.

²⁹³ Cp. T vol. 24, 600c7.

²⁹⁴ Vin IV 33 (*daḍḍhā pi vuccati ajātā pathavī*). Cp. also T vol. 24, 600c7.

²⁹⁵ Acc. to Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 641b14f), earth that has been dug is restored to its original state (of "living" earth) when soaked by rain for four months. Cp. Vin IV 33: *yo pi ... mattikāpuñño ... atirekakācūmāsaṃ ovaṭṭho, ayaṃ pi vuccati jātā pathavī*. Acc. to Vin.Mū., the same happens after three months in case it rains sufficiently, and without rain after six months (T vol. 23, 854a17f; Vin.Mū., te 2a6f: *char chu ḥod na zla gsum gyis sa* (R) 'thas (R: *mthas*) *par gyur pa'o// char chu ma ḥod* (R) *na zla ba drug gis sa* 'thas *par gyur pa'o//*; solid ('thas *pa* = *sra ba*) soil seems to be "living" soil, as against crumbled (*grugs pa*) soil: cp. Vin.Mū., te 2b2 and 3f).

4.3, 7.3 and 13.1). But we do find a counterpart in a sermon²⁹⁶ where a pious layman, who is a potter, is said to fulfil not only the five precepts for lay followers but also some of the minor precepts for monks, viz. eating only once a day and renouncing gold and silver;²⁹⁷ and in addition, thus the text, he does not dig the earth with his own hands (*na sahatthā paṭhaviṃ khaṇati*) for the sake of getting clay for his pottery, but uses what has broken off from a bank or has been thrown up by mice.

15.6 One might furthermore argue that in Jaina sources monks and nuns are enjoined to deposit remnants of food or excrements, etc., at a lifeless spot of the ground,²⁹⁸ not on a sentient (*cittamaṃta*) rock or clod,²⁹⁹ and that they are ordered to walk on paths that have been made lifeless by chariots, beasts of burden, etc., or other people,³⁰⁰ not on (moist, living) clay,³⁰¹ whereas in the Prātimokṣasūtra no such restrictions are to be found.³⁰² But on the one hand the Jaina evidence would seem to require more careful sifting from the chronological point of view,³⁰³ and on the other disregarding the earth in such contexts may also mean that the Buddhists simply did not consider such superficial operations to injure her, in contrast to an operation like digging which wounds the surface (her skin, so to speak), and which is hence unambiguously prohibited in the Prātimokṣasūtra as well as in one of the earliest Jaina sources³⁰⁴.

²⁹⁶ MN II 51; Sa. version: T vol. 1, 501b11ff, esp. 502a5f (MÄ.).

²⁹⁷ Acc. to the Sa. version (see n. 296), the potter fulfils all the ten main moral precepts and also all the minor moral precepts for monks.

²⁹⁸ E.g., Vaṭṭakera, Mūlācāra V.124f (Okuda 1975, 63 and 130), prescribing that excrements, urine, phlegm and snot should be got rid of [only] at an inanimate spot of the ground, i.e. where the earth has been made [lifeless] by forest conflagration, agriculture or crushing to powder. Cp. also Āyār II.1.1.2 (JĀS ed., p. 104,8f), where it is stated that remnants of food should be deposited on a burnt (i.e. lifeless) spot of the ground, etc.; cp. Dasav 5.1.81. As for excrements considered to be a "weapon" against (i.e. to injure) the earth-beings, see ĀyārN 95 (p. 22).

²⁹⁹ Āyār II.10.8 (JĀS ed. § 653).

³⁰⁰ Vaṭṭakera, Mūlācāra 1.11 and 5.107-109 (Okuda 1975, 59 and 125).

³⁰¹ Āyār II.3.1.7 (JĀS § 470): *se bhikkhū ... gāmānugāmam dūḷijamāṇe, antarā se ... udae vā m a ṭ ṭ i y ā v ā a v i d d h a t t h ā , ... ṇ o u j j y a m g a c c h e j j ā ...*; cp. Dasav 5.1.3 (... *care vajjanto ... daga-m a ṭ ṭ i y a m*).

³⁰² For regulations concerning deposition of food remnants and excrements, etc., in early Buddhism see §§ 11.1-11.4.

³⁰³ Cp. C. Caillat, Deux études de moyen-indien, in: Journal Asiatique 1960, 50ff.

³⁰⁴ See n. 272.

16.1 As for water, there is no rule similar to that prohibiting monks from digging the earth and explicitly connected, by the Suttavibhaṅga, with the belief in the sentience of the elements. As mentioned in § 11.2, the rule not to pollute water with remnants of food or excrements, etc., is already there in the Prātimokṣasūtra, in the case of monks and, except for the Mahāsāṅghikas, also in the case of nuns, grouped with the rules of mere decorum (*sekhiya-dhamma*, *śaikṣa-dharma*); hence, such pollution was obviously not understood any longer as an act of injuring water itself as a living being, even though such an idea would seem to have been, originally, part of the conceptual background from which the standard of decorum underlying the rule derived (cp. § 11.4).

16.2 There are some more Prātimokṣa rules which have to do with water. One of them declares, exceptions apart, bathing more than once in a fortnight,³⁰⁵ another one sporting or splashing in the water,³⁰⁶ to be a *pācittiya* offence. In Jainism, bathing (except in case of illness),³⁰⁷ and, a fortiori, water-splashing,³⁰⁸ is entirely prohibited, and one of the reasons may be not to injure water.³⁰⁹ But at the same time, refraining from bathing or at least bathing as rarely as possible is, like fasting or at least restricting food to one meal a day, an element of a *ścētic* practice, showing detachment from one's body and from external comfort; and the same would be true of wanton sporting in water, quite apart from the fact that it does not fit in with the sedate demeanour expected of an ascetic. In the case of Buddhism, there is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, good reason to assume that these rules were motivated by nothing but this.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ Pāc. 57 (Vin IV 117): *yo pana bhikkhu oren' aḍḍhamāsaṃ nahāyeyya, pācittiyaṃ*, followed by enlarged formulas making allowance for special situations. There is no need, in this and most of the following cases, to refer to the versions of other schools.

³⁰⁶ Pāc. 53 (Vin IV 112): *udake hāsadhamme pā°*.

³⁰⁷ E.g., Dasav 3.2; 4.26; 6.61-64; Āyār_s p. 43,24f.

³⁰⁸ Alsdorf 1961, 570f. Cp. Dasav 4.viii (p. 11, esp. 11,10f). Cp. also Āpastamba-dharmasūtra 2.9.22.13 for similar rules for Brahmanical hermits (H.-P. Schmidt, Ahimsā und Wiedergeburt [forthcoming], ch. II.5).

³⁰⁹ Alsdorf 1961, 570f. Williams 1983, 129. Cp. Āyār_s p. 3,23 (... *vibhūsāe ... satthehiṃ viṭṭanti*), where "adorning oneself" may, first of all, mean bathing; more explicit: ĀyārN 111f (p. 28,3ff). — For the idea that bathing and esp. water-splashing may injure tiny *anīmāls* living in the water cp. Dasav 6.62 and, implicitly, 6.31; cp. also Williams, loc. cit. Also in the Chinese translation of the Mū. version of the Vinayavibhaṅga on the Prātimokṣa rule prohibiting sporting in water, the playful, uncaring behaviour of the monks is said to have included striking water-frogs, hence injuring *anīmāls* (T vol. 23, 849a17, but not confirmed by Vin.Mū., (ñe 239b6f)).

³¹⁰ Cp. the first introductory story to the rule not to bathe more often than necessary in Vin.Mī. (T vol. 22, 65c29-66a4). But as a second introductory story in Vin.Mī. as well as in all other versions we find the rather implausible (Schlingloff 1963, 539) motivation by the story that by using the private

16.3 Of considerable importance in connection with the question of the sentience of water in earliest Buddhism are two other Prātimokṣa rules, stating that *sprinkling* water containing tiny animate beings (i.e. small animals) (*sappāṇakaṃ udakaṃ*) on grass or clay³¹¹ as well as *drinking* such water³¹² is a *pācittiya* offence. The motive for these two rules is clearly to abstain from injuring living beings (or to come up to what society expected, in this regard, from ascetics). But the *restriction* of water not to be poured out or drunk to water containing tiny animals makes it perfectly clear that the living beings injuring which constitutes the offence (both ethically and in the eyes of people) are the tiny animals, not water itself. Drinking of water as such, provided that it is free from tiny animals, is no offence.³¹³ The monks are even allowed to drink water without having received it from a lay person,³¹⁴ in contrast to fruits or other vegetable food which,

bath of the king too frequently the monks hindered the king from bathing himself (human interests as the motive, instead of ascetic decorum!).

³¹¹ Pāc. 20 (Vin IV 49): *yo pana bhikkhu jānaṃ sappāṇakaṃ udakaṃ tiṇaṃ vā mattikaṃ vā siñceyya vā siñcāpeyya vā, pā°*; Prāt.Mā.Lok. (p. 20, No. 19): *yo puna bhikkṣur jānaṃ saprāṇakenodakena* (text °*pramāṇa°*, but see Pachow/Mishra 1956, 23) *tiṇaṃ vā mṛttikāṃ vā siñceyya vā siñcāpeyya vā, pā°*; Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson 1986, pp. 124 and 177): *yaḥ punar bhikkṣuḥ saprāṇakenodakena tiṇaṃ vā mṛttikāṃ vā siñcet secayed vā, pā°*; some mss. (pp. 49, 108 and 256) seem to omit *vā mṛttikāṃ vā* but seem to have an equivalent expression upon *secayed vā* (cp. p. 256); Prāt.Mū. (GBM(FacEd) I p. 32 fol. 53,1 and II p. 76 fol. 139,2): *yaḥ punar bhikkṣur jānaṃ saprāṇakenodakena tiṇaṃ vā gomayaṃ vā mṛttikāṃ vā siñcet siñcayed vā, pā°*; the first ms. has a gap and seems to read *siṃ///campayed*, °*pa°* being added below the line.

³¹² Pāc. 62 (Vin IV 125): *yo pana bhikkhu jānaṃ sappāṇakaṃ udakaṃ paribhuñjeyya, pā°*. Other versions practically identical. Cp. also the prescription to carry a strainer (*parissāvana*) while travelling (Vin II 118f; T vol. 22, 173a21ff; 954b10ff; vol. 23, 273a3ff; vol. 24, 224c24ff; cp. also vol. 22, 373a23f). — Similar rules for Brahmanical renouncers: Manu 6.46; cp. Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra 2.6.11.24 (H.-P. Schmidt, op. cit. [see n. 308], ch. II.5).

³¹³ Cp. Vin IV 125: *appāṇake appāṇaka-saññī, anāpatti*, i.e. if the water is free from animals and the monk knows it to be so, no offence. [Of course, if it is free but he thinks it is not and still drinks it, this is problematic (*dukkata* according to the Suttavibhaṅga) since his intention is wrong.] — As for drinking cold = unboiled water, see also Mil 259,5ff, where non-Buddhists (doubtless Jaina ascetics) object to the Buddhist practice by asserting (just as "people" do in the Vinayavibhaṅga with reference to plants and earth) that drinking unboiled water means injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*). In this case, however, the Buddhist reaction is to present a set of arguments *refuting* the sentience of water (see § 38.3).

³¹⁴ Pāc. 40 (Vin IV 90): *yo pana bhikkhu adinnaṃ mukhadvāraṃ āhāraṃ āhareyya a ñ ñ a t r a u d a k a -dantaponā, pā°*; Prāt.Mā.Lok. (p. 22, No. 35): *yo puna bhikkṣur adinnaṃ aprati-grāhitaṃ mukhadvārikaṃ āhāraṃ āhāreya anyatrodakadantaṇe, pā°*; Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson 1986, pp. 7: 10; 167; 258; 277): *yaḥ punar bhikkṣur aparigṛhitaṃ āhāraṃ mukhadvāreṇāhared* (p. 7: °*ābhyavahared*) *anyatrodakadantakāṣṭhābhyāṃ, pā°*; Prāt.Mū. (Lokesh Chandra 1960, 3; GBM(FacEd) II p. 78, fol.

as stated above (§ 12.3), may be eaten by them only when received from a lay person who has rendered them "suitable" for ascetics. By Jaina monks, on the other hand, water, too, may not be consumed unless a lay person has rendered it "suitable" by boiling, drinking cold (i.e. unboiled) water being strictly prohibited.³¹⁵ The fact that, in contrast to this, the *Prātimokṣasūtra* has no objection at all to drinking fresh water as such clearly shows that already in earliest Buddhism, in contradistinction to Jainism,³¹⁶ the sentience of water has, to say the least, become more or less irrelevant.

16.4 This seems to be confirmed by a passage from the *Suttapiṭaka*, where in the context of describing his earlier, futile attempts at severe asceticism, the Buddha also mentions extreme mindfulness in walking, aiming at not killing (*saṅghātaṃ āpādesi(m)*)³¹⁷ any tiny animate beings (*khuddake pāṇe*) in uneven spots,³¹⁸ to the extent of having pity even with a drop of water.³¹⁹ This passage does not expressly deny the drop of water sentience, nor does it necessarily imply such a denial. But what it does imply is that from the Buddhist point of view the sentience of water is, or would be, a matter to be ignored in practical life, even in that of an ascetic.

17.1 There is also a *Prātimokṣa* rule concerning fire, prohibiting monks from kindling fire in order to warm themselves (except in case of illness or for some other strong reason).³²⁰ As D. Schlingloff³²¹ has rightly pointed out, the original

143, l. 1f): *yaḥ punar bhikṣur adattaṃ mukhābhyavahāryam āhāram āhared anyatrodakadantakāṣṭhāt, pā°*.

³¹⁵ Dasav 8.6; 10.2; 3.6; Schubring 1935, 173; Alsdorf 1961, 571.

³¹⁶ According to Bhatt 1989, 136 and 138, in the oldest source, viz. *Āyār* I.1, water is not yet conceived of as a living being. But though agreeing with his reserves in the case of fire (see § 17.2 and n. 338), my impression is that as regards water and earth his arguments need reconsideration.

³¹⁷ Cp. n. 140.

³¹⁸ Or: in his way, across his path? Cp. *AN* V 33, stating that a lion roars thrice before going forth for his hunt, thinking *māhaṃ khuddake pāṇe visamagate saṅghātaṃ āpādesiṃ ti*.

³¹⁹ *MN* I 78 (... *yāva udakabindumhi pi me dayā paccupaṭṭhitā hoti* — "*māhaṃ khuddake pāṇe visamagate saṅghātaṃ āpādesiṃ*" *ti*). Cp. *SHT* V, Kat.-Nr. 1102 R2ff. Cp. also *MN* I 377, where the reference to the water drop is, however, missing. Jaina monks and nuns are expressly enjoined to be careful not to injure even water while walking; cp., e.g., *Āyār* II.3.1.7 (see n. 301: *udae*); Dasav 5.1.3 (see *ibid.*: *daga°*). Cp. also Dasav 8.13 (*dayāhigārī bhūesu*) + 15 (*siṇeha* "moisture") and, as regards *ahiṃsā* with regard to drops of water, Kapp 5.12 and *Āyār* II.1.1.1 (*JĀS* ed., p. 103, 10f: *siyodaṇṇa vā osittam*).

³²⁰ *Pāli*: *Pāc*. 56 (*Vin* IV 115f): *yo pana bhikkhu (agilāno) visibbanāpekkho jotim samādaheyya vā samādahāpeyya vā (aññatra tathārūpaccayā), pā°*; *Upālipariprechā*: *T* vol. 24, 907b4 (*Stache-*

motive is probably n o t , as is — once again³²² — suggested by the introductory story of the Suttavibhaṅga, h u m a n interests (e.g. the apprehension that the monks might be bitten by poisonous animals, like snakes, disturbed by the fire,³²³ or even that they might cause damage³²⁴ or disturb others³²⁵ by becoming nervous on that account). Schlingloff³²⁶ suggests, instead, that the original motive — of which the fleeing snake may still be a last trace — was that by kindling fire one easily endangers small a n i m a l s living in the dry grass or wood used as fuel or insects flying into the fire (or at least — so I should add — that people mind ascetics performing such a potentially though unintentionally harmful act). However, the words "in order to warm themselves" would rather seem to point to an a s c e t i c motive, viz. to the fact that people expected ascetics to endure bodily hardship like cold. On the other hand, in a few versions of the rule there is either no such restriction,³²⁷ or the restricted formulation is introduced as having supplanted an earlier, unrestricted one.³²⁸ Such an unrestricted³²⁹ formulation of the rule not to kindle a fire is also

Rosen 1984, 79); Mī.: see n. 328; Mā.: see ns. 327 and 328; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 23, No. 41: *yo puna bhikṣur ātmārthāya ... jyotismiṃ vitāpanāprekṣo tṛṇaṃ vā kāṣṭhaṃ vā ... ādaheya vā ādahāpeya vā ... , pā°*; Dh.: T vol. 22, 675b11f, 15f and 19-21; 1027b5f; Sa.: Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson pp. 14, 125 and 168): *yaḥ punar bhikṣur ... vitapanāprekṣī abhyavakāṣe* (see p. 247) *jyotiḥ samindhyāt samedhayed vā ... , pā°*; on p. 247 we find *///kāṣe jyotiṣaḥ tṛṇaṃ///*, which indicates a different version; T vol. 23, 104c15-17 (Vin.Sa.); 475b1f (Prāt.Sa.); Inoguchi 1981, 197, Nos. 240-241 (Prāt.Sa._{Th}); for T 1464 see n. 327; Mū.: Prāt.Mū. (Lokesh Chandra 1960, 5): *yaḥ pu < nar bhikṣur ātmārtham aglāno vitapana > prekṣī jyotiḥ samavadadhyāt samavadhāpayed vā , pā°*; Prāt.Mū., che 12a5f = Vin.Mū., ñe 188b1 (*yaṃ dge sloṅ gaṃ mi na bar bdag ñid kyi phyir me la reg gam/ reg tu 'jug na, ...*) and Prāt.Mū. (T vol. 24, 505a15f = T 23, 837c15f: ... 無病爲身若自然火 ...) confirm **ātmārtham* and **aglāno* but not <*vitapana*> *prekṣī* (**pre*° is damaged in the ms.); Kā.: see n. 327.

³²¹ Schlingloff 1963, 539.

³²² Cp. §§ 11.3, 12.1, 13.3, and 14.4.

³²³ Vin IV 115; T vol. 22, 64b14ff (Vin.Mī.); 364c12ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 24, 887c29ff (Sa.(?)).

³²⁴ T vol. 22, 675a17ff, esp. 27f (Vin.Dh.).

³²⁵ T vol. 23, 104b29ff, esp. c6ff (Vin. Sa.; cp. Rosen 1959, 177; cp. also T vol. 24, 888a1); vol. 23, 835c10ff (Vin.Mū.).

³²⁶ See n. 321.

³²⁷ T vol. 24, 663a7 (Prāt.Kā.); 888a2-4 (T 1464 (Sa.?).). T vol. 22, 365a7-9 (Vin.Mā.) and at least the Tibetan and Chinese versions of Prāt.Mū. (see n. 320) have "for himself" (cp. Prāt.Mā.Lok. *ātmārthāya*: see n. 320) i n s t e a d of "in order to warm himself".

³²⁸ T vol. 22, 64b25 [Vin.Mī.] (beside c13f); 364c23 [Vin.Mā.] (beside 365a7-9, for which see n. 327).

found in the Skandhaka;³³⁰ and in the Sarvāstivāda version³³¹ of this unrestricted rule in the Skandhaka the *ahiṃsā* motive is expressly confirmed, the prohibition being motivated by an introductory story relating that a monk who had set fire to grass and trees had killed, thereby, many insects. In the Mahāsaṅghika version of this passage,³³² we even find the prohibition to kindle a fire motivated by the protest of people who regard burning the earth as an act of killing or injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (**ekendriya*)^{333 334}.

17.2 There is, however, no way to deduce, from the rule not to kindle a fire, any evidence in favour of a belief in the sentience of fire itself.³³⁵ On the contrary, in this case one would expect the rule to prohibit monks not so much from kindling as from extinguishing fire,³³⁶ as some Jaina texts actually do.³³⁷ But even in the early Jaina sources there are passages where — in the context

³²⁹ I.e., not restricted by the qualification "in order to warm himself".

³³⁰ Corresponding to Vin II 138, prohibiting monks from setting fire to a forest (except counter-fire in case of emergency). Here, the reason adduced is that people (*manussā*) object to it as being like the behaviour of "forest-conflagrators" (*dava-dāhaka*: slash-and-burn tribes??). It is, however, not clear whether this refers merely to undignified deportment or (also) to the fact that setting fire to a forest, even when not a conscious and intentional act of injuring and hence only *dukkata*, still in fact endangers the animals living there. At T vol. 24, 232c18ff (Vin.Mū.), the reason for the prohibition is clearly indecorous behaviour only, some monks having set fire to a forest in order to frighten and ridicule others who had been meditating there.

³³¹ T vol. 23, 274b10-13. Cp. the parallel passage in Vin.Dh. (960a7ff), where the motive for the prohibition is, however, that people are irritated at the monk's setting fire to grass (which then spreads to the king's deer-park) as an act of destroying the life of sentient beings. — Cp. also Aśoka, PE V.E-F (*tuse saṃjīve no jhāpayitaviye; dāve anathāye va vihisāye va no jhāpayitaviye*), addressing, of course, primarily lay people.

³³² T vol. 22, 495a1ff.

³³³ Provided that the expression 擾傷(?; read 傷?) 一根 (T vol. 22, 495a4) corresponds to the Pāli phrase *ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ vi-heṭṭh-* (see §§ 5.4, 8, 9.1 and 15.2).

³³⁴ Accordingly, in this version the rule merely prohibits monks from kindling fire on an unburnt spot (T vol. 22, 495a6 and 10).

³³⁵ To be distinguished from the concept of fire deities (**agni-devatā*), as in the Mī. version of the Skandhaka passage on kindling a fire or setting fire to a forest (see § 17.1 and ns. 330-332) where a fire deity is ordered by the Buddha to extinguish a bush fire threatening to burn the monks' hermitage (T vol. 22, 175c19ff).

³³⁶ Thus actually T vol. 23, 837c22 (Vin.Mū.), though surely not implying sentience of fire (cp. Vin.Mū., ñe 188b5).

³³⁷ E.g., Dasav 8.8 (... *agaṇiṃ ... no ... nivvāvae muṇī*), in a context where it is expressly stated

of an otherwise comprehensive treatment of *ahimsā* — it is only kindling or application of fire that is prohibited because it is dangerous for other living beings,³³⁸ without any evidence for fire itself being regarded as sentient. Hence, even in Jainism the sentience of fire does not seem to have been, from the outset, a matter of general recognition.

18 To sum up, it seems that among the elements it is only earth with regard to which monks and nuns have to behave in a way which appears to be based, as in the case of plants and seeds, on the belief that earth is by itself a kind of living, sentient being (or aggregate of such beings). But the source material investigated so far does not allow to decide, in the case of earth no more than in the case of seeds and plants, whether this belief was, as the *Suttavibhaṅga* puts it, only the belief of "people" which the Buddhist monks and nuns were enjoined to take into account in their behaviour, or whether it was, in the earliest period, still shared by the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves, or had at least not yet been abandoned by them on a conscious or theoretical level. As for earth, I cannot so far present any additional evidence. But as far as plants are concerned, the *Suttapitaka* contains some interesting passages to be discussed in the following chapter (IV).

(8.2) that fire, too, falls under the category "living being" (*jīva*); *Sūy* I.7.6b (JĀS § 386): *nivvāvaḥ agañi tivātaijjā*.

³³⁸ *Āyār*, p. 4,6ff (cp. also *Āyār*, p. 58, and Bhatt 1989, 136); Dasav 6.33-36; 10.2cd.

IV. Further Suttapiṭaka Material

19.1 Among the materials from the Suttapiṭaka the *Kūṭadanta* Sermon is of special interest because it is not concerned with monks' morals but with that of a layman. In this sermon, the sacrifice of a great king of the past is described. This sacrifice is characterized as superior to the traditional ones because the only offerings were things like butter, curds and molasses, but no cows, goats, sheep, etc., were killed (*haññimsu*) [as sacrificial victims], no animate beings (*pāṇa*) suffered death (*saṅghātaṃ āpajjimsu*), no trees were felled (*chijjimsu*) for being used as sacrificial posts, and no *darbha* grass was cut (*lūyimsu*) to strew it over the sacrificial ground.³³⁹ This clearly presupposes that felling trees and cutting grass are acts of *himsā*, of injuring or killing, and that plants, too, are living beings.

19.2 However, in this case one might argue that the text, dealing with the pre-Buddhist past, presupposes not the — in a sense "modern" — Buddhist point of view but rather the older, Vedic belief. Besides, one might argue that the divergence of the Buddhist view from this older belief is signalized by the fact that the text uses the word '*pāṇa*', i.e., "animate beings", only with regard to animals (either summing up or supplementing the preceding statement), and hence virtually excludes plants from this category. On the other hand, as pointed out above (§ 6.2.2) the use of '*pāṇa*' for animals only, or animals and men, is not specifically Buddhist; and although this use (as well as the use of different verbs for killing/destroying)³⁴⁰ may, to be sure, indicate an awareness of some difference between plants and animals, it does not necessarily imply an exclusion of plants from the realm of living or sentient beings.

20.1 On the other hand, '*pāṇa*' is, both in Buddhist and Jaina sources, also used in a way which suggests comprehensiveness, e.g. in phrases like "all *sattas*, *pāṇas*, *bhūtas*" (Buddhist)³⁴¹ or "all *pāṇas*, *bhūtas*, *jīvas*, *sattas*" (Jaina).³⁴² There is no reason to accept the differentiating interpretation of later

³³⁹ DN I 141. The corresponding passage in the Chinese *Dīrghāgama* (T vol. 1, 100b5ff) lacks the reference to trees and plants, stating only that no cows and sheep nor any other sentient beings were killed, the only offerings being butter, etc.

³⁴⁰ Viz. *haññimsu* and *saṅghātaṃ āpajjimsu* in the case of animals but *chijjimsu* and *lūyimsu* in the case of plants. Cp. also § 6.2.2 (end) and n. 119, and the fact that ŚB 11.1.2.1 uses *han* in connection with both animals and plants and grains.

³⁴¹ E.g. Vin II 110 = AN II 73: *sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā*. Cp. n. 7!

³⁴² E.g., Āyār_s p. 5,6: *savvesiṃ pāṇāṇaṃ, savvesiṃ bhūyāṇaṃ, savvesiṃ jīvāṇaṃ, savvesiṃ sattāṇaṃ*; Sūy II.7.13 and 15 (JĀS ed. §§ 852 and 854). Cp. also MN I 407 and DN I 53: *sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā* (in the description of Ājīvika doctrines; the Mū. version has omitted '*jīva*' even in this context: Vin. Mū., ce 241b3; che 236b7; ke 24b6 [cp. Vogel 1970, 12 and 24; H. Eimer, *Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi*, Wiesbaden 1983, pt. 2, 63]; T vol. 23, 1025a27f [at T vol. 23,

commentators.³⁴³ It is much more probable that originally in these phrases the terms are used as quasi-synonyms, with a tendency towards co-extensiveness,³⁴⁴ or at least no stress on specific delimitations. This would mean that for the Jainas in such a context '*pāṇa*' would tend to include even the element-beings, and at any rate plants (and seeds).³⁴⁵ However, the crucial question for the problem under discussion is whether there are any materials proving or at least indicating that in earliest Buddhism, too, such comprehensive formulas may include even plants, and, what is more, that even the unambiguous term '*pāṇa*' may comprise them. Actually, the Suttapiṭaka does contain some passages using '*pāṇa*' in a broader sense which are of greatest importance in this connection.

20.2 Especially in old verse texts, but occasionally also in prose *suttas*,³⁴⁶ we find references to the mobile (*tasa*) and stationary (*thāvara*),³⁴⁷ or to the mobile and stationary beings (*bhūta*).³⁴⁸ The context is always³⁴⁹ that a

693a2f, there are only two terms, and the Skt. at Saṅghabh II 222,7 has only *sarve bhūtāḥ*]).

³⁴³ E.g., ĀyārViv 47,33ff (ad Āyār, p. 5,6f); Ps III 120 (ad MN I 407); Sv I 161 (ad DN I 53). Cp. Schubring 1935, 133; Vogel 1970, 24 n. 25.

³⁴⁴ Cp. Dasav 6.10-11, where '*pāṇa*' and '*jīva*' are obviously used coextensively (*jāvanti loe p ā ṇ ā ..., te ... na haṇe ...; savva-jīvā vi icchanti jīviṃ ...; tamhā p ā ṇ a -vahaṃ ... vājJayamti ...*).

³⁴⁵ Cp. also Bhatt 1989, 138.

³⁴⁶ SN IV 351 (see n. 347, d); SN V 393 (see ib., e); SHT V Kat.-Nr. 1103 (see ib., g).

³⁴⁷ a) Sn 967: *mettāya phasse tasa-thāvarāni*; b) SN I 141: *nikkhittadaṇḍo tasa-thāvaressu*; line seems to be missing in SĀ. (T vol. 2, 27c); c) SN IV 117: *kodhābhibhūtā puthu-attadaṇḍā virajjhamānā tasa-thāvaressu* (Nāl.-ed.: *virajjamānā sataṇhātānhesu*); line seems to be missing in SĀ. (T vol. 2, 63c); d) SN IV 351 (after *mettā-bhāvanā*): *so* (sc. *ariyasāvako*) *iti paṭisaṃcikkhati: ... na kiṃci vyābādhemi tasam vā thāvaṃ vā*; cp. T vol. 1, 447b20f (MĀ. [Sa.]): 我不犯世 怖與不怖, 常當慈惡一切世間; e) SN V 393 (sc. *ariyasāvako*) *evaṃ pajānāti: avyāpajjhāpame* (v.l. °*bajjha*°) *khvāhaṃ deve suṇāmi; na ca kho paṇāhaṃ kiṃci vyābādhemi tasam vā thāvaṃ vā*; cp. T vol. 2, 216b14f and c27f (SĀ. [Mū.]): 我 ... 於 (請) 世間若怖若安, 不起瞋恚; f) MN II 105 = Th 876: *na hi jātu so mamaṃ hiṃse aññaṃ vā pana kaṃcinam, ... rakkheyya tasathāvaṃ*; g) SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1103 R2+4: *avyāvaddhyārāmā viharataḥ* (read °*ta*) ("delight always in [the attitude of] not doing harm!") ... </> ... *anena ... ///cil* (restore to *na kiṃ/kañcil*?) *loke vyāpādayiṣyatha trasam vā sthāvaṃ vā*).

³⁴⁸ Sn 394 (see n. 428); Sn 629 = Dh 405 (see n. 357, also for parallels). Needless to say that '*bhūta*' is used in these passages in a wider sense than at Pāc. 11.

³⁴⁹ For an exception in a different genre see Jā V 221,7f (gāthā 527.91), where a person states that he is ready to accept (*paccupadissāmi*; 225,15f: = *sampaṭicchissāmi*) all suffering, etc., just as the earth [accepts, or endures, everything] from the mobile and stationary (*pathavī yathā thāvaṃ*)

Buddhist — not only a monk³⁵⁰ but according to some passages also a pious layman³⁵¹ — should not kill or injure³⁵² or oppress³⁵³ them, but should rather protect them³⁵⁴ and suffuse them with friendship and benevolence (*mettā*).³⁵⁵

20.3 It would seem that at least oppressing and suffusing with benevolence do not make sense except with regard to living, nay sentient beings,³⁵⁶ and that hence both the mobile and the stationary beings must be living, sentient beings. But Prajñāvarman, in his commentary on one of the verses concerned,³⁵⁷ takes only the mobile beings to be the living beings, whereas the stationary beings are for him *insentient* things (**acetana*).³⁵⁸ And he adds a quotation according to which one should not harbour injurious thoughts even towards a burnt stump of a

tasānaṃ; for the gen. — unless elliptic — cp. v. Hinüber 1968, § 262).

³⁵⁰ Sn 967 (cp. Sn 964b and 975b: *bhikkhu*); SN I 141 (cp. the 2nd and the 5th verse: *bhikkhu*); Sn 704 (cp. 703d: *muni*); SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1103 (see n. 347) (instruction to monks, cp. R1: *bhikṣavo*).

³⁵¹ Sn 394 (see 393a: *g a h a ṭ ṭ h a -vattaṃ pana vo vadāmi*); at SN IV 351 (see n. 347), the person to whom spiritual advice is given is a layman (viz. a *gāmaṇi*); cp. also IV 350 *kāmesu micchācāraṃ pahāya* (not *abrahmacariyaṃ*, as in the case of monks).

³⁵² Sn 394 (*na hane*, etc.: see n. 428); 629 (*nidhāya daṇḍaṃ, na hanti*: see n. 357); SN I 141 (*nikkhiṭṭadaṇḍo*: see n. 347); SN IV 117 (*virajjhamānā* [reproved behaviour]: see n. 347).

³⁵³ SN IV 351 and V 393 (*vyābādhemi*: see n. 347).

³⁵⁴ MN II 105 = Th 876 (see n. 347).

³⁵⁵ Sn 967 (see n. 347); 146f (see n. 362). Cp. also SN IV 351 (see n. 347).

³⁵⁶ Cp. Wezler 1986, 455 ("*hiṃsā*, taken to mean injury done to a living being ..." [spacing mine]); cp. also ib. 464. Cp. also Paramatthamañjūsā on VisM IX.7, stating that *mettā*- or *karuṇā*-*bhāvanā* do not succeed if a dead person is taken as their object, because such a person cannot be procured well-being (*na hi mata-puggalo hitūpasamhārāho*) nor be freed from suffering.

³⁵⁷ Viz. Uv, 33.47: *'gro ba daṇṇi ni gnaṣ pa yi / 'byuṇ po chad paṣ mi gcod ciṇ / 'gsod med* (v.l. *byed*) *gsod du mi 'jug de / 'bram ze yin par ṇas gsuṇs so* //. The Central Asian Skt. version reads (Uv 33.36:): *nikṣiptadaṇḍaṃ bhūteṣu traseṣu sthāvaṛeṣu ca / yo na hanti hi bhūtāni bravīmi brāhmaṇaṃ hi tam* //. Cp. also DhP 405 = Sn 629 (*nidhāya daṇḍaṃ bhūteṣu tasesu thāvaṛesu ca / yo na hanti na ghāteti, tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇaṃ* //) and Gāndhārī Dharmapada (ed. Brough) I.18 (similar). Acc. to M. Balk, Untersuchungen zum Udānavarga, diss. Bonn 1988, 487, the Skt. on which Uv, is based read *nidhāya* in pāda a, and in pāda c, like Bernhard's old ms. NF, *na hiṃsayati na ghātayati* (though *gsod* is more likely to correspond to *han* than to *hiṃs*).

³⁵⁸ UvViv II, 1020,18: *gaṇ la ṇe na / 'gro ba daṇṇi (= traseṣu) ṇes bya ba smos te </> srog daṇṇi bcas pa dag la'o // gnaṣ pa'i (= sthāvaṛeṣu) ṇes bya ba ni sems med pa'o* //.

tree, let alone embodied beings endowed with mind (**savijñānaka-dehin*).³⁵⁹ To be sure, this interpretation fits in quite well with the fact that in Buddhism malevolent thoughts are evil, it is true, because they may lead to injuring others, but no less because of their negative s p i r i t u a l effect on the very person who nourishes feelings of hatred — poisoning his heart, so to speak —, and under this aspect it does not matter much whether the object of malevolent thoughts is sentient or insentient.³⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Prajñāvarman's interpretation, though reasonable if the verse commented upon by him is seen in isolation, is not acceptable. For in the Pāli tradition, the mobile and stationary beings are, in similar contexts, occasionally expressly called "animate beings" (*p ā ṇ a*³⁶¹ or *pāṇabhū(ta)*³⁶²). Hence, not only the mobile but also the stationary beings must be understood as living, hence probably sentient beings. This is in fact supported by the commentators of the Pāli tradition, who take the *tasa* and *thāvara* to comprise all sentient beings (*satta*),³⁶³ and this is corroborated even by one of the occurrences in the Sanskrit tradition.³⁶⁴

20.4 But then the problem arises how to c h a r a c t e r i z e these two classes of animate beings, especially the stationary ones.

20.4.1 According to the Pāli commentaries, the *tasa* are those animate beings who are still under the sway of Thirst or Desire (*tasiṇā*, *taṇhā*) and of fear (*bhayabherava*), i.e., o r d i n a r y beings, whereas the *thāvara*, the stationary ones, are those who are free from thirst and fear, i.e., the s a i n t s .³⁶⁵ This means that '*tasa*' is either

³⁵⁹ UvViv II, 1020,21ff: *ji skad du / sdoñ dum tshig pa la yañ sems kyiṣ gnod par mi bya na nram par śes pa dañ ldan pa'i lus can la lta smos kyañ ci dgos źes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //*.

³⁶⁰ Cp., in this connection, MPSMah 460a15ff, expressing the idea that mowing grass or felling trees with an evil or hateful mind leads to hell because of the hatred involved, even though mowing grass or felling trees by itself is not bad karma (460b18f).

³⁶¹ Sn 704: *aviruddho aśaratto pāṇesu tasathāvare*; on the basis of this line, there is good reason to assume that in Sn 394 (see n. 428), too, the stationary and mobile beings (*bhūta*) of pādas cd may not have been felt to be different from the *pāṇa* in pāda a.

³⁶² Sn 146f: *ye keci pāṇabhūt' atthi tasā vā thāvarā v' anavasesā, ... sabbe te bhavantu sukhittatā*. On *pāṇabhū/pāṇabhūta*, to be derived from Skt. *prāṇabhṛt*, see K. R. Norman, Pāli Lexicographical Studies IV, in: Journal of the Pāli Text Society 11 (1987), 39f [When presenting my lecture in Kyoto, I had overlooked this article; it was kindly pointed out to me by F. Enomoto].

³⁶³ Th-a III 61 (ad Th 876): *tasathāvare ti sabb' eva satte*.

³⁶⁴ Upasenasūtra (E. Waldschmidt, Von Ceylon bis Turfan, Göttingen 1967, 342) v. 26cd: *sarvvasatveṣu me maitrī ye trasāḥ sthāvarāś ca ye//* (Bower-ms.: ... *ye satvā trāsasthāvarāḥ jaṃgamā//*); T vol. 2, 61b5 (SĀ.): ... 有畏及無畏 (with v.l.; text: 量 instead of 畏).

³⁶⁵ E.g., Nidd I 488; Nidd II 221; Th-a ad Th 876; Ps III 341 (ad MN II 105); Spk I 207 (ad SN

derived from the root *trṣ* "to be thirsty" or from *tras* in the sense of "to tremble with fear", taken in a metaphorical sense, and that '*thāvara*' is also taken in a metaphorical sense, namely that of spiritual and emotional stability,³⁶⁶ and referred to h u m a n beings.³⁶⁷

20.4.2 However, in a historical perspective I cannot help having problems with this interpretation of the expression "*tasa* and *thāvara* animate beings". For, this expression is quite frequent in Jaina sources,³⁶⁸ where it can hardly mean anything but "mobile and stationary animate beings" in a l i t e r a l sense.³⁶⁹ As the term "mobile animate beings" occurs frequently in contexts where it definitely means, primarily,³⁷⁰ the a n i m a l s — including the tiniest ones — in contrast to elements and plants,³⁷¹ the term "stationary animate beings" (*thāvarā pāṇā*) cannot but refer to non-animal life, i.e., perhaps, the elements, especially earth and water,³⁷² but certainly and primarily to (seeds and) p l a n t s .³⁷³ The dichotomy

I 141) and II 398 (ad IV 117). Cp. also the reading of the Nāl.-ed. at SN IV 117 (see n. 347) which has clearly arisen under the influence of commentarial exegesis.

³⁶⁶ Cp. also the Chinese renderings of *t(r)asa* and *(s)thāvara* as "afraid and not afraid" (MĀ. 447b21: see n. 347; SĀ. 61b5: see n. 364) and "afraid and at ease" (SĀ. 216b15 and c28: see n. 347). Cp. also the Ch. rendering of Uv 33.36b (see n. 357) in T vol. 4, 772a27 and 798c15 ("causing [them] not to be afraid"); the commentary at 772b1 even shows the opposition "having fear" and "living in peace".

³⁶⁷ T vol. 4, 772a27 actually translates *bhūta* at Uv 33.36a (see n. 357) by "men" (人), but 798c15 has "sentient beings" (有情).

³⁶⁸ E.g., Dasav 5.1.5 (*hiṃsejja pāṇabhūyāṃ tase aduva thāvare*); 6.10 (*jāvanti loe pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā, te ... na haṇe ...*); 6.24 (*sant' ime suhumā pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā*); Utt 5.8b and 19.89d; Sūy I.1.4.8; I.5.1.4ab (... *tase pāṇiṇo thāvare ya je hiṃsaṭi ...*); I.6.4b; etc.

³⁶⁹ Cp., e.g., Jacobi's rendering at Utt 5.8b ("movable and immovable beings"), or Schubring's translation at Dasav 5.1.5 ("moving or immovable beings"). ĀyārViv 45,7 (ad ĀyārN 153) says *trasanāt s p a n d a n ā t t r a s ā ḥ*. — At Āyār, 5,8f, the context suggests the nuance "getting frightened [very often]" (cp. Bhatt 1989, 137), but this would seem to be a secondary one. Both meanings at SūyViv 277,11 (ad Sūy II.7.11): *bhaya-calanābhyāṃ upapetās trasā(ḥ)*.

³⁷⁰ Since men, let alone heavenly beings and hell-beings, are not in the foreground of *ahiṃsā* contexts, the ascetic being mainly confronted with the problem to avoid killing animals, and especially tiny ones at that.

³⁷¹ E.g. Dasav 4 (p. 5f, esp. 6,9ff); 8.2 (see n. 106; cp. also 8.12); Sūy I.7.1 (*puḍhavi ya āū agaṇi ya vāū taṇa-rukka-bīyā ya t a s ā y a p ā ṇ ā*); cp. also Sūy II.2.6 (JĀS § 696[1]), presupposing that the *tasā pāṇā* are usually killed because one wants their skin, flesh, blood, heart, bile, feathers, tail, horns, teeth, etc.

³⁷² Cp. Schubring 1935, 96 and 143 (+ n. 5, pointing out disagreement concerning fire and wind;

(though not the terminology) goes back to Vedic times,³⁷⁴ and is common also in Hindu sources.³⁷⁵ And not only in Hindu³⁷⁶ but even in later Buddhist³⁷⁷ sources '*sthāvara*' occurs in the sense of "plant". It is difficult to imagine that any listener at the time of earliest Buddhism would have understood the fairly common expression "*tasa* and *thāvara*" (or "*tasa* and *thāvara* beings, or animate beings") in a different sense,³⁷⁸ and hence I for one do not find it probable that they were used differently without any explicit warning. It is much more probable that they were used in the same sense,³⁷⁹ and that it was only at a somewhat later date that the notion of stationary animate beings was found to be at variance with the Buddhist doctrine — consolidated in the meantime — that plants are not animate beings, and that therefore either this concept or even both were reinterpreted in the commentaries.³⁸⁰ This was done in two entirely different ways by Prajñāvarman and by the

cp. also Śīlānka's explanation ad Sūy I.6.4 (SūyViv 96,32: *thāvara* = earth, water, plants) against his comment on Sūy I.10.2 (SūyViv 126,10: *tasa* restricted to beings with more than one sense-faculty, hence not comprising fire and wind), and his synthesizing remarks in his commentary on ĀyārN 153 (ĀyārViv 45,8).

³⁷³ Cp. Schubring 1935, 96 and 143. The *thāvarā pāṇā* are unambiguously plants (in contrast to animals treated in the preceding paragraph: see n. 371) at Sūy II.2.7 (JĀS § 696[2]) where various kinds are enumerated. Cp. also Deleu 1970, p. 135.

³⁷⁴ Cp., e.g., ṚV 1.115.1d = AV 13.2.35d (*jagatas tasthuśaś ca*); ṚV 1.80.14 (*sthā jagac ca*); 1.58.5 (*sthātuś caratham bhayate ...*); 4.53.6 (*jagataḥ sthātur ubhayasya*); cp. also Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad 3.18 (*sthāvarasya carasya ca*). Bollée (1977, 126) refers to ṚV 1.72.6 *paśūn ca sthātīṇ caratham ca pāhi* (Geldner: "die Tiere und alles was steht und geht"; for the unusual pl. *sthātīṇ* see AiGr III, 204, and H. Oldenberg, *Rgveda, Textkritische und exegetische Noten*, vol. 1 (Berlin 1909), 76). [Some of the passages were, some years ago, kindly communicated to me by Prof. A. Mette.]

³⁷⁵ In the Mahābhārata, even the terms '*trasa/sthāvara*' themselves are found: 3.185.28 (*trasānām sthāvarānām ca, yac ceṅgam yac ca neṅgati*); 12.9.19 (*gacchamś trasa-sthāvara-varjakah*); 13.26.24 (*trasānām sthāvarānām ca ... bhayam tyajet*). More frequent is the pair *sthāvara/jaṅgama* (e.g. Manu I.41; MBh 14.94.18 (Alsldorf 1961, 595f: "Tiere und Pflanzen")), besides *carācara* (e.g. Manu 5.44).

³⁷⁶ E.g. Manu I.46; PDhSg p. 42,10f.

³⁷⁷ E.g., MHṛd IX.139; TJv 361a3 (read *brtan pa*).

³⁷⁸ Cp. also the addition of *jaṅgamā <ḥ>* in the Bower ms. (see n. 364), which, exceeding the metre, is obviously a gloss on *trasa* (miswritten as *trāsa* in the ms.).

³⁷⁹ Thus already M. Winternitz, *Der ältere Buddhismus nach Texten des Tipiṭaka*, Tübingen 1929, 84 and 81 (cp. H. Tauscher in: Scholz 1989, 196 n. 12). Cp. also, e.g., K. R. Norman, *The Group of Discourses*, vol. I (London 1984), 24 (v. 146: "moving or still"); 65 (v. 394); 106 (v. 629).

³⁸⁰ At Jā V 225,16f, this reinterpretation is even applied to Jā 221,8 (see n. 349) where it looks still more far-fetched than in the other contexts, the natural meaning being that the earth patiently

Pāli commentators: The former has (even though he does not specifically mention plants) basically preserved the original content of the expression "stationary beings" but denies their sentience, whereas the latter (as well as some Chinese translators)³⁸¹ have kept the aspect of sentience but abandoned the original meaning of "stationary". It is, by the way, interesting that even among contemporary Asian Buddhists their reinterpretation has not remained undisputed, a Sri Lankan monk suggesting that the stationary animate beings are special oceanic animals like sea-anemones.³⁸²

21.1 Anyway, there is yet another passage where plants are — I should say: unequivocally — included in the category "animate beings" (*pāṇa*): In Sn 600ff,³⁸³ a series of verses is introduced by the remark that what follows is an explication of how species of animate beings (*pāṇa*) are distinguished from one another,³⁸⁴ namely by specific biological characteristics (*liṅgaṃ jātīmayaṃ*), in contrast to the social (i.e. caste) distinctions established in human society (more precisely: in Brahmanical Indian society).³⁸⁵ The explication then starts with p l a n t s ,³⁸⁶ which are quite obviously regarded as part of the animate beings (*pāṇa*), just like the animals treated subsequently.³⁸⁷

21.2 The commentary³⁸⁸ wonders why the text starts with plants when it should, according to its introductory verse, explicate the distinctive marks of

endures everything from all creatures inhabiting it: animals and men as well as p l a n t s .

³⁸¹ See n. 366.

³⁸² Maithri Murthi 1986, 5 (slightly modified on the basis of additional oral information from M. Maithri Murthi).

³⁸³ = MN II 196.

³⁸⁴ Sn 600: *tesaṃ vo ahaṃ vyakkhissaṃ ... jātivibhaṅgaṃ pāṇānaṃ ...*

³⁸⁵ Sn 607ff. The main purport of the *sutta* is not, of course, to point out the different species of animate beings but to dispute the legitimacy of the artificial c a s t e hierarchy based on b i r t h and not on specific biological characteristics, and to advocate, instead, a m o r a l "hierarchy" based on what a person d o e s .

³⁸⁶ Sn 601: *tiṇarukkhe pi jānātha; ... liṅgaṃ jātīmayaṃ tesaṃ, añña-m-aññā hi jātayo.*

³⁸⁷ Sn 602-606.

³⁸⁸ Sn-a II 464: «... pāṇānaṃ jātivibhaṅge kathetabbe "tiṇarukkhe pi jānāthā" ti anupādiṇṇakānaṃ tāva kathetuṃ āraddho; taṃ kimattham» iti ce: upādiṇṇesu sukhañāpanattham; anupādiṇṇesu hi jātibhede gahite upādiṇṇesu so pākātatara hoti. The term "appropriated" (*upādiṇṇa*) refers to "biological" appropriation of matter by mind, an act by which matter is constituted as the living body of a sentient being. Accordingly, "unappropriated" material phenomena (among which the text, as a matter of course, includes plants) are insentient.

animate beings, i.e., animals, and suggests that this is a propaedeutical device, facilitating instruction with regard to the animals. But this is surely not the natural way of understanding the situation. It is the understanding of one who presupposes the view that plants are definitely not animate beings, and who hence thinks that the text cannot by any means have intended them to be included among the latter. The only natural, unbiased way of understanding the text is to accept that it does precisely this, namely, that it takes for granted that plants form a group among animate beings (*pāṇa*).

21.3 In the light of this passage, then, in all probability, the above-mentioned expression '*taṣa-thāvarā pāṇā*', too, was, also in earliest Buddhism, understood as "mobile and stationary animate beings", the stationary animate beings being the plants.

V. Evaluation of the Evidence

22.1 In order to evaluate the evidence adduced and discussed in the preceding chapters (II-IV), it may be useful to recapitulate the main results concerning plants:

22.1.1 In the Pāṭimokkhasutta (Pāc. 11) as well as in the Suttapiṭaka, monks (and nuns) are expressly enjoined to abstain from destroying or injuring (seeds and) plants (§§ 4.1-4.3).

22.1.2 The original introductory story to Pāc. 11 in the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga states that this rule is motivated by the fact that *people* would mind the monks destroying plants since they (i.e. the *people*) regard them as living beings (§ 5.4).

22.1.3 This seems to imply that the monks themselves did not share this belief, but we cannot be sure that this was the case from the outset since the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga belongs to a somewhat later period than the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself (§ 5.5).

22.1.4 The investigation of further Vinaya materials (ch. III) does not carry beyond these results but it confirms them. Besides, it yields similar results with regard to earth, but shows that in the case of water the situation is different (practically no "water *ahiṃsā*", and no mention of people regarding water as a living being).

22.1.5 In the Kūṭadantasutta the ideal religious activity of a pre-Buddhist king (a transformation of the Vedic ritual in terms of Buddhist ethical standards, so to speak) is stated to have dispensed not only with slaughtering animals but even with destroying plants (§ 19.1).

22.1.6 Yet, in this text as well as in Pāc. 11 and its Suttapiṭaka parallel (§ 22.1.1), plants are, in contrast to animals, not called "animate beings" (*pāṇa*), nor is any other word indicating life or sentience used. Besides, it should be noted that the expressions used in these passages to denote the act of destroying plants (*chid/lū*, *pātavyatā*, *samārambha*) are different from those used, in the corresponding passages, for the killing of animals (and men) (cp. § 6.2.2, n. 119 and § 19.2 + n. 340), and are, in contrast to the latter, at least ambiguous as far as reference or non-reference to living beings is concerned (see §§ 6.1 and 7.1).

22.1.7 On the other hand, especially in old verse texts, a few passages mention, as the object of abstention from killing or injuring as well as of spiritual attitudes like benevolence, the mobile (*t(r)asa*) and stationary (*(s)thāvara*) animate beings (*pāṇa*) (§§ 20.2ff). According to the common understanding of the pair '*tasa*'/'*thāvara*' at that time, the stationary animate beings cannot but be the plants (§ 20.4.2). This is confirmed by another old verse text where the plants are in fact enumerated among the different species of animate beings (*pāṇa*) (§§ 21.1f).

22.2.1 In evaluating this evidence we should not lose sight of the fact that the passages including plants in the category of animate beings (*pāṇa*) are not many, and that they do so only *de facto*, as a matter of course, while there seems to be no passage expressly stating that plants are

living, sentient beings. It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to early Jaina texts, where — especially in passages where '*pāṇa*' means (men, etc., and) animals only (see § 6.2.2) — the term '*jīva*' for "living beings" is fairly common in a broader sense including plants and even the elements, in the canonical Buddhist sources the use of this term for "living beings" is restricted to passages where non-Buddhist views are reported (See n. 7).

22.2.2 However, as far as I can see there are, in the earlier parts of the canon,³⁸⁹ no passages either that expressly deny plants sentience.³⁹⁰ Even the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka passages that seem to imply such a denial do not belong to the earliest period (see § 22.1.3). The same seems to be true of the schemes of the four *yonis* (see §§ 29.1.1f) and the five *gatis* (see § 29.2).

23 As long as the question of the historical authenticity and chronological stratification of the older parts of the canon remains controversial, the evidence concerning plants would seem to admit of different interpretations. But whichever one chooses, it seems that the evidence excludes the existence of a dogmatic denial of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism.

23.1 If one starts from the presupposition that the old verse collections, and particularly the Suttanipāṭa, contain the oldest layer of the Suttapiṭaka materials, it would be reasonable to take the evidence gathered from these texts to be most likely to represent the view of earliest Buddhism. This would mean that originally Buddhism, too, regarded, as a matter of course, plants as living, animate beings (*pāṇa*). Destroying or injuring plants (and seeds), prohibited by Pāc. 11 and its Suttapiṭaka parallel as well as by some other Vinaya rules, would in this case originally have been a violation of the moral standard of an ascetic not only from the point of view of people but also from that of the Buddhist monks (and nuns) themselves. The problem one has to face in advocating this hypothesis is why and how such an originally positive attitude towards the sentience of plants was, later on, converted into its opposite.

23.2 On the other hand, one may presuppose that authentic information on the typical features of the earliest Buddhist doctrine has to be gathered, primarily, from the (oldest layers of the) prose suttas, and that archaic but divergent utterances in the old verse suttas may be borrowings or adaptations from a pre-Buddhist stock of ascetic

³⁸⁹ I.e., in this connection, the four Nikāyas/Āgamas and the earlier verse collections, viz. Sn, Dhṛp, Ud, It and (probably) Th/Thī, and of course the Prātimokṣasūtra and, with the reserves stated in §§ 22.1.3 and 5.5, the Vinayavibhaṅga and the Khandhaka/Skandhaka.

³⁹⁰ A passage like T vol. 22, 339a13 [Vi.Mā.] (see n. 92) does not really constitute an exception since it has no parallel in the other versions of the Vinayavibhaṅga and since some of the Vinayavibhaṅgas, among them Vin.Mā., contain materials which, if compared with the Pāli tradition, represent, roughly speaking, a stage of development half-way between the Suttavibhaṅga and Buddhaghosa's Sp.

poetry or even from the traditions of non-Buddhist (or originally non-Buddhist)³⁹¹ groups. One may, furthermore, assume that a positive view not only in the Vinaya materials but also in the prose suttas with regard to the sentience of plants is precluded by the fact that they consistently³⁹² avoid designating plants as sentient, animate or living beings (*satta*, *pāṇa*, *jīva*) and even tend to use, in one and the same context, different terms for killing animals (and men) on the one hand and plants on the other (see § 22.1.6). From this, one may conclude that the motivation of Pāc. 11, etc., by the Suttavibhaṅga (see §§ 22.1.2-22.1.3) is, by and large, correct, and that the verses treating plants as part of animate beings (*pāṇa*) (see § 22.1.7) must therefore belong to the materials received or inspired from outside. But even in this case it is hardly conceivable that these verses would have been accepted and kept unmodified if the idea that plants are animate, sentient beings had already been categorically rejected in earliest Buddhism. To be sure, it may well be that the expression "mobile (*taṣa*) and stationary (*thāvara*) animate beings" had become a kind of stock phrase for "all living beings", which one could use even without being explicitly aware of the fact that the stationary living beings cannot but be the plants; but even this would hardly have happened if the dogmatic denial of the sentience of the latter had already formed part of Buddhist thought at that time. Likewise, in case the verses Suttanipāṭa 600ff, on the different species of animate beings (see § 21.1), were, in substance, adapted from outside, one could imagine that the doctrinal implication of the verse mentioning plants was passed unnoticed, so to speak. But this too would hardly have happened if Buddhists had dogmatically denied the sentience of plants from the outset.

23.3 If, however, the prose and verse materials (or at least some of both, if stratification could demonstrate others to be of later origin) are treated as being of equal evidential value, there are several possibilities. One is to concede that the passages speaking of stationary animate beings (*pāṇa*) or enumerating plants among animate beings do not limit themselves to merely expressing this in so many words, but also indicate a corresponding belief on the part of their Buddhist authors or adaptors — adding at the same time, however, that this belief is alien to the reticence of the other canonical sources which seem to avoid an inclusion of plants in the *pāṇa* (and do not apply to them any other word implying life or sentience either). This would suggest — unless chronological sequence is introduced, which would, however, amount to one or the other of the positions sketched in §§ 23.1 and 23.2³⁹³ — the existence of two disagreeing groups. Yet, for want of explicit statements clearly thematizing the issue of the sentience of plants it would seem that such a disagreement could at best have been a latent one, a mere tendency towards different

³⁹¹ Cp. T. Vetter, Some remarks on the older parts of the Suttanipāṭa, in: Seyfort Ruegg and Schmithausen 1990, 42f and 50-52.

³⁹² The two prose passages mentioning stationary [beings] (see n. 346) may be disregarded as not being sufficiently explicit or/and as depending upon the verse tradition.

³⁹³ This would, basically, also hold good in case the Buddha himself had changed his view with regard to the sentience of plants.

views. Besides, it may, to be sure, have emerged at a somewhat later date, but hardly in the very earliest period, which would mean: in the teaching of the Buddha himself. Hence, the starting point should rather be a single view. At a first glance, only two alternatives seem to present themselves: either to take the passages which treat plants as living beings as expressing the actual belief of earliest Buddhism, or to take reticence as the proper position of earliest Buddhism and the positive passages as not really meaning what they say, which would, once again, amount to positions, and problems, similar to those of § 23.1 and § 23.2, respectively.

24.1 However, there is yet another, and to my mind more satisfactory possibility, which is not only compatible with a synchronic interpretation of most of the canonical evidence but would also be applicable to, and even facilitate, diachronic approaches like those discussed in §§ 23.1 and 23.2.³⁹⁴ What I suggest is to start from the assumption that the scantiness and evasiveness of the evidence the earliest Buddhist sources yield with regard to the question of whether plants were regarded as living, sentient beings or not is due to the fact that they were felt to be a kind of border-line case, and that earliest Buddhism either was not sufficiently interested in a clear-cut and explicit theoretical determination of their status, or even more or less deliberately refrained from it.

24.2.1 In certain contexts, there was reason for, or at least no serious objection to, including even such a border-line case: In the context of Suttanipāṭa 600ff, envisaging a kind of rough but comprehensive outline of taxonomy of biological species, it was reasonable to mention plants, too. Likewise, in ethical spirituality, in the context of developing an all-encompassing attitude of universal peaceableness or benevolence, it would seem to be quite natural that even a border-line case, like plants, was, as a matter of course, included. The same holds good when ideal behaviour is described.

24.2.2 Of course, it may well be that such readiness to include plants in the realm of sentient beings was favoured by the less dogmatic genre of the verse suttas.³⁹⁵ But even so the contexts in which the usual reticence is abandoned are probably significant. And even in case we take the verses concerned to have been borrowed or adapted from or inspired by a pre- or non-Buddhist tradition, it may still be the specific context of the verses that allowed to retain stock phrases like "mobile and stationary animate beings" unmodified, no need for excluding a border-line case like plants being felt.

³⁹⁴ In the case of the approach of § 23.1, the "border-line case assumption" would explain why the practicability aspect (see §§ 25ff) could gradually lead to increasing reticence with regard to the sentience of plants and finally to its denial. In the case of the approach of § 23.2, it would explain why there was no problem in retaining the expression "stationary (animate) beings" in verses borrowed or adapted from other traditions.

³⁹⁵ For the prose passages, see n. 392.

24.3 In the Pāṭimokkhasutta, on the other hand, the context in which plants have to be taken into consideration is one of everyday behaviour, regulated by rules of conduct that must be practicable. But even at this level the border-line case is not ignored, destroying or injuring of (seeds and) plants being declared a *pācittiya* offence. But as we have seen (§§ 6.2.1f), the Pāṭimokkhasutta clearly distinguishes between (seeds and) plants on the one hand and *pāṇa*, restricted to animals, on the other. This may indicate that at least in some spheres of everyday life this distinction is, in fact, important.

25 It is, to be sure, comparatively easy to practice *ahiṃsā* with regard to plants as long as wanton destruction of plants without any need or purpose is concerned. But there are limits in connection with the utilization of plants for food as well as other daily needs.

25.1 To be sure, in this regard monks and nuns are in a much better position than most if not all lay people. They need not destroy or injure plants by harvesting since they live on alms. Besides, they can also avoid destroying plants, seeds and even fruits by preparation (cooking, cutting, pounding) and even by chewing them without preparation if they accept, as they are in fact enjoined to, only such food as has already been made "suitable" for ascetics by a lay person (see § 12.3). But even for monks or nuns a problem arises when they accept food prepared expressly for them (*uddissa-kata*) or invitations (*nimantana*). For in such cases, the killing involved, at any rate of plants, would, in many cases at least,³⁹⁶ have been done expressly for feeding them, which means that one may charge them with being, albeit indirectly, responsible for it. Now, as is well known, this is one of the points in which Jainism and Buddhism have adopted different positions. Jainism strictly prohibits monks and nuns from accepting food expressly prepared for them (*uddesiya*)³⁹⁷ — and, so it seems, *a fortiori* from accepting invitations.³⁹⁸ Buddhism, on the other hand, has no objections to this,³⁹⁹ though with an important exception: meat and fish⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁶ I.e., if living plants, grains or fruits are harvested or pounded, cut, cooked, etc., with the intention of preparing food for monks.

³⁹⁷ E.g., Dasav 3.2; 5.1.55; 10.4c; Sūy II.6.40 (JĀS § 826); cp. Schubring 1935, 172. Perhaps a still more pertinent concept in this connection is *āhākamma*, which according to Jain 1983, 70ff, originally means "making [food] lifeless [for the sake of a monk]", and is one of the reasons by which food becomes unacceptable for a Jaina ascetic, besides *uddesiya*, which according to Jain (loc.cit.) means food which is expressly prepared for the monk but not [or at least not necessarily? cp. n. 401!], killed expressly for him.

³⁹⁸ Cp. Bollée 1971, 76.

³⁹⁹ E.g., Vin I 58 and 96 (*nimantana*; cp. also *uddesa-bhatta*); II 197 = III 171f (*nimantana*); M I 77 (rejection of *uddissa-kata* and *nimantana* as features of exaggerated asceticism).

⁴⁰⁰ In the story of Sīha (Vin I 237, etc.: see n. 402) and in the *tikoṭiparisuddha* formula, "fish"

a monk should not accept if he knows or supposes that the animal was killed⁴⁰¹ expressly for him (*uddissa-kata, paṭicca-kamma*).⁴⁰² The fact, however, that there is no such restriction with regard to vegetable food indicates that in Buddhism, compared with Jainism, "killing" plants is taken less seriously than killing animals. There are other features pointing to the same direction; viz. that Buddhist monks and nuns are, to be sure, prohibited from directly asking a lay person to fell a tree or cut a fruit,⁴⁰³ but are allowed to ask for the same thing in an indirect way, e.g., by telling lay persons that they need a tree or a fruit, etc., or by asking them to give it to them or to render it suitable [for ascetics] (*kappiya*).⁴⁰⁴ For a Jaina monk, however, all verbal references to possible

appears to be an addition of the Pāli tradition since the other versions have only "meat" (Jaworski 1931, 107; cp. also T vol. 23, 264c27ff [Vin.Sa.]). But in the five ascetic practices proclaimed by Devadatta (Vin II 196f: see n. 402) "fish" is missing only at Saṅghabh II 259,12 (Mū.), whereas in all other versions we find both meat and fish: see, besides the Pāli version, T vol. 22, 164a24 (Vin.Mī.), 594b3f (Vin.Dh.) and vol. 23, 264c1 (Vin.Sa.). Cp. also passages mentioning complete abstention from meat and fish as an element of exaggerated asceticism disapproved by the Buddha (e.g., MN I 77; T vol. 1, 441c23; AKTU tu 177b7: *sa mi za ba daṇḥ/ nā ... mi za ba*; cp. Bollée 1971, 72 and 81).

⁴⁰¹ Cp. Alsdorf 1961, 563 n. 2. — In contrast to this, *uddesiya* in Jaina sources (and probably also *uddissa-kata* in passages like MN I 77 (see n. 399)) seems to focus on preparation expressly for the monk, which need not necessarily involve killing expressly for the monk, though it certainly does so in many cases (cp. n. 397; cp. also Sūy II.6.40f [JĀS §§ 826f], stating that Jaina monks avoid *uddissa-bhatta* on account of pity with all living beings (*saṃvesi jīvāṇa dayatṭhayāe*), and because they are afraid that beings [might have been killed for them] (*bhūtārābhisaṃkāe*)).

⁴⁰² Vin I 237f (cp. T vol. 22, 149c19ff; 486a11ff; 872b4ff; vol. 23, 190b9ff; GM III.1, 236f); MN I 368f; cp. Vin II 197 = III 172. Cp. Alsdorf 1961, 563f; Ch. Sh. Prasad, Meat-Eating and the Rule of *Tikoṭiparisuddha*, in: A. K. Narain (ed.), Studies in Pali & Buddhism, Delhi 1979, 289ff; Masahiro Shimoda, «Sanshu no jōniku» saikō, in: Bukkyō Bunka 22/1989, 1ff, esp. 7ff. — It is noteworthy that the prohibition is found only in the Skandhaka and that transgression is only a *dukkatā* offence. What we do find in the Prātimokṣasūtra is the statement that it is a *pācittiya* offence when a monk eats fish or meat he has expressly begged for himself (Pāc. 39 = Vin IV.88), but the motive is clearly not *ahimsā* but ascetic decorum since in this rule fish and meat are part of a list of delicious food (*paṇṭa-bhojana*), along with butter, honey, milk, etc.

⁴⁰³ This is clear from the fact that in the Suttavibhaṅga (Vin IV 34: ... *rukkaṃ chindanti pi chedāpentī pi*; IV 35: *bijje bījasaññī chindati vā chedāpeti vā, ... bhedāpeti vā, ... pacāpeti vā*; cp. also T vol. 22, 642a2f; vol. 23, 75a27f; b9f, etc.) and even in some versions of the Prātimokṣa rule itself (see n. 21: T 1464, Mū; cp. also Vin.Mī: T vol 22, 41c23f, and esp. 42a6: "if he has another person [cut a plant] by saying 'cut [it]!', this is a *pācittiya* offence") not only cutting plants or felling a tree with one's own hands but also ordering others to do so is prohibited. Cp. also Sp 766, expressly declaring orders like "cut this tree!" to be a *pācittiya* offence (whereas unspecified orders like "cut a tree!" are allowed(!)).

⁴⁰⁴ Vin IV 35 (*anāpatti* formula); T vol. 22, 42a3-5 (Vin.Mī.); 642a12 (Vin.Dh.). — Even if the

utilization of trees or fruits are as blameworthy as references to the utilization of animals.⁴⁰⁵ All this would seem to indicate that in Buddhism the life or sentience of plants was felt to be, at least, significantly inferior to, or less intense than, that of animals, to a degree justifying, even for monks and nuns, a conspicuous difference of behaviour in connection with their use.

25.2 On the other hand, there is also a significant distinction between plants and water which throws light on the border-line status of plants from the other side: Whereas a Jaina monk must receive both vegetables and water from a lay person who has made them "suitable" (i.e. lifeless, which in the case of water means cooking: see § 16.3), for Buddhist monks this holds good for vegetables only (see § 12.3), whereas they are allowed to drink fresh water (provided that it is free from tiny animals: see § 16.3) and may even draw water themselves, without having it offered to them.⁴⁰⁶ This means that in the case of water, unlike plants, the old belief that it, too, is living and even sentient is disregarded completely.⁴⁰⁷

25.3 This is hardly accidental. For in a tropical country being prohibited from drinking fresh water doubtless causes much more inconvenience than having to depend on alms for food. Thus it would seem that in the case of water, too, it is practicality that determined Buddhism to ignore the old belief in its animateness and sentience. For whereas in Jainism liberation seems to depend on a punctilious avoidance of injuring even the most minute living beings and on severe austerity, in Buddhism, the decisive point is the spiritual process of the eradication of Desire. Abstention from killing living beings is an essential presupposition for spiritual progress, but had to be kept within practicable limits in order not to become a handicap to the main aim. To include even water in the sentient beings would pass beyond these limits, as is also supported by the passage from the Mahāsihanādasutta discussed in § 16.4.

25.4 It would seem that also in the case of plants it is this sense of practicability of the precepts that made the Buddha, or earliest Buddhism, tend to disregard, in a sense, the sentience of plants in certain contexts where the practical difficulties it involved appeared disproportionate. Besides, if monks rejected food expressly prepared for them, this may even have annoyed lay people striving for merit; and to prohibit monks from accepting invitations would have deprived the Saṅgha from an excellent opportunity for religious instruction.

anāpatti formula may be comparatively late, in the present case the pattern of behaviour it testifies to is at least symptomatic of what appears to have been a typical feature of the Buddhist attitude (in contrast to the Jaina one) more or less from the outset.

⁴⁰⁵ Dasav 7.26-35.

⁴⁰⁶ Pāc. 40 (Vin IV 90): see n. 314.

⁴⁰⁷ Cp. also § 38.3.

26.1 The problem of practicability would seem to be even more urgent in the case of lay people. To be sure, for peasants it may even be difficult to avoid killing animals, at least small animals like dew-worms living in the soil. But if such unintentional killing is disregarded, even peasants confining themselves to agriculture, let alone people living in the cities, have a chance to keep the precept not to kill as long as one thinks of animals only. But as soon as seeds and plants come in, matters become very difficult. Peasants can hardly do without harvesting, and even townspeople (except perhaps wealthy persons who have all preparation of food done by servants), when preparing food, will have to cut, pound, cook, etc., vegetables, grain and fruits. Besides, they need wood for construction, etc. Hence, also in connection with the everyday life of lay people there is good reason for a distinction between animals and plants, and the monks could not remain indifferent to the matter since some of the "killing" of plants by lay people was done expressly for the monks or even suggested by them (see § 25.1).

26.2 This requirement has been recognized not only in Buddhism but also in Jainism. For even there, the basic commandments are, at least from a certain time onward, confined to the prohibition of gross killing or injuring (*thūlago pāṇāivāyo, sthūlā himsā*), i.e., killing animals,⁴⁰⁸ whereas destruction of plants forms part of subtle injuring abstention from which is obligatory for the ascetic only. But since Jainism does not in any form weaken or ignore the idea that plants, too, are living, sentient beings, all forms of injuring or killing them cannot but be bad karma. Hence, the Jaina layman also is expressly enjoined to avoid destruction, particularly pointless destruction, of plants, too, as far as possible,⁴⁰⁹ and for this reason Jains try to refrain from professions like agriculture⁴¹⁰ and tend to be businessmen.⁴¹¹ Buddhism, on the other hand, not only came to achieve vast diffusion in cities but it also spread to country people, i.e., in the Indian context, mainly peasants. In accordance with this, its position with regard to the destruction or injuring of plants by lay people is (or has at least come to be) much more reserved. To be sure, unnecessary destruction of plants is occasionally disapproved even in the case of lay people.⁴¹² But on the whole, Buddhism appears

⁴⁰⁸ Williams 1983, 65f. Cp. Sūy II.7.6ff (JĀS ed. §§ 846ff), esp. 8 (§ 847), 10 (§ 849), 13f (§ 852f) and 17 (§ 856); Viyāh (JĀS ed.) § VII.1.7 = p. 274,13-16 (cp. Deleu 1970, 131, VII 1^{3b}).

⁴⁰⁹ Williams 1983, 66. Cp. also, e.g., Sūy II.7.18 (JĀS ed. § 857) and II.7.27 (JĀS § 865[2]): ... *thāvarā pāṇā, jehiṃ samaṇovāsagassa aṭṭhāe daṇḍe añikkhitte, aṇaṭṭhāe daṇḍe ñikkhitte*; Viyāh (JĀS ed.) § VII.1.8 = p. 274,17ff (cp. Deleu 1970, 131, VII 1^{3b}).

⁴¹⁰ Williams 1983, 118; 122.

⁴¹¹ v. Glasenapp 1925, 321ff.

⁴¹² Cp. the passage from the Kūṭadantasutta (§ 19.1), destroying plant life for ritual purposes obviously being, in this text, regarded as unnecessary. Cp. also the passage from Aris 1990 referred to in n. 420. Cp. also n. 418.

to deliberately avoid arousing, in lay people, qualms in connection with a moderate⁴¹³ utilization of plants for food and other basic needs. Though lay people, in a sense, save the monk the trouble to "kill" plants and seeds, this "killing" is obviously played down. To be sure, Buddhism has by no means abolished inhibition altogether. E.g., there are several passages blaming the felling or injuring of a tree whose shade or fruits one has benefited from, as an act of illloyalty or ingratitude.⁴¹⁴ Besides, as already mentioned in § 5.3, Buddhism has kept the popular belief that trees, especially large ones, are inhabited by tree deities commonly believed to resent and avenge the felling of their abode. But on the other hand Buddhism also seems to have contributed to a weakening of inhibition by contriving, or adapting, pacificatory ceremonies asking the tree deity to consent to the felling of the tree⁴¹⁵ or to shift to another tree,⁴¹⁶ and by advocating the idea that it is the "moral norm of a tree" (*rukkhadhamma*)⁴¹⁷ that the deity inhabiting it does not get angry when people fell its tree or injure it in order to use it.⁴¹⁸ And, as Maithri Murthi⁴¹⁹

⁴¹³ Ruthless exploitation would seem to be stigmatized at Jā IV 351f, where merchants are punished because they are not content with cutting the branches of a tree in order to obtain various useful things but finally even cut its roots.

⁴¹⁴ E.g., Pv II.9.1ff, where a person who, pretending to need the stem, fells a tree the shade of which he has enjoyed is called an evil person breaking friendship (*mittadubbho pāpako*; cp. also Jā IV 352 [see n. 413], esp. verse 196) and ungrateful (cp. verse 7: *kataññutā*); cp. also AN III 369 (see n. 420). Cp. BN n. 38. — The idea that a useful tree has to be treated as a friend or partner (as long as it is not re-interpreted in terms of tree deities different from the tree) would no doubt fit in with the belief that plants, too, are sentient, at least as a border-line case. But it may as well be explained as an *ad hoc* adoption of a popular view or as an *ad hoc* personification, with little if any significance for the general view of earliest Buddhism on the question of the sentience of plants.

⁴¹⁵ Jā IV 153f.

⁴¹⁶ T vol. 23, 776a13ff; vol. 24, 576c23ff.

⁴¹⁷ This expression may indicate that originally the idea stems from a period or ambiance where trees themselves, and not only the deities inhabiting them, were still regarded as sentient beings.

⁴¹⁸ AN III 370; Sp 759. Though at AN III 370 the *rukkhadhamma* is stated to demand, of a tree deity, not to become displeased when people utilize parts of the tree for fulfilling their needs, yet in the context what the tree deity had become upset by was an act of wanton injuring of its tree (though only a minor one). Not to become angry even at wanton injury is, of course, in line with the Buddhist ethics of patience, but explicitly stating that even trees or tree deities have to behave in this way surely considerably weakens people's inhibitions to destroy or injure them. To be sure, the text only blames the tree deity's reaction but does not, thereby, automatically sanction the wanton injury inflicted on the tree; but it does not explicitly stigmatize it either; it is only the tree deity that calls the perpetrator a wicked (*pāpa*) person.

⁴¹⁹ Maithri Murthi 1986, 62.

states, villagers in Sri Lanka, though regarding plants to be, somehow, living beings, yet do not consider cutting them to be bad karma. Actually, I for one do not know of any passage in a classical Buddhist text where cutting plants in general, and especially in the context of food and other daily needs, is explicitly stated to be bad karma.⁴²⁰ In somewhat later texts, it is, occasionally, even expressly confirmed that destroying or damaging plants, though an offence in the case of monks, is none for ordinary people (*lokassa anavajjam*)^{421, 422} or that mowing grass or felling trees is not bad karma.⁴²³ This presupposes that the sentience of plants is denied or at least completely disregarded, once again for the sake of practicability.

26.3 In view of the vital significance the problem has for lay people, especially those living on agriculture, one might even consider the possibility that it was primarily for their sake that even the early Buddhist texts are, on the whole, so conspicuously reticent with regard to the animateness or sentience of plants. Such an assumption would seem to be supported by the fact that abstention from injuring seeds and plants is not even included among the additional, rather ascetic than moral restrictions lay people have to observe on *uposatha* days.⁴²⁴ On the other hand, it may be important to note that among the passages speaking of "mobile (*tasa*) and stationary (*thāvara*) (animate) beings" (§ 20.2ff) — of which most deal, to be sure, with the spiritual attitude or behaviour of monks⁴²⁵ or are at least unspecified⁴²⁶ — two or three refer to laymen⁴²⁷ and, what is more, not merely to their spiritual attitude but to their behaviour. The most explicit one is Sn 394, which is of foremost importance in our context since it formulates the first Precept for householders (*gahaṭṭha*, see Sn 393), stating that, abstaining from violence with regard to all beings, mobile and stationary ones, he should not

⁴²⁰ Cp. also T vol. 51, 438b4, stating that it is not heard [in any authoritative Buddhist text] that in the case of insentient beings [like plants, destroying them is an act which] has a [karmic] result. However, M. Aris (1990, 99) reports a passage from a Bhutanese school textbook where needless injury inflicted upon a tree is described as 'sinful'. Cp. also AN III 369 where a person who has wantonly injured a tree after having benefited by its fruits is called "wicked" (*pāpa*) by the tree deity (cp. n. 418). As for Sn 394, see § 26.3.

⁴²¹ Cp. n. 93.

⁴²² Mil 266,26f.

⁴²³ T vol. 12, 460b17-19 (MPSMah).

⁴²⁴ E.g., AN IV 250; Sn 400f = AN IV 254, etc.

⁴²⁵ See § 20.2 + n. 350.

⁴²⁶ E.g., Sn 629 = Dhṛp 405 (see n. 357): the true brahmin.

⁴²⁷ See § 20.2 + n. 351.

kill any animate being, nor have them killed, nor consent to others killing them.⁴²⁸ If my interpretation of the stationary animate beings as plants (§ 20.4.2) is correct, the verse would seem to express the view that even in the case of Buddhist lay followers the precept not to kill or injure is not confined to (men and) animals but includes plants as well. To be sure, the text does not formulate the precepts in terms of good or bad karma, but rather as an ethical ideal,⁴²⁹ conceived on the model of ascetic morality, as becomes especially clear in the case of the third Precept, the text exhorting even the layman to practise continence (*brahmācariya*: Sn 396ab). At the same time, however, the text expressly states that a householder is not in a position to come up to the moral standard of a monk in its entirety (Sn 393cd).⁴³⁰ Accordingly, in the case of the third Precept the text adds that if the layman is unable to practise continence, he should at any rate not violate others' wives (Sn 396cd), which is the usual form of this Precept. In view of the considerable problems involved, for lay followers, in not killing or injuring even plants, one would expect a similar alleviation in the case of the first Precept. But the text does not express any; it does not say, as one might expect, that a layman should at any rate not kill mobile living beings, i.e., animals.

26.4 The question is how to interpret this fact.

26.4.1 One possibility is to assume that the text reflects an early situation and to conclude from it that in the beginning the specific problems lay people may have with plant *ahimsā* were either not realized or disregarded by Buddhism. This would perhaps be easier to understand if we presuppose that the lay people addressed were primarily wealthy townsmen (with servants to prepare their meals), not poor people or peasants.

⁴²⁸ Sn 394: *pāṇaṃ na hane na ca ghātayeyya, nā cānujaññā hanataṃ paresaṃ / sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ: ye thāvarā ye ca tasanti loke //*; cp. Dh 405 = Sn 629 (see n. 357) and, for *pādas* cd, Sn I 141 (see n. 347).

⁴²⁹ This would seem to be true also of SN IV 351 (see ns. 347 and 351) — and V 393 (see n. 347), in case it too refers to a layman —, where, however, the layman declares that he actually does not injure anything mobile or stationary, i.e. that he actually fulfils the ideal.

⁴³⁰ Cp. also Sn 220f. In this passage, however, it is not only a difference with regard to chastity but still more explicitly one with regard to injuring animate beings (*pāṇa*, *pāṇin*) that is expressed. On the other hand, Sn 220f stresses the actual difference between monk and layman in order to extol (and recommend) the status of a monk, whereas Sn 393ff, though admitting the different facilities available to a monk and to a layman, accepts the layman as such and exhorts him to emulate the moral standard of the monk as much as possible (cp. also the *uposatha* rules Sn 400f). It may be merely due to this difference of purpose that Sn 220f suggests the idea that a lay person has little chance to practise complete *ahimsā*, whereas Sn 394, in this regard, ignores the limitations and exhorts the layman to try his very best. There is hence no need to assume (though one can hardly exclude the possibility either) that the two passages also envisage different social situations (e.g., rural versus urban) or reflect a different degree of awareness with regard to the problems involved in plant *ahimsā* (in which latter case the text mentioning plants (*thāvara*) would, oddly enough, be the one which is less aware of the problems involved in their inclusion).

26.4.2 Another possibility is to assume that at least in the text under consideration the use of the phrase "mobile and stationary beings" is a stereotype, or borrowed from another source or tradition — just like the tripartite formula "not to kill, nor to have others kill, nor to consent to others killing" which is atypical of Buddhist texts but common in Jaina sources⁴³¹ —, and hardly purporting anything but the notion of "all living, animate beings" (cp. § 23.2). In this case, the person who composed or adapted the text need not actually have thought of plants. But he would hardly have used or retained the phrase "mobile and stationary beings" had he clearly intended to exclude plants, unless we assume that the text is so late that the original meaning of '*tasa*' and '*thāvara*' was no longer known.

26.5 Hence, although problems of the practicability of the first precept for lay followers may well have played an important role in the development of the Buddhist denial of the sentience of plants, we cannot be sure that this was the starting point. The primary motive may rather have been problems of practicability, especially in connection with food, for monks and nuns (§ 25.1).

27 It is, however, possible that the tendency towards weakening the view that plants, let alone earth and water, are sentient beings was not initiated by Buddhism. For in this case I for one would expect more explicit statements. It may rather already have begun to fade in the course of the gradual development of an overall process of rationalization which may be taken to have started, in a sense, already in the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇa period⁴³² and to have developed further in Upaniṣadic thought and in the śramaṇic movements.⁴³³ It may be worth investigating whether such fading of the belief in the sentience of plants, earth and water may have originated in connection with the extension of agriculture,⁴³⁴ or with the emergence or full-fledged development of urbanization,⁴³⁵ or with any other

⁴³¹ E.g., Dasav 4.VII ff (p. 10ff).

⁴³² Cp. Jan C. Heesterman, *Ritual, Offenbarung und Achsenzeit*, in: S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Kulturen der Achsenzeit: Ihre Ursprünge und ihre Vielfalt*, Teil 2, 1987, 240; id., *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, Chicago 1985, 100; H. Kulke, *Die historischen Ursprünge der indischen Achsenzeit*, in: Eisenstadt (as before), 212.

⁴³³ Cp. Obeyesekere 1980, 157ff, esp. 159.

⁴³⁴ As, e.g., Christian polemics against the Manichaeans (cp. Henrichs 1979, 92 fn. 22) may suggest.

⁴³⁵ For the connection of earliest Buddhism with the urban milieu, cp. Weber 1978, 217; B.G. Gokhale in: *JIABS* 5.2/1982, 7ff; Gombrich 1988, 50; G. v. Simson, *Der zeitgeschichtliche Hintergrund der Entstehung des Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung für die Datierungsfrage*, in: H. Bechert (ed.), *The Dating of the Historical Buddha*, Pt. 1, Göttingen 1991, 92ff. — In this connection, it is interesting that in the inscriptions of Aśoka, which surely reflect the ambiance of the capital, the words for animate or living beings — not only '*pāna*' but also '*jīva*' (RE I.B; III.D

change of the period, but this would by far exceed the limits of this paper. At any rate, if it is true that the tendency towards weakening belief in universal sentience was already there, Buddhism (in contrast to the more archaic or conservative Jainism) would have a c c e p t e d it because it facilitated p r a c t i c a b i l i t y — practicability, to be sure, for the m o n k s a n d n u n s who could concentrate their effort on their s p i r i t u a l task of eradicating Desire, but, at least in the long run, no less for lay people, especially the p e a s a n t s who were thus not obliged to remorse for tilling the soil, using water or harvesting plants, and hence could be i n - t e g r a t e d by Buddhism much better than by Jainism.

[Dhau.]; PE V.G) — clearly refer to animals only, not to plants. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka it is, as M. Maithri Murthi told me, r u r a l people who still consider plants to be, somehow, living beings (see § 5.4 with n. 87).

VI. Later Developments

28 Later on, however, the pragmatic flexibility and reticence of earliest Buddhism fell a prey to the desire for an unambiguous theoretical position, which amounted to plants being virtually, and in the end, at least on the doctrinal level,⁴³⁶ explicitly, excluded from the range of sentient beings, which means that in the long run the point of view of practicability in connection with food, etc., came to prevail over the other aspects.

29 As stated before (§§ 5.5, 8, 9.1f, 10.1, 12.4 and 22.1.3), such an exclusion of plants from the range of living, sentient beings seems to be implied already in a number of passages from strata of the Vinaya-piṭaka which do not belong to the oldest period since they are at any rate significantly later than the Prātimokṣasūtra. One would hence not be surprised to find traces of such a development also in the Suttapiṭaka.

29.1.1 An example is perhaps the scheme of the four *yoni*s, i.e. classes of living beings according to the way they are born: 1. chorion-born (*jarāyu-ja*, i.e. viviparous⁴³⁷), 2. egg-born (*aṇḍa-ja*)⁴³⁸, 3. moisture-born (*samseda-ja*), and 4. spontaneously born (*opapātika*). The third group is explained as comprising beings originating, e.g., in putrid fish, carrion, putrid porridge, or in a stagnant or dirty pool,⁴³⁹ i.e. worms and insects.⁴⁴⁰ The fourth group is stated to contain gods, hell-beings, some human beings⁴⁴¹ and some underworld-beings(?) (*vinipātika*).⁴⁴² Thus, it would seem that there is no place in this scheme for plants.⁴⁴³ This

⁴³⁶ For popular belief, see § 5.4.

⁴³⁷ Acc. to T vol. 2, 632a12f (EĀ_c): men, cattle, and "biped 'insects'" (二足蟲), i.e., probably, bats (Ch. 蝙蝠, hence grouped with 虫, i.e. insects, worms and other small animals like frogs, snakes, etc.; cp. also Sp 363: *vaggulī* ("bats") as a kind of biped animals (viz. such as have wings consisting of skin).

⁴³⁸ T vol. 2, 632a10f (EĀ_c) enumerates various kind of birds as well as snakes (/reptiles), fishes and ants.

⁴³⁹ MN I 73; cp. T vol. 2, 632a14.

⁴⁴⁰ Cp. T vol. 2, 632a14 (EĀ_c): 虫 (cp. also AKBh 118,25f; Stache-Rosen 1968, 110; Y 46,2). This version speaks, strangely enough, of "condition-born" animals, but has "moisture-born" instead at a9.

⁴⁴¹ Acc. to AKBh 119,7f those belonging to the first world-age (*prāthamakalpika*).

⁴⁴² MN I 73; Ps II 36,17f takes the *vinipātika* beings as *petas* (cp. AKBh 119,14f; Y 46,5); T vol. 2, 632a16 seems to have "animals" instead (cp. AKBh 119,9f; Y 46,5) but at the same time adds the *pretas* after the hell-beings.

⁴⁴³ Cp. MHrd IX.140ab: *sacetanā hi taravo na, catuṛyony-asamgrahāt*; VinMañj 200f:

appears to be confirmed by the usual Brahmanical version of the *yonī* scheme, which omits the "spontaneously born" and has beings "born by splitting" (*udbhij-ja*) instead.⁴⁴⁴ This group is normally⁴⁴⁵ said to contain the plants,⁴⁴⁶ and "splitting" is explained as splitting the earth or — perhaps more likely — the seed.⁴⁴⁷

29.1.2 On the other hand, we cannot perhaps be altogether sure that the scheme was in fact, from the outset, meant to comprise all living beings, including a border-line case like plants; for even in the earliest Jaina sources⁴⁴⁸ it is only the mobile living beings (*tasā pāṇā*) that are subdivided into a similar set of classes, and in contexts at that where it is stressed that at least plants, too, are living beings. In the Buddhist canon, too, the scheme is, apart from its general function, also used for the special purpose of subdividing the *Nāgas*⁴⁴⁹ (mythic beings, but at the same time snakes) and their mythical bird-like enemies, the *Garuḍas*.⁴⁵⁰ I for one cannot exclude the possibility that this special use of the scheme is, in Buddhism, the older one, and that it was generalized only later. At any rate, as far as I can see the general version of the scheme is quite rare in the canonical texts, occurring, apart from the

rukkhādayo ... na jīvā, ... catuyoniyam apariyāpannato.

⁴⁴⁴ Cp., e.g., Aitareya-Upaniṣad 3.3; MBh 14.42.19ff; Manu I.43-46; Śāṅkara ad Brahmasūtra III.1.20; cp. also ChU 6.3.1 (*aṇḍaja, jīvaḥ, udbhijja*).

⁴⁴⁵ In the Jaina sources mentioned below (see n. 448), where the scheme refers to animals only, the *udbhijja* (i.e. *udbhijja*) beings cannot mean plants but are explained as referring to animals coming from larvae, like butterflies (cp. Halbfass 1980, 293; 1991, 318). Cp. also Suśruta, quoted by Bh. Jhalakīkar, Nyāyakośa, 871 (*udbhijjāḥ* = fire-flies, frogs, etc. (*indragopa-maṇḍuka-prabhṛtayaḥ*)).

⁴⁴⁶ E.g. Manu I.46; Śāṅkara ad Aitareya-Upaniṣad 3.3 (*udbhijjāni ... vṛkṣādīni*). Cp. also Tjv 356b1 where an opponent, objecting to the Buddhist argument that plants are not comprised in the four *yonis*, states that they constitute a fifth one, viz. *udbhijja* (*yaṁ (D) gal te bṛtol nas steṇ du skye žes bya ba skye gnas lha pa yin no že na ...*). The Buddhist rejects such a fifth *yonī* as pure fancy (text as in D (312b1)), and he adds that even if it were accepted plants would nevertheless not be living, sentient beings because they do not feel pain (see § 34, h).

⁴⁴⁷ MBh 14.42.22 (*bhittvā tu prthivīm ...*); Medhātithi ad Manu I.46 (... *bījaṁ bhūmiṁ ca bhittvā ...*); similarly Kullūka et al., while Sarvajñanārāyaṇa and Govindarāja mention splitting the earth only. Cp. Āyār II.3.1 (JĀS ed. § 464): *bīyā ... ubbhijñā*.

⁴⁴⁸ Āyār, p. 5, 1f; Daśav 4 (p. 6, 9-11); Sūy I.7.1 (JĀS § 381).

⁴⁴⁹ SN III 240(ff); cp. AKṬU tu 125b3f (ad AKBh 120,1; cp. AKVy 266,18ff); T vol. 1, 127a28f = 288a22-24 = 332b13f = 387b10-12 (Lokaprajñaptisūtra; cp. S. Dietz in: E. v. Schuler (ed.), XXIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag, ausgewählte Vorträge, Stuttgart 1989, 492f); T vol. 2, 646a12f; 704a17.

⁴⁵⁰ SN III 246(ff); AKṬU tu 125b4f; T vol. 1, 127a29ff = 288a24-26 = 332b15f = 387b12-14 (Lokaprajñaptisūtra); T vol. 2, 646a8-10.

abhidharma-like Saṅgītasutta,⁴⁵¹ only in one Sutta of the Majjhimanikāya⁴⁵² (where it has no close connection with the context) and, as a sermon on its own, in the Chinese Ekottar(ik)āgama.⁴⁵³ This could, of course, mean that it is an old element that had become obsolete, but since it fits in quite well with later developments and has in fact found remarkable interest in the later tradition⁴⁵⁴ it would seem to me more likely that its scarcity in the canon signalizes later origin, and perhaps it was actually contrived, or at least given a general application, with the intention to contrast with the Brahmanical scheme by not including plants.

29.2 Another scheme which at least in later dogmatics clearly implies that plants are not sentient beings is that of the five *gatis*, i.e. destinies [where one may go after death], viz. gods, men, realm of the forefathers (*petti-visaya*),⁴⁵⁵ animals (*tira-cchāna-yoni*), and hell (*niraya*).⁴⁵⁶ I admit that closer investigation is required, but for the time being I should say that this scheme, though not infrequently used or presupposed in the canon, represents the final stage of a considerable process of clarification and innovation (cp. §§ 36.5.1f). Even if it were early, we cannot be sure that the sphere of possible forms of rebirth was, from the outset, coextensive with the sphere of living beings (see § 36.2.2). Besides, it may be worth noting that the Jains accept only four of the above-mentioned five *gatis*,⁴⁵⁷ omitting *pettivisaya*, though not of course denying the sentience of plants (which are, at least in later canonical sources,⁴⁵⁸ subsumed under "animals").

⁴⁵¹ DN III 230; T vol. 1, 229a2 (DĀ₂); Saṅgītisūtra IV.29 (cp. Stache-Rosen 1968, 110).

⁴⁵² MN I 73. As far as I can see, there is no corresponding section in any of the Ch. parallels listed by Akanuma.

⁴⁵³ T vol. 2, 632a7-19.

⁴⁵⁴ Cp., e.g., Y 45,16ff; Vi 626b2ff; AKBh 118,20ff.

⁴⁵⁵ In later texts and in the Sanskrit tradition (e.g. Divyāvadāna [ed. Vaidya] 185,27f; Y 44,16f; AKBh 114,5f): *p(r)etas*, conceived as hungry ghosts.

⁴⁵⁶ E.g. MN I 73ff; DN III 234; AN IV 459; cp. also MN II 193; SN V 474ff; AN I 37; V 269f; etc.; SN I 34 has *yamaloka* instead of *pettivisaya*. Sometimes (e.g. MN III 22+24; AN I 60) *pettivisaya* is missing. On the other hand, many sources (cp., e.g. BHSD s.v. *gati*) add the Asuras as a sixth *gati*, and there are traces of this even in the Pāli Nikāyas (e.g. DN III 264); cp. also Y 90,9-12 for a summary reference to the existence of canonical texts counting the Asuras as a separate *gati*. AN V 266+268 refers to the five *gatis* but includes "whatever other bad, or good, destinies there are".

⁴⁵⁷ Cp., e.g., Thāṇa (JĀS ed.) § 442 (adding the *siddhi-gati*, which would, however, correspond, in Buddhism, to Nirvāṇa); Jaini 1980, 222.

⁴⁵⁸ Cp., e.g., Schubring 1935, 133; Jaini 1980, 223f.

30 However, statements expressly denying plants the status of living, sentient beings are, as far as I can see, found only in comparatively late, at any rate post-Nikāyic texts.⁴⁵⁹ But it seems that even in later Theravāda dogmatics a trace of their original border-line position appears to have been preserved; for, at any rate according to Nārada,⁴⁶⁰ plants are, to be sure, devoid of mental life-force (*nāma-jīvitindriya*), but they do have material life-force (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), though only one different from the karma-conditioned one of men and animals. They are thus, it is true, not sentient, but, in a sense, living beings. In other currents of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, however, plants are viewed as being entirely on the same level as inorganic things like a clod or a crystal.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹ E.g., MPSMah 406a24ff (cp. F. Sueki in: Tōhōgaku 80/1990, 98); Y 171,12ff; T vol. 32, 313a25f (*Tattvasiddhi); MPPU 433b6f; cp. also Mil 271,9ff (sentient beings (*sacetanā sattā*) are *kammaja*, in contrast to fire and all kinds of seeds (/plants: cp. n. 30) which are *hetuja*); cp. also the Lokaprajñāptisūtra [see n. 449] (T vol. 1, 137b17ff; 354c15ff; 409c21ff) where plants (137c11; 355a2; 410a8) are clearly regarded as not forming part of sentient beings (衆生: 354c25; 410a2; cp. 137c3ff) involved in *samsāra*. — A passage like Jā III 24 (gāthā: *acetanaṃ ... assuṇantaṃ ... ajānantaṃ imaṃ palāsaṃ ... pucchasi kīssa hetu*) is hardly conclusive evidence for the insentience of plants, since what is meant in the narrative context is merely that the tree lacks higher cognitive faculties (like understanding human speech; cp. Thieme's remarks on (*acetana* in KISchr, 377); but this does not necessarily exclude its being animate and even sentient (by possessing, e.g., the sense of touch). Insentience of trees is not unambiguously expressed or implied (though probably intended, cp. Mil 271,9ff referred to above) in the discussion of this Jā passage at Mil 172-174, where the passage is contrasted with another Jātaka passage (Jā IV 210) according to which a *phandana* tree addresses a person, and where the latter passage is rationalized by stating that it is the tree deity who speaks.

⁴⁶⁰ Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha), Colombo ³1975, 88. [This reference I owe to Dr. Payer (Tübingen).]

⁴⁶¹ Cp., e.g., MHrd IX.140 (*loṣṭavat*); 147 (*svargaloke ... ratnadrumā yathā*).

VII. Later Arguments against Plant Sentience

31.1 In view of the comparatively late appearance of express denials of the sentience of plants, it is natural that also formal arguments to prove this position or to disprove the opposite view are, as far as I can see, found only in comparatively late sources.

31.2 I have found arguments in the following sources: the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (4th century A.D. (?));⁴⁶² *Bhāvaviveka*/Bhavya's (6th century) *Madhyamakahrdaya* and its commentary, the *Tarkajvālā*⁴⁶³ (which also contains a verse quotation from an unknown earlier source);⁴⁶⁴ Dharmakīrti's (ca. 600-660) *Nyāyabindu* and Dharmottara's (ca. 750-810) commentary on it;⁴⁶⁵ and the *Vinaya-tthamañjūsā*,⁴⁶⁶ a subcommentary on the *Pāṭimokkhasutta*. In the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Nyāyabindu*, the opponents are the Jains, whereas in the *Madhyamakahrdaya* and in the *Tarkajvālā* the arguments are found in the chapter against the *Mīmāṃsā*,⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶² Y, zi 211a5-b6 (D: zi 202a4-b4) = Y, 660a21-b12.

⁴⁶³ Also ascribed to *Bhāvaviveka*, but the question whether this text (as we have it) is actually by the same *Bhāvaviveka* as *MHṛd* is debated among scholars: cp., most recently, D. Seyfort Ruegg, On the authorship of some works ascribed to *Bhāvaviveka*/Bhavya, in: Seyfort Ruegg and Schmithausen 1990, 59ff, esp. 63ff.

⁴⁶⁴ *MHṛd* IX.139-147 and *TJv* 354b4-361a5 (D: dza 311a3-316a1). Ed. of the *MHṛd* verses in Kawasaki 1988, 31ff. Cp. also Kawasaki 1986 (containing the Skt. text of *MHṛd* IX.139-147 and a Japanese translation also of *TJv*) and Kawasaki 1990.

⁴⁶⁵ See § 32.1f.

⁴⁶⁶ VinMañj 200f. This passage I owe to M. Maithri Murthi, who also informed me that Malalasekera (*The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, London 1928, 201) ascribes the text to *Buddhanāga* who is dated around 1200 A.D.

⁴⁶⁷ I for one do not know of a pertinent discussion in an early (*Pūrva*-)*Mīmāṃsā* text. *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* and *Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.35 (*acetane 'rthabandhanāt*) and 40 seem to presuppose that plants are not sentient. Śālikanātha (*Prakaraṇapañcīkā*, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri, Benares 1961, 330, 16ff) even explicitly excludes plants from the range of sentient beings and possible states of rebirth (cp. also Rāmānujācārya, *Tantrarahasya* (GOS no. 24), 17, 14ff). On the other hand, the (rather late) Bhāṭṭa author Nārāyaṇa (*Mānameyodaya* [ed. C. Kunhan Raja and S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras 1933], 152, 1-155, 3) favours the sentience of plants, though not uncompromisingly (*ibid.* 154, 8ff), and takes pains to restrict the purport of the afore-mentioned passages to the fact that plants do not react when being addressed (*ibid.* 154, 3ff). But there is no argumentation comparable to Bhavya's.— In the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* ("Vedānta") schools, on the other hand, the sentience of plants and their being a possible state of rebirth appears to be a matter of course already at Śāṅkara's time (cp., e.g., Śāṅkara on *ChU* V.10.6 [Gorakhpur ed., p. 525, 1ff]; cp. also Halbfass 1980, 300f; *id.* 1991, 326f; K. H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. III [Delhi 1980]: *Advaita Vedānta*, 260); but this school is treated by Bhavya in a separate chapter.

— the Brahmanic school of the methods of exegesis of Vedic ritual texts; but actually they are, perhaps, rather directed against the Vedic texts (*śruti*)⁴⁶⁸ and the authoritative Brahmanic tradition (*smṛti*) themselves.⁴⁶⁹

31.3 There may be more such passages even in Indian Buddhist texts,⁴⁷⁰ and the material has to be supplemented by pertinent discussions in Hindu⁴⁷¹ and Jaina⁴⁷² sources, about which my information is, however, rather casual.⁴⁷³ Even

⁴⁶⁸ Cp. MHrd IX.139: *acetaneṣu caitanyaṃ sthāvaṛeṣu prakalpitaṃ/ dr̥ṣṭvā* (ms. is said to read *dr̥ṣṭyā*, but cp. IX.59c; 120c; 127c) *durvihitaṃ t r a y y ā < ṃ >* (cp. IX.120d; 127d) *yuktaṃ yat tyajyate t r a y ī //*. Cp. § 2.1 + n. 14.

⁴⁶⁹ As Kawasaki 1986, (14)f, rightly points out, the sentience of plants is advocated, e.g., at Manu I.46-49; cp. also XII.58, and Yājñavalkya III.208. Cp. also the close relation of the *pūrvapakṣa* at TJv 354b5ff to MBh 12.177.10ff (see n. 493). On the other hand, in view of the striking number of agreements between the pro-sentience arguments in the Nīlakēci and other Jaina sources (see n. 472) and those referred to by Bhavya the possibility has to be taken into account that the latter may have integrated, into his treatment of the matter, also arguments of the J a i n a s (with whom the very same arguments are actually connected at GrCh 267,1ff and 278,3f, the Tibetan author stating that Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas agree on this point). On the other hand, it should be noted that in so far as Bhavya's arguments try to refute the sentience of plants merely by pointing out similarities with inorganic things, they would hold good only for such Jainas as do not advocate the sentience of the elements (like Nīl), but not for those who do (like Jinabhadra (VĀvBh 1751ff, esp. 1756ff), Abhayadevasūri (TBV 651,34ff) or Guṇaratna (TRD 153,8ff)).

⁴⁷⁰ As for autochthonous Tibetan sources, I have only used GrCh, which is, however, in this point entirely dependent on MHrd and TJv, apart from placing the discussion into the Jaina instead of the Mīmāṃsā chapter (see n. 469).

⁴⁷¹ Cp. Vyom 404,7-24; Kir 39,13-40,5; Śaṅkaramiśra, Upaskāra on VS IV.2.5 (Bibl. Indica ed., repr. Osnabrück 1981, 213,9ff; similar to Kir). Cp. Halbfass 1980, 292; id. 1991, 317f + 340 n. 104.

⁴⁷² Cp., for an archaic attempt, Āyār_s p. 4,28-31. A more developed stage of argumentation is found in Jinabhadra's (7th century [?]: Schubring 1935, 43) VĀvBh, vss. 1753-1756; cp. also vs. 103. His arguments are further explicated and expanded in Maladhāri-Hemacandra's (12th-13th cent.: Potter, Encycl. of Indian Philos., I [Delhi 1970], 181) Śiṣyāhitā on these passages. Cp. also Śīlāṅka (9th cent.: cp. Schubring 1935, 43), ĀyārViv 44,1ff (ad Āyār_s p. 4,28-31); Abhayadevasūri (11th cent.: Potter, TBV 652,1ff; Guṇaratna (ca. 1400, acc. to v. Glasenapp 1925, 108), TRD 157,7ff. There is, moreover, an interesting and detailed rejection of the Buddhist attacks against the sentience of plants in the anonymous Tamil Jaina text Nīlakēci (8th or 9th cent. A.D., according to A. L. Basham, History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas, repr. Delhi 1981, 200f), with its commentary by Samayādivākara (end of the 13th c., it seems), which are being investigated by my colleague S. A. Srinivasan who kindly put a draft of his translation at my disposal.

⁴⁷³ As my colleague A. Wezler informs me, there is also valuable material in certain medical texts an investigation into which by him is under preparation.

so, it may be interesting to have a closer look at these arguments (as will be done in §§ 32.1-37.3) since they may contain some clue to the original motive for excluding the plants from the range of living, sentient beings, and thus either confirm, or supplement, my conclusions concerning this issue, or suggest some other possibility.

31.4 To be sure, such formal arguments are mostly developed only afterwards, when the matter had already been decided.⁴⁷⁴ They need not necessarily have preserved the original motive (or motives), especially if the sources presenting them are comparatively late, as in the present case. Still, they may yield some useful information.

32.1 In the *N y ā y a b i n d u*,⁴⁷⁵ an epistemological work mainly dealing with the theory of inference and proof, the treatment of the matter is *m a r g i n a l*. In the context of dealing with faulty arguments, Dharmakīrti adduces the argument of the Jainas that trees are sentient beings⁴⁷⁶ because they die when their bark is peeled off completely.⁴⁷⁷ For Dharmakīrti, the reason of this argument is *u n - p r o v e d*; for a Buddhist, he says, dying, in the *s t r i c t* sense required for the conclusiveness of the argument,⁴⁷⁸ means cessation of consciousness, sense-faculties and life-force;⁴⁷⁹ this, however, can *n o t* be predicated of plants since they *l a c k* these properties from the Buddhist point of view.⁴⁸⁰ On the other hand — so the commentator Dharmottara⁴⁸¹ — the kind of "dying" which *c a n* be ascribed also to plants, namely drying up, withering (*śoṣa*), does not imply sentience; for (so one

⁴⁷⁴ Frauwallner 1953, 385.

⁴⁷⁵ NBi III.59: *cetanās tarava itī sādhye sarva-tvag-apaharaṇe maraṇaṃ prativādy-asiddham, vijñānēndriyāyur-nirodha-lakṣaṇasya maraṇasyānenābhyupagamāt, tasya ca taruṣv asambhavāt.*

⁴⁷⁶ My use of "sentient being", here and elsewhere, ignores, for the sake of simplicity, the problem, controversial between the schools, whether a soul (*jīva*, *ātman*) inhabiting or controlling the vegetable body (cp., e.g., TRD 157,7f and 10; Kir 39,21) is involved or not.

⁴⁷⁷ Cp. DasavViv p. 282,11: *sacetanās taravaḥ, sarva-tvag-apaharaṇe maraṇād, gardabhavar;* comm. ad Nil 369 (plants wither when injured). Less sophisticated: VĀvBh 1753a (*marāṇa*); cp. also Kir 39,21). Cp. also ĀyārViv 44,23f, TBV 653,1 and TRD 158,15-17 and 159,10 (plants have a fixed [maximum] life-span, like men).

⁴⁷⁸ Cp. NBīT 191,7f: *kevalaṃ vijñānasattayā vyāptam yaṃ maraṇaṃ, tad iha hetuḥ.*

⁴⁷⁹ Acc. to Durvekamiśra (DhPr 192,17), dying in the strict sense is characterized by the cessation of breathing, body heat, movement, etc.: *tac* (viz. *vijñānasattayā vyāptam maraṇaṃ*) *ca śvāśma-parispandādi-vigama-lakṣaṇam.*

⁴⁸⁰ Cp. NBīT 191,5f: *... yo vijñānanirodhaṃ taruṣv icchet, sa katham vijñānaṃ necchet? tasmād vijñānāniṣṭer nirodho 'pi neṣṭas taruṣu.*

⁴⁸¹ NBīT 191,7-9.

may supply) drying up or becoming dry occurs also in the inorganic, e.g., water or earth, the insentience of which was, at Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's time, surely a matter of course for most people except the (or some)⁴⁸² Jains.

32.2 Similarly, Dharmottara⁴⁸³ criticizes the argument that trees are sentient because they sleep⁴⁸⁴ as logically faulty because the reason, viz. sleeping characterized by contraction of the leaves at night, is not a property of all trees but only of some⁴⁸⁵. The sub-commentator Durvekamiśra⁴⁸⁶ adds that strictly speaking [for the Buddhist] the reason is not even a property of the latter because sleep in the usual sense, which alone implies sentience, consists in a special state counteracting the function of the sense-faculties (*indriya-vyāpāra-virodhy avasthā-viśeṣaḥ*), which cannot be ascribed to trees [since they lack sense-faculties], while "sleeping" in a metaphorical sense, though ascribable to trees, is inconclusive.

33 In the other sources, too, especially in the *Madhyamakahrdaya*, a considerable number of arguments serve to *refute* the arguments of the *opponents*, by showing that the reasons adduced are unproved or inconclusive.

33.1 E.g., properties like sleeping⁴⁸⁷ (attributed to a tamarind tree [folding its leaves during the night],⁴⁸⁸ or to trees in winter⁴⁸⁹), being intoxicated or ruttish (*smyo ba*,⁴⁹⁰ i.e. bursting into vitality in the rainy season⁴⁹¹), having specific

⁴⁸² See n. 19. Cp. also Nīl 371 where the ascription, to the Jains, of the view that the elements are themselves living beings is rejected by the Jaina nun as unjustified.

⁴⁸³ NBiṬ 92,7f (cp. G.P. Majumdar, Vanaspati, Calcutta 1927, 49f; Wezler 1987a, 327): *yathā "cetanās taravaḥ, svāpād" iti pakṣīkrteṣu taruṣu pattra-saṅkoca-lakṣaṇaḥ svāpa ekadeśe na siddhaḥ. na hi sarve vṛkṣā rātrau pattra-saṅkoca-bhājaḥ, kintu kecid eva.*

⁴⁸⁴ See also § 33.1 + n. 487.

⁴⁸⁵ Acc. to Durvekamiśra (DhPr 92,24f): *tintiḍikā-prabhṛtayaḥ* (see § 33.1 + n. 488).

⁴⁸⁶ DhPr 93,16ff.

⁴⁸⁷ VinMañj 201 (see n. 488); MHṛd IX.144c (*svāpāt*; see n. 490). Cp. VĀvBh 1755ab + Vṛtti; ĀyārViv 44,15f; TRD 159,8 (read *svāpa-vibodha-sadbhāvaḥ*: cp. ĀyārViv 44,16); Kir 39,21. Cp. also T vol 77, 313a22 (Kūkai), and vol. 75, 487a1-3 (Annen).

⁴⁸⁸ VinMañj 201 (*supinaṃ viya ciñcādinam*); Nīl 363; cp. also TRD 157,16-18.

⁴⁸⁹ TJv 358a7 (*dgun [D] gyi dus su ni gñid log go*) and b5 (*ljon śiñ rnam s dgun gyi dus su gñid log pa*).

⁴⁹⁰ MHṛd IX.144cd (Tib.) and TJv 358a7 and b7f. The Skt. ms. of MHṛd IX.144cd (acc. to Kawasaki 1988: *ritujanāt tathā svāpānnapīṣṭā turagādivat*) does not seem to contain an equivalent for *smyo ba*; Kawasaki's emendation (*ṛtujāt tathā svāpnonmattād apīṣṭāḥ* ...) is unmetrical; I suggest *ṛtujarvāt tathā svāpāc cāpīṣṭās* ..., presupposing that *smyo ba* was introduced by the Tib. translator

longings or enmity (*dohada*)⁴⁹², or perception of objects and time,⁴⁹³ adduced by

in accordance with TJv 358a6f, where it may have been stimulated by what seems to be a quotation from a Vṛkṣāyurveda text (*Vṛkṣāyurvibhāga? Or °bheda instead of °veda?) (*ljon śiñ gi tshe'i dbye ba las 'di ltar / "gnīd log pa 'a m m y o s . p a 'i dus su bskyed do" žes 'byuñ ste*). That the original *kārikā* did not contain an equivalent for *smyo ba* is corroborated also by the explanation of the *dṛṣṭānta* in TJv which covers only sleep but ignores *smyo ba* (TJv 358a7: *ji ltar rkyañ la sogs pa gnīd log pa bžin no*), and by TJv 359a8f+b3 where the reasons adduced at MHṛd IX.144 are divided into two groups of 2 and 3 items, respectively, in which *smyo ba* is not contained, viz. *sdañ ba'i sems dañ gnīd log pa žes bya ba'i gtan tshigs g ā i s* and *mtshun pa las skye ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs gžan g s u m*.

⁴⁹¹ TJv 358a7 (*dbyar gyi dus su ni smyo ba yin te*) and b7.

⁴⁹² MHṛd IX.144b (*dohadāt ... sacittakāḥ ... iṣṭāḥ*) and 146b; VinMañj 201 (*dohaḥlādayo*: see n. 495). Cp. VĀvBh(V) 1753b; TBV 653,2. — The word *dohada* (for which see H. Lüders, *Philologica Indica*, Göttingen 1940, 44ff) refers to the sometimes morbid longings of a pregnant woman, but it is also used to designate a specific longing or desire of certain trees, or perhaps rather the sexual excitement experienced by them (cp. VĀvBhV p. 69,13 [ad vs. 103]: *maithuna-saṃjñā*) and resulting in subsequent budding (cp. Das 1988, 248ff): e.g., the Aśoka tree (*Saraca Asoca*) is said to flower when kicked by the foot of a lovely young woman (Das 1988, 246f), and the Bakula tree (*Mimusops Elengi*) does so when sprinkled with a mouthful of spirituous liquor by a young lady (ibid., 242 and 247). TJv 355a3ff (ad MHṛd IX.139; cp. Kawasaki 1986, (4)=215) has the opponent refer to this belief in order to prove that plants have sense faculties (and perceptions) (see n. 493) — in this case (if we follow the syntax of Tib. and GrCh 268,6 and 277,4f) the faculty of mental awareness (*manā-indriya*; cp. the ascription of *maithuna-saṃjñā* to them at VĀvBhV p. 69,13), but perhaps also the sense of touch and taste, respectively (cp. VĀvBhV p. 69,7-10) —, but does not seem to use the term *dohada* in this connection. And when explaining *dohada* at MHṛd IX.144, TJv (358a4f) seems to associate it with *daurhrḍa* "enmity" (cp. Lüders, op. cit., 45), taking it to mean "(having the) intention to injure" (*gnod par bya ba'i bsaṃ pa gañ la yod pa*; cp. the Tib. transl. of *dohada* at MHṛd IX.144 by *sdañ sems* "hateful thought"), to be inferred from the fact that poisonous trees destroy life (TJv 358a4f: *dug gi śiñ la sogs pa rñams kyis [D] srog 'joms par byed pa'i phyir 'di la sdañ [D] ba'i sems yod do*). Guṇaratna, on the other hand, understands the *dauhrḍa* of plants from which their sentience can be inferred as certain specific *desires* the fulfilment of which entails budding, etc. (TRD 159,6f; cp. ĀyārViv 44,28f), just as the fulfilment of a pregnant woman's morbid longings guarantees birth of a son, etc. (TRD 159,5f). It is not clear what kind of desires Guṇaratna has in mind; since he mentions cases like the budding and flowering of the Aśoka tree due to being kicked by a young woman in the context of a *nother* argument (TRD 157,20ff), one may think, at least primarily, of desire for special (sometimes, from the human point of view, disgusting) nutritive substances; cp. Vyom 404,19f: *niyata-dravyābhilāṣa ca vṛkṣāyurvede* (cp. Das 1988, 206ff and 466ff) *paripaṭhitas teṣāṃ jñāyate, tadupabhoge puṣpādidarśanāḥ*; cp. also comm. ad Nīl 364. At Kir 40,3 *dohada* even appears to mean such substance itself (*mūle niṣiktānām apāṃ dohadasya ca pāṛthivasya dhātor abhyādānāt*).

⁴⁹³ VinMañj 201 (*visayagahaṇam*: see n. 495); TJv 354b5ff describes and refutes at length a view — similar to that of Mahābhārata 12.177.10-18 (see n. 15) — according to which plants are sentient

the opponent to prove that plants are sentient, are unproved to the Buddhist⁴⁹⁴ and nothing but fancy.⁴⁹⁵

33.2 Or when the opponent concludes sentience from, e.g., the fact that a mimosa leaf reacts to touch by coiling up,⁴⁹⁶ like a millipede⁴⁹⁷, the Buddhist rejoins that similar reactions can also be found in undisputedly in sentient things, as when a hair⁴⁹⁸ coils up under the influence of fire.⁴⁹⁹ To the argument that plants

beings like men, etc., because they have all the six senses (and the corresponding perceptions) (354b5f: *ljon śiñ rnams ni sems dañ bcas pa yin te / dbañ po yod pa'i phyir mi la sogs pa bžin no //*); e.g., when a creeper spreads by taking a tree as its support this indicates its having the sense of sight (*cakṣurindriya*; cp. MBh 12.177.13), or the fact that trees flower and fruit in a specific season shows the presence of [perception or awareness of time, which is non-sensory, and hence the presence of] *mana-indriya* (355a6f: *śiñ rnams kyañ dus ji lta ba bžin du me tog dañ 'bras bu la sogs pa 'byin par byed pas yid kyi dbañ po yod pa yin no*). Cp. VĀvBh 1755cd (*baulādao ya* (sc. *saceyaṇā*), *saddāi-visaya-kālōvalambhāo*); ĀyārViv 44,16-19; TRD 157,18-158,10. — Acc. to VĀvBh 103 and esp. Maladhāri-Hemacandra's explanation of this verse, the phenomena from which Bhavya's opponent derives the presence of all the six senses (and perceptions) in plants are compatible also with the Jaina doctrine that plants belong to the *ekendriyas*, i.e. have only the sense of touch; for the perception and notions (*saṃjñā*) indicated by the above phenomena do not derive from the physical sense-organ (*dravyendriya*), which is lacking in plants, but are a kind of exceptional awareness acquired immediately through the corresponding perceptive capacity of the soul (*bhāvendriya*, cp. Frauwallner 1956a, 270f) and by an analogous thinking capacity (cp. also Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Calcutta 1951, 52f).

⁴⁹⁴ MHṛd IX.146ab: *acittakarvād evaṭṣāṃ dohadādy-aprasiddhatā* (ms. °*taḥ*, but Tib. *ma grub űid*); hence (146c): *hetavaḥ syur asiddhārthāḥ* ...; cp. TJv 359a8f, and 358b5ff for a mechanistic explanation of the rest period and the growth period of plants. — Acc. to MHṛd IX.146d, these reasons (viz. *dohada* and sleep) are not only unproved (viz. if taken in their strict sense) but also inconclusive (viz. if one considers only the phenomena that can be observed, like contracting the leaves at night [cp. TJv 359b1ff, but with different examples; cp. also § 32.2]): *gadaiś ca vyabhicāriṇaḥ* (sc. *hetavaḥ*; Tib. suggests °*ritā* (sc. *hetūnām*)). The example ("diseases"; Tib. has, however, *lhog pa*, "ulcer" (*gaṇḍaiś ca?*)) would make good sense if *dohada* is understood, with Tib. and TJv, as "enmity" manifesting itself in destroying life (see n. 492); and many diseases may be said to "sleep" and "run riot" in the sense of being latent at one time and acute at another.

⁴⁹⁵ VinMañj 201: *visayagahaṇaṃ ca tesam parikappanāmattam, supinaṃ viya ciñcādīnaṃ; tathā dohaḷādayo*.

⁴⁹⁶ Cp. Nil 365 + comm.; VĀvBh(V) 1754ab; ĀyārViv 44,18f; TRD 158,6f and 159,9.

⁴⁹⁷ Tib. has *rkañ brgya* ("[having a] hundred feet") for *maṇḍalakārikā*, which is more suitable to the present context than "eine Art Gyrinus, Taumelkäfer?" (Schmidt, Nachtr). Precisely speaking, it is millipedes (like the European *Julus Terrestris*) and not centipedes (like the European *Lithobius Forficatus*) that roll up when feeling threatened. The *kūṇḍa* of VĀvBh 1754b (the comm. says: *kūṇḍāḥ*) may or may not be the same animal.

⁴⁹⁸ Insentience of hair in spite of its growing on a sentient body: TJv 357a2f (read *ma yin te* (D)).

that have fallen ill are treated medically just like animals or men — there is a special discipline called tree medicine (*vrkṣāyurveda*)⁵⁰⁰ —,⁵⁰¹ the Buddhist replies that this does not prove their sentience since also inanimate things like spoilt liquor or defiled gold are "cured"⁵⁰² by means of certain ingredients (**saṃskāra-viśeṣa*).⁵⁰³ When

Cp. also ĀyārViv 44,8ff.

⁴⁹⁹ MHrd IX.141f: *sparśato yadi saṃkocād yathā maṇḍala-kārikā/ sacittake tathābhīṣṭe sa-
<maṅgāṇ>jalikārike* (ms. °jāla°), // *vahni-saṃsprṣṭa-keśādyai <ḥ> syād dhetoṛ vyabhicāritā/*
cūrṇa-pārata-saṃsprṣṭa-keśair vā ...; cp. also TJv 355a2f and b8ff (with further examples like that
of a piece of skin shrinking when coming into contact with fire). Acc. to MW, *añjalikārikā* is *Mimosa*
natans (PW: *M. pudica*, acc. to MW, EDS: *M. pudica* or *natans*), on which W. Roxburgh (Flora
Indica, repr. 1874, 420) writes: "Leaves possessing much sensibility, I think next to *M. pudica*." The
present botanical name of *M. natans* L.f. is *Neptunia natans* [L.f.] Druce (= *Neptunia oleracea*
Lour.). [This information I owe to Prof. K. Kubitzki (Hamburg).] *Samaṅgā*, too, is probably a
mimosa or related species (cp. Amarakoṣa 2.4.141) though, in a text like TJv, hardly *Mimosa pudica*
(thus MW) which acc. to D. Brandis (Indian Trees, London 1921, 263) was introduced from
America.

⁵⁰⁰ Cp. Das 1988.

⁵⁰¹ VĀvBh 1753 (...*āmayao roga-tigicchāhi ya ... saceyaṇā taravo*); TBV 653,1 (*auśadha-
prayoga*); ĀyārViv 44,26+28 (disease and specific horticultural treatment); TRD 158,19-22 (disease);
158,22ff (application of drugs and specific horticultural treatment); 159,11-13 (*āyurvedodita-tat-tad-
roga-viśiṣṭauśadhaprayoga*); Nil 366 + comm; Kir 40,1. Cp. MBh 12.177.15.

⁵⁰² MHrd IX.143: *cikitsyatvān na taravo yujyante hi sacittakāḥ: / vinaṣṭasyāpi madyādeḥ
pratyāpateṣ ca saṃśayaḥ //*; TJv 357a7ff: "If [the opponent says:] «Trees do have mind; for
instructions have been given [in the Vṛkṣāyurveda (cp. TRD 159,10)] with regard to their different
life-spans and with regard to how to cure their diseases, etc. With regard to insentient [things] like
stones, on the other hand, no [application of] any means for curing [diseases] can be observed ...
Hence, [trees] are sentient, like men», one should reply as follows: Since what is called 'curing
diseases' is a property of the bodies of sentient beings, it is not established in the case of insentient
ones [like trees]. Therefore, the [property] denoted by the reason itself is not established [as occurring
in the subject of the inference] (*hetor asiddhārthatā*); for what is perceived in the present case (viz.
in trees) is merely the cessation of a modification (or disturbance) of the elements (**bhūta-pariṇāma-
nivṛtti-mātra*). Such a modification, however, is inconclusive (*vyabhicārin*) because [it occurs also in
things] that are <not> regarded as sentient, like spirituous liquor (*madya*), musk
or a weapon/sword (**śāstra*) (cp. comm. ad Nil 370: a "scarred" sword repaired
by means of a magnet)" (*gal te ljon śiñ rñams ni sems dañ bcas pa ñid yin te/ tshē'i dbye ba dañ nad
gso ba la sogs pa'i bya ba'i man ñag ñe bar bstan pa'i phyir ro// sems med pa* (D) *rdo la sogs pa
rñams la ni gso ba'i thabs gañ du yañ ma mthoñ la/ ... de'i phyir/ sems dañ bcas pa yin te/ mi* (P,D:
me) *bñin no ze na/ 'di skad brjod par bya ste/ nad gso ba zes bya ba ni sems dañ bcas pa'i lus kyi
chos yin pa'i phyir/ sems med pa rñams la de ma grub pas gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa ñid yin
te/ byuñ ba'i 'gyur ba ldog pa ñid tsam 'dir mñon sum du gyur pa la/ de dag kyañ sems dañ bcas
pa lta bur <ma> mthoñ ba'i chañ dañ/ gla* (D) *rtsi dañ/ mthoñ cha la sogs pa rñams kyis* (D; P

the opponent adduces the fact that plants grow, beget homogeneous offspring or are born in specific seasons, like horses and other animals,⁵⁰⁴ the Buddhist points out that these properties are also found in insentient things: in skin diseases like ringworm or in ulcers,⁵⁰⁵ in ant-hills, corals, salt, crystals(?), jewels or "gold-sprouts",⁵⁰⁶ and in hair or finger-nails^{507, 508} Other characteristics which plants

ma ñes pa ñid kyis) *ma ñes pa ñid yin no*(/). — G o l d : TJv 357b5f; comm. ad Nīl 370.

⁵⁰³ TJv 357b5: *chañ dag*(?) *nus pa ñams par gyur pa las yañ 'dus byas pa'i khyad par gyis* (D) *nus pa dañ ldan par 'gyur ba* ...

⁵⁰⁴ MHrd IX.144: *samānaprasavād vṛddheḥ ... sacittakāḥ/ rtujatvāt ... cāpīṣṭās, turagādivat*// (em. as proposed in n. 490). — For "g r o w i n g" (*vṛddhi*) cp. TJv 358a2-4; Āyār_s p. 4,29 (*vuḍḍhi-dhammayam*); ĀyārViv 44,13f and 44,25f; TRD 157,13-15 and 159,8, as well as 158,18, 159,1 and 159,11f (various aspects of growth; similarly TBV 652,1-3); Sv I 161,21f (= Ps III 120,11f): *tesu* (viz. *sālī-ādīsu*) *hi so* (viz. Makkhali Gosālaputto) *v i r ū h a n a - b h ā v e n a jīva-saññī* (Sv-pt I 289,1f explains: *jīvanato pāṇaṃ dhārentā viya gati-jāti-vaḍḍhanato jīvā*); Nīl 362 + comm.; Kir 40,3: *vṛddhi*, at PDhSg 87,23 one of the arguments for the presence of a soul (in men and animals), but used by Udayana, besides "healing up" (see n. 520), also in connection with plants as a reason for proving that they consume water (cp. MBh 12.177.18; Wezler 1987a, 341f) and nutritive substances, which in its turn serves to prove the presence of internal wind (see n. 514); from this, in its turn, Udayana derives the occurrence, in plants, of living, dying, sleeping, etc., in the strict sense which implies that plants, too, are animate beings inhabited and controlled by an individual soul. — For "h o m o g e n e o u s p r o p a g a t i o n" (*samānaprasava*) cp. TJv 358a1f; VĀvBh 1756 (*sāmāṇa-jāi-rūv'-aṅkurōvalaṃbhāo taruṇa-...-ādao* (*saceyaṇā*)); Nīl 368 + comm.; cp. Kir 40,1: *bīja-sajāṭīyānubandha* (but differently explained by the comm.: Kir 40 n. 1). — For "b e i n g b o r n i n s p e c i f i c s e a s o n s" (*rtujatva*) cp. TJv 358a5f; cp. also TJv 355a6f (see n. 493) and perhaps comm. ad Nīl 367.

⁵⁰⁵ "R i n g w o r m" (*dadru*): MHrd (see n. 508); s k i n d i s e a s e s (*mdze nad* (= *kuṣṭha*) *la sogs pa*): TJv 359b4 and 6; cp. ib. b4 *za phrug* (= *g-yan pa* [Bod-rgya tshig-mdzod chen-mo], i.e. *kaṇḍu* [MVy 8516]); u l c e r (*lhog pa, lhog rgal*): TJv 358b2 and b6-8. Cp. also Nīl 368 + comm. (tumour or cancer). [Precise information on the meaning of *dadru* and *mdze* I owe to Prof. R. E. Emmerick.]

⁵⁰⁶ A n t - h i l l s : TJv 358b2 (*grog mkhar gyi sa*); comm. on Nīl 362; c o r a l s : MHrd (see n. 508), TJv 358b2 (*byu ru*); VinMañj (see ib.: *pavāla*); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (*vidruma*: see ib.); s a l t : VinMañj (see n. 508: *lavaṇa*); TJv 358b2 (*sen 'dab pa'i tsha* = *saindhava*; cp. GrCh 278,4 *sen da ba'i tshwa*); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (see n. 508: *lavaṇa*); s t o n e s , i.e. c r y s t a l s (?) : VinMañj (see n. 508: *silā* [cp. BHSD s.v. *śilā*]); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (see ib.: *upala*); j e w e l s : MHrd (see n. 508), TJv 358b2 (*vaidūrya*); 358b4 (*rin po che* or *rin po che...* 'i myu gu (**ratnāṅkura*)); "g o l d - s p r o u t s" (*hemāṅkura*): MHrd (see n. 508); TJv 358b2 and 4). I do not know what, precisely, "gold-sprouts" (and "jewel-sprouts") are, but cp. TJv 358b4f (see n. 508) and TRD 153,17f, referring to homogeneous "sprouts" of salt, corals and "stones". Cp. also MW s.v. *ratnāṅkura* ("a young pearl"). — Cp. also Vyom 404,21f (sands).

⁵⁰⁷ H a i r : MHrd (see n. 508); TJv 358b1; Nīl 362 + commentary; f i n g e r - n a i l s : TJv

share with animals, like ingestion of food,⁵⁰⁹ are simply passed over in silence.

34 Thus, the tendency of the Buddhist is to stress similarities of plants with undisputedly insentient, preferably inorganic things. The same is also true in many of the cases where the Buddhist does not refute the opponent's view that plants are sentient beings but rather tries to prove his own view that they are not. Here, too, the Buddhist tries to point out either such properties as plants share with the insentient, or properties which distinguish them from animals and men.⁵¹⁰ E.g.,

358b2; Nīl 362 + comm. — TJv 358b2 adduces, as another example, a "fruit of *Benicasa hispida* or *cerifera* (*kuṣmāṇḍa*, a kind of pumpkin) that has been cut (i.e. killed) (?) (*ku sman da'i* [D; P: *kun da'i*; GrCh 278,4: *skun sman da'i*] '*bras bu bcad* [GrCh; P: *bcas*; D: *dañ bcas*] *pa*), which requires further clarification.

⁵⁰⁸ MHṛd IX.145: *dadru* < -*vidruma*- (or: -*pravāla*-, Tib. *byu ru*) > -*vaiḍūrya-keśa-hemāṅkurāḍi-bhiḥ*/ *vyabhiḥcārāt tarūṇaṃ te* (or: *tair?*) *na sidhyati sacittatā*// (Tib. *rin chen* "jewel" instead of °*keśa*°, but cp. TJv 358b1 *skra*; 2nd line e. c.; ms. acc. to Kawasaki 1986, (15) n. 18: °*rāttu rūpāṇāntena sidhyaṃti saṃcittakā*; Kawasaki 1986, (9), suggests: °*rāt tu taravo na sidhyaṃti sacittakāḥ*; Kawasaki 1988, 33: °*rāt tu rūpāṇaṃ* ...; Tib. *śiñ nams* supports *taru*, not *rūpa*, but does not help as regards *te* (i.e. *ṭvan-mate*) or *taiḥ* (sc. *hetubhiḥ*)); VinMañj 201: *vuḍḍhi pana pavāla-silā-lavaṇaṇaṃ api vijjati na tesam jīvabhāve kāraṇaṃ*; cp. also VĀvBh 1756 (*maṃsamkuro vva sāmāṇajāirūvaṃkurovalaṃbhāo ... -vidduma-lavaṇōvalādao ...* (sc. *saceyaṇā*) + comm., and TRD 153,17 (... *lavaṇa-vidrumōpalādināṃ samāṇajāṭṭiyāṅkurotpattimattvaṃ arśomāṃsāṅkurasyeva cetanācihnam aṣṭy eva*). — Skin diseases like ringworm, spreading from one spot of the body to others, are clearly an example of homogeneous propagation (*samānaprasava*), as is confirmed by TJv 359b4-6 (similarly Nīl 368 + comm. [tumour or cancer]), whereas ulcers exemplify growth (*vrddhi*) (TJv 359b6-360a1 and 358b1-3; at b3f an opponent objects that ulcers are sentient [cp. the use of haemorrhoids as an example for sentience in VĀvBh and TRD!]; the Buddhist's reply is that they are insentient in the sense that they have no sentience of their own). Growth is exemplified also by most of the other examples (TJv 358b1-3). Corals, salt and crystals(?) are used as examples of both growth (VinMañj [see above]; TJv 358b1-3; 359a5f) and homogeneous propagation (VĀvBh and TRD [see above], though these Jaina texts do not use this fact for proving the insentience of plants but, on the contrary, for proving that corals, etc., too are sentient, like haemorrhoids). Hair, too, is used to exemplify both growth (TJv 358b1f) and homogeneous propagation (TJv 358a8-b1, interpreting the growing again of hair that has been cut off as *samāna-prasava*). "Gold-sprouts" (*hemāṅkura*) and jewel(-sprout)s are taken as examples of both growth (TJv 358b1-3) and "being born (/arising) in a specific season" (*ṛtujatva*), TJv 358b4f explaining that they arise "when the clouds make noise", which would seem to mean: in the monsoon season. (At TJv 260a1-3, however, the example for *ṛtujatva* is bile, wind and phlegm.)

⁵⁰⁹ E.g., Āyār, p. 4,30 (*āhāragam*); VĀvBh 1753b; ĀyārViv 44,21-23; TBV 653,3 (*pratiniyata-pradeśāhāra-grahaṇa*); TRD 158,12-15 and 159,10; Kir 40,2f (see n. 504).

⁵¹⁰ Cp. VinMañj 200: (*rukkhādayo ... na jīvā, ...*) *viśadisajātikabhāvato*.

a) the fact that plants lack the capacity of (perceptible) autonomous motion or locomotion;⁵¹¹

b) the fact that they lack bodily heat;⁵¹²

c) the fact that they do not breathe⁵¹³ (at least not in the perceptible way animals and men do)⁵¹⁴;

⁵¹¹ Y, zi 211b3 (*rañ gi lus kyis mi g-yo ba*) = Y, 660b5; TJv 361a1 (verse quotation): *g-yo ba med nid*; cp. 361a4 *lus kyī phyī rol bya ba rnams// bṛtan* (P,D: *bstan*) *pa rnams la ma mthoñ bas// des na śiñ la sems pa med//*, i.e. plants are insentient because they lack external(ly perceptible) activities; cp. also VinMañj 200 *pariphandābhāvato* (which, however, may also refer to the lack of jerking or wincing when injured). Cp. also Nil 372 + comm. (accepting the absence of locomotion in plants), whereas some Jaina authors (VĀvBh 1754cd; TRD 158,5ff and 159,9) assert that some kind of movement does occur in plants, as when creepers creep towards a support (*āśrayopasarpaṇa*); cp. also Sv-pt I 289,1f (see n. 504); TJv 354b6f (based on MBh 12.177.13) and, for similar kinds of movement, TJv 354b7: heliotropism of *smān sbrul mgo* (MVy 8531: *nāgaśiṛṣaka*, but not as name of a plant) and *ñi ma'i rjes su 'brañ ba* (**suvarcalā?*; cp. Wezler 1987a, 323ff); Vyom 404,18: extending the "feet" (= roots) towards nutritive substances when these are nearby; Kir 40,1: *anukūlopagama-pratikūlāpagama*, not concretized. According to TJv 355b1 these movements are in reality heteronomous like that of a piece of iron attracted by a loadstone. — For (autonomous) movement being a characteristic feature of life or living beings see TJv 360b8f (verse quotation): *tshē dañ drod dañ rnam śes dañ// g - y o b a ... gañ la dmigs gyur pa// de la 'tsho ba* (= **jīva*) *žes bya'o//*; cp. also DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479); Nyāyasūtra 1.1.11 + comm. (*ceṣṭā*, defined as a specific *samīhā* or *parispanda*). — It seems that the view of plants having consciousness confined within the limits of their "body" (*antahsaṃjha*) could easily be used to defend the sentience of plants in spite of the fact that they lack (autonomous) outward movement or activity and uttering of sounds (see § 34, g) (Medhātithi and Kullūka ad Manu I 49; Wezler 1987b, 114f, 123 and 130) and — hence — (easily perceptible) reactions to injury (see § 34, h).

⁵¹² TJv 361a1 (verse quotation) *drod med*. Yet, MBh 12.177.18 (cp. Wezler 1987a, 341f) suggests that fire must be present in trees because the fact that they grow and discharge excretions proves that they digest food (which presupposes the presence of digestive fire). — For bodily heat (*uṣman*, *drod*) as constitutive of life see TJv 361b8f (see n. 511); MN I 296, AKBh 73,19f, etc. (cp. L. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Tokyo 1987, n. 165); DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479).

⁵¹³ TJv 361a4 (verse quotation): *srog ñi 'byuñ 'jug* (= respiration) ... *ma mthoñ bas// des na śiñ la sems pa med//*; I take *srog* to render Skt. *prāṇa*, and its coming out ('*byuñ*) and entering ('*jug*) to mean "respiration". For breathing as a characteristic of life, see also DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479). Cp. also VSū 3.2.4 und PDhSg 87,20. Critically: comm. ad Nil 375.

⁵¹⁴ The discovery of the respiration of plants (in a sense justifying the inclusion of plants in the *pāṇas/prāṇins* in the sense of "breathing beings") took place in the 18th century only. But Udayana (Kir 40,2f) states that one can infer that plants are furnished with "internal wind" (*ādhyātmika-vāyu*) from the fact that they take up water and nutritive substances (see n. 504) — an idea expressed already at MBh 12.177.16. Yet, as the illustration, at MBh 12.177.16, of the matter by [someone] sucking up water through a [hollow] stalk (Wezler 1987a, 339f) shows, this "internal wind" in plants is not, or at least not primarily, conceived in analogy to respiration proper.

d) the fact that they do not [show signs of] get[ting] tired;⁵¹⁵

e) the fact that they do not close and open [any eyelids]⁵¹⁶ (referring either to winking as a sign of being alive, or to closing and opening the lids as a sign of falling asleep and awaking⁵¹⁷);

f) the fact that branches or even parts of branches when cut off grow again in other places⁵¹⁸ (whereas severed limbs of men and animals invariably die),⁵¹⁹ or that when a tree is heavily pruned or even when it is cut at the root it may still grow again⁵²⁰ (whereas in men and in most animals severed limbs are not reproduced;

⁵¹⁵ TJv 361a3 (verse quotation): *lus la ñal ba med pa...s// ... ñiñ la sems pa med//*.

⁵¹⁶ TJv 361a4 (verse quotation): *bye (D; P byed) btsums ... ma mthoñ bas// ... ñiñ la sems pa med//*; Tib. *bye btsums* (though the intrans. pf. *bye* is somewhat odd beside the trans. pf. *btsums*; perh. *phye*?) would seem to represent Skt. *unmeṣa-nimeṣa*: cp. NBiṬ 214,19 (Tib. 'byed and 'dzum), where this phenomenon is also used, though in a different argument, as a characteristic of living beings. Cp. VSū 3.2.4 and PDhSg 87,22.

⁵¹⁷ For the latter alternative cp. Nīl 363 + comm. In this case, the argument implies that the tamarind's folding its leaves during the night is (as the Buddhist opponent in the comm. ad Nīl 363 actually states) either not accepted as equivalent to closing the eyelids or ignored as exceptional (see also § 32.2 + n. 483).

⁵¹⁸ Y_i zi 211b4 (*yal ga dañ yal ga gyes pa dag bcad na yañ de las gzan pa dag tu skye ba*) = Y_e 660b6f (斷枝條已餘處更生). — Tib. *skye ba* can correspond to Skt. *vi-ruh* (cp. AKBh-I s.v. *vi-ruh*, *virohaṇa*; Prasannapadā (ed. de La Vallée Poussin) 567, ns. 1 and 3; KP § 39 (see n. 520)). As for *vi-ruh* (used of seeds in the sense of "to sprout" [e.g. Jā II 322,15] and of plants in the sense of "to produce fresh growth" [cp. also n. 520] or simply "to grow") said of parts of plants separated from the mother-plant, cp. the (negative) instance at Sv I 120, where the non-Buddhist doctrine of annihilation of living beings after death uses, as an analogy, the fact that leaves fallen from a tree do not grow any more: *yathā rukkha-paṇṇāni patitāni na puna virūhanti, evaṃ sattā*.

⁵¹⁹ The advocate of the sentience of plants can of course avail himself of the fact that in most cases severed parts of plants do not grow again but wither (as is, though ignored in the present context, of course also known to the Buddhists; cp., e.g., Jā IV 396: *nalo chinno va sussati*, or Vin I 189 (cp. § 8): *tāla-taruṇāni chinnāni milāyanti*) and are hence just like severed limbs of animals and men: cp. Āyār_s p. 4,30 (*chinnam milāi*); ĀyārViv 44,20f; TRD 158,10-12 and 159,9 (*chinnāyava-milāni*).

⁵²⁰ This is probably what is meant by *chinne virūlhanato* at VinMañj 200 since the logical subject of the passage (which is most likely also the noun one has to supply, *ad sensum*, to the loc. *chinne*) is "trees, etc." (*rukkḥādayo*), and not "branches" etc., and since the healing up of a wound (even if linguistically possible) would not of course support the difference of trees from animals, etc. The expression *chinne virūlhanato* is reminiscent of MBh 12.177.17 *chinnasya ... virohaṇāt*, where the meaning is probably the same but where the argument is, on the contrary, used to prove that trees do have a soul or life principle (*jīvaṃ paśyāmi vrkṣāṇām*). — As for *vi-ruh* or *virohaṇa/virūhanā* in the sense of "growing again (after having been cut)" see Jā II 322,11 and 323,2 (see n. 521). As for a

what is reproduced is in sentient parts of the body like nails and hair!);⁵²¹

g) the fact that plants do not answer when addressed;⁵²²

h) the fact that plants do not jerk or wince even when suddenly and violently injured,⁵²³ which means, according to the Buddhist, that they do not feel pain,⁵²⁴ just as a clod.⁵²⁵

tree (or more precisely: many species of trees) growing again even when heavily pruned or even when cut at the root (as long as the root is unimpaired), cp., e.g., DhP 338 (*yathā ... mūle anupaddave ... chinno pi rukkho puna-r-eva rūhati*), KP § 39 (*rad yathāpi nāma viṭapacchinno vṛkṣo mūle 'nupadrute punar eva virohati*), or BĀU 3.9.28 (*yad vṛkṣo vṛkṣo rohati mūlān navataraḥ punaḥ ...*); cp. also Sp 763f. — In later demonstrations of the sentience of trees or plants, it is mostly the argument that just as in men and animals so also in plants wounds or broken parts heal up that is used: cp. VĀvBh 1753b (*rohaṇa*; comm.: *kṣata-saṃrohaṇa*); TBV 653,1 (*kṣata-bhagna-saṃrohaṇa*); TRD 158,22-159,2 and 159,12f (*kṣata-bhugna-* (read *-bhagna-*?) *-saṃrohaṇa*); Nīl 370 + comm.; Kir 40,3 (*bhagna-kṣata-saṃrohaṇa*, for which cp. PDhSg 87,23; for the sequence of argumentation at Kir 39,21-40,3 see n. 504); cp. also Vyom 404,16 + 403,29. Note that the term used is mostly *saṃrohaṇa*, though derivations from *vi-ruh* also occur in this sense (cp. PW s. v. *ruh* + *vi-*, *virohaṇa* and *viropaṇa*: *viropita-vraṇa*, *vraṇa-virohaṇa*, etc.). — At T vol. 77, 313a19ff, Kūkai mentions the argument of non-Buddhists that trees and plants possess life because they grow again after having been felled or cut, but he also has an objector point out that precisely this capacity distinguishes them from man who lacks it. — As for the argument that trees are sentient because they die when injured too much, and the Buddhist rejoinder, see § 32.1 + ns. 475 and 477.

⁵²¹ Cp. Jā II 322,11ff, where a man whose nose had been cut off (*chinnanāsa*) is told by another man: *yathā kesā ca massū ca chinnaṃ chinnaṃ virūhati, evaṃ rūhati te nāsā*, whereas yet another one tells him the truth: *natthi nāsāya rūhanā* (Jā II 323,2: *virūhanā*).

⁵²² Y, zi 211b3 (*brjod na yañ mi brjod pa*) = Y, 660b5f (雖與語言而不報答); cp. TJv 361a1f (verse quotation): *thos la sogs par mi 'gyur dan// sgra la sogs pa rtogs* (D; P: *rtog med ni// sems can ma yin bstan* (D,P; read *brtan*?) *pa ñid//*, which I tentatively take to mean: "[As] they cannot be heard [to utter sounds], etc. (i.e.: and cannot be perceived to produce other forms of communication either), and [as] they lack understanding of speech, etc., plants are certainly not living beings (**asattivāḥ sthāvarāḥ khalu* (?))." In the last *pāda* the Tibetan syntax would yield "[they] are not living beings [but] only stationary [things]" (Kawasaki 1990), but I presume that in the original **sthāvarāḥ* was intended to be the subject of the sentence. — Cp. also Jā III 24 (as against IV 210; see n. 459). — As for plants being regarded as sentient in spite of being unable to utter sounds, see n. 511 (end).

⁵²³ MHrd IX.140: *sacittakā na taravo, ... madhyacchede 'pi ... aspandāt*; cp. VinMañj 200 (*pariphandābhāvaṭo*, though this expression may just as well refer to the lack of autonomous movement in general (see § 34, a)). Cp. also n. 511.

⁵²⁴ TJv 356b3: *ljon śiñ de dag ni dkyil du bcad kyañ g-yo ba med de/ tshor ba med pa 'i phyir ro//*; cp. MHrd IX.140d *jaḍatve* (ed. *jāḍyatve*, ms. *jātatve*) *sati*.

⁵²⁵ MHrd IX.140d: *loṣṭavat*.

35.1 One may call these arguments "arguments of natural science (or proto-science)". Now, on the whole, Buddhism, and particularly early Buddhism, quite in contrast to Jainism, shows little interest in questions of "natural science". Hence, it seems rather improbable that considerations of this kind were the original motive for denying plants sentience.

35.2 The only exception is the last argument, namely that plants do not feel pain because when injured they do not show any signs of feeling pain, at least none comparable to those shown by men and animals. Pain, suffering, is, of course, not at all marginal in early Buddhism, and a fundamental characteristic of samsāric existence, at least on the earthly level. Hence, the inability of feeling pain, if taken as symptomatic for having no feeling at all, could easily be imagined to have been a strong reason for excluding plants from the range of sentient beings.⁵²⁶ However, in an ambience where people naively believed in the sentience of plants it was not at all natural to conclude, from the lack of external reactions, that plants do not feel pain when injured. On the contrary, it was common conviction that they did.⁵²⁷ Thus, in this case, too, it is more likely that the argument presupposes the denial of the sentience of plants, and not the other way round.

35.3 Yet, this may not be the whole truth. If we take the afore-mentioned arguments not in their particulars but rather in their common purport of stressing the essential difference⁵²⁸ between plants on the one hand and animals or man on the other, they may in fact have some connection with the original cause for the denial: They may, after all, be a later, consolidated, self-conscious and concretely delineated expression of that rationalist tendency which I presume to have already started to penetrate the ambience in which Buddhism originated, and to have entailed a weakening of the old belief in the animateness and sentience of almost everything. But even so these arguments would not answer the question why this tendency came up in Buddhism itself or, more probably, was assumed by it from its ambience, nor the question why it was, later on, developed into a theoretical, dogmatic

⁵²⁶ Provided that we ignore, in this connection, the fact that (at least some) Buddhists have nevertheless come to advocate the existence of entirely unconscious heavenly beings (*asañña-sattā nāma devā*, e.g. DN I 28). According to Theravādin dogmatics, the *asañña-sattā* consist of nothing but corporeal matter lacking mind (*citta*), consciousness (*sañña*), nay, all the four mental *khandhas* throughout their existence in that sphere, from the first to the last moment (Kv III.11 + Kv-a 71f; Kv-a 113,20-22; Vibhaṅga 419; Saṃmohavinodanī 521; Sv 118; VisM XVII.254f). As against this, other schools hold that these beings are, to be sure, unconscious on the whole but do have consciousness in the very beginning (Vi 784b18f; cp. Kv-a 113,14f) or even in the beginning and at the end (AKBh 68,20f; Kv 262: *cutikāle upapattikāle atthi, phitikāle natthi*), i.e., according to some, in the very first and the very last moment (Kv-a 71,23-28: Andhakas; Kv-a 113,20; Vi 784b20f and 24ff: Ghōṣaka), or, according to the position approved by the Vibhāṣā, even for a certain time-span in the beginning and at the end of this existence (Vi 784b22-24 and c7ff).

⁵²⁷ Cp. MBh 12.177.17a.

⁵²⁸ Cp. VinMañj 200: *visadisajātikabhāvato*.

d e n i a l of the sentence of plants. In this connection, two more arguments are of considerable interest (§§ 36.1-37.3).

36.1 The first one, found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and in the verses quoted in the *Tarkajvālā*, is the argument that plants are not living, sentient beings because they do not perform good and bad k a r m a ,⁵²⁹ and because they are never affected by d e s i r e or hatred.⁵³⁰

36.2.1 This points to the context of the theory of r e b i r t h , which according to Buddhism is kept going by emotions like desire, and determined by one's karma. It may hence be worth investigating whether the rejection of plants as sentient beings may be connected somehow with the theory of rebirth, more precisely with the attempt to establish a c o - e x t e n s i v e the range of sentient beings on the one hand and the range of possible forms of rebirth on the other.

36.2.2 For contrary to what is often suggested,⁵³¹ it seems to me quite improbable that these two areas coincided from the outset. It is more probable that we have to do with two different strands which originally were largely independent from each other. And it seems that originally the range of living, sentient beings killing or injuring which is dangerous or immoral, was much w i d e r than the range of forms of rebirth, at least of such as were usually taken into account.

⁵²⁹ Y₁ zi 211b3f (= Y_c 660b6): *legs par byas pa dan ñes par byas pa'i las la 'jug par yañ mi snañ ba...s mi ruñ ño* (viz. the view that green trees have life: Y₁ zi 211a5f); TJv 361a2f: *dge ba dan ni mi dge'i las// sems yod rñams la 'byuñ 'gyur gyi// brtan* (e.c.; D,P: *bstan*) *pa rñams la de med pas* (D; P: *par*) // *des ni śiñ rñams sems med yin//*.

⁵³⁰ TJv 361a3f: *'dod dan že sdañ dan bral žiñ// ... des na śiñ la sems pa med//*.

⁵³¹ Cp., e.g., Schubring, *Āyār* p. 51; Schmidt 1968, 650. - The thesis that "since its earliest occurrence the *ahiṃsā*-doctrine is connected with the belief in metempsychosis" (Schmidt) would be defensible only if the term "metempsychosis" is understood in an unusually imprecise sense, viz. as merely denoting some kind of a f t e r - l i f e of both men and animals, etc. For what is presupposed in the so-called "story of Bhṛgu in the yonder world" (see § 36.3.2 + n. 539) is not transmigration or metempsychosis in the sense of rebirth of men as animals, etc., or animals, etc., as men in t h i s world. What is presupposed is merely the fact that both men and animals have an after-life, that men after death go to the yonder world, and that animals, plants and (according to the ŚB version) even water take revenge upon man in the yonder world (or on the way to it: see n. 540) by inflicting upon him precisely the same tortures they have suffered from him in this world. It would seem that it is only for this purpose, i.e. for the sake of being able to wield axes and choppers, etc., that the animals, etc., assume human form, whereas men, though now the victims, remain men. This shows that the exchange of rôles does not involve an exchange of essence or nature. The assumption of human form by the animals, etc., is hence merely a functionally motivated m e t a m o r p h o s i s i n t o , not a metempsychosis as, a human being, and still less so in view of the fact that it does n o t include rebirth in t h i s world but, on the contrary, takes place in the y o n d e r world.

36.3.1 As stated above, in V e d i c religion the range of living beings killing or injuring which is dangerous included not only animals but also plants, water and earth. The doctrine of rebirth, on the other hand, appears to have started, according to recent research by M. Witzel and Y. Ikari,⁵³² from a m a n - centered concept. According to this concept (close parallels to which can be found also in Indian tribal belief)⁵³³, a man was, after a sojourn in heaven mainly due to ritual acts, again reborn as a human being, preferably in his old family. I call this the "zig-zag pattern"⁵³⁴.

36.3.2 To be sure, further ideas that have to do with destiny after death can be traced in our sources or may have to be presupposed. E.g., there are traces also of a dark, sombre place to go to after death;⁵³⁵ there is the idea that non-human beings, too, have an after-life in the yonder world: the sacrificial victim goes to heaven⁵³⁶ (remaining, even there, it seems, an animal)⁵³⁷, and the same seems to hold good for sacrificial plants;⁵³⁸ in the "story of Bhṛgu in the yonder world",⁵³⁹ animals, plants and even water are at hand in the yonder world (or on the way to it?)⁵⁴⁰ to

⁵³² M. Witzel, The Earliest Form of the Concept of Rebirth in India. Paper presented at the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Tokyo 1983 (unpublished). Cp. also id., The Earliest form of the Idea of Rebirth in India, in: Yamamoto 1984, I 145f. — Y. Ikari, Some Aspects of the Idea of Rebirth in Vedic Literature, in: Indo-Shisōshi Kenkyū 6/1989, 155ff. — Cp. also P. Horsch, Vorstufen der indischen Seelenwanderungslehre, in: Asiatische Studien 25/1971, 154 and 156f (nos. 5 and 10).

⁵³³ Hodson 1921a, 1; 3f; 6; 9; 1921b, 204f; 208; 211.

⁵³⁴ In using this expression I disregard the d u r a t i o n of stay in this as well as in the other world.

⁵³⁵ E. Arberman, Tod und Unsterblichkeit im vedischen Glauben (in: Archiv für Religionswissenschaft XXV.3-4, 339-387, and XXVI.1-2, 187-240), 357f and 368ff.

⁵³⁶ Schmidt 1968, 646; cp. also 631.

⁵³⁷ Cp. ṚV 1.162.7 and 21 (cp. Schmidt 1968, 646 + n. 4).

⁵³⁸ ŚB 11.1.2.1f; cp. J.C. Heesterman, Non-violence and Sacrifice, in: Indologica Taurinensia XII/1984, 119; Gombrich 1988, 42; see also Manu V.40 (cp. Schmidt 1968, 631); MBh 12.260.24 (cp. Alsdorf 1961, 590f).

⁵³⁹ ŚB 11.6.1; cp. Jaiminiyabrāhmaṇa I.42-44 (water missing). Cp. H. Lommel, Bhṛgu im Jenseits, in: Paideuma 4/1950, 93ff; Schmidt 1968, 644f; H. W. Bodewitz, Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa I, 1-65, Leiden 1973, 99ff.

⁵⁴⁰ I.e. if the black man met by Bhṛgu at the last station of his journey were to be understood as the guardian of the yonder world proper. Cp. perhaps also the fact that Bhṛgu's journey seems to take place, in various directions, on a h o r i z o n t a l level, Cp., in this connection, also the interesting information in Höfer 1975, 50, that — obviously on his w a y t o the Land of the Dead

retaliate injury to the persons who had killed them in this world, and they even assume human form there, probably merely because otherwise they would not be able to wield axes and choppers.⁵⁴¹ Likewise, deceased humans may, before being reborn, assume the form of animals and appear as such.⁵⁴² There may have been the idea that when being reborn in this world the deceased passes through trees or plants,⁵⁴³ and/or rain or dew.⁵⁴⁴ And there must have existed, especially in the indigenous strata of the society, quite different views of afterlife, e.g., probably, the idea of rebirth as an insect⁵⁴⁵ and of a gradual fading away after rebirth(s?) as an insect, butterfly, caterpillar or the like,⁵⁴⁶ or after rebirth in ever remoter Lands of the Dead,⁵⁴⁷ or the idea of a special destiny of people who died an "evil death", and who may become animals, as, e.g., a tiger in case one had been eaten by a tiger.⁵⁴⁸

36.3.3 Some of these more or less heterogeneous elements have been integrated into the "zig-zag pattern" in the famous Upaniṣadic *locus classicus* of the doctrine of rebirth:⁵⁴⁹ especially the return from the yonder world through atmosphere, rain, earth and plants, and the possibility of being reborn as a worm or insect, obviously

— the enemies and wild animals the deceased has killed during his life try to take revenge on him. But ŚB 12.9.1.1 and Śāṅkhyāyana- (= Kauṣītaki-)Brāhmaṇa 11.3 (Schmidt 1968, 644), which express the same idea albeit in a much simpler form, locate the revenge in the yonder world (itself).

⁵⁴¹ See n. 531.

⁵⁴² Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra 2.14.10 (forefathers wandering about in the form of birds; from Witzel 1983 [see n. 532]); Hodson 1921a, 4 (spirit of the dead believed to reside in the bodies of crows (Kurubas)); ib., 6, speaks of repeated *r e b i r t h* as butterflies in the time between death and rebirth as a human (Lushai), but it may be difficult in such cases to draw a sharp border-line between rebirth or metempsychosis on the one hand and metamorphosis on the other.

⁵⁴³ Hodson 1921a, 1f (Santals); 1921b, 205; 208; 212ff.

⁵⁴⁴ Hodson 1921a, 6 (Lushais).

⁵⁴⁵ Höfer 1975, 53 (Nagas). Cp also n. 542.

⁵⁴⁶ Cp. G. Prunner in: Höfer 1975, 195 (Nung: rebirth as an animal, then as an insect, finally turning into red earth); Bezacier, ib. 368 (Tai: rebirth as caterpillars, then turning into a kind of moss).

⁵⁴⁷ Höfer 1975, 53 (Nagas); 114 (Sre, Södang); Chr. v. Fürer-Haimendorf, The After-Life in Indian Tribal Belief, in: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 83.1/1953, 43 (Konyak Nagas).

⁵⁴⁸ Hodson 1921a, 7 (Garos); cp. also 1921b, 205 (no rebirth [i.e., probably, not rebirth as a human: cp. Hodson 1921a, 7] of men killed by tigers or snakes).

⁵⁴⁹ ChU V.10; BĀU VI.2.14ff.

as the destiny of those outside the Aryan cult of cremating the deceased, and obviously without any possibility of further rebirth as a human.⁵⁵⁰ But even this does not yet mean that all elements, plants and insects⁵⁵¹ participate in the process of rebirth, or that they all consist of, or contain, what had formerly been a human being. And, at any rate, the passing through the elements and plants is automatic and not dependent on ritual karma, let alone moral karma, the latter coming in only in a paragraph which is obviously a later interpolation found in one version only.⁵⁵²

36.4 The rebirth theory of earliest Jainism, if retrievable at all, would seem to require special investigation. In the full-fledged system, rebirth as an animal, plant or element-being⁵⁵³ has been fully integrated into the "zig-zag pattern", though the latter is still clearly discernible.⁵⁵⁴ But there exists, even in later times, the idea of certain minute vegetable beings (the *nigodas*) which have always been in this state and do not, or not yet, participate in karma-determined *saṃsāra*.⁵⁵⁵

36.5.1 In Buddhism, too, as has been shown by Vetter,⁵⁵⁶ the old zig-zag pattern is well-preserved, and is probably the starting point of the development of the Buddhist rebirth theory. It is, in several passages,⁵⁵⁷ still close to the Vedic pattern, apart from having been ethicized,⁵⁵⁸ which means that one's destiny after death is now dependent on one's karma in the sense of moral acts, and that the yonder world is now clearly differentiated into heaven for the good and an unpleasant underworld for the bad.

⁵⁵⁰ Cp. Halbfass 1980, 293 and 1991, 319 ("a form of soteriological failure"). I am not sure that the text allows to decide whether the idea is, as Halbfass suggests, an endless repetition of rebirth as an insect, etc., or merely an indefinite number of such rebirths ending in some kind of fading away, as tribal beliefs seem to suggest (see § 36.3.2 + n. 546).

⁵⁵¹ Let alone other animals, some of which are only mentioned — as an alternative possibility to being reborn as a low caste human for people with bad karma — in what is obviously a later addition (cp. also Halbfass 1980, 299; 1991, 325), found in the Chāndogya version only.

⁵⁵² See n. 551

⁵⁵³ Rebirth of mobile (*īśa*) living beings as stationary (*thāvara*) ones and vice versa is already found at Āyār, p. 41,7.

⁵⁵⁴ Cp. Schubring 1935, 123f: rebirth in heaven or hell is possible only from, and invariably followed by, a human (or higher animal) existence.

⁵⁵⁵ P. S. Jaini 1980, 224ff.

⁵⁵⁶ Vetter 1988, 78ff.

⁵⁵⁷ E.g., SN No. 3.21 (I 93ff), or in the formula of the "divine eye" (e.g. MN I 70f).

⁵⁵⁸ Cp. Obeyesekere 1980, 146ff.

36.5.2 In these passages, rebirth as an animal is not mentioned.⁵⁵⁹ In one Sutta of the Majjhimanikāya,⁵⁶⁰ however, it appears to have been secondarily integrated into the zig-zag pattern⁵⁶¹ as an alternative to going to the underworld (now clearly described as hell). This fact suggests, as Vetter⁵⁶² rightly concludes, that animals were, at least in an explicit and systematic way,⁵⁶³ integrated into the Buddhist theory of rebirth only at a somewhat later stage of development.

36.5.3 In my opinion, it is quite plausible to assume that earliest Buddhism, focussing on the path to Nirvāṇa, was not specifically interested in, and did not reflect on, the relation of animals, let alone plants, to rebirth. In the long run, however, this question could not be ignored, if — as was the case in Buddhism — at least animals were taken seriously as sentient beings, especially if their existence was regarded as particularly unhappy.⁵⁶⁴ If existence is conceived as caused by Thirst or Desire, and if at least all such suffering as is the outflow of a certain form of existence is taken to be the effect of the prior karma of the living being concerned,⁵⁶⁵ existence as an animal, too, and the suffering it involves, cannot but be traced back to Desire and prior karma. For, if the moral law of karma is expected to be both binding and reliable it must be not only infallible but also universal. It is not enough to exclude that a moral or immoral action may have no consequence for the doer (*kṛta-vipraṇāśa*); it must also be excluded that a consequence (like unhappy existence as an animal) may hit one who has not done the corresponding deed(s) (*akṛtābhyāgama*).

⁵⁵⁹ It may, however, be difficult to exclude the possibility that some vague chance of being reborn as an animal is, somehow, included in the concept of *vinipāta* (which at MN III 169 seems, in fact, to refer to animals).

⁵⁶⁰ MN No. 129. Cp. Vetter 1988, 93f.

⁵⁶¹ At the same time, the "zig-zag pattern" is, in connection with the possibility of being reborn as an animal, additionally modified by the assumption that to emerge from this state of existence is extremely difficult and will happen at best after a very long time, an assumption which in this case would seem to imply a succession of many animal existences before rebirth as a human. In contrast to this, in the case of hell and heaven the text merely states that rebirth as a human takes places after a very long time, without necessarily implying, in this case, a succession of existences since one single existence in these spheres may well be of an extremely long duration.

⁵⁶² Vetter 1988, 78 (line 3 from below).

⁵⁶³ See n. 559.

⁵⁶⁴ Cp., e.g., MN I 74f; III 169. Cp. BN § 21.2.

⁵⁶⁵ Cp. MN No. 135.

36.5.4 But even so the question arises why the Buddhists, unlike Jainas and most Hindus, have not also included *p l a n t s* into the karmically determined rebirth system. Provided that we do not already *p r e s u p p o s e* the later view that plants are *n o t* sentient beings but rather the earlier one that they *a r e* sentient and hence exposed to suffering through being cut, mutilated or the like,⁵⁶⁶ there is no reason why one should not — as the Jainas and many Hindus⁵⁶⁷ actually do — regard them, too, as owing their state to former karma, and hence as another possible form of rebirth.

36.5.5 It is here that one may advance the argument that plants are not sentient because they do not *c o m m i t* or accumulate good and bad karma. But in the early rebirth pattern it is only in *h u m a n* existence that karma is committed or accumulated, whereas in the *o t h e r w o r l d* karma is only *c o n s u m e d* but not accumulated.⁵⁶⁸ Hence, the argument that plants do not commit good or bad karma would *n o t* have excluded them necessarily from the range of possible forms of rebirth.

36.5.6 To be sure, already in the Buddhist canonical texts we can sometimes observe a tendency to modify the ancient pattern. In this connection, the passage where rebirth as an animal appears to have been newly introduced as an alternative to rebirth in hell is of special interest; for in this passage animals, too, are regarded as not only consuming previous karma but as also *c o m m i t t i n g* *n e w* karma (especially *b a d* karma, by devouring each other).⁵⁶⁹ But it is not clear whether the ability to commit good or bad karma has now become a *n e c e s s a r y* feature of *a l l* possible forms of rebirth.⁵⁷⁰ And even if it had, it would *n o t* have been impossible to assume that, just like animals, so even plants *d o* commit good and bad actions (like bearing fruits and giving shadow,⁵⁷¹ or destroying life by dropping a

⁵⁶⁶ E.g., ŚB 11.6.1.8 and 10; Medhātithi et al. ad Manu I.49 and I.50 (Medh.: *asyāḥ sthāvarāmikāyā gater anyā nikṛṣṭā duḥkhabahulā gatiṃ nāstī*!); Rāghavānanda ad Manu XII.9 (*duḥkhaikayoniṃ tarugulmalatāṛyam*). Cp. Wezler 1987b, 114 and 117. For the Jainas: v. Glasenapp 1925, 188.

⁵⁶⁷ Cp., e.g., Manu I.49 (Kullūka: *vrkṣādayas tamoguṇena vicitraduḥkhalaphalenādharma-karmahetukena vyāptāḥ* ...); XII.9: *śarīrajaiḥ karmadoṣair yāti sthāvaratām naraḥ* (Kullūka: ... *śarīra-karma-ja-pāpāir yuktaḥ sthāvaratvaṃ mānuṣaḥ prāpnoti*); Rāmānuja ad BhG 14.18.

⁵⁶⁸ This is very clearly expressed in the verse quoted at BĀU (Kāṇva) IV.4.6.

⁵⁶⁹ MN III 169; cp. Vetter 1988, 94.

⁵⁷⁰ This is, in fact, hardly possible in the case of the "unconscious (heavenly) beings", at least as they have been understood in the Theravāda tradition (see n. 526).

⁵⁷¹ Cp., in this connection, Pv II.9.3-5 (see n. 414).

branch or by poison⁵⁷²).

36.5.7 Hence, the necessity to establish as co-extensive the range of sentient beings and that of karmically determined rebirth can hardly have been the motive proper for denying plants the status of sentient beings. At best, it may have somehow contributed to the rigid and explicit dogmatization of this denial. But the main motive must have been something else.

37.1 This brings me to the last argument, found only in the Tarkajyālā. Plants, it is said, are not sentient beings, because otherwise eating cereals, fruits or vegetables, and drinking oil or sugar-cane juice would be equivalent to eating meat and drinking blood,⁵⁷³ and this would amount to a gigantic mass of bad karma,⁵⁷⁴ since consumption presupposes killing.⁵⁷⁵

37.2 This is, to be sure, written from the later standpoint of vegetarianism, but the essence of the argument would hold good also for traditional Buddhism, for which eating meat is not prohibited, provided that one has no share in the killing: For, as already stated above, in the case of meat it was, at least in a country like India, possible, even for ordinary lay people, to restrict consumption to occasions on which one was able to buy meat without being involved in the killing, or even to abandon meat-eating altogether. In the case of vegetable food, however, complete abstention at least was impossible unless one was ready to starve.⁵⁷⁶ Any eating would, directly or indirectly, presuppose *himsā*.⁵⁷⁷ And most lay people were definitely unable to avoid harvesting food-plants themselves, or at least preparing them, which mostly includes cutting to pieces, pounding, cooking or frying. If plants are sentient beings, this would mean, primarily for lay followers, but indirectly also for monks and nuns (see § 25.1), a tremendous amount of inevitable killing, hence bad karma.

37.3 Thus, this argument ultimately points to a situation similar to the one derived above (§§ 24.3ff) from the canonical evidence, namely that the starting point and primary motive for the exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the range of living,

⁵⁷² Cp. TJv 358a4f (see n. 492).

⁵⁷³ TJv 360b4f (D: dza 315b2f): *yañ sems dañ bcas pa ñid [g]cig yin na ni 'bras chan* (D; P: *can*) *dañ/ phye ma* (D; P om.) *dañ/ me tog dañ/ 'bras bu dañ/ lo ma la sogs pa zos na yañ sems can gyi sa zos par 'gyur ba yin la/ til gyi til mar dañ/ bur śiñ gi khu ba la sogs pa 'thuñs* (D; P: *'thuñ*) *na yañ srog chags kyi lus las byuñ ba'i khrag 'thuñs pa yin pas ...*

⁵⁷⁴ TJv 360b5f: *des na 'jig rten thams cad kyi kyañ sdig pa chen po byas par 'gyur roll*.

⁵⁷⁵ TJv 360b7f: *zos na ni srog chags la gnod par 'gyur bas ...*

⁵⁷⁶ Cp. TJv 360b7: *thar pa 'dod pa rnam's zas ma zos na ni 'chi bar 'gyur la ...*

⁵⁷⁷ Cp. TJv 360b6f: *kha zas kyi bya ba rtag tu spyod pa na 'tshe ba la 'jug pa ñid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ...*

sentient beings in Buddhism was the compulsions of practicability, i.e. of avoiding excessive cumbersomeness (for monks and nuns) and scruples (in lay people) in using plants in everyday life.

38.1 According to the canonical evidence, in the beginning this exclusion appears to have been only a pragmatic one, not connected with a theoretical denial but rather with an attitude of merely *i g n o r i n g*, in certain contexts of life, the sentience of plants.⁵⁷⁸

38.2 But such a flexible, pragmatic position — typical of earliest Buddhism also in other contexts — is not easily maintained. It may be a general tendency of the human mind to dogmatize such attitudes, or, more precisely, to supply them with a corresponding theoretical foundation or ideology. The more so when there are attacks from outside, as we may in fact presume in the present case. Particularly the *J a i n a s* certainly made scornful remarks on the comparatively relaxed behaviour of the Buddhists and accused them of carelessness and lack of morality.

38.3 It is not improbable that their first target was the fact that Buddhist *m o n k s* drank *f r e s h w a t e r*. For in the *Milindapañha* it is only against the sentience of water that real arguments are adduced, and the occasion for presenting them is in fact that Buddhists were blamed by the Jainas for drinking fresh water, which the latter regarded as sentient.⁵⁷⁹ To this accusation, the Buddhist reacts by denying water sentience and by presenting a series of arguments for this.⁵⁸⁰

38.4 It would seem that likewise the fact that the Buddhist monks and nuns had few scruples in letting lay people "kill" plants expressly for their — the monks' and nuns' — sake (§ 25.1), and accordingly seem to have played down the "killing" of plants by lay people by implicitly or explicitly *n o t* reckoning it as *b a d k a r m a* (cp. § 26.2), must, sooner or later, also have provoked accusations from the Jainas.⁵⁸¹ At least in one passage of the *Yogācārabhūmi*⁵⁸² it is in fact in the

⁵⁷⁸ Cp., as a kind of systematic parallel, Udayana's statement (*Kir* 39,14f) that *Praśastapāda* included plants, in spite of their animateness, not among living bodies (*śarīra*) but among objects (*viśaya*) because he wants to point out that they mostly serve the purposes of mobile beings (*jaṅgamopakāratayā*) and are subject to them (*tadadhinatayā*).

⁵⁷⁹ *Mil* 259,5ff.

⁵⁸⁰ *Mil* 259,9ff.

⁵⁸¹ Cp., in this connection, that in the *Skandhaka* and *Vināyavibhaṅga* the prohibitions, for monks and nuns, to injure plants are not infrequently motivated by the fact that people *o r n o n - B u d d h i s t a s c e t i c s* — stated to regard plants as living beings, especially living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekendriya-jīva*, a term well documented in *J a i n a* sources!) — blamed the Buddhist monks or nuns with *l a c k o f p i t y* or sympathy (*T vol. 24, 817b19; vol. 22, 41c8-11; cp. 129a7+10f; cp. also 641b1 (earth)*). — Cp. also *Nīl* 374.

⁵⁸² *Y* 171,12ff.

context of killing living beings that the Jaina view that plants are included among them is expressly rejected by the Buddhist.

VIII. Postface

39 By way of conclusion, let me link up the past with the present, and with the future. Our problem today is not so much: How can we use (and this means in most cases: injure or destroy) plants without becoming guilty? It is rather: How can we come to feel guilty again when exploiting, injuring and destroying plants to the point of extirpating many of them? How can we re-establish inhibition with regard to injuring them?

39.1 If the usual Buddhist view is presupposed, viz. that plants are not living beings, at least not in the sense of being sentient or at any rate somehow susceptible to injury, one may still recur to the reasons adduced or presupposed by the Suttavibhaṅga and the Khandhaka in order to prove that the precepts not to injure plants are nevertheless well-motivated.

39.1.1 One of these reasons was regard for the view of common people (or non-Buddhist ascetics) who did consider plants to be living, sentient beings (see §§ 5.4-5.5; 8; 9.1f; 10.1; 12.4). Unfortunately, this argument, apart from addressing monks only, will hardly work in our rationalistic modern societies, where most people seem to hold just the opposite view, or at least behave as if they did.

39.1.2 Another reason was the conviction that plants, at least trees, are inhabited by deities or spirits who are injured or damaged by the destruction of "their" plant/tree and may even punish the offender (see § 5.3 and n. 149). This argument would hold good for lay people, too, and at the same time allows cautious use of plants since some of them may, at least occasionally,⁵⁸³ be devoid of a deity or because the deity can be requested to please choose another abode.⁵⁸⁴ However, in modern societies, including Buddhist ones, belief in such deities is vanishing. No longer alive in people's hearts, these deities have little chance to protect their trees. One may, at best, substitute them by the modern concept of Nature, which, mistreated, takes revenge sooner or later.

39.1.3 We also found the argument that injuring plants often violates human interests, mostly those of the owner (see §§ 5.1; 11.3; 12.1; 13.3; 14.4). Since this argument does not aim at excluding exploitation but only damage to the owner, it offers little help to the plants themselves; from their point of view, it does not matter whether they are exploited by the owner or by somebody else. At least as long as the concept of owner and of his rights and duties is not fundamentally reconsidered, this kind of argument, though perhaps not identical with the modern

⁵⁸³ E.g., when a tree deity has died recently (Sp 760; T vol. 24, 823b19f).

⁵⁸⁴ T vol. 23, 776a13ff = Vin.Mū., je 259a7f (*śiṅ ljon pa 'di la lha gaṅ gnas pa de gnas gzan tshol cig*). Cp. also T vol. 23, 775c20-22 = Vin.Mū., je 258b3f where a tree deity is ordered by the Buddha to offer shelter to another one whose tree had been felled by a monk. — In the Bhaḍḍasāḷajātaka (see § 5.4 + n. 88), where the deity is so closely connected with the tree that she is almost a kind of tree-soul, no such possibility seems to exist.

anthropocentric attitude of entirely unrestrained exploitation, is not opposed to it either.

39.1.4 But as stated above (§ 5.2 and n. 204) a few sources suggest yet another motivation, viz. that plants should not be injured or destroyed because they are the abode or habitat of animals (cp. also the analogous motivation not to pollute water in § 11.1). This ecological argument is fully valid today also, indeed more than ever before, and for both monks and lay people.

39.2 However, I for one should find it reasonable to combine this latter argument with a different view of the nature of plants — one that is perhaps not too far from what I hope I have been able to show to have been, with some probability, that of earliest Buddhism: the view that plants themselves, too, are living beings, in the sense of a border-line case. But contrary to the situation in earliest Buddhism where the border-line status of plants served to reduce inhibitions against injuring them, it should now be used to re-establish them. In this sense, we should rather stress the other aspect of the border-line status: Plants are, to be sure, not living beings like animals, and not at all living beings like men, with some secret anthropomorphic features and faculties, and hence perhaps not sentient beings in the usual sense of the word; but not entirely insentient either, not altogether insusceptible of being injured; living beings of a peculiar kind, which we can somehow explore from outside, but which we will probably never be able to "understand" from within; familiar beings, but at the same time utterly strange, and precisely for that reason to be treated with respect: because we simply do not know, and perhaps cannot even imagine, what it means for a plant itself to be injured. To be sure, unless we are ready to starve, we cannot avoid using plants, and this often means: injuring or even killing them. But we should do this as little as possible, carefully and with a sense of regret, not with the unnecessary brutality and relentlessness which has become habitual, and at the root of which is mostly not need but greed.

Abbreviations

[Note: Pāli texts are quoted according to the editions of the Pāli Text Society, though for the basic texts and Sp I have used the Nālandā edition; Upaniṣads are quoted according to the edition by Limaye and Vadekar (Poona 1958).]

[]	in texts: to be deleted
< >	in texts: to be added
Add.	L. Schmithausen, Additions to "Buddhism and Nature", Tokyo (International Institute for Buddhist Studies) 1991.
AiGr	J. Wackernagel and A. Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik, 3 vols., Göttingen 1896-1930, repr. 1954-1975
AitU	Aitareya-Upaniṣad
AKBh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Vasubandhu), ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967.
AKBh-I	A. Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (P. Pradhan Ed.), Tokyo. Pt. 1 (Skt.-Tib.-Ch.): 1973; pt. 2 (Ch.-Skt.): 1977; pt. 3 (Tib.-Skt.): 1978.
AKṬU	Upāyikā nāma Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā (Śamathadeva): Tj, mDo-'grel, vols. tu and thu.
AKVy	Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Yaśomitra), ed. U. Wogihara, repr. Tokyo 1971.
AN	Aṅguttaranikāya
As	Atthasālinī (Buddhaghosa), ed. E. Müller, London 1897 (PTS).
AV	Atharvaveda
Āyār II	Āyāraṅga (Ācāraṅga), 2nd book (quotations acc. to H. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras: SBE vol. xxii, and JĀS ed.).
Āyār/Sūy	Ācāraṅgasūtram and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram, with the Nirukti of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu and the Commentary of Śīlānkācārya, orig. ed. by Ācārya Śāgarānandasūriji Mahārāja, re-ed. by Muni Jambūvijayajī (Lālā Sundarlāl Jain Āgamagranthamālā Vol. 1), Delhi 1978.
ĀyārN	Āyāraṅga-nijjuttī (Bhadrabāhu); ed. see Āyār/Sūy.
Āyār _s	W. Schubring, Ācāraṅga-sūtra, Erster Śrutaskandha, Leipzig 1910.
ĀyārViv	Ācāraṅga-vivaraṇa (Śīlānka); ed. see Āyār/Sūy.
BĀU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad
BhG	Bhagavadgītā
Bhī.	Bhikkhuni/Bhikṣuṇī
BHSD	F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven 1953.

BN	L. Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature, to be published in the Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Occasion of Expo '90 "Buddhism and Nature", Tokyo (International Institute for Buddhist Studies) 1991.
BoBh	Bodhisattvabhūmi (ascribed to Aśaṅga), ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1966.
Ch.	Chinese
ChU	Chāndogya-Upaniṣad
CPD	V. Trenckner et al., Critical Pāli Dictionary, Copenhagen 1924ff.
D	Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
DĀ(ç)	Dīrghāgama (Chinese: T vol. 1, No. 1).
Dasav	Dasaveyāliya, ed. E. Leumann and transl. W. Schubring, Ahmedabad 1932; repr. in: Schubring, KISchr, 109ff.
DasavViv	Daśavaikālikasūtra-vivarāṇa (Haribhadra), ed. in: Yākinīputra-śrīmad-Dharmabhadrasūri-vara-Śiṣyabodhinī-saṃjñakam (sic!) vivarāṇa-yuktam Daśavaikālikasūtram, publ. by Manukhlal Hiralal Lalan, Bombay, vikramasamvat 1999.
Dh.	Dharmaguptaka
Dhp	Dhammapada
DhPr	Dharmottarapradīpa: Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra's Dharmottarapradīpa (being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu), ed. Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Patna 21971.
DN	Dīghanikāya
EĀ(ç)	Ekottarāgama (Chinese: T vol. 2, No. 126)
EDS	An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles, ed. A. M. Ghatage, Poona 1976-.
GBM(FacEd)	Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Ed.), New Delhi 1959-1974.
GM	Gilgit Manuscripts, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, 4 vols., Calcutta/Srinagar 1939-1959.
GOS	Gaekwad's Oriental Series
GrCh	Grub mtha' chen mo, ed. in: The Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa, ed. Ngawang Gelek Demo, vol. 14, Delhi 1973.
IBK	Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).
IIJ	Indo-Iranian Journal
Jā	Jātaka
JĀG	Jaina Āgama Granthamālā
JIABS	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Kā.	Kāśyapīya
Kapp	Kappasutta, ed. W. Schubring, in: Schubring, KISchr, 16ff.

Kir	Kiraṇāvalī (Udayanācārya), ed. Jitendra S. Jetly, Baroda 1971 (GOS No. 154).
Kj	Kanjur, in: The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition (repr.), ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo and Kyoto 1955-1961.
KISchr	Kleine Schriften
KP	Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Staël-Holstein, Shanghai 1926.
Kv	Kathāvatthu
Kv-a	Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā
LAS	Lāṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, repr. Kyoto 1956.
Mā.	Mahāsāṅghika
Mā.Lok.	Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin
MĀ(ç)	Madhyamāgama (Chinese: T vol. 1, No. 26).
MBh	MBh Mahābhārata (crit. ed., unless specified otherwise).
MHṛd	Madhyamakahrdaya; ch. IX ed. Sh. Kawasaki, The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's <i>Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā</i> , (1)-(3), in: Tetsugaku shisō ronshū (Tsukuba Univ.) 2/1976, 12/1987 and 13/1988.
Mi.	Mahīśāsaka
Mil	Milindapañha
MN	Majjhimanikāya
Mp	Manorathapūraṇī (AN-a)
MPPU	Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa (ascribed to Nāgārjuna): T vol. 25, No. 1509.
MPSMah	Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: T vol. 12, No. 374.
Mū.	Mūlasarvāstivādin
MVy	Mahāvvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, repr. 1962; ed. Y Ishihama nad Y. Fukuda, The Toyo Bunko 1989 (Nos. acc. to Sakaki ed.).
NBi	Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): s. DhPr
NBiṬ	Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara): s. DhPr
Nidd I	Mahāniddesa
Nidd II	Cullaniddesa
Nīl	Nīlakēci (see n. 472)
Pāc.	Pācittiya
Pāc.Bhī.	Pācittiya section of the Bhikkhunī-Pāṭimokkha (/Bhikṣuṇī-Prātimokṣa).
Paṭis-a	Paṭisaṃbhīdamagga-aṭṭhakathā
PDhSg	Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha (Praśastapāda); ed.: s. Kir
PE	Pillar Edict(s) (of Aśoka), ed. in: K. L. Janert, Abstände und Schlußvokalverzeichnungen in den Aśoka-Inschriften, Wiesbaden 1972, 127ff.

Prāt.	Prātimokṣasūtra
Prāt.Bhī.	Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣasūtra
Prāt.Bhī.Mū.,	Tibetan transl. of the Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa of the Mūlasarvāstivādins: KJ, 'Dul ba, vol. the.
Prāt.Mā.Lok.	Prātimokṣasūtram of the Lokottaravādimahāsāṅghika School, ed. N. Tatia, Patna 1976.
Prāt.Mū.	Prātimokṣasūtra of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (ed. A. Ch. Banerjee, Calcutta 1954, but not reliable).
Prāt.Mū.,	Tibetan transl. of the Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa of the Mūlasarvāstivādins: KJ, 'Dul ba, vol. che.
Prāt.Sa. _{Th}	Tunhuang ms. of Prāt.Sa. (see n. 21).
Ps	Papañcasūdanī (MN-a)
PTC	Pāli Tripiṭaka Concordance, ed. F. L. Woodward, E. M. Hare, London, 1952-.
PTSD	The Pali Text Society's Pali English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, W. Stede, London 1921-25.
Pv	Petavatthu
R	sTog Palace ed. of the Tibetan Kanjur
RE	Rock Edict(s) (of Aśoka)
ṚV	Ṛgveda
Sa.	Sarvāstivādin
SĀ _(c)	Samyuktāgama (Chinese: Mū.): T vol. 2, No. 99.
SĀ ₆₂	Samyuktāgama (Chinese: prob. also Mū.): T vol. 2, No. 100.
Saṅgh.	Saṅghādisesa/Saṅghāvaśeṣa
Saṅghabh	The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu [from Vin.Mū.], ed. R. Gnoli, 2 vols., Rome 1977-78.
ŚB	Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, ed. A. Weber, 2nd ed., Varanasi 1964.
SHT	L. Sander and E. Waldschmidt, Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden, IV, Wiesbaden 1980; V, Stuttgart 1985.
Śikṣ	Śikṣasamuccaya (Śāntideva), ed. C. Bendall, repr. 's-Gravenhage 1957.
SN	Samyuttanikāya
Sn	Suttanipāta
Sn-a	Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthajotikā II)
Sp	Sāmantapāsādikā (Vin-a)
Spk	Sāratthappakāsinī (SN-a)
ŚrBh	Śrāvakabhūmi (ascribed to Aśaṅga), ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973.
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik

Sūy	Sūyagaḍa (quotations acc. to H. Jacobi, <i>Jaina Sutras</i> : SBE vol. xlv, and JĀS ed.).
SūyViv	Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Vivarāṇa (Śīlāṅka): ed. s. Āyār/Sūy
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (DN-a)
Sv-pt	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī-purāṇaṭikā Linatthapakāsinī (Dhammapāla), ed. L. de Silva, London 1970 (PTS).
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō
TBV	Tattvabodhavidhāyini: Ācārya-śrī-Siddhasenadivākara-praṇītaṃ Saṃmatitarka-prakaraṇaṃ ... śrīmad-Abhayadevasūri-nirmitayā Tattvabodhavidhāyinyā vyākhyayā vibhūṣitaṃ ... 1.-5. vibhāgaḥ. Amadābad, saṃvat 1980-1987.
Th	Theragāthā
Th-a	Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā
Tj	Tanjur, in: <i>The Tibetan Tripiṭaka</i> , Peking Edition (repr.), ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo and Kyoto 1955-1961.
TJv	Tarkajvālā: Tj, dBu-ma, vol. dza.
TRD	Tattvarahasyadīpikā (Guṇaratna's comm. on Haribhadra's Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya), ed. L. Suali, repr. Calcutta 1986.
Utt	Uttarajjhāya, ed. J. Charpentier, repr. Delhi 1980.
Uv	Udānavarga, ed. F. Bernhard, vol. I, Göttingen 1965.
Uv ₁	Tibetan Udānavarga: Udānavarga, Bd. III, Der tibetische Text unter Mitarbeit von S. Dietz hrsg. von Champa Thupten Zongtse, Göttingen 1990.
UvViv	Prajñāvarman's Udānavargavivarāṇa, ed. Michael Balk, 2 vol., Bonn 1984.
VĀvBh	Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyam (Jinabhadra), Maladhāri-Śrī-Hemacandrasūri-viracitayā Śiṣyāhitānāmnayā bṛhad-vṛṭṭyā vibhūṣitaṃ, ed. Pt. Haragovindadāsa, Benares, vīrasaṃvat 2441.
VĀvBhV	Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-(bṛhad)vṛṭti: see VĀvBh
Vi	(Mahā-)Vibhāṣā(-śāstra): T vol. 27, No 1545.
Vin	Vinaya(pīṭaka of the Pāli canon)
Vin.	Vinaya (of any school)
Vin.Bhī.	Tibetan Bhikṣuṇī-Vinayavibhaṅga: Kj, 'Dul ba, vol. the [of doubtful affiliation acc. to C. Vogel in: H. Bechert (ed.), <i>Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur</i> , pt. 1, Göttingen 1985, 110].
VinMañj	Vinayatthamañjūsā nāma Kaṅkhāvitarāṇi-ṭikā, ed. U. P. Ekaṇāyaka 1937.
Vin.Mū.	Chinese version of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins: T vol. 23-24 (Nos. 1442ff).
Vin.Mū.	Tibetan version of the Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins: Kj, 'Dul-ba, vols. khe-che (Vinaya-vastu), che-te (Vinaya-vibhaṅga), de-ne (Vinaya-kṣudrakavastu) and pe (Vinaya-Uttaragrantha).

VisM	Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa), ed. Warren and Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950.
Viyāh	Viyāhapaṇṇatti (JĀS ed.)
VSū	Vaiśeṣikasūtra: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Comm. of Candrānandana, crit. ed. by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Baroda 1961 (GOS No. 136).
Vyom	Vyomavatī (Vyomaśiva), in: The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśastadev-ācharya, with Commentaries Sūkti ..., Setu ... and Vyomavatī ..., ed. Gopinath Kavirāj and Dhundhirāj Shāstri, Benares 1930 (ChSS No. 61).
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens.
Y	Yogācārabhūmi, ed. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1957.
Y _c	Chinese version of the Yogācārabhūmi (T vol. 30, No. 1579).
Y _t	Tibetan version of the Yogācārabhūmi: Tj, Sems-tsam, vols. dzi-yi.

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Index

[Note: Numbers refer to the paragraphs, numbers in italics preceded by *n(s)*. refer to the notes. Occurrences of items in the notes have not normally been listed if the paragraph to which they belong has been entered. Parallels to Pāli texts have not been entered.]

- Abhayadevasūri *n.* 472.
acetana 20.3; *n.* 459.
 agriculture 4.3; 15.1; 26.1-3; 27; *n.* 298.
āhākamma *n.* 397.
āhāra-grahaṇa *n.* 509.
ahimsā 1.1; 5.5; 6.2.2; 11.4; 13.3; 15.1; 17.1f; 22.1.4; 25; 26.4.1; *ns.* 231, 233, 319, 370, 402, 430, 531; cp. "(not) injuring", *himsā*, *avihesā*, *vi-heṭṭh*, *pātavyatā*, *samārambha*.
ajāta (viz. earth) 15.4.
ajīva-kāya *n.* 109.
ā-labbh, *ā-rabbh* 4.3.
āmaka-dhañña: see "raw grain".
 animals 1.2; 5.2; 6.2.2; 9.1f; 10.2; 11.1f; 11.4; 15.2; 16.3; 17.1; 19.2; 20.4.2; 21.1f; 23.2; 24.3; 25.1f; 26.1-3; 29.2; 30; 33.2; 34; 35.2f; 36.3.1ff; 36.5.2f; 36.5.6; 39.1.4; *ns.* 7, 9, 34, 101, 118, 119, 136, 139, 170, 204, 309, 340, 435, 437, 440, 442, 445, 504, 531, 540, 551.
 animate being(s): see *pāṇa*.
añjalikārikā *n.* 499.
 Annen *n.* 487.
 ant-hill 33.2; *ns.* 201, 276, 290, 506.
antaḥsaṃjha *n.* 511.
 anthropocentric: see "human interests", "owner".
 ants 10.2; *ns.* 155, 438.
aparāṇṇa *ns.* 157, 198, 231; see "vegetables".
appaharita 11.1; *ns.* 152, 171, 179.
appāṇakam udakam 11.1; *n.* 313.
ārambha 10ff.
aśoka tree *n.* 492.
 Aśoka 4.3; *ns.* 66, 331, 435.
asañña-satta *ns.* 526, 570.
 ascetics: fit or suitable for a.: see *kappiyya*.
avihesā *n.* 37.
bakula tree *ns.* 492, 493.
 bark (of trees being peeled off) 32.1.
 bathing 16.2.
 bats *n.* 437.
 beans *n.* 231.
 benevolence 20.2f; 24.2.1; see *mettā*.
 Bhaddasāljātaka 5.4; *n* 584; cp. 26.2 + *n.* 415.
 Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya 31.2; cp. 33ff
 Bhrgu story 36.3.2; *ns.* 531, 540.
bhūta 1.2; 5.2; 5.3; 20.1; 20.2; *ns.* 7, 367, 502.
bhūta "plants" 4.2.1; cp. *bhūtag(r)āma*.
bhūtag(r)āma 4.1; 4.2.1; 4.3; 5.2; 5.3; 7.1; *ns.* 95, 174.
bija 5.1; 12.3 (*a-bija*, *nibbatta-bija*); *ns.* 15, 30, 403, 447, 504. see "seeds".
bijā/harita 4.2.1; *n.* 53.
bijag(r)āma 4.2.1; 4.3(f); 5.2(f); 7.1; *ns.* 21, 23, 26, 30, 32, 56.
 border-line case 7.3; 24.1ff; 39.2; *ns.* 60, 414.
 breathing, respiration 34,c; *ns.* 479, 513f; breathing living beings: 6.2.2; *ns.* 7, 514.
 butterfly (rebirth as a b.) 36.3.2; *n.* 542.
caitya tree 10.1f; *n.* 21.
 centipede 10.2; *n.* 497.
 cereals 10.2; 11.3; 37.1; *n.* 231; cp. *pu-bbaṇṇa*.
cetana 1.2; cp. 32.1; *ns.* 9, 477; cp. *n.* 504
cetiya-rukkha: see *caitya* tree.
cittamaṇṭa 1.2; 6.2.2; 15.6; *n.* 202.
 closing and opening the eyelids 34,e; cp. *unmeṣa*.
 compassion, pity 12.4; 16.4; *ns.* 37, 121, 136, 139, 281, 401, 581; cp. *dayā*, *karuṇā*.
 contraction of leaves: see "leaves".
 cooking 13.1-3; 14.2-3; 25.1-2; 26.1; 37.2; *n.* 250.
 coral 33.2 + *ns.* 506, 508.
 creeper *ns.* 493, 511.
 crystal 30; 33.2; *ns.* 506, 508.
dadru 33.2 + *ns.* 505, 508.
dayā, *anu(d)dayā* *ns.* 37, 163, 319, 401.
 decorum 5.5; 7.2; 9.2; 11.2; 11.4; 13.1; 13.3; 16.1; *ns.* 93, 310, 402.
 deities in trees: see "tree deity"; in grasses and herbs: 5.3 + *n.* 72.
 desire 20.4.1; 25.3; 27; 36.1; 36.2.1; 36.5.3; *n.* 492.
 destiny after death 29.2; 36.3.(1-2); 36.5.1; cp. *ns.* 518, 531.
devatā: see "deities".
 Dharmakīrti 31.2; 32.1.
 Dharmottara 31.2; 32.1f.
 digging 6.2.1; 15.1-6; *ns.* 73, 148.

D(īgha-)N(ikāya):

I 5, etc.: 4.3 + n. 41; 7.1-3; 13.1; 15.5;
 I 53: n. 342;
 I 141: 19.1-2; 22.1.4; n. 412.
 diseases n. 494; of plants: ns. 501, 502; cp. "skin".
dohada 33.2; ns. 492, 494.
 drinking: water 11.3; 16.3; 25.2-3; 38.3; n. 118; wine n. 42; oil, juice 37.1.
dukkatā 12.5; 13.2.2; 14.1; 14.5; ns. 183, 238, 258, 313, 330, 402.
Durvekamiśra 32.2; n. 479.
 dying 32.1; ns. 504, 520.
 earth 1.2; 2.1-2; 3.1; 6.2.1; 15.1-6; 17.1; 18; 20.4.2 + n. 372; 22.1.4; 27; 29.1.1 + n. 447; 32.1; 36.3.1; 36.3.3; ns. 7, 73, 109, 133, 148, 202, 279, 349, 372, 380, 546, 581; cp. ns. 32, 113, 176, 179.
 eating: meat, fish 37.1f; cp. 25.1 + n. 402; plants 16.3; 37.1-2; n. 231; fruits 12.1-5; grain 13.1; bulbs, garlic 14.1-5; onions, leek n. 256.
 ecological 1.1; 5.2; 39.1.4.
ekendriya; n. 493.
ekindriya/ekendriya (jīva) 5.4; 8; 9.1-2; 10.1; 15.2; 17.1 + n. 333; ns. 313, 493, 581; cp. 2.2.
 enmity 33.1; see *dohada*, "hatred".
 excrements (and urine) 11.2-4; 15.6; cp. n. 174.
 feeling pain 34,h; 35.2; n. 446.
 finger-nails: see "nails".
 fire 2.1-2; 12.3 + n. 215; 15.4; 17.1-2; 33.2; ns. 37, 125, 316, 372, 459, 512; extinguishing fire 17.2.
 fish 25.1 + ns. 400, 402; 29.1.1; n. 438.
 food 4.3; 12.2-3; 12.5; 13.1-3; 16.2-3; 25-26.2; 26.5; 28; 33.2 (+ n. 509); 37.2; n. 512; cp. *uddesiya*, "fish", "fruits", "garlic", "grain", "meat", "vegetables".
 food remnants 11.1-2; 15.6; 16.1; n. 204.
 frog(s) ns. 309, 437, 445.
 fruits 5.2; 10.2; 12.1-12.5; 25.1; 26.1f; 37.1; ns. 15, 58, 76, 420, 507.
 garlic 14.1-5.
Garuḍas 29.1.2.
gati (five g.s) 22.2.2; 29.2; cp. n. 566.
 gold 15.5; 33.2 + n. 502; cp. *hemāṅkura*.
 grain 26.1; ns. 14, 340; cp. "raw grain", "seed(s)".
 grass 5.3; 9.1-2; 16.3; 17.1; 19.1; 26.2; ns. 31, 32, 76, 77, 148, 171, 179, 204, 360;

cp. *trṇa*.
 growing, growth 33.2 + ns. 504, 508; ns. 494, 512, 518; growing again 34,f; cp. *vr̥ddhi*, *vi-ruh*.
Guṇaratna ns. 469, 472 (etc.).
haemorrhoids n. 508.
 hair 33.2 (+ ns. 498, 507, 508); 34,f.
han- 19.1 + n. 340; ns. 2, 47, 51, 275, 352, 357, 428; cp. "killing".
harita 4.2.1; 9.1 (*haritāni tiṇāni*); 11.1-11.4; ns. 53, 152.
 hatred 20.3 + n. 360; 36.1; cp. "enmity".
 (bodily) heat 34,b; n. 479.
 heliotropism n. 511.
hemāṅkura 33.2 + ns. 506, 508.
himsā, *hims-* 19.1; 26.2 (gross and subtle); 37.2; ns. 3, 37, 51, 272, 274, 347, 356, 357, 368; cp. "injuring".
 Hindu, Hindus, Hinduism: 2.1; 11.4; 15.1-2; 20.4.2; 31.3; 36.5.4; ns. 6, 34.
 human interests 5.1; 11.1; 11.(3-)4; 17.1; 39.1.3; ns. 190, 310; cp. 12.1; 13.3; n. 58; cp. "owner".
 inanimate matter: violence towards i. m. n. 109.
 ingestion of food 33.2 + n. 509; cp. n. 504.
 ingratitude 26.2.
 (not) injuring: 1.1-2; 4.3; 7.1; 10.2; 11.1; 15.2; 16.3; 20.2-3; 22.1.7; 25.3; 26.2-3; 36.2.2; 36.3.1-2; ns. 37, 149, 309, 330; plants and seeds 4.3; 5-5.5; 7.3; 8; 9.1; 10.1-2; 11.1; 11.3-4; 12.5; 13.3; 14.1; 15.3; 15.5; 19.1; 22.1.1; 23.1; 24.3; 25.1; 26.2-3; 34,h; 35.2; 36.3.1; 39-39.2; ns. 56, 152, 232, 477, 511, 520, 581; cp. 22.1.7; fruits 12.3-5; elements 11.4; 15.1-6; 16.1; 17.1; 36.3.1; ns. 202, 298, 319; cp. (a)*himsā*, *vi-heṭh*.
 insect(s) 5.2; 17.1; 29.11; ns. 155, 437; (re-birth as an i.) 36.3.2-3.
 insentient 3.2; 7.1; 7.3; 11.4; 20.3; 32.1; 33.2; 34; 39.2; ns. 9; 388, 420, 459; see *acetana*.
 invitations 25.1; 25.4.
 Jaina, Jainas, Jainism: 2.2; 4.2.1; 4.3; 5; 5.4-5; 6.2.2; 7.1; 9.2; 11.4; 12.4; 13.2.1; 14.2; 15.1-2; 15.6; 16.2-3; 17.2; 20.1; 20.4.2; 22.2.1; 25.1-3; 26.2; 26.4.2; 27; 29.1.2; 29.2; 31.2; 31.3 + n. 472; 32.1; 35.1; 36.4; 36.5.4; 38.2-4; ns. 2, 6, 9, 26, 53, 177, 198, 233, 445, 469, 470, 472, 493,

508, 511, 566.

jāta (viz. earth) 15.4.

Jā(taka) ns. 413, 518-521;

III 24, IV 210: n. 459.

IV 153ff: see Bhaddasāla-j.

V 221, 7f: ns. 349, 380.

jewels 33.2 + ns. 506, 508; n. 289.

Jinabhadra ns. 469, 472, (etc.).

jīva 1.2; 5.4; 6.2.2; 8; 10.1; 15.2; 20.1; 22.2.1; 23.2; ns. 7, 8, 14, 15, 18, 19, 50, 51, 66, 106, 130, 233, 272, 274, 279, 331, 337, 401, 476, 504, 508, 510, 511, 520.

jīva-rukkha ns. 24, 187.

jīvītā voropeti, *jīvītād vyaparopayati* 6.2.2; ns. 2, 47, 100, 101, 116.

jīvītindriya 30 (of plants); ns. 2, 130, 281.

kappiya/kalpika 12.3; 12.5; 14.2; 16.3; 25.1; ns. 155, 231.

karma 26.2-3; 30; 36.1; 36.2.1; 36.3.3-5.1; 36.5.3-7; 37.1-2; 38.4; ns. 360, 459, 551, 567.

karuṇā n. 356; cp. compassion.

kataññutā n. 414.

keśa see "hair".

khanana see digging.

Khandhaka/Skandhaka 8; see Vin(aya) I and II.

khuddaka pāṇa 9.1(-2); 16.4; cp. n. 136.

killing 1.1-2; 4.3; 5; 5.5; 6.1; 6.2.1-2; 7.1; 7.3; 9.1-2; 16.4; 17.1; 19.1-2; 20.2; 22.1.6-7; 23.2; 25.1; 25.3; 26.1-3; 26.4.2; 36.2.2; 26.3.1-2; 37.1-2; 38.4; ns. 77, 101, 119, 279, 370, 371, 397; plants (and seeds) 4.3; 7.1; 7.3; 9.2; 11.3; 13.1; 19.1; 25.1; 26.1-3; 37.1-2; 38.4; 39.2; ns. 40, 146, 190, 507; cp. 36.3.1-2; fruits 12.4; elements 17.1; cp. 36.3.1-2.

Kir(aṇṇavālī) ns. 471, 504, etc.

Kūkai ns. 487, 520.

kulīṅga n. 497.

kuṣmāṇḍa n. 507.

kuṣṭha 33.2 + n. 505.

Kūṭadantasutta: see DN I 141.

Land of the Dead 36.3.2.

lavaṇa see "salt".

layman, lay people 1.1; 5.4-5; 7.3; 12.3; 13.2.1; 15.5; 16.3; 19.1; 20.2; 25.1-2; 25.4; 26.1-5; 27; 37.2-3; 38.4; 39.1.2; 39.1.4; ns. 42, 148, 220, 231, 254, 264, 267, 269, 279, 331.

leaves (contraction or folding of l.) 32.2; 33.1-

2.

(spirituous) liquor 33.2; cp. "wine".

living: plants 4.2.1; n. 179; cp. *jīva-rukkha*; earth: s. *jāta*.

living being(s) 1.2, n. 7, etc.; cp. *jīva*. locomotion: see "motion".

loka-vajja, *loka-sāvadya*: n. 93.

M(adhyamaka-)Hṛd(aya) 31.2; 33(-34);

IX. 139: n. 468;

IX.140: ns. 443, 523-525;

IX.141f: n. 499;

IX.143: n. 502;

IX.144: ns. 490; 492; 504;

IX.145: n. 508;

IX. 146: n. 494.

madya: see "liquor".

Mahāsīhanādasutta: see MN I 78.

maithuna-saṃjñā (in trees) n. 492.

M(ajjhima-)N(ikāya):

I 13: 11.1 + n. 170;

I 73: 29.1.1 + ns. 439, 442, 452;

I 78: 16.4 + n. 319; 25.3;

I 180, etc.: 4.3 + n. 41; 7.1-3; 13.1-2.2; 15.5;

I 407: ns. 7, 342, 343;

II 51: 15.5;

No. 129, esp. III 169: 36.5.2-3 + ns. 559, 560, 564; 36.5.6 + n. 569.

Maladhāri-Hemacandra ns. 472, 493.

man: killing a m. 6.2.2; 7.3; n. 101; rebirth as a (hu)man 36.3.1ff; cp. "human".

Mānameyodaya n. 467.

maṇḍalakārikā n. 497.

mango 12.1-12.3.

manussa, *manuṣya*: 5.5; 8; 10.1; 15.2; ns. 116, 130, 198, 330; cp. "man", "people".

marāṇa: see "dying".

meat 25.1 + ns. 400, 402; 37.1-2; n. 232.

medical treatment (of plants) 33.2 + ns. 501, 502; see "Vṛkṣāyurveda".

mettā 20.2 + n. 347; n. 356; cp. "benevolence".

Mil(indapañha):

172-174: n. 459;

259: 38.3; n. 313;

266: ns. 93, 95, 112, 422;

271: n. 459.

millipede 33.2 + n. 497.

Mīmāṃsā 31.2 + ns. 467, 469.

mimosa 33.2 + n. 499.

- mittadubbha* n. 414.
 mobile and stationary: see *t(r)asa* and *(s)thāvara*
 monks 4.1-18; 20.2; 22.1-4; 24-3; 25.1-4; 26.1; 26.3; 26.5; 27; 37.2-3; 38.3-4.
 moss 5.1 + n. 61.
 motion, movement 34,a; ns. 479, 511, 523.
 mould n. 60.
mūla-bīja, etc.: 5.1; n. 30.
 mushrooms n. 60.
 musk n. 502.
myos pa n. 490.
 Nāgas 29.1.2.
 (finger-)nails 33.2 + n. 507; 34,f.
 Nārada 30.
 Nārāyaṇa (Mīmāṃsā author) n. 467.
 natural science 35.1; cp. 21.1.
nigodas 36.4.
 Nīl(akēci) ns. 469, 472, 482, etc.
nimantana 25.1 + n. 399.
 nuns 4.1 etc. (cp. Prāt.Bhī.)
 Nyāyabindu 31.2; 32.1.
 Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā 32.1-2; cp. 31.2.
oṣadhi ns. 32, 72.
 owner (interest of the o.) 5.1; 11.3; 14.4; 39.1.3.
 pacificatory ceremonies 26.2.
pakati-vajja/prakṛti-sāvadya n. 93.
pāṇa, prāṇa, p(r)āṇin: 1.2; 4.2.2; 5.4; 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 7.3; 19.1-2; 20.1; 20.3; 20.4.2; 21.1-3; 22.1.6-7; 22.2.1; 23.1-3; 24.3; ns. 2, 7, 47-51, 202, 204, 274, 430, 435, 513, 514; cp. *appāṇaka, sappāṇaka, khuddaka pāṇa, t(r)asa* and *(s)thāvara*, "animals".
pāṇabhū(ṭa) 20.3 + n. 362; ns. 2, 3, 368.
panaga n. 60.
pāṇātipāta 1.1 + ns. 2, 3; 26.2; cp. 7.3 and ns. 118, 344, 428, 430; cp. "killing".
paññatti-vajja/prajñapti-sāvadya ns. 93, 95, 138, 234; cp. 26.2.
paribhoga, pāribhogika 11.3 + n. 200; ns. 180, 198.
pariphandā, parispanda: see "motion".
 Pātimokkhasutta: purpose of the P. 5.5; 24.3; structure 6.2.1; n. 118;
 Saṅgh. 6 and 7: 10(ff) + n. 143; n. 75;
 Pāc. 10: 15.1(ff) + n. 270; ns. 73, 174; cp. 6.2.1;
 Pāc. 11: 4.1-6.2.2; 22.1.1; 22.1.6; 23.1-2; ns. 21, 118, 403;
 Pāc. 19: ns. 152, 190;
 Pāc. 20: 16.3 + n. 311; n. 118;
 Pāc. 40: 16.3 + n. 314; 25.2 + n. 406;
 Pāc. 53: 16.2 + n. 306;
 Pāc. 56: 17.1(ff) + n. 320;
 Pāc. 57: 16.2 + n. 305;
 Pāc. 61: 6.2.1-2 + n. 100; n. 118;
 Pāc. 62: 16.3 + n. 312; n. 118;
 Pāc. 88: n. 121;
 Sekhiya 74-75: 11.2 + n. 176;
 Pāc.Bhī. 1: 14.1 + n. 250; 14.5;
 Pāc.Bhī. 7: 13.1ff + n. 230;
 Pāc.Bhī. 9: 11.2 + n. 176;
 Pāc.Bhī. 39: 9(ff) + n. 125.
pātavya(tā) 4.1; 4.2.2; 6.1; 6.2.2; 22.1.6.
 peasants 15.2; 26.1-2; 26.4.1; 27.
 people's belief 5.4-5; 8; 9.1-2; 10.1; 11.1-4; 12.4-5; 13.2.2; 13.3; 14.1; 15.2-3; 16.3 + n. 313; 17.1; 18; 22.1.2; 22.1.4; 23.1; 32.1; 35.2; 39.1.1; ns. 7, 435, 581.
 perception of objects 33.1 + n. 493.
 perception of time 33.1 + n. 493.
 phlegm and snot 11.2.
 pity: see compassion.
 plants: passim; see *bhūta(grāma)*, *harita*, *(s)thāvara*;
 included in *pāṇa* 20.1-21.3; 22.1.7; 23.1-3; 24.2.1-2;
 as the abode of animals 5.2; 39.1.4; n. 204;
 in the context of rebirth 29.2; 36.2.1-5.7; cp. 29.1.1;
 in Vedic religion and Hinduism: 2.1; 20.4.2; 29.1.1; 31.2 + n. 467, 471; 36.3.2-3; n. 34; cp. 33.1-34;
 in Jainism: 2.2; 4.2.1 + n. 29; 5.4; 14.2; 20.1; 20.4.2; 25.1; 26.2; 31.2 + n. 472; 36.4; 38.4; ns. 202, 469, 477, ; cp. 12.4; 33.1-34;
 unnecessary destruction of pl. 26.2;
 utilization of pl. for food: esp. 12.1-14.5; 25.1; 25.4; 26.1-2; 37.1-3;
 statements expressly denying their sentience 3.2; 22.2.2; 30;
 arguments against their sentience 31.1ff.
 poisonous trees n. 492.
 potter 15.5; n. 37.
 practicability 24.3-26.2; 26.5-28; 37.3.
 Prajñāvarman 20.3; 20.4.2.
prāṇa, prāṇin: see *pāṇa*.
prṛthivī, pathavī: see "earth".
pubbaṇṇa ns. 198, 231; see "cereals".
 rationalization 27

- raw grain 13.1-13.3; n. 228.
 rebirth 29.2; 36.2.1-5.7; n. 467.
 remnants of food: see "food".
 respiration ns. 513, 514.
 ringworm: see *dadru*.
ṛtjāra 33.2 + ns. 504, 508.
rukkha 5.4; 8; 10.1; ns. 18, 24, 30, 59, 106,
 130, 133, 187, 371, 386, 388, 403, 443,
 510, 518, 520; cp. *vrkṣa*, *taru*, "tree".
rukkhadhamma 26.2 + n. 418.
rukkha-jīva 5.4.
sacetana: see *cetana*.
sacittaka 1.2; ns. 492, etc.; cp. n. 233.
 Śālikanātha n. 467.
 salt 33.2 + ns. 506, 508; n. 289.
samaṅgā n. 499.
samaṇakappa 12.3 + ns. 211, 215.
samāna-prasava 33.2 + ns. 504, 508.
samārambha 4.3; 7.1; 22.1.6; ns. 109, 119,
 274.
saṃghātāṃ ā-pad 9.1-2; 16.4; 19.1; n. 340.
 Śāṅkara ns. 34, 467.
saṃrohaṇa n. 520.
saṃsāra see "rebirth"
Samyuttanikāya:
 I 141: 20.2 + n. 347;
 I 169: 11.1 + n. 173;
 IV 117: 20.2 + n. 347; n. 365;
 IV 351 and V 393: 20.2 + ns. 347, 351; n.
 429;
 V 467-474: ns. 41 (470), 42.
sappāṇakāṃ udakam 16.3
 Sarvāstivādins: different versions of their
 Prāt.: ns. 21, 55, 176, 270, 311, 314, 320.
satt(v)a 1.2; 20.1; 20.3; 23.2; ns. 7, 163.
 schools: relationship between Buddhist s.s 4.4
 + ns. 54, 55.
 sea-anemones 20.4.2.
 seeds 2.1f; 3.1f; 4.2.1; 4.3; 4.4; 5.3ff; 12.3ff;
 13.1; 13.3; 25.1; 26.1ff; 29.1.1; ns. 26, 30,
 202, 459, 518; see *bija*.
 sentient, sentience: passim; def. 1.2; n. 476;
 see also *cetana*.
 sentient being(s): 1.2, n. 7, etc.; cp. *satt(v)a*.
śīla/śīla 4.3; 7.2; n. 118.
śilā/śilā: see "crystal".
 Śīlāṅka ns. 372, 472.
 skin ns. 371, 437, 499; skin diseases 33.2 +
 ns. 505, 508.
 sleep(ing) 32.2; 33.1; ns. 490, 494, 504; cp.
 34.e.
smṛyā 33.1 + ns. 490, 491.
 snake 10.2; 17.1; 29.1.2; ns. 437, 438, 548.
spanda(na) ns. 369, 523; cp. "motion".
 sprinkling water 16.3; n. 118.
 stationary (animate beings): see (s)*thāvara*.
sthāvara 20.4.2; ns. 468, 522, 566, 567; cp.
 n. 511; see "t(r)asa and (s)thāvara".
 stone(s) 1.2; 2.1; 15.4; ns. 17, 166, 171, 202,
 502, 506, 511 (loadst.).
 strainer n. 312.
 Suttanipāṭa 23.1;
 p.14: 11.1 + n. 173;
 v.146f: 20.3 + n. 362;
 220f: n. 430;
 393ff, esp. 394: 26.3-4.2; n. 361;
 600ff: 21.1-2; 24.2.1;
 629 (= Dhṛp 405): 20.3 + n. 357;
 704: 20.3 + n. 361;
 967: 20.2 + n. 347.
 Suttavibhaṅga: see Vinayavibhaṅga.
suvarcalā n. 511.
svāpa: see "sleep".
 sword n. 502.
 T 1464 n. 21 (etc.); cp. n. 55.
tasa: see *t(r)asa*.
tāla-taruṇa 8; n. 519.
 tamarind 33.1; n. 517; cp. 32.2.
 Tarkajvālā 31.2; (33-34); 36.1; 37.1;
 354b5ff: ns. 493, 511 (b7);
 355a3ff: n. 492;
 356b1: n. 446;
 357a7ff: n. 502;
 358a4f: n. 492;
 358a6f: n. 490;
 358b1ff: ns. 506-508;
 360b4ff: ns. 573-577;
 360b8ff (verse quotation): 31.2; 36.1; ns.
 377, 511-513, 516, 522, 529.
taru ns. 33, 443, 475, 477, 480, 483, 501,
 502, 504, 508, 523, 566.
tasa ns. 51, 106; see "t(r)asa and (s)thāvara".
thāvara: see *sthāvara*, "t(r)asa and (s)thāva-
 ra".
 tiger 10.2; 36.3.2.
tīṇa: see *ṛṇa*.
tiryagyonī(gata) 6.2.2 + n. 100; see "ani-
 mals".
t(r)asa and (s)*thāvara* 20.2-4.2; 21.3; 22.1.7;
 23.2(-3); 26.3; 26.4.2; cp. 24.2.2; ns. 409,
 553; cp. *sthāvara*, *tasa*.
 tree(s) 4.2.1; 5.3-4; 8; 10.1-2; 17.1; 19.1;

- 20.3; 25.1; 26.2; 32.1-2; 33.1; 34.f; 36.3.2;
39.1.2; *ns.* 14, 15, 31, 43, 45, 58, 187,
189, 403, 459, 492, 493, 502, 512, 518,
529, 584; *cp.* *rukkha*, *taru*, *vanaspati*,
vrkṣa, "*caitya tree*".
tree deity 5.3-4; 26.2; 39.1.2; *ns.* 148, 149,
583, 584.
tree soul 5.4; *n.* 584.
tribal belief 36.3.1(-2); *ns.* 201, 279.
ṭṭṇa, *ṭṭiṇa*: 9.1; *ns.* 30, 32, 59, 171, 174, 176,
179, 204, 311, 320, 386; *cp.* "grass".
udaka, *daga*: 11.1-3; 16.3; *ns.* 19, 106, 202,
301, 306, 319; *cp.* "water".
U(dāna)v(arga)-[Viv(arāṇa)] 33.36: 20.3 + *ns.*
357-359 and 366f.
Udayana *ns.* 504, 514, 578.
udbhijja 29.1.1 + *ns.* 444-447.
uddesiya 25.1
uddissa-kata 25.1
ulcer 33.2 + *ns.* 505, 508; *n.* 494.
unmeṣa-nimeṣa n. 516.
Upaniṣadic doctrine of rebirth 36.3.3
Upasenaśūtra 20.3 + *n.* 364.
uposatha 26.3; *ns.* 42, 430.
urbanization 27
urine: see "excrements".
uṣman see "heat".
Uttara-Mīmāṃsā *n.* 467.
vanaspati ns. 32, 58.
Vedic (religion, ritual, texts, etc.) 2.1; 4.3;
19.2; 20.4.2; 22.1.5; 31.2; 36.3.1; 36.5.1;
n. 279.
vegetable(s) 10.2; 11.3; 12.5; 14.2; 16.3;
25.1f; 26.1; 36.4; 37.1f; *ns.* 202, 215, 220,
231, 261, 476; *cp.* *aparāṇṇa*.
vegetarianism 37.2.
veḷu-taruṇa 8.
viḡhāsa 11.2; see "food remnants".
vi-heṭh 8; 9.1; 10.1; 15.2; *n.* 333; *cp.* 5.4.
vikopana 7.1; *n.* 46.
Vin(aya):
I 137: 9-9.2;
I 157 (I 352; II 216): 11.1;
I 189: 8;
I 225: 11.1;
I 237f: *ns.* 400, 402;
II 108f: 12.1-5;
II 138: 17.1;
II 140: 14.1; 14.3; 14.5
II 169f: *ns.* 400, 402;
III 151: 10.2;
III 155f: 10.1;
IV 32f: 15.2-4;
IV 34f: 5.3-5.5; *ns.* 403, 404; *cp.* 5.2 (Sa.,
Mū.); 39.1-1.2.
IV 47: *ns.* 58, 190;
IV 115: 17.1;
IV 258f: 14.4;
IV 266f: 11.3;
IV 296: 9.1 + *n.* 128.
Vinayamātrkā 12.4 + *n.* 218; *ns.* 21, 126,
148, 150, 189, 215.
Vin(ayaṭṭha)-Mañj(ūsā) 31.2 + *n.* 466; *ns.* 95,
443, 488, 495, 508, 510, 511, 520, 523,
528.
Vinayavibhaṅga 5.5; see Vin(aya) III-IV.
vinipāṭika 29.1.1 + *n.* 442.
vi-ruh, *virūhana*: *ns.* 504, 518, 520, 521; see
"growing again".
visaya-gahaṇa n. 493.
Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya *ns.* 469, 472, 493, 497,
etc.
vrddhi, *vuddhi*: *ns.* 504, 508; see "growing".
vrkṣa ns. 446, 483, 520, 567.
Vṛkṣāyurveda 33.2; *ns.* 490; 492; 502.
wandering about during the rainy season 9-9.2.
water 1-2: 2.1-2; 11.1-4; 16.1-4; 20.4.2;
22.1.4; 25.2-3; 27; 32.1; 36.3.1-2; 38.3;
39.1.4; *ns.* 118, 504, 514; *cp.* *udaka*.
water-splashing 16.2.
wind 2.1-2; *ns.* 372, 504, 508, 514.
wine *n.* 42.
wither(ing), (un)withered 5.2; 8; 15.4; 32.1;
ns. 65, 130, 477, 519.
Yogācārabhūmi 31.2; (34); 36.1; 38.4;
Y_i zi 211a5-b6: 34 + *ns.* 511, 518, 522;
36.1 + *n.* 529;
yoni: four y.s 29.1.1-2.
"zig-zag pattern" (in the doctrine of rebirth)
36.3.1ff.

Addenda:

- n. 477: Cp. also DaśavCū (= Daśavaikālika-cūrṇi, Indore 1933) 139,7: *sacetanās taravaḥ, aśeṣa-tvag-apagame maraṇopalambhād, devadattavat*.
- n. 487: As for the sleeping and awaking of the tamarind (?; text: *citā*, for *ciṃcā*?), cp. also DaśavCū 139,8.
- n. 492: Just as in TJv and TRD, so also in DaśavCū *daurhṛda* (for *dohada*) is adduced as an argument for the sentience of plants b e s i d e the reactions of the Aśoka and Bakula trees (which are said to prove the presence of the senses of hearing and touch and of the sense of taste, respectively: DaśavCū 139,7f and 8f). According to DaśavCū 139,9, melons, etc., manifest their animateness "by [the fact that they have certain] strange longings quenched by means of [repulsive things like] fumigation with manure and bones (cp. Das 1988, 258 and 310), just like a woman" (*prāṇavatyo karkaṭikādayaḥ, paśukarīṣāsthidhūpagandhena daurhṛdāpagamān, nārīvat*).
- n. 493: For examples proving that plants have sense-faculties see also DaśavCū 139,7-9.