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“2. The series of successive and each-other-relieving ideals which the divine authority permits temporary establishments to work out.

“3. The great phenomena of creation, and new life in the divers epochs and ages of Nature and mankind.

“4. The comprehension of the ultimate ideal of mankind as an organism.”

A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK NOTICES.

Lecture on Buddhist Nihilism, by F. Max Müller, M.A., Professor of Comparative Philology in the University of Oxford. Delivered before the general meeting of the Association of German Philologists at Kiel, 28th September, 1869. Translated from the German by Alex. Loos. New York: Asa K. Butts & Co., 36 Dey street. Price 10 cts.

The following passages settle the dispute as to whether “Nirvana” means annihilation, or elevation above the senses and passions:

“No person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the Nirvana, contained in the Buddhist Canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, viz.: That Nirvana, the highest aim, the *sum-mum bonum* of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing.

“Burnouf adds, however, that this doctrine, in its crude form, appears only in the third part of the Canon, the so-called Abhidharma, but not in the first and second parts, in the Sutras, the sermons, and the Vinaya, the ethics, which together bear the name of Dharma or Law. He next points out that, according to some ancient authorities, this entire part of the Canon was designated as ‘not pronounced by Buddha.’ These are, at once, two important limitations. I add a third, and maintain that sayings of the Buddha occur in the first and second parts of the Canon which are in open contradiction to this metaphysical Nihilism.

“Now as regards the soul, or the self, the existence of which, according to the orthodox metaphysics, is purely phenomenal, a sentence attributed to the Buddha says, ‘Self is the Lord of Self, who else could be the Lord?’ And again, ‘A man who controls himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self.’ And this untrodden land is the Nirvana.

“Nirvana certainly means extinction, whatever its later arbitrary interpretations may have been, and seems therefore to imply, even etymologically, a real blowing out or passing away. But Nirvana occurs also in the Brahmanic writings as synonymous with Moksha, Nivṛitti, and other words, all designating the highest stage of spiritual liberty and bliss, but not annihilation. Nirvana may mean the extinction of many things — of selfishness, desire, and sin — without going so far as the extinction of subjective consciousness. Further, if we consider that Buddha himself, after he had already seen Nirvana, still remains on earth until his body falls a prey to death; that Buddha appears, in the legends, to his disciples even after his death.—it seems to me that all these circumstances are hardly reconcilable with the orthodox metaphysical doctrine of Nirvana.

“What does it mean when Buddha calls reflection the path of immortality, and thoughtlessness the path of death? Buddhaghosha, a learned man of the fifth century, here explains immortality by Nirvana, and that this also was Buddha’s thought is clearly established by a passage following immediately after:

'These wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong powers, attain to Nirvana, the highest happiness.' Can this be annihilation? and would such expressions have been used by the founder of this new religion, if what he called immortality had, in his own idea, been annihilation?

"I could quote many more such passages did I not fear to tire you. Nirvana occurs even in the purely moral sense of quietness and absence of passion. 'When a man can bear everything without uttering a sound,' says Buddha, 'he has attained Nirvana.' Quiet long-suffering he calls the highest Nirvana; he who has conquered passion and hatred is said to enter into Nirvana.

"In other passages, Nirvana is described as the result of just knowledge. There we read: 'Hunger or desire is the worst ailment, the body the greatest of all evils; where this is properly known, there is Nirvana, the greatest happiness.'

"When it is said in one passage that Rest (Santi) is the highest bliss, it is said in another that Nirvana is the highest bliss.

"Buddha says: 'The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place (Nirvana), where, if they have gone, they will suffer no more.

"Nirvana is called the quiet place, the immortal place, even simply that which is immortal; and the expression occurs, that the wise dived into this immortal. As, according to Buddha, everything that was made, everything that was put together, passes away again and resolves itself into its component parts, he calls in contradistinction that which is not made, i.e. the uncreated and eternal, Nirvana. He says: 'When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.' Whence it appears that even for him a certain something exists which is not made, which is eternal and imperishable.

"On considering such sayings, to which many more might be added, one recognizes in them a conception of Nirvana altogether irreconcilable with the Nihilism of the third part of the Buddhist Canon. The question in such matters is not a more or less, but an *aut-aut*. If these sayings have maintained themselves in spite of their contradiction to orthodox metaphysics, the only explanation, in my opinion, is, that they were too firmly fixed in the tradition which went back to Buddha and his disciples. What Bishop Bigandet and others represent as the popular view of the Nirvana, in contradistinction to that of the Buddhist divines, was, if I am not mistaken, the conception of Buddha and his disciples. It represented the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself, and a freedom from the circle of existences from birth to death, and from death to a new birth. This is still the meaning which educated people attach to it, whilst to the minds of the larger masses Nirvana suggests rather the idea of a Mohammedan paradise or of blissful Elysian fields."

Hamlet's Insanity. By Horatio R. Bigelow, M.D., of Boston, Mass. Reprinted from the "Chicago Medical Journal" for September, 1873.

Dr. Maudsley defines insanity to be

"a morbid derangement, generally chronic, of the supreme cerebral centres—the gray matter of the cerebral convolutions, or the intellectorium commune, giving rise to perverted freedom, defective or erroneous ideation, and discordant conduct, conjointly or separately; and more or less incapacitating the individual for his due social relations."

The question how a character in a work of fiction could be pronounced

insane in accordance with this definition, might be supposed difficult to answer for the reason that the fictitious character lives not in a brain of his own, but in that of the poet or his reader. Dr. Bigelow remarks in the course of a brief discussion and analysis of the play :

“Then he is informed by the ghost of the manner in which his father had died. This was the only stimulus needed to create that disruption of the ideational centres in respect to their anastomoses for which they had already been paved, and which resulted in that melancholic condition which ceased only with death. Is it not easy of comprehension how an overwrought mind, congenitally unreliable, could be turned aside from a normal condition by a series of such life-long shocks? Notice too the manner in which such information is given! The ghost, first seen by Horatio and others, then by Hamlet, what was it but an ideal creation—a hallucination arising out of the overstrained cell in which had festered the dominant idea of the recently buried king; the residual force of the impression which had been formed during the life of the king, and which, acted on powerfully by the emotions, thus spent itself externally?”

Die Philosophie des Bewusstseins, in Bezug auf das Böse und das Uebel. von Dr. M. Franz Bicking. Von Dr. Franz Hoffmann. Leipzig: Oswald Mutze.

This is a review of a posthumous work of Dr. Bicking, written by Dr. Hoffmann of Halle for the “*Spiritische-rationalisch Zeitschrift*” and printed separately. He first makes an exposition of the work and then criticises it.

“The author seems to have taken his way through Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel. The absolute substance is for him the Knowing activity which determines itself as Willing and Capacity, and thus becomes Self-consciousness. The original self-consciousness is the absolute personality which embraces the efficient and final causes of all, and constitutes its freedom and necessity. The unconditioned consciousness is truly known through this alone, that it creates the world and thereby exhibits its entire nature in itself. Hence the immanent God is transcendental. The world is necessary and eternal. Development presupposes something already complete. Development is a becoming and its presupposition is something eternal. The struggle of the internal for its external manifestation is the struggle toward manifoldness. The manifold in juxtaposition is space; in succession, time. Space and time are the most general ideas for what exists; their content is matter, the abstract unity of the two, &c. &c.”

“Since the author makes the unconditioned Being that lies at the bottom of all appearance to be original consciousness, absolute personality, one could have hoped that he would have avoided semi-panteism as well as full panteism. But he has fallen into the former, since according to him the unconditioned consciousness attains to true consciousness in its objectivity and person only in the act of procession from its all-embracing Essence, and in the creation of externality enters itself into true actuality. Were God truly conscious of Himself only through His creation of the world, then He would not be self-sufficing without the world, not perfect apart from it, but only with it, through it, and in it. But since God’s perfection cannot be something reached through evolution in time, but must transcend time, the creation of the world must be an eternal act, and the world in its totality be co-eternal with God and one and the same in Essence. But were the world co-eternal with God, one in Essence with Him and perfect in Him, His own actualized perfection, then it could no more fall out of this perfection than God could fall out of His own perfection. Whoever assumes the possibility of the lapse of a world the same in essence as God, must suppose at

the same time the lapse of God Himself as possible; or, more definitely, the lapse of His self-actualizing, of His immanent Position, from the unity, from the centre of God."

It seems somewhat strange that the attribution of self-consciousness to the Absolute should not be considered "semi-pantheistic" by Dr. Hoffmann, since the act of self-consciousness is the act of objectifying one's self, and hence the act of externalizing one's self—the act of sundering the unity of self into antitheses and thus of making the one finite or imperfect. This act of self-knowing in the Absolute is viewed as the eternal creation of the world by Hegel, whom Dr. Hoffmann charges with absurdity in his criticism. Let one consider only two points: what the effect of cognition which sunders into subject and object would have upon the idea of the Absolute, and remember that this idea is inseparable from that of consciousness. Secondly, let him inquire whether such objectivity as would adhere to the object of the divine thought would not be sufficiently objective for all phases of temporal existence that we are acquainted with. We apprehend that it will not be called Pantheism justly when its (the world's) every phase (positive and negative) is seen to be posited through the divine Will.

The Grammar of Painting and Engraving. Translated from the French of Blanc's *Grammaire des arts et du dessin*, by Kate Newell Doggett. With the Original Illustrations. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1874.

The French have a most happy faculty for popular exposition. Matters above the ordinary comprehension may be translated by a Frenchman in such a way as to prove very entertaining. In this elegant translation we have the technics of Painting and Engraving made so intelligible and interesting that the common reader who has never heard of these things may approach them without tedium or perplexity. This is the best of all books for the general reader who desires to know the standards and rules of criticism of works of Art in this sphere.

The principles of composition and the devices invented by the genial artists to portray their subjects, the drawing, the attitude, the gesture, the laws of complementary colors, the principles of chiaroscuro, the correspondence of moral expression to light and color,—all these things are discussed comprehensively and clearly. Certain conventionalities of Painting vary, and must vary, according to the character of the work and the nature of the surface the artist has to cover. Thus there are the special fields of Painting to be discussed: fresco painting, wax painting, painting in distemper, ceilings and cupolas, oil painting, pastel painting, enamel painting, &c. &c., all of which are characterized and distinguished in a happy manner. Then the different kinds of painting belong to the lower or higher method according as imitation or style plays in them the principal rôle, and here he distinguishes the painting of landscapes, animals, battles and hunting scenes, and portraits.

Under the head of Engraving there comes quite naturally the consideration of the proper manner of transferring the effects of the colors of the painting to the simple light and shade of the engraving.

Engraving on copper, aquafortis engraving, mezzotint, aquatint, wood engraving, and engraving in cameo, are successively discussed, and a chapter on Lithography completes the subject. The remarks scattered throughout the volume on the celebrated works of Art by Rembrandt, Albert Dürer, Holbein, Raphael, Claude Lorraine, Michael Angelo, and others, are very suggestive, especially where they are illustrated by engravings, of which there are about fifty in the book.

Studies in Poetry and Philosophy. By J. C. Shairp, Principal of the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews, author of "Culture and Religion." New York: Hurd & Houghton.

The four essays included in this volume are: I. Wordsworth; II. Coleridge; III. Keble; IV. The Moral Motive Power. The essay on Coleridge is perhaps the most valuable, as offering a coherent account of the growth and development of that influential thinker. It traces him through his career as follower of Hartley; then as student of the mystics, Tauler, Boehme, George Fox, William Law; next as disciple of Kant, whom he adopted substantially as his master for the rest of his life. Mr. Shairp omits allusion to Schelling's influence upon Coleridge, which was certainly quite considerable.

A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. By George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. With Prolegomena, and with Annotations, select, translated, and original. By Charles P. Krauth, D.D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, and Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874.

This work is one of a series of "Philosophical Classics" projected by the publishers, and its excellence will cause philosophical students to look with interest for subsequent volumes of the series. The most important portion of the book is the critical apparatus accompanying the treatise of Berkeley and occupying upwards of 300 out of the 400 pages of the entire work. In the Prolegomena Dr. Krauth treats exhaustively of the precursors of Berkeley and of his opponents and of the nature of Idealism, then also of the followers of Berkeley and of the chief philosophers who have represented Idealism. He treats Hume as the "skeptical idealist," Kant as the "critical idealist," Fichte as the "subjective idealist," Schelling as the "objective," Hegel as the "absolute," and Schopenhauer as the "theoretical" idealist. Professor Fraser's Preface is inserted and the Annotations of Ueberweg. Under the head of "Summaries of Berkeley's System," Dr. Krauth has industriously collected the opinions on Berkeley given by Reid, Kant, Platner, Hillebrand, Tennemann, Hegel, Krug, Rothenflue, Nichol, Brockhaus, Schwiegler, Fraser, Scholten, Ueberweg, and Vogel. He traces its influence upon Jonathan Edwards, Ferrier, Grote, Mansel, Mill, and others. He gives the objections urged against the system by Samuel Clarke, Andrew Baxter, Reid, Voltaire, Diderot, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald Stewart, Buhle, Tennemann, Hegel, Erdmann, Thomas Brown, McCosh, and others.

In the same style we have "Estimates of Berkeley," compiled from numerous sources, followed by definitions of idealism collected in the same way. The original expositions of the several systems by Dr. Krauth are of permanent value, especially that of Schopenhauer. To the classification of different species of idealism as skeptical, subjective, objective, absolute, theoretical, &c. &c., we note that "theological" is applied to the idealism of Berkeley and "problematical" to that of Descartes. Perhaps that of Jacobi should be called "sentimental." The classification by means of descriptive adjectives is, however, rather cheap, and conducive to superficiality in philosophy. It leads to a conceited manner of dealing with great thinkers on the part of young men. With a good supply of labels obtained from his professor at college, the youth sallies forth, and finds it far more convenient to label the thinkers of the world than to master their systems by patient thought. Having mastered Cousin's distinctions of idealism, materialism, skepticism, and mysticism, the student found it his chief business to classify philosophers like minerals in a cabinet, and, being an eclectic, he believed in no one of them.

The work of Dr. Krauth is a credit to American scholarship and philosophic study.

Supplement to the Calculus of Operations. By John Paterson, A.M. Read before the Albany Institute, Nov. 3, 1874.

The author gives in this pamphlet his theory of the origin of motion, sound, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, and lastly life itself, both vegetable and animal, from one single principle—emanation or repulsion.

Cavour et l'Église libre dans l'État libre. Par A. Vera. Professeur de Philosophie à l'Université de Naples, Ancien Professeur de Philosophie à l'Université de France. Édition française, avec un préface et des notes. Paris: Germer Baillière. 1874.

In an extended preface (88 pages) Professor Vera considers the criticism of Treitschke upon his book. This preface, and the notes scattered throughout the volume, have been added since the Italian edition in 1871 (announced in this journal in January, 1872). He combats the idea of an utter separation of Church and State in the sense that the State should have nothing to do with Religion. He would not endorse the first amendment of the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." He quotes Professor Taylor Lewis of Union College, who says in a letter on the unity of Italy: "The day of church and state is gone * * * but an absolute divorce between the state and religion, that is another and very different matter. It is an experiment yet to be tried. * * * There may be a state without a bishop, without a priesthood, without a church; but there cannot be a State without a God—a God acknowledged. The opposite idea is not simply anti-religious; it is anti-social, anti-national, suicidal. To express it all in a single, most significant term, it is utterly and hopelessly disorganizing. There is danger in both directions, and that, too, not merely of moral disorder, but as directly threatening our cherished idea of American nationality."

Professor Vera remarks on this statement quoted: "What is the thought uppermost in these words—a thought expressed, indeed, in a vague, indefinite, and even contradictory fashion, but nevertheless a just thought and one which gives to these words sense and importance? It is this, that the doctrine of separation is a doctrine which disorganizes society. And, in fact, it does disorganize society, because it breaks the unity of Spirit. The writer says that a state may exist even without bishops or church, but that it cannot exist as an atheistical state, or, using his words, 'without God, and without an acknowledged God.' It is a contradiction, or rather an *inconsequence*, and one of those inconsequences into which one falls when he does not consider truth in its concrete and systematic nature. A religion without a church is, as I have shown, an abstraction—a religious atomism. Now, what is meant by a God recognized and 'acknowledged by the state'? It is evidently a religion recognized and acknowledged by the state." He continues to comment on Professor Lewis's position, and his fear that the state is menaced by Catholicism, and points out that this danger is supposed to come precisely from the separation of the state and church, as Cavour recommended, and as actually exists in America. He thinks that the Catholic Church, in its ability to use the separation of church and state to its own advantage, proves its sagacity, or even more—its greatness and its truth. "Its truth consists in the fact that Catholicism does not recognize the separation of church and state, nor liberty in the separation, and accordingly that it does not admit the subordination of the church to the state."

In subsequent chapters Professor Vera discusses: true and false conciliation; liberty; inseparability of force, right, and liberty; can there be a religion without a church? can one reduce religious instruction to moral, and discard the mystical portion? the idea of religion and of the state, and their mutual re-

lation; the reasons for their conflict; Catholicism and Protestantism; relation of philosophy to religion; doctrine of the Trinity according to the church, and the idea of philosophy. He makes out Protestantism to be an advance on Catholicism, notwithstanding he defends the unity of church and state.

Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner. Von A. Taubert. Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag. 1873.

Mr. Taubert considers in this book — (a) The value of life and its true estimate; (b) Private property and labor; (c) Love; (d) Sympathy; (e) Natural happiness; (f) Happiness as æsthetic view of the world; (g) Happiness as virtue; (h) Happiness in view of the next world; (i) Happiness as historic perspective of the future; Pessimism and Life. He finally concludes with a critique of Ludwig Weis's three volumes published under the title of *Anti-Materialism*.

The Philosophy of Spiritualism, and the Pathology and Treatment of Mediomania. Two Lectures. By Frederic R. Marvin, M.D., Professor of Psychological Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence in the New York Free Medical College for Women. Read before the New York Liberal Club, March 20 and 27, 1874. New York: Asa K. Butts & Co. 1874. Price \$1 cloth and 60 cts. paper.

Dr. Marvin is firmly convinced that all spiritual phenomena, not conscious legerdemain, are produced by physically diseased organisms, which can be abated by a dose of assafoetida and spirits of ammonia. He is disposed to explain even the nightly trances of St. Theresa and St. Catharine de Siene by physical derangement. "Buddha, Confucius and Mahommed could never have founded their immortal religions in England or America, for we are too cold-blooded and slow in our development and too thoughtful in our culture to seize very suddenly the revelations of the heart." "The religious and sexual instincts are very closely united — so closely united as to be inseparable." Dr. Marvin explains soul to be the liberation of force at nervous centres. "The utilization of force by the brain is thought — this utilization is the function of that part of the brain which we call the cerebrum." "Away from our little brains into the forever of space float waves of motion. Ceasing to be waves of nervous motion, they reach the air and become waves of atmospheric motion. The thought you think may vibrate the other side of the universe in the trembling of a flower or the majestic sweep of a planet." "The soul, like the body, is neither fixed nor changeless. You have not the same soul you had yesterday. No, nor the same soul with which you entered this room. Forces are using you and you are using them — reaching your brain, they serve its purpose and are your soul." "The soul is immortal in its own nature, and in history, and in the race." Such immortality — which is identical with the correlation of forces, a quantitative but no qualitative identity — is not very desirable or consoling to the individual. To know that his thoughts are forces impinging upon his brain *ab extra*, and that, "having served its purpose they cease to exist as thoughts, change their form and go on other missions," is to know that he is only a transient phase in a vast correlated activity which is no conscious individuality as a whole. His consciousness once quenched will never kindle again, although its elements, scattered through the universe, may enter the transient manifestations of other conscious beings.

With such results in the name of Science, no wonder that there is great activity of Magic — or the immediateness of Spirit — in our age, in the form of "spiritualism." The materialistic denial of the soul is correlated with the materialistic manifestation of it.

A Lecture on the Protestant Faith. By Dwight H. Olmstead. New York. 1874. The writer takes ground against ecclesiastical authority.

My Visit to the Sun; or Critical Essays on Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics. By Lawrence S. Benson, author of "Benson's Geometry." Vol. I. Physics. New York: James S. Burnton. 1874.

Our philosopher seems to have visited the Sun to hear the "man of the Sun" echo the new mathematical discovery of his Geometry, to wit: that the area of the circle is exactly equal to three-fourths of the circumscribed square. Such a voyage would seem necessary on account of the difficulty in finding any "man of the Earth" who could echo the doctrine.

Philosophic Reviews. Darwin Answered; or Evolution a Myth—Geometrical Dissertation—Notes on Definitions. By Lawrence S. Benson, &c. &c. New York: James S. Burnton. 1875.

"Synopsis of the following argument: I. Herbert Spencer, by ignoring all system or order in Nature, self-inflicts a fatal blow to his 'philosophy of evolution.' II. Charles Darwin, to prove a gradual evolution among organisms, uses the *petitio principii* reasoning," &c. &c. Mr. Benson apparently attacks Spencer and Darwin in order to attract attention to his Geometry, from which he boasts that he has excluded the *reductio ad absurdum* and substituted the "Direct Method." What this "Direct Method" may be we learn by reading his chapter "On the Circle." It seems that he concludes by Analogy that because "Archimedes discovered, by revolving surfaces around an axis, that the cone, sphere, and cylinder are to one another as 1, 2, 3; and the same procedure gives the proportion between the solidities and surfaces of the sphere and cylinder as 2 to 3," &c. &c., "we have consequently an agreement with them of the area for the circle, obtained by revolution;—for instance, the area of the circle being proved by this method equivalent to three-fourths of the square of its diameter, we get the proportion of 1, 2, 3, 4, for the cone, sphere, cylinder, and cube, thus agreeing with Archimedes' proportion." Thus it seems that we thrust out "Indirect Method" from Geometry in order to admit proof by Analogy. It is clear that Mr. Benson, in making the area of the circle equal to $3R^2$ by analogy, finds that the *reductio ad absurdum* must be ignored, for he comes straightway upon the result that the circle is equal to its inscribed hexagon, which would be absurd—unless he had been already careful to exclude the sense of absurdity from his geometrical tests.

Strauss as a Philosophical Thinker. A Review of his book, "The Old and the New Faith," and a Confutation of its Materialistic Views. By Hermann Ulrici. Translated, with an Introduction, by Charles P. Krauth, D.D., Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1874.

In the Introduction Dr. Krauth discusses the materialism of our day, and gives some account of the recent discussions and the appearance of Strauss's book. He quotes copiously from Strauss's reviewers, giving some excellent paragraphs from Fichte, Philippson, Hausrath, Dove, Frenzel, Froschammer, Moritz Carrière, Rauwenhoff, Huber, Lang, Spörri, and others. As in his work on the Prolegomena to Berkeley, Dr. Krauth has collected for us in a small space the opinions of the great authorities on the subject, then on the author's treatment of it, and finally on Ulrici's criticism of it. Thus we have the various phases of reflection upon the theme. Ulrici's criticism, to use the words of Nippold, "cuts with an almost unsurpassable acuteness."

"Science," says Dr. Krauth, "moves ever toward the proof how supernatural is the natural; religion moves toward the proof how natural is the supernatural." The fact that Strauss was habituated to the use of the philosophical technique of Hegel rendered it impossible for him to write a consistent system of

materialism, or to entirely break with the "old Faith" as embodied in institutions and "ideal strivings." This fact gives Ulrici his opportunity, and he makes good use of it to show everywhere in the work implications and acknowledgments of ideas which are entirely incompatible with the coarse materialism expressed in the same connections.

Memories: A Story of German Love. Translated from the German, by George P. Upton. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co. 1875.

In this tastefully printed volume we have a unique piece of romance and mysticism such as only Germany can produce. Simple and naïve as the innocence of childhood, and at the same time tinged with subtle psychological insights like the writings of Tauler and Meister Eckhart, the work seems to have been composed by one who had learned Jean Paul by heart in youth, and later had taken up Wordsworth and Carlyle, and who now for years had found consolation in Thomas-à-Kempis and that serene soul, the author of *Theologia Germanica*. It has a faint suggestion of Auerbach's "On the Heights," but perhaps this is not owing so much to the Spinozan Repose of the latter as its use of the little poem of Goethe, *Ueber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh*, for its overture. The Chicago translator has succeeded remarkably in his rendering of this poem:

"On every mountain-height
Is rest,
O'er each summit white
Thou feelest
Scarcely a breath;
The bird-songs are still from each bough,
Only wait, soon shalt thou
Rest, too, in death."

Here is Longfellow's more literal version, which we prefer:

"O'er all the hill-tops
Is quiet now,
In all the tree-tops
Hearest thou
Hardly a breath;
The birds are asleep in the trees;
Wait: soon like these
Thou too shalt rest."

The translator, Mr. Upton, has judiciously called in the aid of specialists to enable him to reproduce the above poem and the extracts from the *Theologia Germanica*. Speaking of the unknown author of the latter work, the principal character in the book says:

"For a suffering and dying life like mine, much consolation and strength may be derived from his book. I thank him much, for it disclosed to me for the first time the true secret of Christian doctrine in all its simplicity. I felt that I was free to believe or disbelieve the old teacher, whoever he may have been, for his doctrines had no external constraint upon me; at last it seized upon me with such power that it seemed to me I knew for the first time what revelation was. It is precisely this fact that bars so many out from true Christianity, namely: that its doctrines confront us as revelation before revelation takes place in ourselves. This has often given me much anxiety; not that I had ever doubted the truth and divinity of our religion, but I felt I had no right to a belief which others had given me, and that what I had learned and received when a child, without comprehending, did not belong to me. One can believe for us as little as one can live and die for us."

Tinnitus Aurium, or Noises in the Ears. By Lawrence Turnbull, M.D. Reprinted from the Philadelphia Medical Times for June, 1874.