The scientific and technological revolution which started in the mid-20th century has proved to be a serious test not only for many scientific theories, but also for a number of philosophical ideas, concepts and even major trends. It affected, first and foremost, those philosophical schools which were, or claimed to be, connected with natural science. The global nature of many scientific problems, the high level of theoretical abstractions, the wide scope of generalisations and the deep differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge enhanced by the scientific and technological revolution have increased the progressive scientists' concern about the ethical aspects and humanistic orientation of research and sharpened their sense of social responsibility for the destinies of mankind. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress has intensified their natural interest in the latest achievements of philosophical thought and emphasised the 7 need for a genuinely scientific philosophical theory that would make it possible to comprehend concrete scientific problems in a broad theoretical, methodological and social context and provide a key to the most crucial issues of our time.
It is not fortuitous, therefore, that of all the major philosophical trends and schools those related more or less closely to science and representing it in some form or other were the first to weather the storm. And no wonder that positivism and dialectical materialism, the two teachings that have always professed their adherence to science, recognised its great mission and expressed their readiness to serve its lofty ideals turned out, as it were, to be the two poles of attraction for increasingly theory-minded natural scientists.
Which of the two philosophical schools will be able to pass through the crucible of time and provide reliable guidance for creative thought in the epoch of scientific and technological revolution? The author of this book undertakes to answer this crucial question and to substantiate the answer to the extent a task of such dimensions is accomplishable within the scope of a single monograph.
Many Soviet and foreign philosophers believe that contemporary positivism, despite its professed adherence to scientific thinking, is undergoing a deep ideological crisis because of an obvious and ever growing rift between its methodological programme and the tasks, tendencies and principles of modern science. The nature of this crisis sharpened by the scientific and technological revolution deserves special attention, the more so as there is a glaring contradiction 8 between the actual results of the evolution of positivism and its professed goals, between its pretentious claims and the real contribution to scientific progress.
Speaking of positivism and its crisis, we shall mainly concentrate on the third stage of this philosophy known as logical positivism and often referred to as logical empiricism or analytical philosophy, and make occasional digressions to the previous stages in order to trace certain current concepts to their sources.
Positivism as a philosophical trend is known to derive from radical empiricism which is one of the pillars of this teaching in all its forms. According to the programme of logical positivism elaborated by the Vienna circle science begins; with the observation of similarities and differences between phenomena, i.e. with the observation of -single facts. Established facts provide a basis for initial empirical generalisations which, after an additional study of separate phenomena and events, are transformed into broader generalisations. Universality of statements can only be attained at a theoretical level and such universal truths are regarded as empirical laws constituting the basis and the core of all theoretical knowledge. The development of science thus consists in the progressive expansion of empirical generalisations, and inductive conclusion turns out to be the main instrument of such development. Expressing the concept of empiricism in a concise logical form, Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of logical positivism, wrote: ``...~science begins with direct observations of single facts. Nothing else is observable. Certainly a regularity is not directly observable. It is only when many 9 observations are compared with one another that regularities are = discovered.''^^1^^
The rapid development of fundamental research in the 20th century has clearly shown the untenability of logical positivism based on radical empiricism. As a matter of fact, the entire history of modern science, starting from the development of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity and ending with cybernetics, is a repudiation of the tenet of empiricism. It is not accidental that most contemporary philosophers of science reject the reduction of theoretical knowledge to empirical knowledge. They believe that knowledge does not begin with observations and sensual experience, since observation is always preceded or attended by theoretical concepts. Yet this general premise is still a long way from regular criticism of empiricism as the core of positivist philosophy, as well as from a comprehensive theory of scientific knowledge and its consistent substantiation. The actual relationship and unity of the empirical and the theoretical in scientific cognition, their concrete interaction in the history and logic of science, the passage from lower to higher levels call for a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, the development of the entire Western philosophy of science in the 1960s and 1970s is keynoted by a revision of the programme of radical empiricism found to be untenable both methodologically and theoretically. And this is a very grave symptom of an ideological crisis of this philosophy.
_-_-_^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers New York, 1966, p.~6.
10Another sign of the predicament of the philosophy of science which follows in the wake of positivist traditions is a drastic change in its attitude towards ``metaphysics''. The struggle against ``metaphysics'' and the attempts to oust it from science and philosophy have had both positive and negative aspects. The positive effect of the campaign against metaphysics which was a characteristic feature of early positivism consisted in its opposition to the traditional speculative, particularly religious and idealistic, philosophy which showed little interest in concrete problems of scientific cognition and practical life. On the other hand, positivists rejected as ``metaphysical'' practically all most general and, in essence, traditional problems of philosophy as unrelated to science. These included the problems of objectivity, necessity, causality, essence, etc. Such problems, according to positivists, went beyond the limits of experience, did not accord with the basic tenets and criteria of empiricism and were therefore declared speculative, senseless, non-scientific, etc.
Unlike most pre-positivist critics of the so-called metaphysics who were not opposed to a philosophical theory dealing with traditional problems in one or another form, positivism rejects ``metaphysics'' in principle both as a method and a specific field of knowledge and declares all its problems to be irrational by nature. The negative attitude towards traditional philosophy is regarded by positivists themselves as a characteristic feature of their concept and as one of its fundamental principles. ``If one wishes to characterize every view which denies the possibility of metaphysics as positivistic,'' wrote Schlick, ``this is 11 quite unobjectionable, as a mere definition, and I should in this sense call myself a strict positivist.''^^1^^
In order to overcome ``metaphysics'', logical positivism advanced an extensive programme providing for a logical restructuring of the whole edifice of science in order to standardise the language of science, clear up its logical structure, identify the basic elements of knowledge and reduce all the other concepts and propositions of science to these elements. These tasks, according to the exponents of the new theory, were to be accomplished through the agency of mathematical logic. At this stage the so-called philosophy of science posed as the logic of science, claiming to give the anatomy of science with the help of mathematical logic.
Yet all attempts by positivism to become a pure methodology were doomed to failure. In substantiating the platform of the philosophy of science positivism could not but proceed from a set of definite philosophical principles, i.e. from a new ``metaphysics'' of science. This ``metaphysics'' with its idealistic and anti-democratic premises gave a distorted picture of the world in. which the existence of the object was made conditional on its sensual perception by the subject, the reality was construed as an aggregate of elementary facts, etc.
One of the symptoms of the current crisis of positivism consists in that the exponents of the philosophy of science have renounced yet another tenet of their teaching and are turning their _-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, ``Positivism and Realism'', in: Logical Positivism, Ed. by A.~J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, p.~83.
12 eyes to what they call metaphysics. Proposals are even made to start developing a new metaphysics on a more or less regular basis. The concept of metaphysics, however, is extremely broad and sometimes reflects a stable interest in the problems of materialism and dialectics. The attempts to solve such problems, though far from being consistent, testify to a search for a new methodological basis and a new system of values.Hebert Feigl, for instance, defends the scientific status of such ``metaphysical'' problems as the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Mario Bunge believes that the main task of the new ``metaphysics'' is the construction of scientific ontology. Marx Wartofsky writes that ``metaphysics represents the most general method of articulating, in critical and systematic form, the alternative conceptual frameworks within which theoretical understanding becomes possible. The heuristic force of metaphysics lies in its closeness to our primary modes of understanding and explaining (by means of the story, the re-enactment of nature in dramatic = form).''^^1^^ Recognising the methodological (and even the heuristic) role of metaphysics, Wartofsky, however, fails to give a clear idea of its content. Despite the obvious tendency towards a more realistic approach to the structure of scientific knowledge, to general philosophical principles and categories and to their role in the development of science, it is already clear that the philosophy of science remains and will evidently _-_-_
^^1^^ M.~Wartofsky, ``Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science'', in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~III, Dordrecht, 1967, p.~123.
13 remain loyal to some basic traditions laid down by the classics of positivism, focusing on the problems of the logic of scientific cognition, the language of science and special problems of the methodology of science, natural science in the first place. Deviating from some dogmas of positivism, it does not relinquish its claim to the title of the ``philosophy of science'', thus determining the sphere of its interest. In our subsequent discourse we shall use this name too, inasmuch as it is associated with Western, particularly Anglo-American philosophy.It will also be in place here to define our attitude to the term ``metaphysics'' which will be frequently used in the subsequent text. Though it has acquired a positive sense in anti-positivist literature, being almost synonymous to general philosophical problems, we shall abstain from equating these notions and use the term strictly in the sense it has in the context of the philosophical doctrines under consideration---negative in positivist philosophy, positive in the concepts of ``scientific realism'', etc. Each of these doctrines will be treated separately and the reader will have no difficulty in identifying the context in which the term is used thus making the inverted commas unnecessary. As regards the methodological problems discussed in the book, we shall call them all philosophical, distinguishing each time between their specific types, such as theoretical, philosophical-methodological, ontological, epistemological, logical and others.
In the already extensive critical literature on positivism the most controversial problems appear to be those connected with the relationship between theory and sensory experience, the 14 attitude to metaphysics, and the objectivity of knowledge. The concepts of causality and determinism, by contrast, have been relegated to a secondary plan and are usually discussed as separate issues independent of other basic problems, though the most prominent exponents of positivism have always, at all the stages of its evolution, focused their attention on causality, the nature of scientific laws and scientific explanation. There is no doubt that their views on these problems should be critically reappraised.
Besides, the problems of causality and determinism are obviously linked with a number of general epistemological and methodological issues and influenced by radical empiricism, reductionism, induction logic, etc. One or another solution of these general issues---and such solutions, despite the downright rejection or dodging of metaphysics, could never be avoided---has had a direct bearing on the concepts of causality and scientific law. Conversely, any interpretation of the concepts of causality and determinism could not but affect the general conclusions of the theory of knowledge and the positivist methodology of science.
Similarly, the negative attitude towards ``metaphysics'' has predetermined the rejection of causality and determinism as pseudo-problems. In turn, the positivist interpretation of causality was partly accountable for the negative attitude of positivism in general and logical positivism in particular to general philosophical (metaphysical) problems.
In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1958, Friedrich Waismann, one of the pillars of positivism, referred to 1927 as the year of the funeral 15 of = causality^^1^^. Explaining the title of his lecture ``The Decline and Fall of Causality'', Waismann contended that the collapse of the principle of causality was not unexpected as it had been prepared by a long period of its general recognition. According to Waismann, this recognition dated back to the 18th century, i.e. to the Laplatian concept of determinism which inspired scientists with a hope that the location of all possible systems in space and time, as well as their physical state could be accurately predicted given the knowledge of their initial state. Laplace, in Waismann's opinion, became the exponent of the principle of causal determinism which had prevailed for more than a century and a half as an ideal of scientific explanation. For all the power of human intellect, however, such an ideal was unattainable even in the realm of classical mechanics which was greatly indebted to Laplace. It was called in question as soon as scientists found it impossible to measure physical values with ideal accuracy implicit in the Laplatian doctrine. The concept of causality was bound to collapse as was the Laplatian ideal of scientific knowledge. According to Waismann, causality was dealt a final blow in 1927 by Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty as it dismissed completely the possibility of any prediction of events on the subatom level.
Western philosophers were not slow to attack Waismann's views, yet even in the 1960s most of his opponents stood but for a limited _-_-_
^^1^^ See A.~C. Crombie, Turning Points in Physics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1960, pp. 84--154.
16 rehabilitation of the principle of causality. Of late, the criticism of positivist views regarding causality and determinism has become. sharper, broader and more elaborate. The opposing concepts, inconsistent as they are, tend to restore causality to some of its methodological and theoretical rights. Nevertheless, it is still hard to say which path the philosophy of science will follow in treating these issues.There is no doubt that logical positivism can be credited with posing a number of interesting scientific problems. No less obvious is the contribution made by its outstanding representatives to the development of the logic of scientific cognition, the investigation of some specific problems of the language of science, etc. There is no denying the fact that this school has helped science to get rid of fruitless speculations and dogmatism. We do not focus on the deserts of logical positivism deliberately since our interest lies not so much in positivism per~se as in the lessons that could be learned from the analysis of its weaknesses, limitations and errors.
The sharp criticism of the positivist methodology is not the only obvious symptom of its current crisis. Using Thomas Kuhn's terminology and his approach to the analysis of crisis situations in sciences, one should attach special significance to the emergence, within the framework of the contemporary philosophy of science, of a multitude of rival concepts which go far beyond a critical revision of certain aspects of the positivist methodology of science and lay claim to a new methodological paradigm. In point of fact, they strive to develop a more or less complete methodological alternative to positivism and __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2-1152 17 work out a philosophical programme defying positivism on all or nearly all key issues.
Such alternative programmes are represented by ``critical rationalism'' (Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend), ``scientific (or critical) realism'' (Wilfrid Sellars, J. Smart, Mario Bunge), ``historical trend'' (Tomas Kuhn, Joseph Agassi, Stephen Toulmin) and other, perhaps less influential, schools of the contemporary philosophy of science in the West.
Which course will the philosophy of science follow, what new theory, if any, is likely to emerge as a result of the present crisis? To answer these crucial questions one ought to find out, first and foremost, the real relationship between the above-mentioned schools and positivist philosophy, i.e. the depth of division between them, the existing traditional and conceptual links, the ability of these schools to solve the topical methodological and theoretical problems of contemporary science and the adequacy of the proposed solutions from the viewpoint of scientific and technical progress.
The crisis of positivism has been brought about not only by the internal contradictions of its platform, but also by the inadequacy of its understanding of the real nature of scientific investigation, of the laws and history of scientific knowledge. We shall not concentrate therefore on the issues that preoccupied positivism at different stages of its evolution, but give our main attention to the most general, fundamental problems connected with the world outlook and methodology which are in the focus of attention of scientists, philosophers and practical workers at the present time. What we mean is the 18 relationship between philosophy and natural science, the nature of scientific knowledge, the objective content of notions and theories, i.e. their relation to the ``outside'' world, the role of the subject in the construction of scientific theories, the reliability and verifiability of scientific concepts, the role of the principles of causality and determinism in research, etc.
The fact that throughout its entire history positivism has either been ignoring some of these problems altogether or trying to dismiss them as irrelevant to scientific investigation is, in fact, of little consequence. Willy-nilly, all masterminds of positivism, starting with Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer and ending with Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Ayer, were compelled to come to grips with them. What is more, it is these fundamental problems and not the specifically positivist issues such as the logical structure of statements, the meaning of reduction, the structure of explanation, etc. that proved to be the main battlefield where the fate of positivism as a philosophical teaching was decided.
It should be noted that the above problems will be considered in this book not as separate subjects divorced from one another and from other problems, but in their logical connection with other problems and always in the context of the methodology of scientific knowledge. For instance, the solution of the problem of the source of knowledge predetermines, to a certain extent, the solution of the problem of causality or the relationship of the philosophy to science. Conversely, the solution of the problem of causality will influence the specific form of the analysis of epistemological problems. Hence, we shall __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 try to deal not with some random distinctions and features of this or that school or some peculiarities in the interpretation of a problem by different thinkers, but with a more or less connected system of their basic principles. We shall focus, therefore, either on the essential common features in the philosophical concepts of different representatives of one and the same school or, on the contrary, on the basic differences in the views of the adherents of different schools. Understandably, some specific features of different philosophical trends and some peculiarities in the views of their representatives will be, of necessity, left out of account.
The controversy over the fundamental problems of philosophical methodology is highly instructive as it highlights their contemporary significance. Thus, the attitude to science on the part of the exponents of positivism is a logical consequence of their absolutisation of the empirical methods of cognition, whereas the attitude to science of ``critical rationalists'' stems from their interpretation of the verification problems. ``Scientific realism'' as a philosophical trend regards science as practically the only source of material for philosophical analysis and for any concepts of the world. The conflict of opinions reveals weaknesses in each of the above philosophical teachings, shows how they distort the actual process of cognition and exposes their prognostication errors.
The present-day significance of the problem of causality, too, becomes more apparent if we, on the one hand, find out the reason for the negative attitude to it on the part of the positivists and, on the other hand, show its revival in ``critical 20 rationalism'' as expounded by Popper who displays special interest in the forms of theoretical explanation and in the deductive models of the process of cognition. Highly instructive is also the collision between the concept of causality rehabilitated and revised by ``scientific realism'' in the spirit of materialism and the logical concept characteristic of the positivist approach inasmuch as this collision highlights the specific demands of contemporary science on the means of a theoretical causal explanation and prognostication and reveals the very essence of the principle of causality.
It would be impossible to define the prospects of the methodology of scientific cognition without considering the confrontation between positivism and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The history of ``critical rationalism'', ``scientific realism'' and other new trends in the philosophy of science runs into several decades at most, whereas the ideological struggle between Marxism and positivism dates from the mid-19th century and is in fact as old as Marxist philosophy itself. Important as they are, the old-time philosophical battles will not command our attention, since our chief interest lies, as has already been indicated, in a comparative analysis of the dialectical-materialist methodology and = post-positivism^^1^^.
As regards the problems which will be considered in the light of dialectical materialism, the author has not set himself the task of expounding in a systematic form the commonly known _-_-_
^^1^^ We shall sometimes use this term to denote all modern schools of the philosophy of science merely to save space, without implying that they form a single homogeneous whole.
21 Marxist concepts or the views of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on these issues. Proceeding from the basic principles of their solution known from Marxist literature the author has attempted to reveal their topical aspects and new forms of interpretation and solution in accordance with the latest scientific data and new philosophical tasks posed by the scientific and technological revolution. The book, therefore, does not pretend to an exposition of any set of truths, but rather underscores the need for a further investigation of the problems of interest from the methodological positions which the author believes to be the most fruitful and promising. It is the author's conviction that the mutual understanding of philosophers investigating the methodology of scientific cognition is more and more becoming a reality. [22] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER ONE __ALPHA_LVL1__ BETWEEN SCIENCEThere is hardly any trend or school in Western philosophy that could compare with positivism in the depth and durability of its influence on society, particularly on intellectuals. Since the first half of the 19th century positivism has suffered many ups and downs and the interest in this teaching has alternately risen and subsided. Its founders have had the greatest of triumphs a thinker can dream of and sunk to the depths of the bitterest humiliation and derision that may fall to the lot of an unlucky philosopher. The powerful grip of positivist philosophy on intellectuals' minds and the periodic tides of its universal popularity can only be accounted for by its sincere devotion to, even worship of, science.
However biting today's remarks about the destiny of positivism as a philosophical trend, one can hardly question the sincerity of its intentions to enter into a firm and durable alliance with science. Born in the atmosphere of universal ecstasies over the successes of the natural sciences, positivism has preserved till nowadays its 23 romantic faith in the power of experimental investigation, its appeal for realism in cognition and genuine interest in the scientific analysis of everyday experience and language. In the light of contemporary science and philosophy which have gone far ahead in the understanding of the laws of scientific cognition and the effectiveness of the interaction of natural and social sciences a number of its concepts appear now to be naive and sometimes even ill-matched, the more so as positivism, like any other philosophical trend, assumed different forms in the works of its exponents: John S. Mill earnestly strove for accurate applied knowledge without realising the fatal narrowness of his concept of such knowledge restricted within the bounds of the bourgeois world outlook and system of values; Bertrand Russell hoped to find strict logical rules for solving philosophical problems, including those in the sphere of ethics; Rudolf Carnap made persistent attempts to resolve the growing contradictions inherited from the previous forms of positivism.
In positivism, like in many other philosophical schools, one should always distinguish between the ideas of the classics and their followers. The former, representing progressive tendencies in science, can usually be identified, first and foremost, by their profound devotion to the goddess of philosophy and, alas, by sometimes no less profound delusions. Unlike the wholehearted founders of positivism, their numerous mediocre imitators lack the necessary critical spirit of trailblazers in science and, instead of exploiting the success of their forerunners and rising to a higher level, fall to aggravating their shortcomings and debasing their fruitful ideas.
24For all the delusions of the founders of positivism we cannot but pay tribute to the noble endeavours of such outstanding scholars of their time, scientists in the proper sense of the word as Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein who did everything possible to bring closer together science and philosophy even at the expense of their personal self-disparagement. Indeed, there is something unnatural about a professional philosopher contending for self-destruction of philosophy, its abrogation and dissolution in ``positive'' scientific knowledge. People usually regard this either as cunning, or as reprehensible folly, and are apt to overlook the possibility of the scientist's utter selflessness in the service of his goddess which goes hand in hand with modesty and complete indifference to scientific degrees, honorary academic titles, priority and material benefits. Such selflessness may induce a true scientist of outstanding erudition and talent to be content with the role of a humble clerk in attendance on an endless flow of scientific papers the meaning of which will always remain unknown to him. His devotion to science may even cause him to assume voluntarily the function of a cleaner of scientific Augean stables and become, so to speak, a scientific scavenger.
In the 1830s, when German classical philosophy with its pledges to explain nature by itself, to penetrate the very core of the universe and establish eternal control over its mechanism seemed to be at the summit of glory, the challenge of young positivism and its promise to rid science of quackery, whoever the genius behind it, came as a gust of fresh wind and deserved 25 every respect and recognition. Positivism was indeed a tree planted for the benefit of science and intended to promote its greatness and glory--- however bitter the fruit that was eventually born by it.
The rapid development of experimental science in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the natural attraction held out to scientists by the empirical methods of research gave rise to an illusion that all problems of natural science and social development could be solved exclusively by empirical means and that the techniques used in the natural sciences should be broadly applied to social research. Practicism and utilitarianism characteristic of the way of life in the developing capitalist countries of Western Europe---Britain, France, later Germany and still later the USA--- gradually became a standard of scientific thinking. Referring to this feature in early positivism in the first half of the 19th century one of its founders, Herbert Spencer, said that the wish to possess a ``practical science'' which could serve the needs of life was so strong that the interest in scientific investigation not directly applicable to practical activities seemed ridiculous. Enthusiasm over the new methods of scientific investigation, naturally, went side by side with growing scepticism towards the knowledge which did not conform to everyday experience, could not be obtained within the framework of the empirical approach or had no direct practical application.
Nevertheless, the ideology of positivism contributed to some extent to the development of natural science, particularly experimental investigations, and helped science to free itself from 26 the fetters of the religious world outlook and various speculative doctrines and artificial, not infrequently mystic, concepts and theories. Positivism as an embodiment of this tendency has served as a good purgative. In the 1830s, while still in its cradle, positivism came out with a demand to oust idealistic philosophers from science and subjected idealism and religion to sharp criticism regarding them both a product of the mythological stage in the development of human spirit. According to the positivists, metaphysics had very much in common with theology and differed from it in form only. Both of them represented different systems of world outlook and, as such, were outside the limits of scientific knowledge. Auguste Comte, another founder of positivism, repeatedly stressed the affinity and, in some important aspects, even the identity of the theological and metaphysical methods of thinking. In his opinion, the basic distinction of metaphysical concepts consisted in regarding phenomena as being independent of their carriers, and in attributing independent existence to the properties of each substance. He considered it immaterial whether these personified abstractions were later turned into souls or fluids. They came from one and the same source and were the inevitable result of the method of studying the nature of things which was characteristic in every respect of the infancy of human mind. This method, according to Comte, inspired originally the idea of gods which were transformed later into souls and finally into imaginary fluids.
Comte rejects metaphysics, i.e. everything that goes outside the limits of science (religion, mysticism, idealism, materialism, dialectics, etc.) 27 and proclaims the ideal of positive knowledge and, accordingly, a new philosophy. Yet metaphysics, according to Comte, is not entirely identical with religious thinking. Moreover, it prepares mankind for a transition to scientific thinking. A metaphysical thought is, so to speak, an intermediary between the theological and the scientific ways of thinking and performs simultaneously a critical function in relation to science. Owing to imagination which prevails in metaphysical thinking over observation, the thought becomes broader and is prepared unostentatiously for truly scientific work. According to Comte, another contribution of metaphysics to the emergence of positive science consisted in that it performed the vitally important function of theory until the mind was able to develop it on the basis of observations.
Philosophy in its traditional guise is identical with metaphysics. Its existence can only be justified as long as science is unable to solve certain general problems. Hence, philosophy is only destined to pave the way for science and ceases to exist as soon as science takes over. It is only within this brief lifespan, measured off by history, that philosophy contributes to the emergence of science. Its cognitive value is limited to the preliminary formulation of problems. The social task of philosophy consists in attracting the attention of the broad masses, even amateurs in different fields, to these problems, but their solution should be the concern of the positive sciences and narrow specialists.
Despite the long evolution of positivist philosophy, this understanding of science and of the relationship of science to metaphysics was shared 28 by all exponents of positivism. The problem of demarcation between science and metaphysics, in some periods just implied, in others posed sharply and uncompromisingly, was one of the key issues in the programme of positivism at all its stages and even the main driving force of its development.
In the 1920s, logical positivism, starting from the investigations of the Vienna Circle, continued its struggle against ``metaphysics'' from the positions of empiricism, though less radical than that of Auguste Comte, John S. Mill, Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. According to the principle of verification first defined by Moritz Schlick^^1^^ and further generalised by Ludwig Wittgenstein,^^2^^ the truth of every scientific statement must be ascertained by comparing it directly with the evidence of the senses.
In a later version Alfred Ayer described this principle as follows: ``The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express---that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is _-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Springer, Berlin, 1925.
^^2^^ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1949, p. 77.
29 consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it = does.''^^1^^Hence, empirical verification was assigned a function which went far beyond its possibilities--- to appraise the truth-value of all statements without exception. As compared with the previous forms of positivism, the new element here (actually borrowed from Kant) was the division of all statements into two types: analytical and synthetic. Analytical statements were regarded as tautological or identical, similar to those often used in mathematics and mathematical logic. Synthetic statements were regarded as object judgements characteristic of empirical, factual sciences and claimed to be the only statements which carried any new information.
Regarding the first two types of statements as being of some scientific significance, logical positivism not only denies all other statements any scientific value, but considers them simply _-_-_
^^1^^ A.~J. Ayer ``The Elimination of Metaphysics'', in: Philosophy Matters, Ed. by A.~J. Lisska, Charles E. Merril Publishing Comp., Columbia, Toronto, London, Sydney, 1977, p.~236.
30 senseless. If one or another statement does not lend itself to direct verification, it must at least be reducible by logical means, as a theoretical, nonanalytical statement, to a corresponding basic or protocol statement which can be confirmed by direct observation. Statements which are neither analytical nor synthetic are meaningless and subject to elimination from the language of science as metaphysical.The narrowness of the verification criterion induced the positivists to make repeated attempts at its modification. The watered-down (for instance, Ayer's) version of this criterion admits of both full and partial verification of statements, i.e. of their partial confirmation by empirical data. A theory was needed, however, which being itself in agreement with this criterion, would define more accurately the notion of confirmation, on the one hand, and correspond to the general programme of positivism (construction of the logical language of science) and to the traditions of empiricism, on the other hand.
A most significant attempt to develop such a theory was Carnap's inductive logic expounded by him in Logical Foundations of = Probability^^1^^ and in The Continuum of Inductive = Methods,^^2^^ and then, in an enlarged and elaborated form, in A Basic System of Inductive = Logic.^^3^^ A characteristic feature of both versions of his system _-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago, 1951.
^^2^^ Rudolf Carnap, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago, 1952.
^^3^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``A Basic System of Inductive Logic'', in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Ed. by R.~Carnap and R.~Jeffrey, Berkeley, 1971.
31 consisted, first and foremost, in that the logical probability of the meaningfulness of universal generalisations was recognised to equal zero and that there existed a theoretically neutral language of observations. Out of the three phases of inductive inference---the selection of the language, the selection of the statements of this language and the assessment of the degree of confirmation of a given statement by other statements---Carnap focused on none other than the appraisal of the probability of statements relative to the results of the observation (empirical data).As we see, in Carnap's inductive logic the traditional problem of induction undergoes a considerable transformation. The main task of an inductive conclusion is regarded to be the formulation of a probabilistic prognostication of a particular event rather than of a universal assertion. Induction for Carnap is practically any non-deductive conclusion and, primarily, a metalinguistic statement establishing, on the basis of experimental data, a definite degree of confirmability of a hypothesis. Consequently, Carnap expands the volume of the traditional concept of induction, on the one hand, and, on the other, eliminates the problem of confirmation of universal assertions, i.e. laws, from its content.
According to Carnap, universal laws appear to be senseless from the viewpoint of the verification principle and inconfirmable in inductive logic. In point of fact, universal statements are useless: no one, in Carnap's opinion, will make a stand for the universality of this or that theory in any part of the universe. All a scientist or a practical worker may want is a hope that the next test 32 will confirm his hypothesis. The logical evolution of Carnap's views brought him later to an admission that a shift in emphasis from confirmation to decision-making in the analysis of inductive logic's problems would provide even a more radical method of ousting universal laws as the last remnants of metaphysics in science. Such a shift would indeed free science from universal laws replacing them with specific hypotheses. Finally, in the Foreword to the 2nd~edition of Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), Carnap altogether avoids mentioning the ``degree of confirmability'' in connection with the assessment of inductive probability and prefers to speak of the significance of inductive logic for the theory of solutions only (and not for the theory of confirmation). This looks like the end of the last hope to construct the methodology of science on a strictly logical foundation.
The failure to solve this problem cannot but tell on the prospects of the programme of empiricism, since it affects the two most important and interconnected premises of positivist philosophy. A question is bound to arise: are the principles of Carnap's inductive logic purported to be helpful in the solution of the main task of logical empiricism compatible with the principles of empiricism itself?
It has already been pointed out that Carnap's inductive logic was focused on the evaluation of the degree of confirmation of hypotheses. It proceeded from the assumption that the statements concerning such confirmations by empirical data were the result of metalinguistic analysis and, as such, analytical statements. Carnap emphasised that his inductive logic excluded any __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-1152 33 a priori synthetic principles and not only remained loyal to empiricism but even in some respects corrected its shortcomings, thereby strengthening its positions.
The principle of induction, as formulated by Carnap, was based on the assumption that the experimental data testified to a very high degree of probability of the world's uniformity. Since the probability in the formulation of this principle was logical by nature, the statement as such was analytically true. Its truth was not necessarily conditioned by the truth of the principle of induction---it was sufficient to know that this principle was probable. The contradiction inherent in this proposition consisted in that the principle of induction itself was assigned a role of the foundation of logic and, consequently, its analytical truth value could not be deduced from the very same logic, but was to be established within the framework of a more general logical system.
All attempts made before Carnap to develop the logic of inductive conclusion pivoted, as it were, on the principle of the uniformity of nature which lay at the root of the principle of induction. Yet this latter principle is ontological rather than logical and cannot be obtained through inductive generalisation. According to Kant, it could have been classified with good reason as an a priori synthetic generalisation. Carnap, as we see, could not avoid this ill-fated dilemma either and had to make his choice between an a priori synthetic generalisation and an ontological statement (in the spirit of materialism). A detective story writer skilled at stock phrases could have summed up the situation in these words: 34 ``The fateful shadow of metaphysics has again crossed his path.''
It was not fortuitous that Carnap, seeking later to provide a rational substantiation for induction, pointed out that the axioms of inductive logic could only rest on a priori statements and argued that inductive logic as such could be constructed in a formal way. Yet inductive probability could only be justified in the context of the theory of solutions where the concept of probability is linked with utility and rational action.^^1^^ The search for a non-inductive foundation of inductive logic as a form of scientific cognition brought Carnap in the end to the understanding of probability as a reasonable degree of faith. As a result, the theory of induction turned out to be built on the sand of intuitive and subjective propositions. Each of the paths tried by Carnap in his attempts to substantiate induction on the basis of empiricism led him beyond its limits right into the arms of metaphysics.
It is noteworthy that logical positivism seeks to reinforce empiricism in its drive against metaphysics by a logical analysis of the structure of knowledge. For all the internal contradictions of Carnap's version of logical positivism, it turned out to be the most successful of all, as it revealed one of the main trends in the development of positivism and displayed a characteristic feature of its understanding of the subject-matter of philosophy. Significantly, both the adherents and opponents of Carnap's theory often call it ``logical empiricism''. The search for new ways in _-_-_
^^1^^ See Rudolf Carnap, ``Inductive Logic arid Rational Decisions'', in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, op. cit., pp. 5--31.
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 the struggle against metaphysics was by no means accidental. Already in the 19th century the development of theoretical sciences revealed the narrowness and inadequacy of the empiricist programme for the revision and restructuring of science which had been advanced by early positivism. It became clear even in that period that the programme of struggle against metaphysics ran counter to the interests of science and hampered the development of theoretical investigation. The theory of the atomic structure of matter, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity provided ample proof that empiricism as a philosophical and methodological programme was useless and even detrimental to scientific progress.The rapid development of logico-mathematical studies in that period seemed to indicate an attractive and promising way out of the difficult situation---to treat a theory as an aggregate of logically interconnected facts. That anti-metaphysical line was started by Russell and then developed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into an elaborate theory followed by their successors.
Russell did not yet shun many traditional philosophical problems which he hoped to solve through the agency of strict rules of mathematical logic. His failure on this path caused Wittgenstein to take a more uncompromising position ---not only to divorce science from metaphysics, but also to throw the latter overboard as senseless mysticism. The centuries-old controversy over certain philosophical problems pertaining to the world outlook was viewed by him either as a result of violation of the elementary 36 rules of logic, or as a linguistic confusion. Alfred J. Ayer, one of the contemporary followers of these ideas, keeping his allegiance to more or less orthodox logical positivism writes: ``We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are = nonsensical.''^^1^^ According to Ayer, the typical examples of metaphysical assertions are those underlying the problems of the reality of experience, the unity of the world, the nature of ``true reality'' as distinct from sensory experience, etc.
Richard von Mises who regarded his own position relative to traditional philosophy as the most conciliatory among the neo-positivists, was also of the opinion that metaphysics constituted the sphere of pre-scientific propositions and was not entirely devoid of future as people would always ask questions extending beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Even in new fields of research, while the adequate scientific language was still nonexistent and the main linguistic rules and logical forms were not yet known, new questions going beyond the familiar ground were bound to be at first non-scientific, i.e. metaphysical. To become truly scientific, new concepts must get a footing in their field, merge with the formal systems adopted earlier and _-_-_
^^1^^ A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1978, p.~56.
37 develop full ability to communicate, so to speak, with other fields of scientific knowledge.Clearly, this contraposition of scientific and non-scientific or metaphysical knowledge is rooted in a peculiar understanding of the ideal of scientific knowledge. This ideal, according to positivism, is represented by empirical science with its principle of empirical verification of any assertion. To become scientific, a proposition must pass through the purgatory of sense-perceptions which alone are capable of providing direct, really verifiable and really objective knowledge.
Metaphysics as a specific set of traditional philosophical problems derives, according to positivism, from the recognition of some unique reality which does not lend itself to scientific cognition and can only be apprehended with the help of the metaphysical, speculative faculties of the mind. ``A more ambitious conception of metaphysics is one that places it in competition with the natural sciences,'' says Ayer. ``The suggestion is that the sciences deal only with appearances: the metaphysician penetrates to the underlying = reality.''^^1^^ All positivists irrespective of the school to which they belong hold that traditional philosophy postulates the existence of some transcendental reality which is different from and independent of the sensual world, but which determines its main features.
The pretension to know something beyond possible experience presupposes the existence of an extraempirical source of knowledge. The only method whereby metaphysical philosophers obtain _-_-_
^^1^^ A. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, London, 1973, p.~4.
38 their truths can be the method of a priori speculative reflection. For instance, Russell considered that one of the essential features of the classical tradition in philosophy consisted in a conviction that a priori reflection alone was capable of penetrating the mysteries of the universe. Nothing but an a priori method was capable of proving that reality was different from what appeared to direct observation. Emphasising that the a priori principle was the essence of traditional philosophy, Mises wrote: ``As soon as one speaks of reaching beyond experience and of the disclosure of the true core, one appeals to the existence of extraempirical sources of knowledge. In spite of all their many differences, such theories as Husserl's `Wesensschau' and Plato's `doctrine of ideas', Spinoza's `knowledge through apprehending insight', Kant's `a priori' and Schopenhauer's transempirical metaphysics, ... are things of a similar = kind.''^^1^^ This stand, despite certain modifications in different forms of positivist philosophy has not changed till nowadays. There is nothing, asserts Ayer, that cannot be expressed in the language of observations, and everything beyond these limits is of a mystic nature. In point of fact, however, along with mystic entities Ayer throws overboard everything that cannot be perceived by senses.According to positivism, the unscientific character of metaphysics springs from its worldview function or, more precisely, from its social orientation and claim to disclose the essence of the world, as well as from the fact that its _-_-_
^^1^^ Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 277.
39 propositions are based on convictions. On these grounds metaphysics is regarded as a false projection of subjective human qualities and emotions on knowledge and on the world in general. The possibility of a scientific world outlook is dismissed altogether, since scientific theories, according to positivism, cannot give answers to questions pertaining to world views.The positivists maintain that metaphysics meets man's psychological need for understanding the world as a whole and his place in the world, and is called to life by the fateful questions as to the meaning of human life, moral responsibility, and human values. Yet science is unable to tackle these questions as they cannot be answered on the grounds of empirico-mathematical investigation which is regarded by positivism as the only form of scientific knowledge. These questions, according to the positivists, will always remain the objects of unscientific methods of comprehension. Man is entitled to use any means to express his world views, including the least suitable one, i.e. metaphysics, but in that case he should not claim it to be what it is not and will never become---a science, a system of knowledge. Carnap regards metaphysics not as actual knowledge, but rather as poetry giving but an illusion of knowledge.
The world-view character of philosophy is considered by positivism as the main cause of its incompatibility with science. Justly underlining the inseparable ties between the world view, on the one hand, and ideology and politics, on the other, the positivists come to the conclusion that no problems relating to nature, society and cognition can fee solved by 40 philosophy (metaphysics) on a scientific basis for the simple reason that these problems are treated in the broad context of the world outlook and their solution depends, in the final analysis, on the views and ideological stand of the philosopher. ``The desire to arrive at practically useful answers (predictions) in the most difficult and most general questions of life,'' says Mises, ``leads to the construction of systems of metaphysical propositions.''^^1^^
Ambitious and noble were the aspirations of positivism which set out to free philosophy from the fetters of religious and idealistic dogmas. The 20th century seemed to have been destined to become the age of triumph of positivist philosophy. Indeed, it has started with fundamental scientific discoveries and its closing decades are marked by a profound revolution in the entire system of scientific knowledge, technology and social relations which are being successfully restructured on truly rational and scientific principles. Ironically, however, this century has also borne witness to the decline and fall of the philosophy that has made science its fetish.
Dramatic as it may be, the situation is not likely to rouse our emotions unless we perceive a human drama behind the ideological vicissitudes. In point of fact, the reverses of fortune in the realm of ideas are never divorced from the destinies of human beings and usually entail a drama of a whole galaxy of outstanding personalities, who believed in the viability of the principles they had advanced and did everything possible to defend and elaborate them. One can _-_-_
^^1^^ Richard von Mises, op. cit., p. 370.
41 hardly blame any one of them personally for the long and, alas, futile wanderings in the labyrinths of methodology. If only it were a matter of personal fallacies, mankind would have long ago found a way to avoid them.Yet the bitterest irony consisted, perhaps, in that positivism, whose credo was service to science, failed to find a common language with its master for any appreciable length of time. True, there were periods when positivism was in vogue. Its shares went up at the turn of the 20th century with the discoveries of the complex structure of the atom and of the electromagnetic field. Hopes also soared in the 1920s which were marked by the successful development of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. Another spell of good luck came with the intensive investigations into the problems of linguistics and psychology in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, the last boom was connected with the rapid development of cybernetics and genetics, neurophysiology and psycho physiology.
The philosophy of science has been favourably commented upon and can even boast of the homage paid to it by Henri Poincare, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Jacques Monod. Yet it is also known that the heights of their mutual sympathies invariably coincided with the periods of abrupt breakdown of old fundamental theories rather than with constructive periods in the history of science. Once a crisis in science comes to an end and the gulfs are bridged, the philosophy of science in its logico-empirical version would inevitably reveal its inability to offer a positive programme for scientific, technological or social 42 progress. Each new upswing of theoretical thought was a sure sign of approaching depression in positivist philosophy. Yesterday's followers and adherents of positivism would promptly turn away from the ``friends of science'' and the short-lived mutual understanding would give place to even a more profound and lasting mutual distrust than before. These tides remind one of something like intermittent fever in Western science, and the blame for it can hardly be put on any particular individual. The disease must evidently be traced to a source other than the human qualities of each separate thinker---be he great or mediocre, honest or hypocritical, egoistic or unselfish. It proved to be contagious for altruist Einstein and misanthrope Heisenberg, great Bohr and mediocre Paul = Volkmann^^1^^. The true cause of the illness lies not in the merits or demerits of individuals, outstanding or at least interesting as they are, but in the conditions of contemporary society.
The role of social conditions in the emergence and development of positivism is a separate subject that lies outside the scope of this work. Here I shall confine myself to discussing the general laws and tendencies of scientific cognition which provide, as it were, an epistemological background of the developing ideological drama. Paradoxical as it may seem, this drama is contained in embryo in the basic tenet of positivism determining its attitude to science. It is precisely the glorification of science and the disparagement of philosophy that did positivism an ill turn accounting for the scepticism and even for the _-_-_
^^1^^ Paul Volkmann (1856--1938) was a professor of theoretical physics in Konigsberg and wrote several philosophical works.
43 downright denial of the value of scientific cognition that are characteristic of positivist works. How did the extremes meet? To answer this question, let us turn once again to the positive platform of the philosophy of science.Rejecting traditional philosophy as unscientific and metaphysical and using many other disparaging epithets to belittle its role, positivism has never denied the need for philosophy in general. On the contrary, the exponents of positivism have underscored the significance of a new, scientific philosophy which was called a ``philosophy of science'' and given it many other no less pretentious titles. What was the real meaning of their contentions?
Philosophy as a theory of the most general and essential laws of being was eliminated by Comte in favour of some universal system of scientific knowledge. All scientific knowledge, according to Comte, can only be obtained by special sciences through observation, experiment, description and generalisation with the help of broadly used mathematical means. There can be no specifically philosophic understanding of nature different from that ensured by the natural sciences. Whatever the particular distinctions in the understanding of the subject matter of positivist philosophy revealed by different representatives of the ``first'' form of positivism, there is every reason to assert that their views are in the main identical: new philosophy has in fact nothing in common with old metaphysics and does not basically differ from other ``positive'' sciences: both the positive sciences and scientific philosophy are absolutely neutral in the metaphysical sense, i.e. in relation to materialism and idealism. The 44 main object of a philosophical investigation is science, its concepts and method. The methods of ``philosophical'' investigations .are also borrowed directly from science. In short, science is its own philosophy. It is these ideas, developed and elaborated during the evolution of positivism that underlie its understanding of the subject matter of philosophy.
Just like the rapid development of special sciences and the strengthening of their experimental base in the 18th century gave the early positivists occasion to contend that scientific investigation should substitute for philosophic cognition of the world, so the development of biology and psychological sciences was in the late 19th century interpreted by Machism as the elimination of metaphysics from the studies of man's cognitive activities in favour of a scientific theory of knowledge. This idea was clearly expressed by Mach's follower and commentator V. V. Lesevich, one of the first Russian positivists: ``What will remain of philosophy after the theory of knowledge, too, gains the status of a separate and independent science?'' he asks and proceeds as follows: ``When psychology, thanks to its successes, rose to a truly scientific level, no fragment was left of the old all-embracing and undivided science, philosophy, which could be said to possess the property of universal and comprehensive knowledge: its place was taken up by a number of separate independent sciences, and philosophy in the old sense of the word = disappeared.''^^1^^
The achievements of biology and psychology _-_-_
^^1^^ V. V. Lesevich, Collected Works, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1915, pp. 7--8 (in Russian).
45 in the study of man, his psychical and cognitive activity were interpreted by the ``second'' form of positivism as the emergence of a scientific theory of knowledge opposing traditional epistemology as unscientific metaphysics. Machism, like classical positivism, made the concepts and methods of special sciences the object of philosophy which, consequently, was to be metascientific by nature. According to Mach, a philosopher differs from a natural scientist in that the former has to deal with a broader range of facts. Justly stressing the need for a broad approach to philosophical matters, Mach maintains, in full agreement with the positivist principles, that it is achieved not through the generalisation of the process of cognition in philosophical categories and its interpretation on the basis of a definite world view and methodology, but with the help of some new specialised science which would study knowledge with the use of special scientific means of investigation. Such means, according to Mach, could best be borrowed from biology and psychology, since it was precisely these disciplines that studied man as the subject of cognition and could provide a reliable basis for the understanding of his cognitive activity.The most explicit presentation of the positivist concept of the relationship between science and philosophy can be found in the works of Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein and other members of the Vienna Circle which is usually associated with the emergence of logical positivism. The representatives of the new trend fully agreed with their predecessors in that scientific philosophy was an immanent product of the development of science, that philosophy should give up 46 metaphysical problems if it was to be promoted to a rank of science and that it should get both its object of inquiry and its method from science itself. According to neopositivists, the only reason why philosophy had been unable to become scientific for a long period consisted in the insufficient development of science itself which could not provide the necessary means for philosophy to fulfil its metascientific functions. The emergence of ``scientific'' philosophy at the present stage of the evolution of science was a result of the development of mathematical logic which devised the technical means for the analysis of science. The initial methodological models developed within the framework of positivism were in fact nothing but the application of the ready-made body of mathematical logic borrowed from Principia Matematica by Russell and Whitehead to the logical development of some hypothetical system of ``ideal scientific knowledge''.
Logical positivism was a full-scale realisation of the analytical tendency in the understanding of ``scientific'' philosophy. Yet unlike Mill and Mach, who initiated this tendency, logical positivism did not regard philosophy as a theory dealing with the principles of the classification of sciences, the system of laws common to all sciences and with cognition as such (interpreted in terms of either inductive logic or the psychology of cognition), but as an instrument for the analysis of science. This approach reduced philosophy to a scientific system of actions, a kind of analytical activity. Wittgenstein's thesis that ``philosophy is not a theory but an = activity''^^1^^ _-_-_
^^1^^ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., p. 77.
47 became the banner of an influential trend in analytical philosophy. ``The great contemporary turning point,'' wrote Schlick, ``is characterised by the fact that we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions, but a system of = acts.''^^1^^ The attempts of the earlier positivists to construct scientific philosophy as a theory are regarded by neopositivists as a relapse of old metaphysics.In view of the growing proportion of highly specific logico-methodological problems in scientific investigations, logical positivism demanded that methodology should be completely independent of philosophy and that a new ``pure'' methodology, free from any presuppositions should be developed that would banish philosophical epistemology together with other philosophical worldview elements from genuine science. According to the logical positivists, the ``reflection upon scientific knowledge'', hitherto the domain of philosophy, turns into a special field of concrete scientific investigation. In this respect the only distinction of logical positivism from other forms of positivist philosophy consists in that it turns into an absolute the logico-methodological analysis of knowledge instead of empirical science in general and psychology and biology in particular. Logical positivism regards the use of accurate logico-methodological means in the investigation of the structure of scientific knowledge as a ``scientific'' method of the formulation and solution of philosophical problems. The emphasis on logic as an instrument of philosophical research is the keynote of the latest stage in the realization of the _-_-_
^^1^^ M. Schlick, ``The Turning Point in Philosophy'', in: Logical Positivism, Ed. by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, p. 56.
48 principal aim of positivist philosophy, viz. discarding traditional philosophical problems and substituting formal-logical and linguistic methods of analysis for the philosophical approach to science.It should be noted that positivism denouncing the so-called extrascientific metaphysics is in effect carrying out a programme based on entirely ``extrascientific'' principles. It is wrong to take for granted the assertions of the positivists that their philosophy is free from metaphysics as the premises of positivism, unlike those of other forms of philosophy, are allegedly self-evident. Positivism is shy of declaring and exposing to analysis the postulates underlying the entire system of its arguments.
The metaphysical content of the philosophy of science is admitted retrospectively by the positivists themselves. It has become a peculiar tradition with the positivist philosophers to accuse their predecessors of metaphysicism, inconsistency in the struggle with metaphysics, various concessions to metaphysics and deviations from the principle of ``neutrality'' in philosophy. Spencer reproached Comte for concessions to metaphysics, the Machists are advancing similar charges against both of them. As regards the neo-positivists, they are laying claims to a final break with metaphysics which allegedly has never been banished completely from the writings of all positivist philosophers. Defending the concept of phenomenalistic analysis, Gustav Bergman reproaches physicalists for their inclination to metaphysics, which term, as it transpires, he applies to some of their materialistic statements. Even within logical positivism itself the palm of the __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-1152 49 most consistent fighter against metaphysics is claimed now by one, now by another of its representatives.
It will be shown later that despite all attempts of positivism to discard such problems as the relation of man to being, consciousness to matter, interdependence of space, time and movement, causality, the nature of contradictions, etc. it is in fact unable to ignore them altogether and has to tackle them in one way or another, often in a disguised form. Moreover, the more persistent the attempts of each new generation of positivist philosophers to dismiss the above problems as metaphysical and nonsensical, the more obvious their importance for science and philosophy. All positivist theories invariably started from some sort of denunciation---be it the denunciation of metaphysics, idealism, dualism or materialism. Yet all their criticism designed to clear the way for the new ``scientific'' methodology always contains in a hidden form some positive, assertory elements.
The metaphysics of positivism is all the more dangerous as it is concealed behind loud phrases about the need to fight it and rid science of the cobweb of the past. The oversimplified idea of scientific knowledge and the disregard of its hierarchical multilayer structure, as well as the primitive understanding of the nature of the scientific reflection of the world that leaves no room for the throbbing thought proved detrimental to positivism even in its self-evaluation and prevented it from understanding the hidden purpose of its own dogmas. Not only did positivism fail to uncover its social face and state its social aims, it proved unable even to define its 50 place in the general process of cognition. The hidden part of the positivist programme, its basic general postulates covered up by loud and pretentious declarations have never been brought to light for open examination. Yet for the purpose of this analysis it is advisable that acquaintance be made of these ghosts of metaphysics kept from the public eye in the backyard.
A curious paradox with the positivist philosophy, besides its unhappy relations with science, consists in that in its struggle against metaphysics (which happened to be now the speculations of German classical philosophy, now the philosophical principles of classical science, i.e. mechanistic materialism, now Freudism, now dialectical materialism which has synthesised the most valuable achievements of progressive philosophical thought), positivism at all the stages of its evolution has invariably found itself in a snare of metaphysical concepts, sometimes not a bit more elaborate than those of the 18th-century materialism or Hegel's idealistic dialectics.
Incidentally, the metaphysical fallacies of German classical philosophy and the Enlighteners' materialism have at least the justification that their speculativeness was partly a result of the immaturity of science and social relations ruling out the possibility of the profound, truly scientific understanding of the laws and tendencies of social development. But can there be any justification for positivism wallowing in metaphysics and idealism at our time when philosophy became a branch of science way back in the middle of the 19th century, when the problem of the relationship between philosophy and special __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 sciences has been successfully solved and they have developed their own powerful means of theoretical investigation?
If Minerva's night-flying owl had ventured to make its appearance in broad daylight, it would have inevitably struck against various obstacles and could have hardly become the ancient symbol of wisdom. Positivism, unlike the mythological bird, has appeared too late to win the scientists' faith for long and become the foundation of scientific knowledge. It has never, even in the days of its so-called triumphs, been able to overcome the somewhat ironic attitude of the scientists to most of its claims.
Positivism combines in itself the belated faith in empirical science which was the foundation of the industrial power of capitalism in the 18th century with the youthful illusions of its ideologists that the prosperity of capitalist society was inseparable from scientific progress. Yet it is already infected with early scepticism in the anticipation of its inevitable decline and does not believe either in science, industry or in human values. The metaphysical principles making the foundation of positivist philosophy are similar to those metaphysical doctrines which were characteristic- of both the 19th-century's idealistic philosophy and mechanistic materialism. How can they tally with the latest versions of positivism, with its refined ``logic of scientific discovery'', ``semantic philosophy'', pseudo-scientific terms such as ``explication'', ``denotation'', ``verification'' and the like?
The rejection by positivism of such traditional philosophical problems as the relationship of consciousness to being, spirit to nature is by no means 52 tantamount to the rejection of idealistic and materialistic metaphysics. Just like in the case of Machism which claimed to rise above the antithesis between materialism and idealism with the help of ``neutral world elements'', ``introjection'', ``the principal of coordination'', ``economy of thought'', it simply means that the only object of scientific investigation is, according to positivism, the scientists' sensory experience, which allegedly does not represent any metaphysical, transcendental reality. The true significance of the empirical theory of verification advanced by neo-positivism consisted in that its adherents, despite all their anti-metaphysical declarations, were forced in the end to revert to the traditional, essentially metaphysical, problem of philosophy ---that of the basic, ultimate elements of knowledge. Instead of the objective reality the title ``absolute'' was conferred on sensations. According to the positivists, man's activity proceeds not in real space and time, but within the narrow confines of logical formulae binding the sensory experience. Man is incapable of breaking out of the jail built by positivist philosophers.
The mystification of the relation of knowledge to reality is characteristic of all idealistic philosophy which regards the world as the materialisation of an ideal form, as logic incarnate represented in language. Carnap, like Berkeley, Hume and any other subjective idealist, puts the true relation of knowledge to objective reality upside down. He starts his analysis not from objective reality, but from the logical structure of the language as it exists today, i.e. the language which has already taken a definite shape and is no longer a living organism, In other words, the 53 accumulated factual material represented in the modern language is the eternal truth---not relative, inaccurate, approximate, but Her Majesty Reality personified. To be intelligible, reality must have the same parameters as the logical structure of language. Man cannot go beyond the facts arranged in accordance with the logical structure of language. Such transcendence would call for a truly mystic ability to adandon the sphere of language and intellect.
According to Ayer, for instance, the world is a ``logical structure'' made up of sensations, which, in his modernised parlance, are called ``sensuous content''. Since the ``sensuous content'' is inseparable from the forms in which it is expressed, we are unable to pass beyond the bounds of even our statements of sensations. Ayer does not deny the existence of material objects, yet such existence, in his opinion, cannot be proved with the same certainty as the existence of sensuous images.
In the positivist picture of the world, like in a frequently staged play, the action always follows one and the same pattern set by the producer: subject to change are only the actors, i.e. concrete facts. Not only do the present logical schemes substitute for real relations between objects which are infinitely richer, more complex and contradictory than their logical counterparts; no less important is the fact that such schemes turn out to be even more speculative than the natural-philosophical doctrines of the 18th century, except that they take into account some results of the scientific progress during the past two centuries. In other words, the artificial positivist schemes ignore the crucial fact that the 54 logical links and relations are by no means identical with the real ones.
Positivism sees its main task in binding together the ultimate elements of scientific knowledge rather than in searching for them. Nevertheless, such elements do have to be defined, if only vaguely. The more resolute the opposition of positivism to objective reality as something that stands behind the ``elements'' and is different from them, the more it turns these elements into the ``absolute source'' of knowledge. By the ultimate elements of knowledge logical positivism understands ``facts''. For all the ambiguity of this term which can denote both the fragments of objective reality and events registered by language, the so-called facts are turned into an absolute similar to Mach's ``neutral world elements'' or Berkeley's sensations. The certitude of these original sources of knowledge does not need any further confirmation---it is self-evident. All other structures of knowledge rest on this solid foundation given directly in experience.
Wittgenstein's selected propositions such as ``the world is all that has place'', ``the world is an aggregate of facts, but not things'', the ``atom fact is the connection of objects (things)'', ``objects make the substance of the world and therefore cannot be composite'', are in fact nothing but vaguely defined ontology not much different from that of Hume or Berkeley: it is the ontology of ``atom events'' given in sensations. The only difference consists, perhaps, in that in the ontology of the classics the atoms are connected by association, through the agency of mental links, whereas in logical positivism the connection must be purely logical.
55Positivism takes for granted Hume's doctrine that the laws of science do not moan anything but habitual concomitance of events (conjunction of facts) and sets itself the task of showing the soundness of this. It has also borrowed the empiricist concept of ``observation'' as a simple self-evident act which only calls for distinguishing the observation of objects from the observation of their properties. Observation is not only the initial, but also the final point of cognition, since the only method of the verification of knowledge is also observation.
Hence, it would not be correct to regard the positivist doctrine as free from any ontology. Recognising that observation represents something that exists independent of man and his consciousness, positivism projects outside the result of observation. The positivist philosopher's world appears to be made up of separate, unconnected objects united only by some kind of affinity which, incidentally, is taken for granted and requires no explanation. These logically independent and empirically indifferent facts are joined with one another solely through the relation of similarity, just as distinctions are the only form of their separation.
Consequently, each object can change without affecting the properties of other objects or can remain immutable despite the existing alternatives. This, however, is not the premise, but rather the conclusion following from the logical independence of statements of facts. In Ayer's doctrine all facts are particular or represent conjunctions of separate events so that any generalisation of such facts can only be purely formal. Causality has no other empirical basis than 56 permanent conjunction since, according to Ayer, there can be no obvious links between them. Hence, relations between facts can only be external. Even if one speaks of ``internal relations'', the phrase can only mean a combination of simple elements as component parts of larger objects. Ayer avers that even if the process of identifying an element in the system carries some reference to other elements, there will be no two elements of which it can be said that they are necessarily related, and this is as much as Hume's argument requires.
Hence, the obvious paradox consists in that positivism, despite its own declarations about the need to overcome metaphysics and free philosophy from myths and Utopias remains itself metaphysical and even a mythological system substituting speculative logical schemes both for objective reality and for the real processes of cognition.
Advocating a strictly scientific approach to knowledge and demanding the elimination of all a priori propositions from scientific analysis, ' the positivists proceed from a very definite system of values which were established way back in the ideological battles with scholastic metaphysics. We shall yet have not one opportunity to see that positivism, even in its latest forms, has not been averse to the classical tradition in philosophy and in science in general. On the contrary, it has proved its strong affinity, remote in time but not in spirit, for this tradition, attempting to reconcile Locke's and Hume's views, incompatible in many respects as they are.
The inherent metaphysics of positivist philosophy, incapable of critical self-analysis, combines in itself some characteristic features of 57 18th-century natural philosophy and mechanistic materialism manifesting themselves in the irresistible urge of positivism towards formal simplicity, rigidity and completeness of scientific knowledge, with the principles of Hume's and Berkeley's subjective-idealistic philosophy underlying the positivist absolutisation of empirical facts regarded as the only source of self-evident certitude and the true foundation of scientific knowledge. Indeed, beware of metaphysics!
The widely advertised neutrality of positivist philosophy is in fact nothing but a philosophical eclecticism leading inevitably to idealism, just as the proclaimed freedom from metaphysics is nothing but a smokescreen for more subtle metaphysics. Lucien Seve has justly observed that ``positivism is a typical form of the decline of metaphysics which has not yet managed to find its way to scientific = materialism''.^^1^^ It stands to reason that the inner contradictions of positivism inherent in its basic dogmas, let alone the contradictions between the premises and conclusions, could not but lead positivism from one crisis to another and stimulated its attempts to find a way out with the help of one or another stopgap theory. The philosophy of science was bound in the end to reject the positivist programme of struggle against metaphysics and give up attempts to discard all general problems pertaining to being, nature, society and thinking. It is not surprising, therefore, that the tendency towards the revival of ``metaphysics'' has at last prevailed in the philosophy of science itself.
_-_-_^^1^^ L. S\`eve, La philosophie française contemporaine, Editions sociales, Paris, 1962, p. 294.
58 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. METAPHYSICSOne of the radical attempts to solve the problem of the relationship between science and metaphysics on a non-positivist basis has been undertaken by Karl Popper, a prominent English philosopher, who proposed a doctrine of the structure and development of scientific knowledge and gave it the name of ``critical rationalism''. It is noteworthy that the main principles of his doctrine, alternative in a way to logical positivism, were developed by Popper within the walls of its citadel---the Vienna Circle. The ideas of Popper who had been a member of this circle from its very foundation foreshadowed, as it were, the inevitable crisis and disintegration of the new school long before it reached the peak of its glory when nothing seemed to betoken the impending end.
From the very beginning Popper was a severe critic of the new trend in the philosophy of science which was budding within the Vienna Circle among the philosophers and natural scientists interested in the logic and methodology of science. However, Popper was no alien in this circle, though there is an obvious tendency now to leave this fact out of account in considering his relation to logical positivism. Popper's alliance with the new school was by no means accidental even if we put aside his formal membership of the Vienna Circle. One could evidently speak of a certain difference of opinions concerning the means, yet the aim as such was undoubtedly common. This is true at least of the early period of Popper's activity when he advocated 59 the restructuring of scientific knowledge on the basis of an empiricist interpretation of its laws and categories and underscored the need for complete elimination of metaphysics from scientific studies. Hence, not only did he identify himself with the tasks set by logical positivism in that early period of his research, but he strove wholeheartedly to solve them in a most consistent and effective manner.
True, the way which Popper considered to be the most expedient and logically sound fell off the tracks chosen by most of the other adherents of the Vienna Circle. Giving him credit for scientific intuition one ought to note that he sensed the inherent weakness of the verification theory when it was still in the cradle and discerned the seeds of contradictions bound to undermine this theory when it was to start revealing its philosophical content, particularly when the principles proclaimed by the Vienna Circle were to be applied to the problems of real scientific cognition.
In his polemics with logical positivism Popper stressed, not without reason, that modern physical theories were too abstract, even speculative, to meet in any degree the criterion of verification. This criterion, according to which the truth of any theoretical statement must be confirmed by direct experience, could not provide reliable guidelines even for a most general appraisal of their scientific value. All attempts to reduce them to experimental data and to show that such statements, if only in the field of classical mechanics, were based on direct observation have proved to be futile. Even the basic laws making the backbone of a theory were too remote from what was called the empirical 60 foundation of science. On the other hand, the treatises devoted to dreams and spiritualistic seances appeared at first sight much closer to everyday experience than theoretical propositions and even seemed to use something like the induction method which held undivided sway in empiricist natural science.
Popper also noted the fact that many scientific theories had originated from myths. It was yet another proof that there existed no sharp demarcation between science and metaphysics, particularly in terms of the verification theory. According to Popper, Copernicus's heliocentric theory of the Universe was inspired by the neo-Platonists' worship of the Sun which they placed in the centre of the Universe. Ancient atomistics was another example of a myth that played an extremely important role in the development of science. As opposed to logical positivism which reduced the difference between science and metaphysics to the difference between meaningful and senseless propositions, Popper underscored already in his first mature works that the problem of meaningfulness and senselessness was a pseudo-problem. Metaphysics, according to Popper, was neither a science nor a set of nonsensical assertions. Hence, already in the early period of his ideological evolution Popper held a different view of metaphysics than the founders of the Vienna school influenced to a considerable extent by Wittgenstein's and Schlick's ideas.
According to the ``verification version'' of logical positivism, the criterion of the scientific value of different forms of human knowledge is their confirmability by inductive methods: an assertion can only be regarded scientifically 61 (empirically) valid if it can be confirmed by inductive methods or an inductive = inference.^^1^^ As regards a theoretical proposition, it must permit logical reduction to a protocol statement confirmable by an experiment. The basic distinction of Popper's criterion of scientific knowledge from the verification principle consisted in that he regarded refutability (or ``falsifiability'') and not confirmability as the main characteristic feature of a scientific statement. Hence, Popper's solution of the problem of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific assertions is the direct logical opposite of the neopositivistic criterion. The immunity, even if only thinkable, of a proposed hypothesis against refutation is a sure sign of its metaphysical nature. A system of assertions can only be considered scientific if it is at least capable of being at variance with observation. From this it follows that the verifiability of a theory coincides not with its confirmability, but with its refutability, and this is just what makes the difference between science and ``nonscience''. For instance, the existence of God, according to Popper, is asserted in approximately _-_-_
^^1^^ The weakness of empiricism and inductivism as methodological concepts was noted long ago. The most exhaustive assessment of these trends was given by Engels who, in particular, wrote in his Dialectics of Nature: ``These people have got into such a dead-lock over the opposition between induction and deduction that they reduce all logical forms of conclusion to these two, and in so doing do not notice that they (1) unconsciously employ quite different forms of conclusion under those names, (2) deprive themselves of the whole wealth of forms of conclusion in so far as it cannot be forced under these two, and (3) thereby convert both forms, induction and deduction, into sheer nonsense'' (Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.~226).
62 this form: God is because he is. Since this statement is practically tautological, the degree of its confirmability is very high. Yet it is quite obvious that a statement, of this kind is completely immune from refutation and is, therefore, non-scientific.Popper's argument against the verification principle and in favour of his ``falsification'' criterion are serious enough, though not at all as original as he claims. Putting aside the author's pretence, let us take a more close look at his arguments against the ``verification version'' of anti-metaphysical philosophy.
First, Popper contends that observation is always preceded by certain theoretical assumptions and scientific knowledge, contrary to the positivist concept, does not start with sensory experience. Second, the traditional problem of empiricism, that of the substantiation of the inductive conclusion, derives, according to Popper, from Hume's error concerning the nature of the scientific method. In Popper's opinion, Hume indeed showed that a theory cannot be 'deduced logically from observation statements, yet he overlooked a very important circumstance: his arguments do not prove that a theory cannot be refuted by observation. Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the positivists, empirical generalizations are immaterial for scientific cognition. A scientist is usually not guided by generalised observations, but makes a resolute step and puts forward bold proposals which are subject to subsequent empirical verification. Popper maintains that scientists test new theories not in an attempt to deduce them from a certain imaginary basis, but by creating experimental 63 situations whereby they try to refute or falsify them.
One cannot but admit that Popper did pinpoint the vulnerable spot of empiricism. Yet the full significance of his criticism can only be assessed in the light of the programme which he proposes as an alternative. It may seem at first sight that his epistemological principles are radically different from those of positivism. Indeed, according to Popper, ``knowledge cannot start from nothing---from a tabula rasa---nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the modification of earlier knowledge. Although we may sometimes, for example in archaeology, advance through a chance observation, the significance of the discovery will usually depend upon its power to modify our earlier theories.''^^1^^
Refutation in science, according to Popper, is a motive force of progress---a refuted hypothesis gives place to another one intended to eliminate or avoid the error. Some conclusion ensuing from an adopted theory or from a hypothesis may be refuted---this will cause the scientists to improve and transform the theory or the hypothesis. It may also happen that the very premises of a theory will prove to be invalid---in that case the theory should be resolutely rejected. In any case, a scientist himself must always strive to subject his hypotheses to severe criticism as it stimulates continuous progress of science. ``Refute!'' _-_-_
^^1^^ K.~R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Harper and Row Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1963, p.~28; see also Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960.
64 ---calls Popper on scientists. A refutation, in his opinion, is a scientist's victory since any act of rejection represents the essence of sciencof elimination of errors and perpetual progress e: knowledge.According to Popper, the test of a theory amounts in fact to an attempt to refute it, and refutability is the fundamental property of scientific knowledge, whereas the critical spirit is one of the basic characteristics of scientific life, the ethical imperative, so to speak, of a scientist's behaviour. In assessing a hypothesis a scientist should first of all decide whether it lends itself to a critical examination and, if so, whether it is capable of withstanding a critical charge. Newton's theory, says Popper, predicted a deviation of the Sun's planets from Kepler's orbits owing to their interaction and thereby exposed itself to a possibility of being refuted by experience. Einstein's theories were tested in a similar manner as the conclusions they suggested did not follow from Newton's theory.
By contrast with the metaphysicians striving for an ever broader generalisation and confirmations of their ideas, the scientists do not seek a high degree of probability of their assertions or, to be more precise, it is not their main aim. The more a statement asserts, the less probable it is, says Popper. For instance, a theory giving exact quantitative predictions in relation to the splitting of lines in the atom emission spectrum under the influence of magnetic fields of different intensity is more vulnerable to experimental refutation than a theory predicting merely the effect of a magnetic field on such emission. In that respect, according to Popper, the __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5---1152 65 more definite and refutable a theory is the more verifiable it also is, as it lends itself to more accurate and exacting tests. In other words, contrary, for instance, to Carnap, Popper maintains that a high degree of verifiability cannot represent the aim of science. If that were so, the scientists would confine themselves to tautological statements alone. Actually, however, their task consists in developing science, i.e. in enriching its content, and that is bound to lower the probability of its propositions.
As we see, Popper presents rather a dramatic picture of the evolution of science which consists essentially in a continuous struggle of theories and in the survival of the fittest. Unlike Carnap who regarded the victory of a theory to be in no way damaging to the prestige of its rivals, Popper maintains that the triumph of one hypothesis inevitably spells the doom of all others. With Carnap, scientific theories move in a respectable and civilised society, whereas Popper sees them waging relentless struggle for existence in which the rise of a theory can only be achieved by ``murdering'' its opponent. Explaining his understanding of the difference between science and ``metaphysics'', Popper used to say that a believer perishes together with his false convictions, whereas a scientist sacrifices his creation, a theory, for the sake of the progress of science.
As regards each individual scientific theory, it begins, according to Popper, with a problem. Then follows a tentative solution, a conjecture, criticism and correction of errors. The tentative solution may prove partly or even completely erroneous. Yet this does not mean, says Popper, 66 that a scientist is entitled to a deliberate error. To avoid it, he must, first of all, look deeper into the problem and ``comprehend'' it. And how can he do this? Popper says: ``To understand a problem means to understand its difficulties, and to understand its difficulties means to understand why it is not easily soluble---why the more obvious solutions do not = work.''^^1^^ The step that follows a tentative solution consists in discussing and criticising the theory. At this stage everybody tries to find faults with it, to refute it or to correct the errors. Popper writes: ``The critical attitude may be described as the conscious attempt to make our theories, or conjectures, suffer in our stead in the struggle for the survival of the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the elimination of an inadequate hypothesis---when a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by eliminating = us.''^^2^^
This attitude, according to Popper, is true of the animal, pre-scientific and scientific knowledge and, consequently, characterises the mechanism of its evolution in general. A specific feature of scientific knowledge consists in that the struggle for existence in human society becomes more difficult because of conscious and systematic criticism.
In Popper's opinion, one can only speak of any progress in science (as well as of the demarcation line between science and metaphysics) in connection with the possibility of falsification. _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p.~260.
^^2^^ Challenges to Empiricism, Ed. by Harold Morick, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Ltd., Belmont, California, 1972, p.~149.
__PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 Popper's falsification concept is closely linked with his peculiar notions of the genealogical tree of knowledge. If we take a tree in its natural position, i.e. with its crown up, for a model of the evolutionary process, we shall have, according to Popper, the picture of the development of applied sciences, since they are characterised by the ever increasing diversification and specialisation. Yet to visualise the development of pure knowledge, of fundamental sciences, one should set the tree with the crown down, since the leading tendency in the sphere of pure knowledge consists in the growing integration and unification of theories.From the epistemological viewpoint, Popper's concept is different from the traditional empiricist stand only in that it dismisses the question of the source of knowledge, since the logic of a scientific discovery which is what Popper's epistemology boils down to, does not concern itself with questions of this kind. In point of fact, this question lies on the other side of the demarcation line which Popper draws between science and metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits of a purely logical model of the process of cognition Popper's concept gives rise to serious contradictions. Indeed, in investigating the relation between knowledge in general and a concrete discovery or theory one must answer at least two questions: (1) which element of knowledge and at which stage of its maturity is taken as the basic proposition; (2) which proposition in a given specific case can be confirmed or refuted with the help of an experiment. The second question remains, in fact, unanswered by Popper. As regards the first one, the answer is as follows: 68 the initial, basic propositions are a product of arbitrary convention among scientists. Popper does not deny the connection of basic propositions with experience. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery he writes that the decision to adopt a basic proposition stands in causal relation to our sense perceptions. Experience, according to Popper, can only go to the extent of motivating a decision which is needed for the adoption or rejection of a proposition. Yet any attempt to trace basic propositions to perceptions would be entirely fruitless.
As we see, despite the ostensible opposition to empiricism, Popper's concept reveals a curious similarity to logical positivism in at least two aspects: (1) in its tendency to limit the subject-matter of epistemology to purely logical problems and to reject some general problems (e.g. the problem of the source of knowledge); (2) Popper, like the leading theorists of the Vienna school, is forced to resort to conventionalism when it comes to explaining the origin of basic propositions, though he substitutes conventionalism ``from below'' for the traditional conventionalism ``from above'' used by logical positivism in its attempt to account for scientific laws and theories. Popper's conventionalism is a result of his far-reaching logicism, leading to the dismissal of philosophical and sociological problems of science as insoluble. The basic propositions introduced by Popper are intended to replace the protocol statements of the Vienna school and differ from them in that they reflect a system of conventional knowledge rather than the transient individual experience.
The rational kernel in Popper's criticism of the 69 verification theory consists in that Popper considers science as an endless chain of theories that replace one another. He effects a radical change in the traditional orientation of the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Having started with the investigation into the rules of refutation of scientific theories, Popper made the progress of science the pivotal point of his concept. The problem of the criterion of scientificity now organically merges with the concept of the development of science: crises in science, i.e. the collapse of traditional theories are declared to be inherent in the main postulates of the logic of scientific development. The new logic of science is a logic of scientific discovery, of the radical transformation of the existing systems of knowledge. Popper has shifted the focus of attention from the formal logical analysis of systems and propositions to the problem of the logical reconstruction of historical events in scientific development.
In his person the logic of science has made a step towards the history of science in the hope of creating a new tradition in the analysis of scientific knowledge. New horizons have been opened up before logic both in terms of theory and heuristics. Popper's logical notions show a clear tendency towards historicism in the presentation of scientific progress. Historical analysis, of course, would have been highly helpful in the solution of such problems as the criterion of scientific theories, the role of philosophical knowledge in the development of science, and many others. But such analysis proved to be beyond Popper's possibilities. Logicism has got the better of his aspirations.
70Development, a traditional metaphysical problem, has also been treated with reference to scientific knowledge by Thomas S. Kuhn, who gave it even a more pronounced anti-positivist turn.
In opposition to Popper, Kuhn put forward a thesis that scientific development cannot be explained by means of rational logical notions in principle. The sharp controversy that was initiated by his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first published in 1972 is still unabated centering around Kuhn's polemics with Popper's school. This polemics is playing rather an important role in weakening the positions of ``critical rationalism''.
A crucial feature of scientific life which, according to Kuhn, was ignored by Popper, consists in the presence of some ``dogmatic'' elements in the scientists' work which bolster up their faith in the success of their investigations and help them to persist in their studies without arguing with their colleagues. As distinct from Popper who underscores the significance of criticism in science, Kuhn emphasises the function of dogma in scientific investigation. Contrary to Popper, who avers that bold refutations and tough competition of theories pave the way for scientific progress, Kuhn sees the starting point of progress in a transition from debates and competitive theories to a common viewpoint shared by all specialists.
According to Kuhn, the true creator of science is the scientific community, a group of professionals who decide to adopt a certain scientific achievement or theory as a model and make it a basis for their investigations. No scientific community can start investigating natural phenomena 71 without a definite system of generally recognised notions. Such a system of notions also includes certain metaphysical propositions or models of the type: ``heat is kinetic energy of particles making a body'' or ``all perceptible phenomena are essentially interaction of qualitatively homogeneous atoms in free space'', etc. Within the scientific community a model theory is a paradigm, whereas the study of nature within the framework of a paradigm is ``normal science''. If there is a paradigm, the solution of concrete scientific problems resembles the solution of puzzles: the scientist has a model of the solution (the paradigm), the rules to be followed, and knows that the problem is soluble. The conditions being set, his success depends on his personal ingenuity. The secret of scientific achievements lies largely in the self-organisation of the scientific community. No other professional group has succeeded to such an extent in fencing itself off from everyday life and laymen's questions as the scientific community. To be sure, such isolation can never be complete, yet it is very essential. A scientist always does his individual research with an eye to his colleagues in the first place, whereas a poet or a writer addresses a non-professional audience and depends to a great extent on its appreciation. ``Just because he is working only for an audience of colleagues, an audience that shares his own values and beliefs, the scientist can take a single set of standards for = granted,''^^1^^ writes Kuhn. He does not even have to select his problems--- they themselves are waiting for him.
_-_-_^^1^^ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p.~164.
72However, this is only the first stage of the scientific process. The next stage consists in a break-down of old paradigms, a crisis and a formation of a new paradigm. It is a period of extraordinary investigations and controversy leading to the development of the new principles of investigation and to the creation of a new picture of the world. The main task of this period is to select a theory that would play the role of a paradigm. This selection, according to Kuhn, is not a logical problem as it appears to logicians. The criterion for the selection lies in a socio-psychological sphere: the scientific community selects for a paradigm the theory which appears to be best suited to ensure the ``normal'' functioning of the scientific mechanism. Therefore each critical period gives way to a new upsurge of creative activity and another step forward in the onward march of natural science. To an individual scientist, however, a change of basic theories (paradigms) is tantamount to conversion to a new faith: he feels like entering a new world with entirely different objects, notions, problems and tasks.
Hence, a scientific revolution consists essentially in a change of paradigms. This change does not yield to rational explanation in terms of logic as it is rooted in the professional feeling of the scientific community: either the community possesses the necessary means for solving ``puzzles'', or, if such means are not available, the community has to create them.
The main turning points in the history of science are associated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein. According to Kuhn, each of these turning points signified 73 that a group of professional scientists had to discard one age-old theory in favour of another incompatible with the former.
Paradoxical as it may seem, Popper's logical concept of scientific revolutions and of the downfall of famous theories has been constructed on the basis of the same historical material. In this connection Kuhn justly observed that Popper had no reason for characterising all scientific activity in the terms applicable to its rare revolutionary periods only.
The severity of the test criteria referred to by Popper is only one side of the medal, the other one being the tradition of ``normal'' science, the solution of ``puzzles''. Subject to testing is not the basic theory, but the scientist's conjecture, his ingenuity. An erroneous conjecture is a setback for the scientist, but not for his paradigm.
Popper's idea of the ``elimination of errors'' which accompanies a change of theories is yet another concept which meets Kuhn's resolute opposition. Popper regarded as erroneous Ptolemy's geocentric astronomy, the flogiston theory, Newton's mechanics. Kuhn refuses to accept this point of view: no ``error'' has been committed in the development of these theories and the notion of error in general is absolutely irrelevant in the assessment of an obsolete scientific theory. In his opinion, the most one can say in such cases is that a theory which had once been correct later became erroneous, or that a scientist made a mistake by adhering to a theory too long.
In the final analysis the basic distinction between Popper's and Kuhn's concepts lies in their different understanding of the nature of science and progress. Popper has repeatedly emphasised 74 the need to cast off ``psychologism'' in the solution of such problems. He was never tired of repeating that his concern was the logical rules of scientific progress rather than the scientists' psychological incentives; yet he could not but admit that the rules of logic followed by scientists in their investigations are something like their professional imperatives. In contrast to Popper, Kuhn contends that such imperatives alone can account for a scientist's selection of one solution instead of another and that his preference cannot be explained on purely logical or experimental grounds. In other words, it is only the analysis of socio-psychological factors in the development of science that provides a key to the correct understanding of the historical aspects of scientific progress. Popper's science is impersonal whereas Kuhn strives to introduce a ``human element'' into the logical problems of scientific cognition and highlights its sociological and psychological aspects. Both concepts, however, are completely divorced from the problem of the interaction between philosophy and particular sciences. Moreover, Kuhn even makes a special point of substantiating this indifference. A question, naturally, arises if such an abstraction in the investigation of the history of science is justifiable and if it is not likely to distort the true picture of scientific progress.
A serious attempt to save the logical tradition in the analysis of historical changes in science was made by Popper's disciple Imre Lakatos, a prominent representative of critical rationalism and a talented expounder of his school's principles.
Lakatos holds that it is necessary to discard 75 completely the tradition of logical positivism which focused on formal logical means in the analysis of scientific = knowledge.^^1^^ He shares Popper's opinion that the only way in the investigation of the logic of science is to turn to the real practice of scientific thinking. To substantiate this view he shows that even mathematics which has long been regarded as the main bastion of the adherents of formal logical analysis needs the substantive analysis of its history so as to get a basis for the development of the logical and methodological scheme of scientific discovery.
Each time the historical process of scientific cognition reveals a need for a change in the existing system of knowledge there appears a possibility for different strategies and for different ways of development. Being always faced with the necessity of ``casting lots'' in selecting one of the alternatives that would prove the most beneficial for further scientific progress, the scientists never stop seeking for a guideline. This guideline, according to Lakatos, must be provided by the modern logic of science. It is precisely for this reason that it should break off with the tradition of formalism. Formal logical analysis deals with deductive, formalised theories which represent science in the artificially ``frozen'' state, whereas the real object of logical analysis and explanation should be the methods and mechanisms of changes in the structure of knowledge. Criticism gives scientists a rich ``situation logic'', i.e. opens up a broad range of possible lines of behaviour in different situations.
_-_-_^^1^^ See I.~Lakatos, ``Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic'', in: The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 325--30.
76Lakatos points out that Popper's solution of the ``demarcation'' puzzle and his criterion of scientific knowledge have brought about a radical change in the very formulation of the problem. After Popper, the logical appraisal of a scientific theory turned in fact into the analysis of conditions under which a given theory or hypothesis can be adopted for scientific use. In other words, Popper's new approach to the traditional problems of the logic of science brought to the forefront the question of the acceptability of a scientific theory or a hypothesis. According to Popper, a theory can only be accepted as scientific if it is falsifiable. Lakatos, however, regards this criterion as only one of the requirements a theory must meet in order to become acceptable.
Kuhn's controversy with Popper about scientific revolutions raised the crucial question of the possibility of representing the endless change of fundamental scientific theories as a rational process interpretable in terms of logic. As for Lakatos, his main object was to give a logical explanation of the victory of a new paradigm. He is firmly convinced that logic is capable of giving the scientist a rational guideline for his behaviour during a ``critical'' period in the development of science. Proceeding from this aim, Lakatos develops his concept known as the ``methodology of research programmes''.
Lakatos sides with Kuhn in his criticism of Popper's rule: ``having falsified---reject!''. According to Lakatos, the comparison of a theory with the results of an experiment is a more complex procedure than Popper originally thought it to be. This comparison involves, as it were, three ``layers'' of knowledge: (1) the theory under test 77 itself; (2) the sensory data explained by the theory (for instance, the light images observed with the help of an optical instrument); (3) the so-called background knowledge embodied, for instance, in the instrument design. We cannot know what the experiment demonstrates and how it can pass a final judgement on the theory under test. Rather, says Lakatos, we subject to testing a tangle of our theories and the experiment's verdict is: ``incompatible''. Which of the theories must be rejected is still a big question. Generally speaking, there are no absolutely indisputable facts which would compel an ardent adherent of a theory to surrender immediately and unconditionally. On these grounds Lakatos comes to the conclusion that a theory cannot be invalidated by a single empirical counter-example. Its rejection can only come about in the process of adoption of a new, better theory.
Broadly speaking, it means that the true object of a logical evaluation is a series of theories in their succession rather than an individual theory. Several series cluster around propositions playing the role of something like a dogma---here, according to Lakatos, Kuhn was right. It can therefore be affirmed with good reason that the scientists in their investigations of nature translate into reality some more or less developed ``programmes''.
Lakatos understands science as activity aimed at solving concrete problems within the framework of a certain programme. Each programme can be viewed as consisting of two components: a rigid core and a safety zone of ``sacrificial'' theories. The rigid core consists of one or several propositions which are not subject to refutation. 78 Such are, for instance, the three laws of thermodynamics and the law of gravitation for the adherents of Newton's theory. These propositions must be preserved under any onslaught of falsifying data. The ``salvation'' of the core is achieved at the expense of auxiliary hypotheses which replace one another and are intended to neutralise counter-examples and preserve the core with the help of various amendments and modifications.
By way of illustration Lakatos refers to Newton's gradual elaboration of his theoretical models.^^1^^ Having first worked out his programme for a planetary system with a fixed point---like the Sun and one single point-like planet, Newton derived his inverse square law for Kepler's ellipse. But this model was forbidden by Newton's own third law of dynamics, therefore the model had to be replaced by one in which both the Sun and the planet revolved round their common centre of gravity. Later he introduced more planets as if there were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. However, the results obtained at this stage ran counter to observations, and later Newton worked out the case where the Sun and planets were not mass points but mass-balls and also introduced interplanetary forces. Such multistage elaboration, according to Lakatos, reveals the true course of the scientist's thought.
The history of science, according to Lakatos, is the history of the birth, life and death of research programmes. While a programme is being realised, science runs its normal course---it is Kuhn's ``normal science''. During a change of _-_-_
^^1^^ See Imre Lakatos, ``Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'', in: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 143--59.
79 programmes, or a change of paradigms, science undergoes a revolution. As distinct from Kuhn, however, Lakatos believes that programmes are logically commensurable and can be compared to one another. Their comparative analysis can provide a scientist with a reasonably reliable guideline for selecting one programme and rejecting another.According to Lakatos, any theoretical concept of knowledge provides a framework for the rational restructuring of the history of scientific knowledge. Though not every detail in the history of science fits in with rational explanation, logico-methodological concepts should provide the closest possible approximation to real processes in order to permit their description. For instance, an inductivist who considers Newton's theory an ``error'', and its lasting prevalence a delusion would find no rational justification for it. Popper's type of logic would provide a rational explanation for a scientist's failure to recognize the collapse of his theory by referring to his metaphysical views. In Lakatos' opinion, preference should be given to a concept which permits the rational restructuring and interpretation of the largest possible number of facts in the history of science. Proceeding from this criterion, Lakatos considers his concepts to be the most expedient. However that may be, his ultimate conclusion is this: it is the history of science which is the touchstone of any logico-methodological concept, its strict and uncompromising judge.
The controversy between the ``critical rationalists'' and the adherents of Kuhn's-concept of the history of science had greatly affected the assessment of the very possibility of constructing a 80 purely logical concept of scientific knowledge and its development. The most sceptical views in relation to this problem were expressed by Paul Feyerabend. In one of his works, after expounding the basic principles of Popper's logic of scientific investigation, Feyerabend puts two questions which he considers to be of prime importance: (1) whether it is desirable to live up to the rules of ``critical rationalism'' and (2) whether science can be brought in accord with these = rules.^^1^^ Feyerabend gives negative answers to both questions.
According to Feyerabend, the highly specialised thinking characteristic of modern civilisation is accountable for a corresponding narrow approach to the study of man's cognitive activity and for a tendency to rationalise the process of cognition by simplifying its participants, strictly delimiting the field under investigation and by abstracting from historical context. Feyerabend contends that such abstraction from the external factors of scientific development becomes fatal for philosophy, since human inclinations, interests and ideological influences have a greater effect on the progress of knowledge than is generally believed. Despite his general opposition to Kuhn's understanding of the nature of scientific activity, Feyerabend, as he himself admitted, had wholeheartedly accepted his thesis of the incommensurability of basic scientific theories that succeed one another in history. Incommensurability was the point on which the views of both authors completely coincided when they were discussing the basic ideas of Kuhn's book. Kuhn was fond of _-_-_
^^1^^ See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London, 1975.
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---1152 81 comparing the world as it appeared to Aristotle with the world depicted by the 17th-century science. Having taken the cue, Feyerabend carries out a detailed comparative analysis of classical celestial mechanics and the special theory of relativity and strives to show that even the concepts of length, mass and speed in these theories were entirely different. According to both Kuhn and Feyerabend, the meaning of observation terms is completely determined by the theoretical context in which they are used. From this it follows that theories replacing one another are mutually incompatible and even incommensurable. They belong to different worlds. The field of application of a new theory is not necessarily the extended field of application of the previous theory, these fields may only overlap each other. The view according to which a new theory is bound to be commensurable with the previous one cannot be accepted as a universal principle. Incommensurability may be eliminated in one aspect, but holds good or even becomes more complete in another.The thesis of the incommensurability of theories succeeding one another is so important for Feyerabend that he considers it imperative for the logical analysis of scientific theories to start with revealing and emphasising the qualitative distinction of the new theory over the old one. A new theory must not only explain new facts, but also show the causes of the failure of the old theory. It is only on this condition that a new theory can be admitted to the temple of science. According to Feyerabend, a scientific theory can only be identified by its novelty and complete break from its predecessor. This criterion should 82 also be applied to epistemology and to the logic of science.
Feyerabend contends that the history of science testifies to the absence of any norms and standards of scientific activity valid for all times. Proceeding from his own understanding of Hegelian dialectics, Feyerabend maintains that any phenomenon can only be investigated in terms of the dialectics of the subjective and the objective, chance and necessity. Any absolutisation of norms and rules tends to bar the way to cognition. The true task of philosophy is to neutralise the baneful trends towards the stability and rigidity of methodological norms. Philosophy should embody the whole gamut of man's creative potentialities, all his individual qualities. To achieve this end, however, it must do away with the stability of all norms of scientific knowledge. Consequently, the logic of science should renounce the very idea of standards which hold good throughout history. Such standards can at best be treated as a verbal ornament or, more accurately, as a remembrance of those happy days when it was believed possible to gain success in science just by observing a few simple and rational rules and when scientific investigation was not yet known to be a risky and hazardous venture that it is, with endless upheavals and cataclysms.
Feyerabend's methodology calls for rejection of the theoretical monism characteristic of positivist and some other philosophical doctrines. The plurality of theories, in his opinion, must not be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will be replaced later by a ``single true theory''. ``Theoretical pluralism is assumed to __PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83 be an essential feature of all knowledge that claims to be objective,'' writes Feyerabend. ``Nor can one rest content with a plurality, that is merely abstract and created by arbitrarily denying now this and now that component of the dominant point of view, as is the plurality created by the various attempts of modern artists to free themselves from the conventions of their predecessors.''^^1^^
In its methodological orientation the theory of science should proceed from the idea of epistemological anarchism. The development of science, according to Feyerabend, is a process of the continuous combination of standards and their violations, dogmas and heresies, norms and errors. Kuhn's ``normal science'' does exist, but it has to be opposed in every way as it reflects the ideology of professional specialist. Kuhn's concept of paradigm is deficient in that it ``consoles'' the specialists instead of subjecting their views to criticism. Feyerabend's motto is an uninterrupted revolution.
Proceeding from his own interpretation of Hegel's words about human practice, man's spiritual and practical activity, Feyerabend avers that it excludes any regularities. A theory of science should only provide some general hints, rules of thumb and heuristic methods, but not general injunctions. ``Knowledge is ... an ever-increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) = alternatives.''^^2^^ _-_-_
^^1^^ Paul K. Feyerabend, ``Problems of Empiricism'', in: Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, Vol.~2, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965, p. 149.
^^2^^Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit., p.~30.
84 Nor is philosophy itself amenable to rational analysis in view of the disorderliness, complexity and wholeness of its structure.Feyerabend proposes a broad programme of struggle to attain the ideal of anarchic epistemology and overcome the ideas of critical rationalism which seeks to alienate science and enslave human spirit. He points out three means to achieve this goal: (1) scrupulous analysis of the works of such revolutionaries as Galilei, Newton, Luther, Marx and Lenin; (2) study of Hegel's philosophy and its alternative as.expounded by Kierkegaard; (3) integration of science and art. According to Feyerabend, their present separation is not natural and results from the idea of professionalism which must be discarded. A poem or a play can be intellectual and informative in equal degree (Aristophanes, Brecht), whereas scientific theories are capable of giving pleasure (Galilei, Dirac). In Feyerabend's opinion, we can change science and make it conform to our tastes.
Being indeed anarchical and wide open to all winds of theoretical thought, this model of scientific knowledge nevertheless leaves enough room for metaphysical ideas. Moreover, their function, as defined by Feyerabend, makes them a decisive factor both in the criticism and in the development of what is generally believed and ``highly confirmed''. Hence, they must be present at any stage of the development of scientific knowledge. Feyerabend contends that a science free from all metaphysics is on the way of becoming a dogmatic metaphysical system. Metaphysics performs the role of an instrument of criticism of existing theories, on the one hand, and, 85 just because of the possibility of such criticism, is an argument in favour of these theories. The postulate of Feyerabend's philosophy affirming the absence of any certainty, stability and system in methodology assumes itself the character of a dogma. Its absolutisation results in the restoration of a new variety of metaphysics which is anything but refined.
Joseph Agassi also shares the view that the claim of logic to the role of the theory of scientific knowledge can hardly be considered justifiable. As for himself, he is inspired by the idea of reproducing the real history of science with all its wealth of conflicting tendencies, and the methodology of science has no special appeal for him. The keynote of his works is the futility of preconceived viewpoints and the need for a scrupulous and unbiased reproduction of the entire history of science with all its real conflicting tendencies.
In Agassi's opinion, one ought to start with asking himself a question: what do we know about science in general and about its history? The existing historiography is too raw to provide a basis even for a most abstract theoretical discussion of the criterion of scientificity and the logical principles of cognition.
Agassi contends that a broad programme of historiographic investigations of science should be based on Popper's situation logic which makes it possible to reveal the historical context of various scientific theories or hypotheses. He warns, however, that such investigations should not be influenced by any preconceived idea of science, since the present-day task consists in disclosing and singling out concrete genetic links 86 between scientific theories rather than in their reduction to some ideal type or logical model.
Agassi holds that the core of science reveals itself in the scientists' ``metaphysical'', i.e. philosophical, views which should therefore be given priority attention in historiographic studies. He shows that philosophical ideas tend to degrade to current opinions if their authors are shy of exposing them to criticism. Those and only those scientists can develop new fruitful theories who are willing to subject their philosophical principles to a serious examination. According to Agassi, the priority objective of a historian of science is to disclose the nature of the metaphysical nucleus of scientific theories and doctrines. He therefore contends that there should be a radical change in the very orientation of the logical analysis of knowledge which, in his opinion, should be focused on historiographic investigations. The history of science should be written anew, since the existing historiography of science is unsatisfactory.
It is evidently for the accomplishment of this task that Agassi sets out to revive metaphysics.
Significantly, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos and some other representatives of the modern philosophy of science follow different paths and are interested in different aspects of scientific cognition. Yet they have one point in common--- all of them stand for the rehabilitation of metaphysics which has been held in contempt by positivism for many years. Of course, the difference in their approach to the process of cognition and their different aims cannot but tell on their 87 concepts of metaphysics, their understanding of its role in scientific cognition and their attitude to traditional philosophical problems. For instance, unlike Popper who does not go beyond the formal justification of metaphysics, and unlike Lakatos who confines himself to asserting the irreducibility of theory to the empirical basis, Agassi's doctrine tends to endow metaphysics with certain substance.
Accepting in principle the view that metaphysical proposition can be identified by its empirical unfalsifiability, Agassi nevertheless brings his metaphysics closer to the traditional philosophical problems. It is indicative that his assessment of the scientificity of one or another theory depends to a certain extent on its relation to metaphysics. Thus the selection of scientific problems which are to be studied should be governed, according to Agassi, not by the degree or their verifiability or falsifiability, but by their importance for arising metaphysical problems. Metaphysics is regarded by Agassi as a coordinating factor in the development of science, since the criterion of the importance of a scientific problem is its metaphysical significance.
It is noteworthy that Agassi's understanding of the concrete historical conditions affecting the development of science appears to be more profound than that of Popper, as he takes into account or, at least, shows interest in the factors determining the selection of problems to be tackled and the change of scientific interests (including the change of ``vogue'' in science). An important role, in his opinion, belongs not only to the techniques and equipment used in experiments, but also to the general socio-economic 88 situation, to society's needs, etc. For all that, his doctrine assigns the role of the main factor to none other than metaphysics. ``Some scientific problems,'' he writes, ``are relevant to metaphysics; and as a rule it is the class of scientific problems that exhibit this relevance which is chosen to be = studied.''^^1^^
In his analysis Agassi deals not so much with a single theory as with a totality of theories, problems and methods of investigation characteristic of a given period and viewed by him as a single whole. It enables him to make comparisons and deduce general principles governing scientific progress in different fields, e.g. in physics, biology, social sciences in a given period. In Agassi's interpretation, metaphysics is no longer a specialised theory divorced from science. Hence, the focus of attention should be shifted from the problem of demarcation between science and non-science to that of demarcation between science, on the one hand, and metaphysics (bad or good), on the other.
This leads to a corresponding modification of the criterion of such demarcation: the aim of scientific investigation, according to Agassi and contrary to Popper, is not to find and verify plausible hypotheses, but to search for and to test those hypotheses which appear to be relevant to metaphysics.
Reasoning in a purely metaphysical manner, Popper regards the transition from observations to a good theory not as a result of some _-_-_
^^1^^ Joseph Agassi, ``The Nature of Scientific Problems and Their Roots in Metaphysics'', in: The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, Ed. by Mario Bunge, Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., London, 1964. p.~192.
89 inductive conclusion, but as a tentative solution subject to testing, as an advancement of any new theory. The criterion of a theory which is to be given priority in testing should be, according to Popper, its falsifiability. Contrary to Popper, Agassi contends that the choice among rival theories should be made on an heuristic basis and governed by metaphysical considerations. He also contends that metaphysics itself takes part in the development of theories considered important in given problem situations. ``Scientific physics,'' he writes, ``belongs to the rational debate concerning metaphysical ideas. Some of the greatest single experiments in the history of modern physics are experiments related to metaphysics. I suggest that their relevance to metaphysics contributes to their uncontested high status. And yet, I contend, the metaphysical theories related to these experiments were not parts of = science.''^^1^^Metaphysics for Agassi is not something homogeneous. As has been indicated above, it can be ``bad'' or ``good''. The former merges with pseudoscience, the latter, with science. Bad metaphysics, such as existentialism or Hegel's philosophy is not capable of exerting serious influence on the development of science. Good metaphysics, on the contrary, not only provides something like a methodological programme for science--- in point of fact, it blends with science and can hardly be distinguished from it.
Agassi regards metaphysics as a programme for future scientific development and stresses that it cannot be characterised as ``true'' or ``false''--- _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~193.
90 it can be either commendable or condemnable. Here Agassi practically follows in Popper's footsteps adopting the main principles of his doctrine. Metaphysical theories themselves may engender an attractive programme such as that of Faraday, but the attractiveness or unattractiveness of a programme is not directly connected with the truth or falsity of the metaphysical theory that produced it. According to Agassi, the significance of a programme is only determined by the heuristic value of this theory. At this point, however, we arrive at a contradiction: if the criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics holds good, the truth or falsity of metaphysical theories will not depend on their refutability, or else there must exist a method for establishing the truth or falsity of theories without resorting to their falsification.In his concept Agassi strives to fence off ``bad'' metaphysics which claims to be on an equal footing with empirical science. He says: ``Metaphysics may be viewed as a research program, and the false claims of pseudo-science as the result of confusing a program with the finished product.''^^1^^ Yet he fails to draw a distinct demarcation line between true science and the pseudo-scientific style of thinking characteristic of old natural philosophy. Unlike Lakatos who either merges metaphysics with special sciences and practically makes it their integral part, or altogether eliminates metaphysics from scientific investigations regarding it as some obscure source of inspiration for the scientist, some purely subjective factor akin to his personal inclinations, aesthetic _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~204.
91 tastes or peculiarities of biography, Agassi strives to resolve the contradiction by turning this subjective factor into something immanent in the very substance of science. A scientific theory in his doctrine appears as some kind of interpretation of a metaphysical concept, but not as its logical consequence.It should be rioted, however, that this part of Agassi's programme of reviving metaphysics is patently beneath any criticism. What with metaphysical theories being neither true, nor false, there remains at best but one way out: to assume that there are no practical means, or even no possibility in general to come to a definite conclusion as regards their status. In that case, however, one has to give up all attempts at distinguishing between metaphysics and science and to leave the reader in the dark regarding the ways whereby metaphysics becomes immanent in scientific theories undergoing strict verification procedures. It proves impossible to reconcile the understanding of philosophy as an external factor determining the development of science with its role of an internal factor determining its content. The sphere of metaphysics, too, though including some traditional philosophical problems, appears to be both too narrow and too vaguely defined for all Agassi's pretensions to having developed a highly efficient working model, something like a matrix for production of new theories. All that a scientist now needs, according to Agassi, is but a few comparatively simple parameters having a purely ``technical'' meaning. In Agassi's doctrine metaphysical propositions have no basic distinctions from empirical generalisations. On the other hand, they must meet 92 the rigid rules of formal logic. This kind of approach which appears more or less compatible with Lakatos' concept does not tally with Agassi's historiographic orientation and runs counter to his intention of giving a sufficiently accurate, adequate and broad representation of the historical process of scientific cognition.
The history of ``critical rationalism'' shows that Popper's initial call to.turn to the analysis of the development of science has proved, as it were, a Trojan horse for critical rationalism. Having taken his cue from Popper, Feyerabend comes to doubt the very possibility of maintaining a logical, normative stand in the analysis of scientific knowledge. The criterion and the norms of scientificity advanced by critical rationalism prove untenable when applied to the real practice of scientific thinking, to the study of the history of science. As a result, Agassi puts forward a new programme of the investigation of science focusing not on the logic, but on the history of its development.
Would it be correct, then, to draw the conclusion that the history of science indeed attests to the fallacy of the existing logical concepts of scientific knowledge and its development? It would rather be more correct to say, paraphrasing Lakatos, that life itself has compared the logical and historical pictures of science and showed that these pictures are ``incompatible''. Hence, the conclusion of the ``critical rationalists'' about 'the necessity of radical changes both in the history and logic of science appears to be quite sound.
``Critical rationalism'' is undoubtedly one-sided in all its variants of scientific development 93 as it does not strive to present science as an integral part of the life of society. Yet this school has succeeded in showing one important thing, namely, that the progress of science is not a simple accumulation of knowledge or a gradual increase of its certainty, but a complex contradictory process.
The positivist logic of science was only capable of reflecting the norms and standards of a certain ``synchronous'' level of science. ``Critical rationalism'' has made an attempt to construct a logic of scientific development, i.e. a logic capable of reflecting ``diachronous'' transformations. This attempt, however, has called in question the very idea of such a logic. Indeed, the history of ``critical rationalism'' has vividly demonstrated that the traditional logical approach with its orientation on the ``natural'' laws of rational thinking suffers a complete fiasco whenever it is applied to the problems of growth and development of knowledge. The ``critical rationalists'' cannot accept this fact as all of them, even such a radical as Feyerabend, have committed themselves to the logical tradition. Nevertheless, the tendency to tone down the rigours of the positivist attitude to ``metaphysics'' and to link philosophico-methodological analysis (without reducing it to sensory experience) with the 20th-century theoretical investigations clearly revealed itself already in Popper's early fundamental works. This tendency became even more manifest in his subsequent studies and particularly in the investigations of other ``critical rationalists''. Popper's concept of science as a chain of successive theories replacing one another accounts to some extent for an important change in the traditional 94 positivist orientation of logical analysis. Starting out with the doctrine of falsification, Popper has come to the problems of the development of science and reassessed the criterion of scientificity in terms of historical progress. Crises in science, i.e. the periods of the collapse of its traditional theories, are not only explained by his logic, but ensue from its main postulates. A theory which is found to be fully confirmable turns, according to Popper, into technology, know-how or something of the kind and has no more room in the temple of science.
Popper's logic of science is the logic of scientific discovery, the logic of a radical transformation of the existing system of knowledge. His emphasis on the history of science is an important point of his programme of logical analysis marking a considerable deviation from the positivist traditions if only for the fact that he focused his attention not on the formal logical analysis of systems of statements, but on the problem of the logical representation of scientific development. To be sure, his emphasis on the relative independence of theoretical knowledge afforded greater freedom for creative thinking and allowed for a possibility of generic links between scientific theories. and ``metaphysics''. Nevertheless, despite the deductive character of the logical structure of knowledge, Popper's concept, as has already been pointed out, did not go beyond the limits of empiricism since it proceeded from the direct dependence of a theory on its empirical verification, post factum though it was. This dependence on empirical data was perhaps even more rigid than allowed by the ``verification version''. On these grounds early Popper's concept 95 should be regarded on the whole as essentially logico-positivistic. Its assessment by ``critical realism'' focusing on the formal structure of Popper's logico-methodological system rather than on its philosophical orientation need not be taken into account too seriously.
Popper's attitude to metaphysics, i.e. to general ontological problems, as well as his definition of the falsification principle have been gradually changing. His later works present a modified falsification variant watered down in accordance with his growing interest in metaphysical problems and in the question of autonomy of the so-called World 3. To be sure, from the very beginning Popper's philosophical system as a whole did not fit the Procrustean bed of the falsification principle devised by him to eliminate ``metaphysics'' and looked, from the viewpoint of this principle, quite metaphysical even in its initial explication. Yet late Popper's blunt turn to metaphysics was evidently somewhat unexpected and amusing even for his most ardent adherents despite the obvious trend towards such a development traceable already in his early publications. Popper's new stand was clearly expressed in his works Objective Knowledge (1972) and The Self and Its Brain (1977) in which he set out to construct a cosmic methodological system, though already in the 1950s and 1960s Popper had criticised the physicalist and behaviourist theories of consciousness questioning at the same time the fruitfulness of the linguistic approach to the problems of matter, spirit, the brain and psychological phenomena.
Popper's recognition of refutability as a characteristic feature of scientific knowledge and 96 his assessment of metaphysics as a historically inevitable, though mythological stage of scientific cognition were in themselves important steps towards his own ``metaphysics''. No less important was his idea that the mysterious process of scientific cognition manifests itself in the strife of hypotheses and theories, i.e. in the sphere of rational thinking, but not in the depths of the scientist's individual consciousness. This concept was also instrumental in paving the way for metaphysics and contributed to the materialisation of consciousness. All these fragmentary notions developed later into an evolutionary concept of consciousness and knowledge, into a metaphysical system of ``three worlds'' which shall be considered in more detail in the next chapter.
Popper's main epistemological or logico-methodological doctrine denies the validity of any final explanations or final truths. Yet Popper abandons his principles when it comes to the primary source of objective knowledge. Rejecting Plato's metaphysics of ideas, he evolves his own metaphysics which resembles to some extent 18th-century natural philosophy and is supplemented by notions borrowed from evolutionism and genetics. Popper maintains that active human consciousness capable of influencing the environment through the mediation of culture had its forerunner---the biological evolution of organisms. The aims and preferences of the organism influence the environment which, in turn, affects the evolution of the organism. According to Popper, this ``emergent'' process is not only analogous to the consciousness and vital activity of the organism, but also provides __PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7---1152 97 a key to the understanding of the origin of science.
Already in his Objective Knowledge Popper makes an attempt to reveal the embryo of science in its incipiency in the vegitable and animal kingdoms. ``I assert,'' he writes, ``that every animal is born with expectations or anticipations which could be framed as hypotheses, a kind of hypothetical = knowledge.''^^1^^ This, according to Popper, is the secret of the phylogenesis of scientific knowledge which provides a clue to its ontogenesis. In his opinion, ``this inborn knowledge, these inborn expectations will ... create our first problems; and the ensuing growth of our knowledge may therefore be described as consisting throughout of corrections and modifications of previous = knowledge''.^^2^^
Hence, there is no and cannot be any ``exoteric'' history of science. Its history is the logic of scientific discoveries which is nothing but a chain of successive problems or theories.
The genetic structure of man also contains in incipiency the faculty of speech which plays an important part in natural selection and, according to Popper, participates in some obscure way in the social process of language study. Thus Popper comes to the problem of the relationship between consciousness and the brain, spirit and matter, not only from the logical, but also from the historical viewpoint. However, handicapped by his earlier commitments, Popper in fact disregards the historical aspect in the development of _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, p.~258.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 258--59.
98 consciousness and ignores the real, social context of its formation and progress. The emergence of language, according to Popper, leads to the formation of the cortex and, consequently, to the development of consciousness.Popper's biological approach to the problem of the origin and development of knowledge prompted by his studies of modern evolutionary biology and genetics must have become yet another stepping stone towards his concept of ``emergent realism''. In recent years this concept has been contrasted not only to positivism with its physicalist and behaviourist tendencies in the approach to the problems of the nature of consciousness, history, etc. but also to the ideas of the so-called ``scientific realism'' and ``scientific materialism''. Investigating the origin of objective knowledge, Popper has been engaged of late in a controversy against idealism, phenomenalism, positivism, materialism and behaviourism simultaneously or, using his own words, against all forms of anti-pluralism^^1^^. Explaining the reason for his critical attitude towards reductionism, Popper describes life as an inherent property of all physical bodies. He declares: ``If the situation is such that, on the one hand, living organisms may originate by a natural process from non-living systems, and that, on the other hand, there is no complete theoretical understanding of life possible in physical terms, then we might speak of life as an emergent property of physical bodies, of = matter.''^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^ See K.~R. Popper, ``A Realist View of Logic, Physics and History'', in: Physics, Logic and History, Ed. by Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, Plenum Press, New York, 1970, pp. 6--9.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~7.
__PRINTERS_P_99_COMMENT__ 7* 99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/20050704/199.tx" __SPELL_CHECK__ Basic (ispell-buffer) (2005.07.09). __CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11) __CHECKS__ end-of-line hypens checked (2005.07.11) __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+Coming out against positivist reductionism, Popper specially emphasises the uselessness of purely linguistic solutions whereby the behaviour of an individual once explained in terms of postulated psychical states is translated into the language of physiological states, or an account of a physiological state is reduced by linguistic means to the Schr\"odinger equation. Particularly characteristic in this respect is Popper's reappraisal of the problems which he recently qualified as metaphysical: ``We must beware,'' he writes, ``of solving, or dissolving, factual problems linguistically, that is, by the all too simple method of refusing to talk about them. On the contrary, we must be pluralists, at least to start with: we should first emphasize the difficulties, even if they look insoluble, as the body-mind problem may look to = some.''^^1^^ According to Popper, the hopes that the objective meaning of a theory can be reduced to the states of consciousness of those who propound it rest on a trivial error---failure to distinguish between the two meanings of the word ``thinking''. In the subjective sense ``thinking'' describes perceptions or the processes of consciousness, but different perceptions or acts of individual consciousness cannot be logically related even if they are causally connected to one another.
Another problem which has come of late to be interpreted by Popper in terms of ``emergent realism'' is the relationship between the self and its brain. Popper agrees with ``scientific materialism'' in that all spiritual activities of the individual are accompanied by certain brain processes. Yet _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~9.
100 his concept of the self is entirely different from that of scientific materialism as he regards it essentially as a self-contained entity identical with what was earlier called ``soul'' and what actually constitutes man's true essence less the religious envelope. Popper ranks himself among the interactionists who disagree with the materialists in the understanding of the relationship between the consciousness and the brain and regard the problem basically in terms of the interaction between two levels of reality---the psychic and the physical. Moreover, they assign the active role in this system not to the physical world, i.e. the brain as a material object, but to what they consider to be the self. Popper even goes so far as to assume that the self is a quasi-substantial entity if substance is understood as a process or as activity in general.Traditional materialism, according to Popper, usually linked man to machine, modern materialism identifies him with computer, whereas the self is in fact the ghost in the machine and at the .same time the active programmer of the thinking activity. The self is the embodiment of wishes, plans, hopes, the determination to act and the acute awareness of its being the acting centre. The self is the motive force of activity. What makes the self is different from the chemical and biological processes attending the act of thinking and other kinds of activity by one unique quality--- the integration and coherence of experience. Expounding his views, Popper writes: ``What characterizes the self (as opposed to the electrochemical processes of the brain on which the self largely depends---a dependence which seems far from one-sided) is that all our experiences are 101 closely related and integrated; not only with past experiences but also with our changing programmes for action, our expectations, and our theories--- with our models of the physical and the cultural environment, past, present, and future, including the problems which they raise for our evaluations, and for our programmes for action. But all these belong, at least in part, to = World~3.''^^1^^
The important conclusion that Popper makes reflects the socio-ethical and ideological thrust of his concept: the emergence of the self signifies the transition of nature to a socio-cultural level of development and the transformation of the laws of evolution and natural selection in accordance with the new environment. ``The main function of mind and of World 3,'' writes Popper, ``is that they make possible the application of the method of trial and the elimination of error without the violent elimination of ourselves... Thus in bringing about the emergence of mind, and World~3, natural selection transcends itself and its originally violent character... Non-violent cultural evolution is not just a Utopian dream; it is, rather, a possible result of the emergence of mind through natural = selection.''^^2^^
Hence, Popper's scheme of cognition, his understanding of its sources and trends is falling under the increasing influence of the concept of natural selection and biological inheritance. It stands to reason that this concept can in no way be subjected to empirical verification. Being a simple extrapolation of biological laws to the sphere of scientific cognition it is postulated as premise _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, Springer International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 146--47
^^2^^Ibid., p.~210.
102 which does not have to be proved and is in fact rooted in Popper's interest in biology. The notions of evolutionary biology are introduced into the system of epistemological categories by analogy rather than on the basis of a serious investigation into the nature of cognitive processes. Biological laws are declared to be universal, governing the development of the world in general and the process of cognition in particular. Popper's former logicism gives way here to a biologised concept of scientific development which seems to contain more of a substance than a purely formal logical theory. Yet this ostensibly more profound concept is essentially metaphysical, and that in the worst sense of the word, because of its undisguised apriorism, subjectivism and speculative nature.Rejecting the principle of the universality of physico-mathematical knowledge which underlies the concept of logical positivism, Popper comes in the end, as a result of his own evolution, to the ``ontologisation'' of biological knowledge substituting biological laws and notions for general philosophical principles and traditional philosophical problems. Using the falsification theory as a foundation, and the notions of special sciences, mainly biology, as building blocks, Popper erects his own metaphysical building that has no room for categories and problems with long-standing historical tradition behind them. Even if he speaks of the active essence of consciousness materialising in culture, i.e. in the universal, and strives to find some culturological approach to the solution of different problems, this approach is limited to the self-programmed wholeness'' of ``World~3''. As to social reality, it is reduced by 103 Popper to an indefinite combination of ``physical reality'' and ``World 3''.
All in all, Popper's doctrine with all its weaknesses inherent in any metaphysical system and often justly criticised by both positivists and ``scientific realists'', and handicapped by its speculativeness, apriorism, empirical contestability and dogmatism proves rather a meagre replica of more profound systems. It offers but very schematic, embryonic versions of ``new metaphysics'' which is far behind 18th-century materialistic natural philosophy and Hegel's idealistic metaphysics in terms of profoundness, informativeness and wealth of concrete material. It is not improbable that the further evolution of ``critical realism'' and the views of its inspirer, who has evidently embarked on the final stage of his scientific career, will somewhat enrich and elaborate the schematic solutions proposed so far. Yet the very return of positivism to metaphysics, and a crude one at that which aggravates the old weaknesses of natural philosophy by new idealistic fallacies, proves better than anything else that this philosophical trend has outlived itself and is now, very much in the manner of a scorpion, stinging itself to death with its own venom.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. ``SCIENTIFIC REALISM''.The internal contradictions of positivism and the growing rift between its concepts and the real scientific development were bound to lead to a profound crisis which will evidently mark the end of this school as an independent 104 philosophical trend, though its traditions and certain achievements in the logic and methodology of science have been adopted by many schools of the modern philosophy of science. Equally inevitable was a more radical, compared with ``critical realism'', revision of the notorious positivist demand for ``elimination of metaphysics'', i.e. concepts, theories and problems that failed to meet the rigid empirical criterion of verification or falsification. Not only did this demand run counter to the very essence of positivism which has always rested on certain non-empirical postulates. It was also untenable from the viewpoint of the laws, problems and tendencies of scientific cognition as it tended to restrict the scientist's outlook to the mole's horizons and kill the very spirit of creative scientific endeavour.
The philosophical platform of positivism despite the periodic revivals of interest in its evolution was bound sooner or later to arouse dissatisfaction among scientists as it deprived them of the stimulating effect of theoretical and philosophical knowledge and shut them off from the wealth of human culture. Discontent with the isolationist concept alienating science from humanitarian and social values was also to be expected and had in fact been predicted, e.g. by the Marxist philosophers, among the intellectuals, particularly in the humanitarian circles. Natural, too, was the antipathy to positivism on the part of various philosophical schools and trends which could never stomach some or all of its tenets.
The storm which had long been gathering over positivism was precipitated by the scientific and technological revolution with its imperative 105 demand for immediate solutions to a number of fundamental problems of scientific, technical and cultural progress, and the decrepit vessel of the philosophy of science was swept over by a powerful wave of general discontent. The critical fervour of different schools has been centring largely around the demand to revive ``metaphysics''. Naturally enough, such a revival, as well as the content of metaphysics itself, are receiving widely varying interpretations ensuing from no less widely varying intentions. Idealism, for one, resentful over the hesitating position of positivism between the objective knowledge of the physical world and subjective perceptions is insistent on the unequivocal recognition of the primacy of the mind and consciousness. The scientific community, long deprived by positivism of solid grounds in theoretical investigations is demanding of the ``realists'' a reliable ontology, a materialistic one at that. The scientists whose interests mainly lie in the sphere of empirical investigations are expressing their grave concern over the theoretical vacuum, partly traceable to the ``antropogenic'' influence of positivism. All these trends are unanimous in their demand to concentrate on the solution of fundamental philosophical problems and are keenly aware of the inability of traditional philosophy to meet the challenge of natural sciences.
It stands to reason that the concept of constructive revivified metaphysics advanced by such heterogeneous opposition to positivism with its wide diversity of interests and views on the subject-matter of philosophy cannot but be very vague or at least extremely polysemantic. Problems regarded a$ metaphysical include general 106 scientific and metatheoretical doctrines, the so-called ontology or the general doctrine of being rejected by.positivism, as well as the traditional ``eternal'' philosophical problems of value, ethical norms, etc. Such an approach will be quite understandable if we take into account the fact that the attempts to revive metaphysics are based on the specific material of the history of science, history of philosophy, ethics, psychology, linguistics, etc. In his Afterword to a collection of articles entitled The Future of Metaphysics one of its exponents Richard McKeon writes: ``The future of metaphysics is determined by the controversies of philosophers as well as by the ontology of things or the epistemology of thoughts; and its course is often marked more clearly by suggestive paradoxes than by indubitable = certainties.''^^1^^ We need not characterise all the trends of metaphysics, the more so as some of them continuing the line of idealism and religious philosophy have always fed on such problems and the crisis of positivism has simply added fuel to their = fire.^^2^^ Far more important to us is the variety of new metaphysics, known as ``scientific realism'', which springs up on the ruins of positivist philosophy and pretends to the role of its alternative in the methodology of science.
The name ``scientific realism'' which is currently used alongside other names, such as ``scientific materialism'', ``new ontology'', ``critical realism'' and others is purely conventional, since this _-_-_
^^1^^ Richard McKeon, ``The Future of Metaphysics'', in: The Future of Metaphysics, Ed. by E.~Wood, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1970, p.~288.
^^2^^ See, for instance, E.~Sprague, Metaphysical Thinking, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978, p.~3.
107 school has not yet offered its solutions to the problems of scientific progress, nor defined its objectives or methods of analysis. The name represents what may be termed the nucleus of the programme---the criticism of positivist views on the structure, foundation and future development of scientific knowledge. It is noteworthy, however, that the so-called materialism of the new school proves in some respects to be but a new version of reductionism, whereas its ``criticism'' is sometimes markedly uncritical and its ``newness'' often goes back to the concepts of the 19th or even 18th centuries. Vague as it is, the new teaching has evidently revealed so far only one positive feature---recognition of the objective reality as the starting point of scientific cognition. To this can be added its intention to analyse the real process of scientific development and the real history of science rather than to indulge in the invention of speculative schemes based on new metaphysical concepts. It is undoubtedly a sober approach which corresponds to the present level and to the prospects of scientific development.To be sure, critical attitude to positivism is an important asset of the new school. Its criticism is all the more effective as it exposes the inner contradictions of the philosophy which has in fact been source of the youthful inspiration of practically all modern prominent expounders of scientific realism. Willard Van Orman Quine, Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, Mario Bunge and many other contemporary leaders of this trend were under a strong influence of positivist philosophy at least in their early period, even though they did not completely share its views. Understandably, the general crisis of positivism which 108 revealed itself not only in the internal contradictions of the positivist methodological programme but also in the conflict with the general trend of scientific cognition marked a turning point in the attitude towards the ideas of Carnap, Schlick, Reichenbach, Ayer, and other positivists. No less significant is the opposition of scientific realism to critical rationalism which is often considered to be the direct successor of positivist philosophy. One cannot deny, however, the mutual influence of these trends which is manifested, for instance, in that Popper, Feyerabend and others not infrequently identify themselves with the ``realists''. True, their statements are not immune from verification.
The ``realism'' of the new school implies a critical reappraisal of the positivist methodological programme prompted, as has already been pointed out, by the practical needs of the scientific and technological revolution in the late 1940s- early 1950s. This reappraisal has involved almost all the essential points of this programme: the problems of the objectivity of knowledge, causality, determinism, the relationship of matter and consciousness and, to a lesser extent, the problems of the development and structure of science. To be sure, the actual range of problems requiring a different approach in connection with the methodological criticism of positivist philosophy is much broader and extends far beyond the narrow scope of the positivist programme which, in fact, determines the horizon of ``scientific realism'' and prevents it from opening up broader fields of scientific cognition. We shall consider the attitude of the new trend to these problems later and concentrate now on its interpretation of the 109 scientificity of philosophy and the relationship of philosophy and science, the two main topics of this chapter. The anti-positivist solution of these issues by scientific realism has led, first and foremost, to the revival of ontology.
It is noteworthy that ``realism'' connects the revival of ontology as a philosophical doctrine of being and as a philosophical explication of the properties, objects and relations of the external world with the recognition of the external world, i.e. the reality which existed prior to and independently of man. Significantly, most of the followers of scientific realism declare themselves ``modern materialists'', ``exponents of scientific materialism'', etc. But how true are such declarations? Do the claims of scientific realists correspond to the content of their doctrine and its premises to its conclusions?
The new school directs its criticism first and foremost at the extremes of the positivist slogan of struggle against metaphysics under the cover of both verificationism and falsificationism. According to the ``realists'', this slogan is untenable for several reasons: first, in everyday practice scientific investigation ignores the facts which contradict theory; second, facts are not primary in scientific cognition, they are born, so to speak, in theoretical diapers; third, theories deal not with the objects of observation, but only with their idealised models; fourth, the verification of a scientific assertion is not, as a rule, a simple consequence of a theory, but rather follows from a theory combined with additional assumptions which must also be tested by experience. Hence, neither verification nor falsification taken separately can provide a satisfactory criterion for 110 establishing the truth of a theory and recognising its scientificity and, consequently, for distinguishing metaphysical statements from true science.
Quine, one of the early opponents of positivism representing the views of the new school, clearly reveals the unsoundness of the main dogmas of the traditional philosophy of science: its belief in the possibility of sharply demarcating the analytical truths independent of empirical facts (i.e. deducible from definitions and therefore tautological by nature) from the synthetic propositions based on empirical facts, and its reduction principle whereby each meaningful assertion can be reduced by purely logical means to basic empirical facts or propositions of the protocol-statement type. He points out that the basic concept of logical positivism which regarded language to be the starting point of analysis was fallacious, since the so-called physical-object language proposed by this school was at variance with its own demand---to be the language of sensually perceptible physical phenomena. Including the notions of a logically developed theory, language incorporated of necessity certain elements of mathematical theories related, for instance, to mathematical logic. The presence of such notions as a class of objects and a class of classes in the concept of logical empiricism was in itself a linguistic indulgence incompatible with the monastic vows of positivism.
Quine admits that ontological problems are unavoidable and emphasises that their formulation can only be sensible and free from contradictions if ontological statements meet the demands of modern logical analysis. The adopted ontology can only be regarded as unambiguous after the 111 confusion resulting from the use of individual terms has been eliminated with the help of Russell's description theory, quantification methods, etc. According to Quine, the fundamental ontological question can be put as follows: what kind of objects can be considered real if we believe in the truth of a given theory? The criterion of being which is the subject-matter of ontology is no less definite: to be is to be the meaning of the variable. From this it follows that any theory recognises in fact only those objects which can be classified as variables connected with one another in such a way as to confirm the truth of the propositions of the given theory.
Quine as a ``realist'' declares in favour not only of the existence of objective reality, but also of a possibility to construct scientific ontology, thus overcoming the general anthropocentrism of positivist philosophy. In his opinion, no special philosophical system of knowledge is required for this purpose, since ontology is entirely a product of scientific theory.
Quine contends that our knowledge, on the one hand, maintains contact with the external world through sense perception. Yet it also comprises entities outside sensory experience. Man's knowledge is predetermined by his sense perception, but different people need not necessarily get identical sensory data under identical conditions. This accounts for a possibility of switching over from the empirical language to the language of theory. It is precisely the intersubjective language which makes it possible, according to Quine, to perceive different empirical facts, i.e. to agree or disagree with the observer's propositions. ``It is this,'' writes Quine, ``that enables the child to 112 learn when to assent to the observation sentence. And it is this also, intersubjective observability at the time, that qualifies observation sentences as check points for scientific theory. Observation sentences state the evidence, to which all witnesses must = accede.''^^1^^
As distinct from Feyerabend, Quine is ready to go beyond the empirical evidence. Even if two theories are equivalent in terms of empirical evidence, they may be very different. This suggests, according to Quine, that the preference in selecting a true theory is determined by its simplicity rather than by a criterion related to empirical material. Hence, the judgements regarding the truth of a theory can only be passed after the theory has been accepted or rejected. It is only within the framework of the existing conceptual scheme that one can assess the true content of a theory. Consequently, reality as the true content of knowledge is entirely out of the question, except in the language of the adopted conceptual scheme. Quine prefers not to speak of ``things-in-themselves'' or of some other special philosophical interpretation of a scientific theory. ``Reality'', according to Quine, is in fact what we believe to be existing. Therefore he regards science as primary, and epistemology as secondary, or, as he puts it, as science self-applied. Its task, according to Quine, is to show how we know what we ought to know about science.
Quine does not concern himself about the metaphysical status of propositions but is rather interested in what we should do with them. _-_-_
^^1^^ W. V. O. Quine, ``The Nature of Natural Knowledge'', in: Mind and Language, Ed. by Samuel Guttenplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p.~74.
__PRINTERS_P_113_COMMENT__ 8-1152 113 Epistemology, according to Quine, is not something outside science, it is incorporated in our judgement about it. The decision as regards what is existent and what is non-existent depends on the contemporary state of science.Quine takes special note of Carnap's well-known attempt to water-down the rigid dogma of radical reductionism by conceding that each proposition taken by itself and isolated from other propositions can be confirmed or disproved as a whole. Yet even this thesis does not seem to him quite satisfactory and he contrasts to it his own version according to which our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. According to Quine, ``total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the = field.''^^1^^ Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections, but the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.
If this view is right, reasons Quine further, there is no ground for speaking about the empirical content of an individual statement, particularly if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore, _-_-_
^^1^^ W.~V. Quine, ``Two Dogmas of Empiricism'', Philosophical Review, Vol.~60, No.~1, 1951, pp. 38--39.
114 it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic and analytical statements. Any statement can be held true if the theoretical system is subjected to drastic enough adjustments.Mario Bunge, one of the most influential adherents of ``scientific realism'' also points out the sketchy character of the positivist concept of the relation of theory to experience. He maintains that the procedure of checking a theory is, generally speaking, far more complex than is suggested by those simplified schemes imposed both by the verification and falsification principles. The task of the philosophy of science is to bring the description of this procedure as close as possible to the scientist's real work. In one of his articles he writes: ``We must start afresh, keeping closer to actual scientific research than to the philosophical [positivist] = traditions.''^^1^^ The empirical test alone is far from being sufficient. A scientific theory must be subjected not only to an empirical, but also to a non-empirical test which should have at least three aspects: metatheoretical, intertheoretical and philosophical. The object of the metatheoretical checking of a theory should consist in ascertaining that it is not inwardly contradictory, that its consequences have factual content and that there exists a procedure for a transition from unobservable causes to observable ones. The intertheoretical checking consists in ascertaining that the theory in question is consistent with other theories, already recognised. The purpose of the philosophical _-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, ``Theory Meets Experience'', in: Mind, Science and History, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1970, p.~164.
__PRINTERS_P_115_COMMENT__ 8* 115 checking is to establish to what extent the new theory corresponds to the dominant philosophy. Bunge has no doubts about the need to bring our scientific theories in accord with the dominant philosophical concepts. The world view, according to Bunge, has a direct bearing on the selection of research problems, the formation of hypotheses and the evaluation of ideas and = procedures.^^1^^ This correspondence has always been sought for and alleged even if it did not exist, as was the case with the relativist and atomic theories in relation to positivism. The latter circumstance makes it absolutely imperative to check the soundness of the philosophical principles themselves.According to scientific realism, Popper's falsification theory is no less contradictory than the verification theory and both of them are equally far removed from the real practice of scientific cognition. Not a single scientist, says Bunge, would like to see his own creation dead. On the contrary, he would do everything possible to make it viable, i.e. to corroborate his theory. A closer look at the process of consolidation of a scientific theory reveals in it two more or less distinct stages. At the first stage, the theory advanced by a scientist gains ground and his colleagues, no less than the author himself, are busy searching for facts to support it. At the second stage, the new theory struggling for existence and for the right to develop comes across phenomena which do not fall within its framework. The theory becomes the object of criticism and the process of the revaluation of facts begins.
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., p.~142.
116A lot of theories highly beneficial to science have won the right to existence without applying to the falsification criterion. There are many methods whereby a theory can be constructed. Theories can adapt themselves to new data which seemed at first ``inconvenient'', develop additional and auxiliary hypotheses and, once they reached the necessary level of corroboration, are never discarded at once. ``A way of building a scientific theory,'' writes Bunge, ``is to surround the central hypotheses with well-meaning protectors hoping they will eventually turn out to be = true.''^^1^^ There is nothing wrong about protecting a hypothesis by ad hoc hypotheses as long as the latter are in principle independently testable. This method permits building quite a viable hypothetico-deductive system and may ensue in a new crop of experiments, whereas a strict application of Popper's criterion would nip the whole development in the bud.
After a detailed analysis of the applicability of Popper's falsification criterion to some important scientific theories Bunge comes to the conclusion that it is useless in the assessment of many general theories such as, for instance, the concept of continuum mechanics, the evolution theory, etc. They can only be tested in combination with additional (ad hoc) hypotheses or specific data pertaining to the components of the systems, their interaction or spatial configuration, etc.
Unlike the lever, simple pendulum and other specific theories which lend themselves to fullscale testing (i.e. to verification and falsification), _-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, D.~Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p.~28.
117 the field theory or, for instance, the concept of quantum mechanics cannot be subjected to exhaustive testing. In this connection Bunge singles out three types of scientific theories: (1) specific theories, such as particle mechanics or the quantum theory of the Helium atom; (2) generic fully-interpreted theories, such as classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, general relativity, the evolution theory; (3) generic semi-interpreted theories, such as games theory, information theory, field theory, etc. Characterising the third-type theories most of the symbols of which are assigned no factual interpretation, Bunge points out that such theories are particularly valuable in case of insufficient, incomplete knowledge of facts. Emphasising also their extremely general character and empirical untestability, Bunge points out that many such theories seem in fact to qualify as metaphysical ones. From this he makes the conclusion that there is no sharp line of demarcation between science and metaphysics. ``Surely,'' contends Bunge, ``there is a line between wild metaphysics and science---as well as a boundary between exact metaphysics and pseudoscience---but there seems to be no frontier between exact metaphysics and the set of most general (type~III) scientific theories: in fact, there is a good deal of = overlap.''^^1^^Bunge further points out that the term ``metaphysics'' had different shades of meaning in the history of philosophy and concentrates on two of them. Plain metaphysics, according to Bunge, ``ranges from elaborate nonsense through archaic common sense to deep and sophisticated yet _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., pp. 39--40.
118 outdated good = sense.''^^1^^ It is removed too far from modern knowledge. ``Kant,'' says Bunge, ``was certainly right in his day in stressing the difference between science and metaphysics and in claiming that it was impossible to conceive of metaphysics as a science. So were probably the Vienna Circle and Popper---in their own time, that = is.''^^2^^ Now, according to Bunge, the situation has radically changed with the appearance of exact ontological theories relevant to science. Conditions are now ripe for the emergence of exact metaphysics which seeks to solve some problems put off by plain metaphysics and strives to keep tune both with formal and factual sciences.Bunge's requirements to scientific metaphysics on which he dwells at length deserve special attention. In his opinion, scientific metaphysics should (1) concern itself primarily with the most general properties of reality and real objects, rather than with spiritual objects; (2) it should be a systematic theory or a part thereof rather than expound somebody's views; (3) it should make use of logic and mathematics; (4) it should expound key philosophical concepts and fundamentals of science; (5) it should contain elements which can be found among the postulates of scientific theories. Scientific metaphysics can itself become a scientific theory as a result of specification or additional conditions for its application. Metatheories, according to Bunge, can also be constructed with the use of elements borrowed from other fields of knowledge, as well as with the help of analogy and extrapolation. _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~145.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~41.
119 In Bunge's opinion, all means are good for this purpose. He considers in detail the analysis and synthesis theory as an example of metaphysical theories and maintains that it is growing beyond the bounds of chemistry where it originated. Among metaphysical he also rates the automata theory on the grounds that it can be referred to the ``object-medium'' system of any type: mechanical, electrical, biological or behavioural.The author classifies the problems pertaining to the methodological analysis of scientific metaphysics under three categories. The first relates to the form of metaphysical theories, which, in the author's view, must have a mathematical structure to qualify as exact theories. This structure must be at least algebraic or logical, if not quantitative. The second category of problems is pertinent to the content of metaphysical theories. Here the author points out that scientific metaphysics, unlike factual sciences, is concerned primarily with the world at large. Consequently, the logically possible models of natural processes lie outside its sphere (in Bunge's opinion, scientific metaphysics includes two systems of theories: universal or multilevel theories and regional theories limited to one integration level. Yet even the most special of metaphysical theories are not specific enough to cover in detail individual objects). Finally, the third category of problems is connected with the testing of metaphysical theories.
Rejecting both the empirical-positivist and Popper's concepts of the testability of scientific knowledge, Bunge proposes a special criterion of scientificity---the conceptual testability of theories understood as their compatibility with the 120 fundamentals of our prior knowledge. What is more, conceptual testability is but the indispensable condition of scientificity. To qualify as scientific, theories of any type must also meet additional requirements which depend on the nature of the problem being considered. These additional requirements, according to Bunge, are as follows: (1) a hypothesis should be at least indirectly confirmable; (2) a specific theory should include components which are both empirically confirmable and refutable when enriched with empirical data; (3) a generic interpreted theory should be susceptible of becoming a specific theory upon the adjunction of subsidiary assumptions and their interpretation; (4) a generic semi-interpreted theory should be capable of turning into a generic interpreted theory. Bunge avers that conceptual testability jointly with any of the above four conditions constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for a hypothesis or a theory to be called scientific. Hence, testability in the broad sense is in fact the equivalent of scientificity: testable knowledge is scientific and vice versa.
As regards the testability of metaphysical theories the author does not go beyond generalities. A metaphysical theory should be enlightening, as well as capable of being inserted in the nonformal axiomatic background of some scientific theory, i.e. it should be susceptible of becoming a presupposition of theoretical science. To be scientifically valid, metaphysical theories, according to Bunge, should be exact, consistent with scientific knowledge, and capable of clarifying and systematising philosophical concepts (such as event and chance) or principles (such 121 as law and interdependence of integration levels).
As we see, Bunge's testability concept is patently contradictory. Denying a sharp line of demarcation between metaphysical and generic scientific theories, he nevertheless does not admit that metaphysical theories, unlike scientific ones, do not lend themselves even to a conceptual verification. They cannot be true or false, they can be applicable or non-applicable. They are useful in the sense that they are always motivated and constitute sweeping generalisations of actual or possible specific theories. The theories of this kind are corrigible, but not refutable: they can be improved upon formally (logically or mathematically) or they can be made more complex. In short, theories in scientific metaphysics cannot be refuted, but, on the other hand, they can be confirmed---if not through prediction but at least by showing that they are compatible with a whole family of specific theories or that they take part in the design of viable systems. ``Strangely enough,'' writes Bunge, ``such theories can be adequate and convenient without being true and they can never be falsified: at most they can be shown to be irrelevant or pointless or = useless.''^^1^^
According to Bunge, the theories of the second and third types can raise the level of generalisations and serve as a basis for predictions owing to the introduction of additional specific premises. If that is so, there seems to be no reason why the theories called by him metaphysical cannot be specified in a similar manner. Sure enough, the general systems theory or the theory of _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~37.
122 integration levels classed by the author as metaphysical cannot give concrete predictions in such fields as, for instance, economics, biology, cybernetics where they have set up, so to speak, their specialised divisions. Yet it is obvious that these theories can provide a basis for some general conclusions which, in turn, enable scientists to make forecasts and inferences of a less general level, and so on. Hence, there is no sharp line of demarcation between metaphysical theories and the theories of the second and third type from the viewpoint of their testability either.Bunge writes: ``While the Vienna Circle rejected metaphysics as the enemy of science (which it was in most cases), and Popper tolerated it for its heuristic value (which it often has), we have come to regard metaphysics as capable of becoming scientific and moreover as constituting, together with logic and semantics, the common part of philosophy and = science.''^^1^^ However, contrasting his viewpoint to the positivist concept, Bunge fails to take into account that positivism has qualified as metaphysical not only and even not so much the general theories of science as the most general philosophical principles of materialism and dialectics. That is why any consistent criticism of positivist philosophy must of necessity show the real methodological and worldview significance of these principles for special sciences. Critical as he is of positivism, Bunge undoubtedly makes here an important concession: bridging the gap between science and metaphysics, he disregards the difference between _-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, op. cit., pp. 42--43.
123 philosophical concepts and the general theories of modern science reducing the former to the latter.Among the important components of scientific metaphysics Bunge ranks, for instance, the concept of the structural levels of matter. Giving this concept the conventional interpretation reflected in relevant scientific literature Bunge, however, treats it not only as a metaphysical theory, but also as a set of definite epistemological principles. Moreover, he also presents it in a methodological form as a set of conditions which scientific investigation must comply with.
One may ask here if other metaphysical theories too must have both the epistemological and general methodological form. The answer to this question should evidently be in the negative, since the level of generalisation in the concept of the structural levels of matter is much higher than in such ``metaphysical theories'' as the automata theory or the theory of games. The automata theory cannot provide a basis for the general methodology of science and epistemology. Here Bunge, evidently, eliminates the line of demarcation which does exist---that between special scientific theories and philosophical concepts. However broad the generalisations in such theories as the theory of games, the automata theory and the general theory of systems, all of them remain within the sphere of special sciences, whereas the concept of structural levels has long since become the object of philosophical investigations. Such vagueness in demarcating special sciences and philosophy is by no means accidental. In the context of Bunge's concept it attests to a tendency to reduce philosophy to the level of metaphysical principles and theories rather than to include 124 metaphysical theories into the system of philosophical knowledge. This becomes even more evident when we acquaint ourselves with Bunge's attitude towards materialism and dialectics. Substantiating his views on the scientific value of metaphysical theories, Bunge evidently intends to dispel in this way the prejudices of positivism against the so-called metaphysical problems. His efforts, however, go wide of the mark since he deprives materialism and dialectics of their methodological and world-view role in science without any reason whatsoever and ascribes all methodological functions to general theories, such as the automata theory, the general systems theory, etc.
This trend towards the identification of ontology with science is characteristic, with some variations, of many other representatives of ``scientific realism'', though some of them attempt to distinguish between philosophical and scientific = ontology.^^1^^ ``The task of the philosopher,'' writes Errol Harris, ``is thus two-fold. He must use the evidence provided by the sciences to construct a comprehensive and coherent conception of the universe, and he must examine the methods of scientific investigation and discovery and the process by which the science advances, in order to discern the insignia of reliability that entitle any discipline to be called by the name of knowledge---that is, = science.''^^2^^ As a rule, the defence of a scientific theory by ``realism'' is not based on ontological convictions---rather on the _-_-_
^^1^^ See, for example, Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Hassocks, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 29--30.
^^2^^ Errol E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, Humanities Press, New York, 1965, p.~30.
125 contrary, the reliability of a theory guaranteed by the use of adopted means and methods of scientific investigation can serve as a basis for ascribing ontological existence to its postulates, motions and concepts. Of course, besides the scientific perception of reality by man, there also exists the conventional everyday perception. Wilfrid Sellars, for instance, even writes about a ``tragic dualism'' of the two antagonistic ways of thinking: the scientific and the manifest. The first makes use of the techniques, methods and language of natural sciences. The second is guided by the common sense and traditional thinking adopted in everyday life. In Sellars' opinion, the task of philosophy consists in a harmonious integration of these two ways of thinking. Yet in his ontology he shows obvious preference for the paradigms of scientific thinking. For him, the world's ultimate constituents are primarily the theoretical postulates and principles of science. ``Speaking as a philosopher,'' he notes, ``I am quite prepared to say that the common sense world of physical object in Space and Time is unreal---that is, that there are no such things. Or, to put it less paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is = not.''^^1^^As we see, ``scientific realism'', gradually detaching itself from positivism, step by step shapes its anti-positivist programme aimed at reviving metaphysics. The central point of this programme _-_-_
^^1^^ Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.~173.
126 is the relation of consciousness to the brain--- the problem which was completely ignored by the former philosophy of science. Indeed, the development of scientific ontology is impossible without its solution. Positivism has eliminated the consciousness-brain (or psychophysical) problem as patently metaphysical. Thus Carnap wrote: ``Are the so-called mental processes really physical processes or not? Are the so-called physical processes really spiritual or not? It seems doubtful whether we can find any theoretical content in such philosophical questions as discussed by monism, dualism and = pluralism.''^^1^^The attempt to get rid of the psychophysical problem, like of other so-called metaphysical problems, was not and could not be successful --- it proved to be yet another delusion of positivism. In point of fact, positivist literature itself gives quite a definite solution to this problem in the monistic spirit of subjective idealism. This solution which has nothing in common with materialist views is plainly stated by Moritz Schlick who writes that ``the adjectives `physical' and `mental' formulate only two different representational = models''^^2^^, or by Alfred Ayer who tries to substantiate the thesis that statements of mental phenomena and statements of bodily phenomena are two different methods of the _-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1949, p.~413; see also K.~G. Hempel, ``The Logical Analysis of Psychology'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit., p.~380.
^^2^^ Moritz Schlick, ``On the Relation Between Psychological and Physical Concepts'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op cit., p.~403.
127 classification and interpretation of our experience. The authors of these views are far from asserting the primacy of electromagnetic, thermal, mechanical or other physical processes which underlie psychic phenomena. They do not deal with the phenomena of objective reality---their main intent is to emphasise the unity of science or sciences which study sensory experience or facts entirely different by nature. All they are aiming at is to provide a single description of sense data on psychical processes, on the one hand, and of sense data on the outer world, on the other. They seek reduction within the framework of a theory only and do not turn to the actual processes taking place in the physical world. Consequently, sensory experience remains the origin of all origins, the cause of all causes and the task only consists in harmonising the languages of physics and psychology within the present framework. The sum total of this reduction is bluntly stated by Carl Hempel who contends that psychology is an integral part of physics and even asserts that all sciences have in principle one and the same nature and belong to physics as its = branches.^^1^^Searching for the ontology of knowledge, ``scientific realism'', naturally, could not sidestep the problem of the relation of consciousness and the brain not only as a specific issue directly involved in all the problems being raised by the new trend, but as an independent problem of crucial importance for the very status of scientific ontology. It is not accidental that the branch of ``scientific realism'' directly concerned with the _-_-_
^^1^^ See Carl G. Hempel, ``The Logical Analysis of Psychology'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit., pp. 378, 382.
128 investigation of this problem has actually turned into a more or less independent school of ``scientific materialism'', the name suggesting a definite anti-positivist and anti-idealistic orientation of the new teaching.Nevertheless, the difference between positivism and ``scientific realism'' is not infrequently hard to determine, mainly owing to the fact that both schools bear a distinct mark of reductionism. Logical positivism coming out against dualism strives to overcome it by reducing psychic to physical phenomena within the framework of scientific descriptions. The followers of ``scientific materialism'' are also engaged in reductions with practically the same aim as the positivists--- to eliminate dualism. The difference between these two schools consists in that ``scientific materialism'', in contrast to positivism, is concerned not with theoretical reductions, but with ontological ones, i.e. it strives to reduce psychic phenomena as such to physical phenomena. It is, in fact, the confusion of these two types of reduction that underlies endless debates in the literature on psychophysical problems.
Positivistic reductionism tends to treat the psychophysical problem within the narrow confines of the concept of unity of scientific knowledge casting aside all its so-called metaphysical aspects. The possibility of reducing the psychic to the physical is based here, and by no means accidentally, on the theory of meaning alone: the description of an object in psychical terms must have the same meaning as its description in physical terms. The proof of the unity, naturally, boils down to the logico-semantic analysis of statements. Logical positivism maintains that __PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9-1152 129 psychological statements cannot be directly translated into physical ones. Yet one can speak of them as being identical if they are considered to be just different methods of describing one and the same object. The direct experience of human beings, as well as the experience we sometimes ascribe to some higher animals is identical with certain aspects of nervous processes in the organism. ``What is had-in-experience, and (in the case of human beings) knowable by acquaintance, is identical with the object of knowledge by description provided first by moral behavior theory and this is in turn identical with what the science of neuro-physiology = describes.''^^1^^ The author of this statement, as we see, does not accentuate physical identity---he emphasises the fact that in the two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge through the realisation of one's own ``raw sensations'' and the knowledge by description differing from each other both in the source of information or language and in the method of verification we in fact deal with one and the same object which gives us the right to speak of their identity.
Very characteristic is also Feigl's pronounced positivistic approach to the problem: he sincerely believes that the identity thesis eliminates any ontological interpretation of the psychophysical problem and thereby abolishes psychophysical dualism.
According to Feigl, the ``mental'' and the ``physical'' are identical in that the mental terms, on the one hand, and some neuro-physiological terms, _-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, ``The `Mental' and the `Physical'\thinspace'', in: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~II, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958, p.~446.
130 on the other, have similar meanings and, as scientific progress goes on, tend to converge so that their correlation gradually turns into actual identity. Feigl distinguishes between direct sense experience ``(raw sensations'') which carries direct knowledge of our mental states, and the experience expressed in some very personal language. All empirical concepts are based entirely on this personal language, since they form ``a higher degree of = certainty''.^^1^^Despite a certain deviation from the positivist paradigm noted by numerous authors, Feigl nevertheless does not desert it completely. The physicalism of his position is, on the whole, far removed from consistent, i.e. dialectical, materialism, though Feigl sometimes notes (hat the term ``physical'' in the ``personal language'' denotes an aggregate of molecules whose action produces a sensory impression.
In its solution of the mind-body problem ``scientific materialism'' (``realism'') seeks to overcome the barrier set up by positivism and find a way to objective reality which is pictured as having its own existence independent of the process of cognition, yet being knowable only through the medium of science. Here the function of reduction is different---it consists in creating a scientific image of the world, ontology, representing the real processes as they actually happen. ``Determining whether or not materialism can be true,'' writes Jerry Fodor, ``is part of understanding the relation between theories in psychology and theories in neurology---a relation that many philosophers believe poses a stumbling block for _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~392.
__PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__ 9* 131 the doctrine of the unity of science. In particular, it is sometimes maintained that the unity of science requires that it prove possible to `reduce' psychological theories to neurological theories, the model of reduction being provided by the relation between constructs in chemistry and those in = physics''^^1^^.The treatment of the mind-body problem by positivism is also criticised by Australian philosopher J.J. Smart who unequivocally dissociates himself from its dualism. He writes: ``In so far as 'after-image' or 'ache' is report of a process, it is report of a process that happens to be a brain process. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain = processes.''^^2^^ Criticising dualism, Smart counterposes to it what he styles as his ``materialistic metaphysics''.
According to Smart, every year science provides more and more convincing proof that man is nothing but a psychophysical mechanism. Sooner or later his behaviour will be exhaustively characterised in the corresponding terms. In point of fact, there is nothing in the world besides a complex aggregate of physical particles, protons and _-_-_
^^1^^ J.~A. Fodor, ``Materialism'', in: Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Ed. by D.~M. Rosenthal, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.~J., 1971, p.~128.
^^2^^ J. J. Smart, ``Sensations and Brain Processes'', in: Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, op. cit., p.~56.
132 electrons, and their interaction, and the only real laws of science are the laws of physics and chemistry.As we see, unlike former materialism which gravitated towards ontological reductionism, i.e. tended to reduce real psychic and mental processes to physical phenomena, modern ``scientific materialism'' strives to substitute the knowledge of physical objects for the objects themselves thereby identifying reality with its linguistic image. The difference of the approaches to the mental-physical or mind-body problem on the part of Feigl, on the one hand, and Smart or Sellars, on the other, consists in that the neopositivist faction focuses on this problem in order to discard it as metaphysical by reducing the mental to the physical, whereas ``scientific materialism'' as a form of ``scientific realism'' pursues quite a different aim---to translate the descriptive language used to characterise mental processes into the language of science in order to be able to construct a scientific ontology of mental processes. The reductionist approach to the consciousness-brain problem characteristic of ``scientific realism'' and positivism, the attempts of both schools to reduce all spiritual phenomena exclusively to neuro-physiological processes are largely traceable to their common traditions. The similarity of the ``realistic'' and positivist views also shows up in their exaggerated emphasis on the analysis of the language used to describe processes in interest. For all that, one ought to distinguish between positivist reductions and the reductions proposed by the ``scientific materialists'' who sincerely strive for a materialistic solution of the above problem.
133It should be noted that in its approach to the mind-body problem aimed at creating a new scientific ontology of mental processes ``scientific materialism'', like ``scientific realism'' in general, makes certain concessions to idealism and cannot be credited with consistency. ``scientific realism'' as a whole regards the ontology of mental processes and, for that matter, ontology at large as a peculiar projection of scientific knowledge on the outer world, as a certain theoretical assumption which follows of necessity from the adopted system of scientific knowledge. Hence, reality as understood by ``realism'' is identified with the current scientific picture of the world and even with the language whereby the present or eventually possible reality is described. ``The specific input to NPP [new philosophy of physics] should be the whole of physics, past and present, classical and quantal,'' writes Bunge. ``The corresponding output should be a realistic account (analysis and theory) of actual and optimal research procedures, of conceived and conceivable ideas, of currently pursued and possible goals both in theoretical and experimental = physics.''^^1^^
As we see, ``realism'' offers no criterion for distinguishing between the really existing objects of science and purely mental, theoretical ones which, consequently, need not necessarily have their analogues in the material world. It proceeds from the conviction that reality outside the language of science, i.e. reality as such, is nonsensical since all true judgements of reality can only be expressed in scientific notions.
According to R.~Rorty, the traditional _-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.~Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p.~12.
134 description of psychic and spiritual phenomena in modern culture must also be replaced by scientific description which is to be given priority. All other languages are not only inadequate, they are simply anachronistic, akin to demons and evil = spirits.^^1^^ On the face of it, this thesis is directed against phenomenalism and the later views of Wittgenstein who underscored the decisive significance of the analysis of everyday language as a panacea for all unpleasant dilemmas of modern science and advocated the concept of the plurality of languages. Yet it is quite obvious that the language of science reflects primarily the most general or universal properties and links of being and is incapable of conveying the boundless richness of relations in the real world. The deficiencies of scientific knowledge are to be made up for by literature, painting, music, sculpture and other forms of human culture. The underestimation of the humanitarian forms of culture by all ``scientific realism'' is yet another feature which draws it closer to positivist philosophy. It is not fortuitous that both positivism and ``realism'' seek to ' reduce the broad diversity of individual traits to a few rather lean abstractions and show undisguised scepticism regarding the possibility of penetrating the inmost recesses of human heart. ``The conceptual framework of persons,'' writes Sellars, ``is not something that needs to be reconciled with the scientific image, but rather something to be joined to = it.''^^2^^ _-_-_^^1^^ See R.~Rorty, ``Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories'', in: Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, op. cit., p.~179.
^^2^^ Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, op. cit. p.~40.
135It should be noted that distinguishing between ontology and objective reality as such calls for analysis of scientific knowledge from the angle of the relation of the objective to the subjective in its content. The accomplishment of this task, in turn, presupposes a comprehensive study of the subject's role in scientific cognition, of his intellectual possibilities and limitations, merits and demerits, the theoretical heritage and the new concepts and hypotheses, abstractions and assumptions, philosophical and theoretical premises, etc. It is only through such a comprehensive study that one can reveal the objective component of theoretical knowledge and regard it as truly scientific ontology. As to the ontology which is being constructed by scientific realism outside the crucible of philosophical examination, it does not go beyond the generalisation of special knowledge and the extrapolation or even direct ontologisation of current scientific theories.
The example of Bunge, Quine and other representatives of ``scientific realism'' shows that this school, having made some obvious concessions to idealism, has also failed so far to dissociate itself completely from the idealistic understanding of metaphysics as such. Scientific metaphysics which is identified with ontology by most of the ``scientific realists'' should in fact be regarded as a sphere of general scientific or metatheoretical research. It lies beyond the limits of theoretical knowledge proper, though its generalisation level is below the level of philosophical laws and principles as understood by dialectical materialism. From the viewpoint of ``scientific realism'', the analysis of problems belonging to this 136 sphere does not call for their serious examination either in terms of materialism or dialectics, the latter being in special disfavour with this philosophical school.
It is only natural, therefore, that the ontology thus constructed turns out to be indeed metaphysical, and sometimes in the worst sense of the word at that, as it is not amenable to any critical analysis in terms of either philosophical (dialectical and materialist) or special scientific concepts.
``Scientific realism'' makes a very vague distinction between ontological and scientific theoretical problems and this in fact amounts to postulating a new philosophical discipline. ``Philosophy, or what appeals to me under that head,'' writes Quine, ``is continuous with science. It is a wing of science in which aspects of method are examined more deeply, or in a wider perspective than elsewhere. It is also a wing in which the objectives of a science receive more than average scrutiny, and the significance of the results receives special = appreciation.''^^1^^
To sum up, the characteristic features of ``scientific realism'' are its anti-positivist orientation and persistent search for non-traditional ways in the development of the methodology of science. Life shows, however, that this school has no future as an independent philosophical trend and as a serious alternative to positivism because it proceeds from the incompatibility of _-_-_
^^1^^ W.~V. Quine, ``Philosophical Progress in Language Theory'', in: Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1970. p.~3.
137 materialism and dialectics within a single philosophical doctrine. Assessed in general terms, ``scientific realism'' represents a certain tendency of the bourgeois philosophy of science to turn from positivism to the objective analysis of scientific knowledge. [138] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER TWO __ALPHA_LVL1__ SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVEObjectivity of knowledge has been a key issue in the course of the entire history of philosophical thought. In our time, too, it remains a touchstone of the true attitude of one or another philosophical school to science revealing the extent of its influence on social and practical life. Those philosophers who show interest in this problem have always been aware, vaguely or keenly, that knowledge which cannot be regarded as objective is powerless or useless, and that the practices relying on such pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even harmful. Failing to meet the requirements of objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary.
Philosophical schools do not always focus their attention on the problem of objectivity, let alone placing it in the foreground. Wittingly or unwittingly, it is often overshadowed by other issues, seemingly more concrete and, at first sight, more pressing. Yet it always underlies all controversies over the place and role of metaphysics, i.e. over 139 the subject-matter of philosophy, and has a direct bearing on such problems as the relation of sensory experience to theory, induction to deduction, truth to error, etc. Therefore the problem of the objectivity of knowledge sometimes becomes, as it were, a concentrate of many issues pertaining to different aspects of the theory of knowledge.
It would not be correct to say that this problem has been treated separately from all other problems of the methodology of science, such as causality, determinism, laws of development, etc. Yet its solution has always been determined primarily by the answer to the question if reality exists outside and independently of man. Any answer to this, be it positive, negative or fifty-fifty, and even abstention from any answer at all, is in itself a sufficiently clear indication of the philosopher's views on the content and nature of knowledge. Attempts to elude the issue have never helped to make the philosophers' and scientists' life easier---on the contrary, the muddle has always grown worse.
In its attempts to reject all unscientific, metaphysical problems, including the problem of the independent existence of objective reality and such ``absolutes'' as matter, substance, space, causality and others, positivism has proved to be no more fortunate than other philosophical schools. However, it would be interesting and instructive to trace the impact of the objectivity problem on positivist philosophy in general, and on its specific concepts and notions in particular. This question deserves special attention if only for the fact that numerous gullible authors take in all good faith the rejection by positivism of 140 the problem of the existence of objective reality as metaphysical, whereas others, aware of the latent contradiction in the views of the positivist writers, suspect them of a crafty intention to conceal the true meaning of their philosophy and its subjectivism. As a matter of fact, neither of these views can be accepted without serious reservations. The issue is much more complicated than is implied by the proposed explanations.
There is yet another aspect to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge in positivist philosophy---the understanding of its true attitude to this problem provides a key to understanding the modern criticism of the positivist programme by ``critical rationalism'', ``scientific realism'', ``scientific materialism'', etc.
Being always opposed, as it was, to the discussion of the so-called metaphysical problems and, in particular, refusing to investigate the relation of knowledge to the objective world and bother about the origin of scientific knowledge and what lies behind this knowledge, positivism could not afford to discard completely the principle of the objectivity of knowledge. Declaring against this principle would be tantamount to opposing the fundamental scientific tradition, in fact, the entire history of science which has always held that objectivity was its chief goal and basic trait distinguishing it from other forms of knowledge and intellectual culture.
Positivism has regarded traditional philosophy to be metaphysical first and foremost because it postulates the existence of transcendental reality different from and independent of the sensuous world. The question of the existence of the physical world independent of sensory experience has 141 always been viewed by positivism from Comte to Reichenbach as a pseudo-problem at best. Refusing to discuss the origin of scientific knowledge, positivism has also regarded as metaphysical the question of its development not only from the historical, but also from the logical angle. Both these negative premises of positivist philosophy have led to a number of dramatic conclusions. For instance, Mach not only discards the ``absolutes'' of Newton's mechanics, for which he had good reason, but also declares himself against the atomic theory. Accepting the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, Carnap and Reichenbach interpret them merely as logical devices to systematise and harmonise sensory experience.
In the notes to his article ``The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language'' (1957) Carnap comes out against idealism as a metaphysical tendency. At the same time, expressing his attitude to metaphysics he writes: ``This term is used for the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of empirically founded, inductive science. Metaphysics in this sense includes systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, = Heidegger.''^^1^^ Carnap is evidently not aware of the fact that this criticism reaches far beyond his target and hits the theoretical pillars of all modern science, as well as its material foundation. Reichenbach, on his part, ignores the real dialectical unity of the corpuscular and wave properties of matter which was not known to classical physics and which is considered in Bohr's concept _-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language'', in: Logical Positivism, op. cit., p.~80.
142 of complementarity developed and elaborated, among others, by Vladimir Fock and his disciples. In his philosophical discourse on quantum mechanics Reichenbach makes certain assumptions regarding the terms ``particle'' and ``wave'' which, in his opinion, are ``neither true nor false'' and proposes a theory of equivalent descriptions according to which both the corpuscular and wave interpretations are admissible under certain conditions as ``they say the same thing, merely using different = languages''.^^1^^The independent existence of objects made no serious problem for the researchers in classical science. First, their attention was mainly focused on the external side of the physical world and science was only building up strength to penetrate the hidden mechanisms of phenomena and processes, the structure of physical bodies, the earth's bowels, the intricate heredity carriers and the laws of cosmic processes. Second, the notions expressing the properties of objects and phenomena under observation differed but little . from current everyday concepts. Third, the distorting influence of the researcher on objects and phenomena under investigation was incommensurate, even in terms of energy alone, with real processes in nature and could not therefore affect to any appreciable degree the course or direction of these processes. Finally, progress in scientific cognition was very slow and scientific concepts and theories were not subject to rapid change, at least on a historical scale. Knowledge accumulated and grew in scope without any serious breakdowns. _-_-_
^^1^^ Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1956, p.~218.
143 Revolutionary changes in science were regarded by scientists themselves as something quite out of the ordinary.Positivism as a philosophical teaching was a typical product of its time, though it was not destined to have a long life. As physics and other sciences were passing on from macroscopic objects familiar to man from his everyday experience to the inner structure of matter, the problem of objectivity was acquiring essentially new scope and dimensions. Scientific notions were more departing from the ideal of sensual certitude, observability. Particularly heavy was the blow delivered on the principle of sensual certitude by the discovery of electron and other microparticles at the end of the 19th century.
The crisis in physics at the turn of the century was regarded as crisis of all former scientific ideals, including the ideal of objective knowledge and, consequently, as a crisis of materialism. The fact that objects under investigation could be observed no longer was used by positivist philosophy not for revising its mistaken views, but for confusing the issue, namely, for rejecting the idea of any reality beyond the limits of sensory experience. Incidentally, it is precisely this philosophy clinging to the obsolete ideals of empirical science that bears responsibility for the survival of the dogmas of metaphysical materialism in natural sciences till the end of the 19th century---the dogmas which had been discredited and buried by dialectical materialism half a century earlier.
If objective reality is only what is observable, the task and the function of theory consist merely in finding as yet unknown observable 144 and measurable objects proceeding from the available sensory experience and taking into account the body of mathematics. In this case theory does not play any independent role and its function is confined to purely logical analysis leading a scientist from one sensory experience to another.
The obvious implication of this approach is that a non-classical theory should be free from any new notions, i.e. notions having any new physical meaning, new objective content. A physical theory is merely a new logical means to systematise the observable.
Quantum mechanics, however, proved to be not only far removed from the ideals of positivism---it was a direct challenge to it, despite some temporary rapprochement between them regarding the principles of causality and objectivity which ended in a complete alienation, evidently final. The positivists regarded quantum mechanics as an expression of experience or its elements connected by formal logical means. By contrast, Bohr's aim was rather to find out the conditions making experience possible, i.e. its necessary premises. The so-called Copenhagen interpretation is often associated with the assertion that ``the non-existent cannot be observable''. Its essence, however, will be more accurately summed up in this statement: the observable is definitely existent, the nonobservable allows of certain suppositions.
The purpose of research in classical physics was to establish definite phenomena taking place in space and time and to investigate laws determining the course of processes. A problem was considered solved if the researcher succeeded __PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__ 10--1152 145 in proving that a process did take place in space and time. The method whereby the process had been cognised, the observations which had made it possible to ascertain its existence experimentally were absolutely immaterial. In the quantum theory the physicist is faced with an entirely different situation. The very fact that the mathematical scheme of quantum mechanics is not a graphic representation of processes taking place in space and time shows that it can only permit calculating the probability of one or another result of an experiment based on the experimental knowledge of the previous state of the atom system, in so far as the latter has not been subjected to any other disturbances except those needed by the experimentalists themselves. Even a most complete set of experimental conditions cannot give more than a mere probability of the result expected in the next experiment on the system. To the positivists it was a sure sign that any objectivity of the processes in interest was entirely out of the question. Each observation led to a certain discrete change of the mathematical values characterising the atomic process and, consequently, to a discrete change of the physical phenomenon itself. In contrast to the classical theory, where the method of observation was immaterial for the process under investigation, in the quantum theory the disturbance produced by each observation of atom phenomena plays a decisive role. Further, since any observation can only be summed up in probability statements as regards the results of later observations, the account of the essentially uncontrollable disturbance component must become, according to Bohr, a decisive factor 146 in constructing a quantum theory free from contradictions.
As distinct from positivism in general or, at least, from its most radical (or most naive) versions, Bohr did not consider sensory data to be elementary entities. What he called phenomena could only be defined within a broader context of ``reality''. This reality as the context of experience could be set by concepts performing the role of definite conditions or premises of classical physics. Bohr usually meant two such conditions: spatial-time description and causality which were only compatible within the classical model of events. In his opinion, the discovery of the quantum of action had led to a break between them and to the adoption of the principle of complementarity of descriptions.
Things being as they were, Bohr and a number of his followers made an attempt to combine the object of observations, the measuring apparatus and the observer into a single quantum-mechanical system and thus to eliminate uncertainty. In his speech on receiving a Nobel prize, Werner Heisenberg said that classical physics was the kind of aspiration for the knowledge of nature in which scientists strove to make conclusions on objective processes proceeding in fact from their sensations and refusing to take into account the influences of all observations on the object being observed. Quantum mechanics, on the contrary, obtained the possibility of considering atomic processes by partly refusing to objectivise them and describe in terms of space and time.
Despite the controversies lasting many years this interpretation known as the ``Copenhagen __PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__ 10* 147 approach'' has not yet completely lost its grip on the minds of philosophers and physicists many of whom are still inclined to think that by breaking with the traditions of classical science quantum mechanics has opened up a new epoch. ``Quantum mechanics,'' writes, for instance, J.~A. Wheeler, ``has led us to take seriously and explore the ... view that the observer is as essential to the creation of the universe as the universe is to the creation of the observer... Unless the blind dice of mutation and natural selection lead to life and consciousness and observership at some point down the road, the universe could not have come into being in the first place; ... there would be nothing rather than = something.''^^1^^ Hence, quantum mechanics provides a new point of reference for understanding all events in the universe, including its emergence in the form which engendered our life itself. Reality, according to Wheeler, can no longer be regarded as independent of the observer.
Eugene Wigner, too, is inclined to share the opinion that quantum mechanics deals with nothing else but ``measurements'' or ``observations''. He maintains that the equations of movement both in classical and quantum mechanics do not describe reality but are merely instruments to calculate the probability of certain results of observations. His opinion is in full conformity with the positivist views that the observation becomes fulfilled when the _-_-_
^^1^^ J.~A. Wheeler, ``Genesis and Observership'', in: Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Ed. by R.~E. Butts and J.~Hintikka, Dordrecht, 1977, p.~27 ff.
148 observer's consciousness is brought into play and that not a single system has any definite measurement attributes of its own---they appear only as a result of the very process of measurement or simultaneously with it. In this connection Wigner writes: ``It is the entering of an impression into our consciousness which alters the wave function because it modifies our appraisal of the probabilities for different impressions which we expect to receive in the future. It is at this point that the consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and unalterably. If one speaks in terms of the wave function, its changes are coupled with the entering of impressions into our = consciousness.''^^1^^ There is nothing surprising, according to Wigner, in that idealism provides the most relevant representation of the world. Even if it were possible to exclude the observer (or sensations) from the analysis of a quantum-mechanical situation, it would be necessary, in Wigner's opinion, to project him mentally.Indeed, observation and measurement are important requisites for the construction of quantum mechanics. The admission of this fact, however, leaves open the question of the relations between the components of this unity--- the system, the instrument and the observer. Wigner's method reduces the first two to the last one. The independent existence of physical objects is called in question. To be sure, Wigner does not aver that consciousness creates its images in absolute vacuum or that physical _-_-_
^^1^^ E.~P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections, Bloomington, Indiana, 1967, p.~175.
149 theories are products of immaterial elements. His viewpoint, rather, consists in that scientific research is limited to the sphere of actually existing, i.e. observable, events. Wigner does not simply repeat the arguments of Machist philosophy but goes further making the object more and more dependent on observation. This view leads, in fact, to the elimination of the positivist concept of system-instrument unity in favour of the logical primacy of the observer.As a result, reality becomes the world of experience or the ``empirical world''. Modern physicist S.~W. Hawking goes even as far as asserting the existence of some impenetrable ``curtain'' which completely shuts out everything that lies behind it. In his opinion, gravitational collapse sets an obvious barrier to scientific cognition which can hardly be expected to be overcome even in the distant future. The thing is that the inner state of the ``black hole'' is, according to theoretical calculation, unobservable in principle. Hence, gravitation provides an example of uncertainty regarding the existence of real objects, which is even of a higher order than the uncertainty in quantum mechanics. Recalling Einstein's winged words ``God does not play dice'' in his well-known controversy with Bohr, the author even attempts to strengthen Bohr's arguments. In his opinion, ``God not only plays dice, he sometimes throws the dice where they cannot be = seen.''^^1^^
Another threat to the objectivity of scientific knowledge comes from the probability _-_-_
^^1^^ S.~W. Hawking, ``Breakdown of Predictability in Gravitational Collapse'', Physical Review, Vol.~14, No.~10, 1976, p.~2464.
150 interpretation of the so-called Ψ-function. According to Bohr, the wave and corpuscular theories of microparticles need not necessarily be contradictory in reality despite their conceptual incompatibility. Both theories are equally important for the physical reality, each covering a definite type of situations, and consequently, are complementary. Proceeding from this viewpoint, some physicists and philosophers came to the conclusion that the Ψ-function is a wave function representing the density of probability and, consequently, is merely a mental projection of theory on a physical situation.In point of fact, nothing but the form of mathematical equations makes it possible to treat a particle as a certain ``density of probability'' which can represent it in an experiment. The Ψfunction provides but a partial description of physical reality and, besides, merges the object and the subject into a single whole. Though, according to Heisenberg, we can separate them temporarily in different specific situations, they can never be completely detached from each = other.^^1^^
Erwin Schrodinger contends that one can hardly assert the existence of waves in nature if probability is their characteristic feature. In his opinion, one can only speak of the probability of an event if one believes that it does occur now and then. If the probability function does not describe any physical reality in an experiment it definitely does not give any _-_-_
^^1^^ See W.~Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, London, 1958, pp.~22, 28--29; see also Physics and Philosophy, London, 1959, Ch.~III.
151 information on what takes place ``between two experiments''.As we see, some of the above arguments boil down to the assertion that what is not observable cannot be accepted by science. Others emphasise the fact that wave is the only form of quantum movement in space, which is attested to by such physical phenomena as interference, diffraction and others. Since waves represent nothing but probability, doubt is cast on the existence of particles in the period between the experiments ascertaining their presence.
It should be noted that the above viewpoint leaves out of account two important circumstances. First, any experimental set is a macrosystem. Analysing the results of experiments, a physicist cannot but proceed from certain laws governing physical phenomena. As a rule, he does not have to resort to probability functions. Second, the idea of the inseparable unity of the subject and the object reflects the simple fact that dynamic and spatial parameters cannot be defined simultaneously in a single experiment. Indeed, certainty can only be attained within definite limits. This fact, however, gives no grounds at all for a conclusion that the unity of the object and the subject is inseparable in general. Besides, even if particles do appear in the course of an experiment only, as is the case with excited vacuum (virtual particles), probability as a state is no less objective than actuality. From the viewpoint of the positivist interpretation of physical reality the very idea of such objectivity is bound to look preposterous indeed.
The real obstacle confronting the experimentalist and preventing him from accurately 152 defining the parameters of a moving particle consists at present in the objective and glaring contradiction between the absense of any system capable of emanating or absorbing less than one quantum of energy, on the one hand, and the inevitability of the exchange of energy, however negligible, between the instrument and the object in any measurement or experiment, on the other. As regards the microworld, where one quantum of action and the object under measurement are commensurate, any process of measurement will cause a substantial change in the state of the object. All that does not prove, however, that the existence of the object in microphysics is completely dependent on the subject.
It stands to reason that the observability of an object as such does not provide a solid ground for scientific cognition. The progress of theoretical research and particularly quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, have revealed the inadequacy and limitations of observation as a method of cognition to the positivists themselves. The development of theoretical science has enhanced the danger of solipsism which was evident even to the Machists way back in the late 19th century. The very fact that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity appear to be equally meaningful to different people irrespective of their nationality and ideological affiliation has called for a considerable extension of the notion of objectivity. From the methodological viewpoint, the philosophers of science have begun to attach ever growing significance to Hume's old idea that the focus of attention should be shifted from the observation of 153 individual phenomena to the regular repetition of events, their regular concomitance or sequence. A separate experiment can neither confirm, nor refute a hypothesis---it takes a whole series or succession of observations. Philipp Frank, a representative of late logical positivism, wrote: ``A single experiment can only refute a `theory' if we mean by `theory' a system of specific statements with no allowance for modification. But what is actually called a 'theory' in science is never such a system... Therefore, no crucial experiment can refute any such = theories.''^^1^^ From this it follows that one of the main requirements to an experiment is its reproducibility at different times and in different parts of the universe.
What is the purpose of this methodological principle leading to the denial of the decisive role of experiments in science? Its aim is to replace the criterion of observability by the criterion of inter subjective verification of knowledge. As a result, objectivity becomes equivalent to intersubjectivity. Solipsism can be avoided (without resorting, like Berkeley, to God) by recognising at least the existence of other people. But this is not all, of course. It must also be postulated that people are alike everywhere, consequently, the reality constructed by them will also be similar everywhere. Contrary to common sense which accepts only one physical world, the emphasis on the subject who is the architect of reality leads to a tempting idea that different scientific theories and, consequently, their authors represent different worlds which _-_-_
^^1^^ Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.~J., 1957, p.~31.
154 they themselves construct. To avoid absolute relativism ensuing from this concept, it is necessary to show additionally how one experience can be compared with another, i.e. to solve the problem of their mutual correction. Naturally enough, subjective experience may fail to tally with what is regarded true by common consent. Let us consider at least one of the answers to this question proposed by Max Born which is sufficiently typical of all attempts of the positivists to find a way out of a difficult situation without forfeiting their main dogmas.Expounding his views, Born describes a conversation with his cousin who asked him a puzzling question way back in his school years: ``What do you mean exactly when you call this leaf, here, green or the sky, there, blue?'' Dissatisfied with Born's reference to the impressions of other people who all saw green and blue like he did, the cousin said: ``There are colourblind people who see the colours differently; some of them, for example, cannot distinguish red and = green.''^^1^^
The answer to this question appeared to be far from simple and the question itself was evidently not at all as superfluous as it had seemed at first to Born, if he deemed it necessary to return to it time and again in his declining years. Moreover, Born admitted that he had found the meaning of this question even more profound after he had got acquainted with the classical answers to it given by Kant, Russell, Mach, and Hume. Assessing the positivist doctrine _-_-_
^^1^^ Max Born, My Life and My Views, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968, pp. 161--62.
155 alongside those of other philosophical schools he was to some degree familiar with, Born wrote: ``In the most radical interpretation this theory means a denial of the existence of an external world, or at least the negation of its knowability. In practical life a follower of this doctrine would hardly behave as if there were no external = world.''^^1^^Born, however, does not accept the materialist view either. In his opinion, dialectical materialism has so broadened the concept of matter that its initial meaning has been completely lost and the concept itself has become too far removed from concrete problems of physics. The existence of the real, objective, knowable world, according to Born, has turned into a sanctified creed.
Born offers his own solution to the problem of objectivity of knowledge. In his opinion, the impossibility to prove the objective existence of green leaves and the blue sky is rooted in the attempt to reach an agreement on a single sensory impression. Such a task, according to Born, is nonsensical. Objective knowledge can only be reached by obtaining the perceptions of two communicable impressions which lend themselves to intersubjective verification. The equality or inequality of such impressions can already be ascertained quite definitely. Born lays special emphasis on the communicability of impressions. One person cannot give an adequate description of his sensations which he experiences when looking at a green leaf, but two persons together can come to an agreement regarding the colour of the leaf they observe.
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., p.~166.
156Objectivity is thus reduced to the equality of impressions. An important means of comparing impressions is a symbol, i.e. a visual or a sound signal the exact form of which is not important--- what matters is the information conveyed by this symbol. One and the same set of data can be represented by different signals. Symbols performing the function of data carriers during intercourse between individuals are of decisive importance in attaining objective knowledge.
The process of cognition is visualised by Born as follows. A child assimilates language as the totality of symbols and learns to correlate them with one another. It is worth noting that Born does not speak of the correlation between symbols and the objective world, but of the correlation between different symbols with definite meanings. Hence, given the ability to manipulate symbols, the measurement of heat intensity can be presented as the process of correlation of the sensation of heat with a geometrical value (the height of the mercury column in a thermometer). Learning provides man with a dictionary and enables him to correlate sensations through the agency of thermometer readings, i.e. to correlate his sensations with other people's sensations. Similarly, chemistry teaches people to correlate different substances with a combination of symbols denoting elementary basic components (atoms). By correlating atomic weights with the symbols of elements one can learn the corresponding molecular weights, whereas the correlation of valency with the symbols of atoms makes it possible to forecast the results of chemical reactions.
Such correspondence of sense data 157 (perceptions and the corresponding symbols) is established, according to Born, in all spheres of experience. Born notes the existence and coincidence of structures which are identified with the help of the sense organs and indicates that the corresponding impressions can be passed from one individual to another. He is even inclined to call these structures after Kant ``things-in-themselves''. Physical formulae and systems of equations need not necessarily symbolise what is known from experience and what can be visualised. Yet Born is convinced that all these formulae are deduced from experience through abstraction and a continuous process of experimental test.
For the sake of objectivity, the scientists should describe the essence of their abstract formulae in the plain language, using self-evident notions. Yet modern science, according to Born, cannot avoid subjectivity, no matter how hard the scientists may try to do so. On the whole, Born's interpretation of the complementarity principle falls in line with the principles of the Copenhagen school: a scientist is free to choose the experimental apparatus which is to be used in his experiment. However, the selection of the apparatus determines the picture of reality. ``Thus a subjective trend,'' writes Born, ``is reintroduced into physics and cannot be eliminated. Another loss of objectivity is due to the fact that the theory makes only probability predictions, which produce graded = expectations.''^^1^^
As we see, Born in fact substitutes the process of tuition and learning for the cognition of reality. He proceeds from an already existing _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~187.
158 system of knowledge which enables the individual experience of every man to be harmonised. This approach implies that individual experiences are identical and therefore do not need any comparison, elaboration and correction of their content. It is quite sufficient to correlate the symbols denoting one or another totality of impressions. Such a model has in fact nothing in common with the real process of scientific cognition which aims first and foremost at investigating new, unknown phenomena, but not at harmonising and systematising individual experiences with the help of an arbitrarily selected aggregate of symbols described by Born.Of course, the communicative aspect of scientific cognition is in itself an interesting philosophical problem, but it should not overshadow the essence of scientific cognition. Criticising Mach for his attempts to reduce the world to sense perceptions and the scientific theory to a means for establishing logical links between sense perceptions, Born is in fact very close to positivism in his understanding of the process of cognition. The world lying ``beyond phenomena'' indeed remains for Born something like the Kantian ``thing-in-itself'' which is not amenable to any determination. As a result, the problems of truth, of the certitude of knowledge and of the means for improving incomplete and inaccurate knowledge become superfluous. No reason whatsoever is given for the identity of our perceptions of reality, except for the reference to the selected system of symbols and to an agreement on their meanings---such identity is the more strange as the subjective perceptions of different people vary to a considerable extent 159 and as there are no similar people with equal abilities for perception, equal personal experiences, equal interests and equal stocks of knowledge, let alone many important personal qualities.
The investigation of these problems has long since transcended the bounds of physical science, though the problems themselves have not become any easier for that reason. On the contrary in such fields as chemistry, biology, the psychology of public opinion, and others where the possibilities for observation are limited, it has proved even more difficult to explain how subjective knowledge can be turned into objective knowledge, verifiable and applicable for practical purposes as it is. To save the principle of objectivity in these fields on the basis of empiricism, the philosophy of science had but one way out only---to sacrifice its traditional phenomenalist approach in favour of physicalism. This did not mean, however, a complete break with traditions, since the philosophical thinking of the positivists has always been characteristic of a peculiar symbiosis of both the phenomenalist and the physicalist approaches. Whereas the philosophers advocating phenomenalist analysis contended that sensory experience was the basis of knowledge from the epistemological viewpoint and that the statements expressing such experience formed the language of all meaningful propositions, the physicalists believed that the foundation of all knowledge was the observation of material things and that the statements of observation made the core of the language which was used for expressing the meaningful propositions of cognitive value. Carnap, for one, represented both these tendencies in different periods 160 of his life. Siding up first with the phenomenological branch of positivism, he became later one of the most persistent and, perhaps, most profound expounders of the second branch too. As a result of the evolution of his views, Carnap became, willy-nilly, an instrument for a considerable deflation of the initial claims of physicalism, though the latter has not lost its ground completely till nowadays.
For later-time Carnap, the foundation of knowledge is not irrefutable statements, as he believed earlier, but statements which underlie any scientific investigation and provide a psychological basis of cognition not only for a scientist, but also for any individual in general. It is these initial statements that can be connected intersubjectively with other statements and therefore make the objective foundation of knowledge. Carnap's radical physicalism boils down to the assertion that all meaningful statements can be connected in one way or another with a statement of the type: ``the temperature in this place varies within 5 to 10° C.'' According to Carnap, the statements of such sciences as biology, chemistry, geology, etc. can be reduced to physical notions because the type of determinism prevailing in these sciences can be reduced to physical determinism. ``All laws of nature,'' he writes, ``including those which hold for organisms, human beings, and human societies, are logical consequences of the physical laws, i.e. of those laws, which are needed for the explanation of inorganic = processes.''^^1^^ For instance, the notion _-_-_
^^1^^ The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Ed. by P.~A. Schillp, Open Court, London, 1963, p.~883.
__PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__ 11--1152 161 of impregnation can be interpreted in terms of merger of sperm and ovum accompanied by some redistribution of elements. Similarly, psychological knowledge, in Carnap's opinion, can be reduced to physical knowledge. Thus, a statement to the effect that somebody has been very angry at 10 a.m. today can be translated without any detriment to the scientific value of this statement into the language of physics by stating that the person's breathing and pulse have quickened, the muscles have strained, etc. True, Carnap concedes that this reduction may perhaps fail to provide a clear idea of the laws underlying impregnation in the first case, and the emotional process, in the second. Making this concession, Carnap does not concern himself about the nature of the impregnation process or the individual's inner world. He views the problem from the angle of verbal descriptions only. If such descriptions prove to be impossible for some reason or other, there can be no question of attaining intersubjectivity, i.e. the objectivity of biological and psychological phenomena as they are understood by different scientists.In turn, the correctness of the initial statements of observation is made by Carnap contingent on the extent of agreement between the sense data of different observers. If the sense data of each of the observers are consistent with the interpretation of the indications of a certain apparatus designed to fulfil a given task, it means that the initial statements required to form a scientific proposition have passed the test for viability.
True, intersubjective observability has certain advantages over the phenomenologic language 162 from the standpoint of the development of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, one can hardly take seriously the attempt, to construct all sciences, psychology and social disciplines including, on the basis of physics, arid expect all theoretical concepts and laws to be derived from physical concepts and laws. Being aware of the weakness of his position, Carnap later proposed several modified variants of the physicalist programme limiting it, for instance, to the reduction of all descriptive terms in the languages of different sciences to terms denoting sensuously perceived properties of things. In his opinion, the class of observable material predicates can provide a reliable basis for the reduction of all statements and for language integrity. For instance, the ability ``to be dissolved in water'' is revealed and confirmed by the observation of the fact of dissolution. It was a significant moderation of Carnap's initial stand, as the sphere of observable empirical and dispositional predicates is markedly broader than the .sphere of terms expressing our sense data in purely physical parameters. Finally, in one of his latest works entitled Philosophical Foundations of Physics Carnap beats a further retreat and confines himself to a mere recommendation of a very general character, an admonition rather than an injunction, advising the scientists to base their language on the language of physics wherever possible. This is all that remained of his formerly uncompromising physicalism.
Of certain interest in this context is also the position of Ernst Nagel, one of the latest and sufficiently radical adherents of the physicalist __PRINTERS_P_163_COMMENT__ 11* 163 principle of reductibility. Like all other philosophers siding with the modern philosophy of science and upholding some essential traditions of positivism, Nagel sees the meaningfulness of empirical statements in their connection with direct observation, considering logical links between them chiefly formal or linguistic. In his opinion, a theory can only be meaningful if its statements relate to potentially observable things and do not run counter to its principles. He denies meaningfulness to those statements which have no empirical confirmation. According to Nagel, the data of experience, observation statements and logical links play each their special role in the process of cognition.
Nagel maintains that any attempt to base the knowledge of physical facts on sensory data is doomed to failure. If the whole edifice of science were built on direct sensory experience, knowledge would never go beyond its limits.
Nagel contends that our knowledge includes objective facts, but not simple sensory data or some of their complexes localised in the sphere of sensory experience. It is only after investigation and by no means before it that we can claim the possession of sensory data. Investigation alone enables us to assert that the earth is round and that President Roosevelt remained in office longer than his predecessors.
In Nagel's opinion, the objectivity of our knowledge does not lead to metaphysical realism. He supports the view of some other physicalists that the doctrine whereby all statements on directly observable objects can be translated into the so-called physicalist language should be replaced by semantic realism in which 164 non-observable objects are represented by a system of nomological statements.
According to Nagel, in proposing the reduction of one theory to another we implicitly proceed from the assumption that there exist some methods to demonstrate the deducibility of one theory from another. ``In reductions of the sort so far mentioned,'' Nagel writes, ``the laws of the secondary science employ no descriptive terms that are not also used with approximately the same meanings in the primary science. Reductions of this type can therefore be regarded as establishing deductive relations between two sets of statements that employ a homogeneous = vocabulary.''^^1^^ Nagel admits that the secondary science sometimes includes notions which are absent from the primary science.
Understandably, positivist physicalism is directed against openly idealistic concepts which not only fail to provide adequate answers to acute theoretical questions, but in every way hamper the development of modern science. The biologists, for instance, can hardly be encouraged in their investigations by philosophical doctrines explaining all the processes in living organisms by the operation of mysterious immaterial agents such as entelechy or the vital force which do not yield to any rational determination or even description. Central to all these doctrines from Emil Dubois-Reymond's time till nowadays has been the idea of blessed ignorance---ignoramus et ignorabimus. A prominent biologist Konrad Lorenz says in his book The Reverse of the Mirror _-_-_
^^1^^ E.~Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York, 1961, p.~339.
165 that this view not only acts as a brake on scientific progress, but is also one of the gravest errors having a dire consequence---a doubt about the reality of the external = world.^^1^^ Lorenz deplores the belatedness of his enlightenment and notes that the practical problems of medicine and natural science have made him an opponent of idealism. This materialist tendency of modern science causes many biologists to turn their eyes to philosophical materialism.Confessions of this kind are not exceptions with prominent representatives of modern biology. Another well-known biologist, Francisco Ayala, makes this significant statement: ``The goal of science is the systematic organization of knowledge about the universe on the basis of explanatory principles that are genuinely = testable.''^^2^^ The reappraisal of values is characteristic not only of modern biology. Idealism is being subjected to devastating criticism in many works on the physiology of higher nervous activity, on neuropsychology, neurophysiology, etc.
Contrary to idealistic theories of knowledge the latest investigations in biology and psychology provide convincing evidence that human thinking is not entirely autonomous. Viewed from both the psychological and epistemological angles, it represents the ability of highly organised living systems to reflect, i.e. to cognise, the external world and themselves.
_-_-_^^1^^ See K.~Lorenz, Die R\"uckseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlicher Erkennens, R.~Piper & Co. Verlag, M\"unchen, 1975, S.~27.
^^2^^ F.~J. Ayala, ``Biology as an Autonomous Science'', in: Topics in the Philosophy of Biology, M.~Grene and E.~Mendelsohn (eds.), Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1976, p.~312.
166How does this materialistic tendency reveal itself in the modern ``philosophy of science''?
Several trends are in evidence here. The beaten track for the adherents of this philosophy is to restrict the problem of objectivity to the problem of observation and accumulation of empirical data. Since the observation of intimate biological processes is identified by many scientists with the analysis of their physical manifestations, their materialism not infrequently borders on physicalism. When it comes to the analysis of new phenomena, particularly in biology, psychology and sociology, the researchers seek in the first place to trace them to the operation of physical or chemical mechanisms. Naturally enough, it is the only way to ``transfer'' many biological, psychological, social, demographic and other processes to the sphere of the observable. Carnap writes that the physical language is universal. This is the thesis of physicalism. If the physical language on the grounds of its universality were adopted as the system language of science, all science would become physics. The various domains of science would become parts of unified science. According to Carnap, the laws of psychology are special cases of physical laws holding in inorganic physics as well. Identifying all materialism with its mechanistic trend, Carnap believes that the materialist system corresponds to the viewpoint of the empirical sciences, since in this system all concepts are reduced to the = physical.^^1^^
It is common knowledge that molecular genetics and molecular biology owe their _-_-_
^^1^^See Logical Positivism, op. cit., pp. 166--67, 144.
167 achievements to modern physics and chemistry. Physico-chemical investigations have enabled scientists to make the greatest discoveries in modern genetics---to reveal the molecular structure of DNA (desoxyribonucleic acid) as the carrier of genetic information and to define the role of nucleic acids, their molecular and sub-molecular structures, in heredity. These epoch-making achievements of molecular genetics and molecular biology have given a new impetus to the mechanistic doctrine and mechanistic reductionism according to which all life processes and properties of living organisms, as well as the origin and evolution of living matter can be explained with the help of physico-chemical investigations of microstructures and microprocesses in living organisms.The history of science shows that the ideas stimulating scientific investigations in their initial stage do not always prove beneficial for the subsequent progress of science. The inception of molecular biology was indeed marked by the influence of the physicalist paradigm. Noting this fact, E.~N. Lightfoot, however, seeks to perpetuate it: in his opinion, the investigations in molecular biology have been based on the view that living organisms are subjected to the same laws as inanimate objects and can be denoted by terms corresponding to these laws. Now, says Ayer, he holds the same view, though on a higher level of complexity and comprehension.
This mechanistic approach has been expressed in a most uncompromising form by the discoverers of the molecular structure of DNA, John Watson and Francis Crick. In one of his lectures 168 in 1966, Crick declared that the ultimate goal of the modern development of biology was explanation of all biological phenomena on the basis of achievements in physical and chemical sciences. In his opinion, there were very good reasons for that. The revolution in physics in the mid-1920s provided a solid theoretical basis for chemistry and for the corresponding departments of physics. According to Crick, it would not be presumptuous to assert that the quantum theory and the available empirical knowledge in chemistry provide at present a no less reliable foundation for the construction of biological science.
Crick's reference to quantum rather than to classical mechanics is indicative of a new trend in the modern doctrine of physicalism. Nevertheless, the essence of this doctrine does not change--- as before, it represents a tendency to express biological phenomena, processes and laws in the physico-chemical language.
Taking exception to ``organicism'' and ``holism'' one of the representatives of this trend Jacques Monod writes: ``Some philosophical schools (all of them being consciously or unconsciously under Hegel's influence) are known to contest the significance of analytical approach to such complex systems as living beings. According to these schools (organicists or holists) which rise from ashes like Phoenix with every new generation, the analytical approach qualified as reductionist has always been sterile since it tends to reduce, purely and simply, the properties of extremely complex organisations to a mechanical aggregate of the properties of their parts. Harmful and useless is any argument with holists which testifies to nothing but their utter 169 ignorance regarding the scientific method and the essential part played in it by = analysis.''^^1^^
Monod also rejects the general theory of = systems^^2^^ and any ``dialectical = description''^^3^^ of living organisms. According to Monod, the cell is indeed a machine which defies any ``dialectical'' description. In its essence it is not Hegelian, but Cartesian. According to Kenneth Schaffner, regarded to be a typical representative of modern mechanistic reductionism and physicalism, the discovery of Watson and Crick also contributes to a general development towards a complete chemical explanation of biological organisms and processes and substantiates the view that ``genetics, and other biological sciences, are reduced to physics and = chemistry''.^^4^^
It is noteworthy, however, that while repeating the familiar propositions of radical mechanistic reductionism in relation to living organisms and biological science, Schaffner is forced to make reservations after each of his statements thereby confirming the irreducibility of biological phenomena to physico-chemical ones. Schaffner's views are apparently anti-vitalistic and anti-idealistic. He cannot but admit qualitative distinctions between the living organisms and the dead nature, yet he persists in his mechanistic reductionism as he sees no alternative to it except _-_-_ __ERROR_P_170_COMMENT__ Missing footnote number before 3rd footnote.
^^1^^ Jacques Monod, Le hasard et la n\'ecessit\'e. Essai sur la philosophic naturelle de la biologie moderne, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 92--93.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~94.
^^3^^Ibid., pp.~47, 50.
^^4^^ K.~F. Schaffner, ``The Watson-Crick Model and Reductionism'', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~20, No.~4, December 1969, p.~338.
170 for the idealistic doctrine which he does not accept.The crisis of biological chemism and mechanistic reductionism in modern biology is at the same time the crisis of neopositivistic physicalism, the ``logico-empirical analysis of science'', whose representatives from Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Percy W. Bridgeman to Rudolf B. Braithwaite, M. Brodbeck and Carl G. Hempel have invariably pursued one and the same aim, viz. to reduce the biological to the physical.
Until recently the neopositivistic ``philosophy of science'' was predominantly the ``philosophy of physics'' and made no serious attempts to apply its logico-empirical analysis to biology. However, the gap has started filling up. The most important ``contribution'' in this direction appears to be Michael Ruse's book The Philosophy of Biology, which is remarkable, for one, in that it convincingly shows the difficulties facing the positivists in their attempts to apply the logicoempirical analysis of science, i.e. physical reductionism, to biology. Ruse is out to prove that such application is possible. He stresses, for instance, that ``there are now no theoretical barriers in the way of a Nagelian-type reduction and that there are obvious signposts about how this should be done, as that such a reduction has been rigorously accomplished... It is only after this development that the physico-chemical and the biological came into harmony, opening the way for a reduction, or at least, for a possible = reduction.''^^1^^
_-_-_^^1^^ M.~Ruse, The Philosophy of Biology, Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, Ltd., London, 1973, p.~207.
171Ruse obviously strives for a consistent implementation of the logico-empiricist, i.e. positivist, approach to the present problems of biology and to the future of biological science. At the same time he is aware of the appeal of organicism to the biologists and admits that many branches of biological science, such as systematics and palaeontology seek to develop their own theories, genuinely biological, without resorting to molecular-biological, i.e. essentially physical, explanations. He regards such trends as transient phenomena and expresses a hope that biology would ultimately take the course of reductionism and translate its theories into the language of physics and chemistry. In his opinion, the existing state of affairs can only be explained by the stubborn reluctance of prominent modern biologists to join the new school of molecularbiological reductionism.
In positivist philosophy empiricism as the criterion of the objectivity of knowledge is inseparably linked with reductionism. Epistemological reductionism tending to reduce all scientific knowledge to its empirical basis was supplemented by theoretical reductionism which revealed itself in persistent attempts to translate all the wealth of accumulated knowledge together with its theoretical explanations in the language of physics. From the viewpoint of logic, this transition is understandable: the laws of physics permit experimental checks of theoretical propositions making them testable. Hence, theoretical reductionism leads to and finds its logical expression in physicalism. The language used in the description of physical objects appears to be natural, too, since it is the first language of 172 man starting to master the external world. The type of experience expressed in this language precedes chronologically, psychologically and even logically other types expressed in other languages, the phenomenological one inclusive.
The fallacy of this stand is not hard to expose. The perception of physical objects by man at an early stage of his development is indeed natural and goes side by side with the mastery of the physical world. Yet this experience in the child's development is preceded by more primitive forms of perception, such as the perceptions of colours, smells and tastes which are very different with the infant from modern physical notions. Besides, the development of man does not stop at perceptions and his growing knowledge of the external world extending to the animal kingdom, thinking and psychological processes, the sphere of social phenomena such as the relations of production, freedom, solidarity, etc. can by no means be squeezed into the physicalist paradigm.
Seeking to substantiate their doctrine, the adepts of physicalism also refer to the intersubjectivity of the language of observable physical phenomena as its characteristic feature. In their opinion, this feature accounts for the fact that it is much easier to ascertain the objectivity of one or another scientific proposition through physical reduction than through phenomenalistic analysis. Hence, they make the objectivity of knowledge contingent on the possibility of its intersubjective expression, i.e. on the community of notions and their usability with different people and different scientific quarters. In turn, intersubjectivity is made contingent on the possibility of reducing this knowledge to 173 physical terms. Such a concept of the objectivity of knowledge is far removed from the materialistic concept identifying objectivity with independence from man and his consciousness in general, particularly if we take into account that most physical terms except those testable by direct sensory experience are considered conventional.
True, the language of physics provides a basis for intersubjective certainty in the sense that it does not deal with abstract sensory data or even perceptions, but reflects universal or general, recurrent, stable and therefore regularly observable phenomena, which is in full accord with the requirements of scientific cognition. Yet the requirements of universality and recurrence, being important as they are, do not yet ensure the objectivity of knowledge. Such physicalist views suggest the idea that intersubjectivity is characteristic not only of objects under observation, but of the observations themselves. Hence, they may be considered final in the analysis of epistemological problems. Here is, so to speak, a feedback link---from theoretical reductionism back to epistemological reductionism. One strengthens the other. Yet all observations, no matter how complete they may be and whatever their objects, remain, from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, the perceptions of individuals.
The language of physics is incapable of providing the intersubjective basis for science in general and for scientific epistemology, in particular, if only for the fact that it constitutes a smaller part of our language and that the perceptions of physical facts are not more important--- 174 indeed, they can sometimes be even less important---than the perceptions of biological or psychological phenomena, since the perception of the physical world is inconceivable outside the human brain. Another weakness of the physicalist programme which becomes ever more obvious with the advance of science ensues from the growing differentiation of physical science itself. A question, naturally, arises: where is the limit of the reduction process? Do we have to reduce biological, psychical and social phenomena to the physics of the macroworld? Or to molecular physics-chemistry? Or to the atomic level? Suppose, we adopt the physicalist doctrine and stop at the atomic level. But what about the future? What if the world of the electron or some other elementary particle indeed opens into infinity? One can only be sorry for a philosophy which will attempt to shut the door in the face of a new generation of scientists.
Expounding some of the weaknesses of the physicalist doctrine mentioned above, many philosophers propose, in fact, to go back where positivism has started. All their ardent criticism thus turns out to be merely aimed at reinstating the phenomenologic approach (we leave aside here the numerous pluralistic versions of the combination of the empirical and the theoretical, the physical and the mental, etc.). Yet the unsuccessful attempts to reduce the mental to the physical, the biological to the chemical, the theoretical to the empirical, etc. do not mean that biology is doomed to stay forever in the cradle and content itself with exclusively empirical approach. Nor does it mean that the ``irreducible residue'' of biology which could not 175 be rationalised by physics and made part of ``respectable'' science should always remain purely empirical.
The dialectical synthesis of the achievements of phenomenological analysis, be it in biology, psychology, social sciences or elsewhere, with the results of consistent and rational reduction is the only path to a new theory, a new theoretical fundamental discipline destined to turn biology, sociology, etc. into independent sciences which will not confine themselves, on the one hand, to the superficial description of phenomena, too specific in their external manifestation's to be reduced to coarse physical terms, and will not dissolve, on the other hand, in physical notions degrading to a commonplace.
There has been growing evidence of late that biology, psychology, sociology and other specific sciences are beginning to turn onto this path and gain independence not as primitive phenomenological schools, but as full-fledged scientific disciplines. Darwin's phenomenological theory synthesised with the achievements of molecular biology and genetics exemplifies a solution to the dilemma of reductionism or organicism. The same path is evidently being taken now by the modern theory of knowledge despite the predictions of epistemological reductionism. It is emerging as a product of integration of general epistemological concepts with the results of specific investigations into the nature of consciousness as such (including the social and historical factors of its development), on the one hand, and into the neurophysiological mechanisms of conscious and unconscious activity, on the other. In its advancement new scientific epistemology is casting off both the 176 phenomenological fetters and the physicalist dogmas.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGESince the 1920s, when Karl Popper proclaimed his principle of falsification as the basis for the testability of knowledge and for distinguishing between scientific propositions and pseudo-science, he has invariably criticised positivist philosophy and its understanding of objectivity as the observability of events. His arguments against empiricism are serious enough. Popper maintains, first, that observation is always based on some theoretical premises and that scientific knowledge, contrary to the positivists, does not start with sensory data. Hence, the objectivity of knowledge cannot be identified with the observability of events. Second, the traditional problem of inductive conclusion regarded by empiricism as the principal argument in favour of the objectivity of a theory is rooted in Hume's error regarding the nature of the scientific method.
However, the true significance of this criticism can only be assessed in the light of Popper's positive programme. It may appear at first sight that the principles of his epistemology are indeed radically different from those of positivism. Knowledge, according to Popper, cannot start from nothing---from a tabula rasa---not yet from observation. Science, philosophy, rational thought, must all start from common = sense.^^1^^ _-_-_
^^1^^ See K.~R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, p.~33.
__PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12--1152 177 Yet the main principle of common sense is the faith in the existence of the real world. Realism which asserts the existence of the world outside and independent of its perception cannot, in Popper's opinion, be proved or disproved. In other words, it belongs to the sphere of ``metaphysics''. Realism should be accepted ``as the only sensible hypothesis---as a conjecture to which no sensible alternative has ever been = offered''.^^1^^ Popper's realism, however, has little in common with ``scientific realism'' or ``scientific materialism'', particularly in the understanding of objectivity. In Popper's opinion, shared also by enlightened common sense, ``realism should be at least tentatively = pluralistic.''^^2^^ A rationalist seeks to reduce all the diversity of the world to several fundamental entities or processes. In Popper's words, Ockham's razor can only be applied after recognising the plurality of what there is in the = world.^^3^^As has been indicated earlier, Popper distinguishes three autonomous and relatively independent worlds noting that the term ``world'' is conventional and that there may be different criteria for their classification. The ``first world'' is physical reality, the ``second world'' the subjective knowledge of an individual, and the ``third world'', objective knowledge as understood by Popper. ``My first thesis,'' Popper writes, ``involves the existence of two different senses of knowledge or of thought: (1) knowledge or thought in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~42.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~294.
^^3^^Ibid., p.~301.
178 consciousness or a disposition to behave or to react, and (2) knowledge or thought in an objective sense, consisting of problems, theories, and arguments as such. Knowledge in this objective sense is totally independent of anybody's claim to know; it is also independent of anybody's belief, or disposition to assent; or to assert, or to act. Knowledge in the objective sense is knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge without a knowing = subject.''^^1^^ The elements of the ``third world'' comprise, according to Popper, not only theories and ideas, but also problems or problem situations. By analogy with physical states he also qualifies as the ``third world's'' elements the states of discussion or the states of critical arguments, as well as information carriers, i.e. books, magazines, libraries, etc.It is indicative in itself that Popper's evolution has brought him to the recognition of the existence of the ``physical world''. Yet the sequence of the worlds as listed above by Popper does not correspond to their significance in Popper's logic of science. It is not at all the physical world occupying the first place on Popper's list that constitutes the essence of scientific knowledge. Nor is the ``second world'', i.e. the world of emotions, sensations and individual knowledge, of any great significance. In Popper's opinion, it is just because of its exclusive interest in the subjective knowledge as expressed in everyday phrases ``I know'' or ``I am thinking'' that traditional epistemology has lost its influence. It was concerned with what was not, in fact, scientific knowledge. Popper writes: ``For scientific _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., pp. 108--09.
__PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__ 12* 179 knowledge simply is not knowledge in the sense of the ordinary usage of the words 'I know'. While knowledge in the sense of 'I know' belongs to what I call the 'second world', the world of subjects, scientific knowledge belongs to the third world, to the world of objective theories, objective problems, and objective = arguments.''^^1^^ Hence, the ``third world'' or ``world~3'' alone is truly autonomous and objective.From the epistemological viewpoint this thesis does not offer any new solutions. It only counters empiricism in that it eliminates the question of the source of knowledge, as the logic of scientific discovery which is the core of Popper's entire epistemology has no place for such question. It lies on the other side of the ``line of demarcation'' drawn by Popper between science and metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits of the logico-theoretical model of knowledge the concept of the ``third world'' gives rise to serious contradictions. If we analyse the relation of the ``third world'' to a concrete discovery or theory, we are bound to answer at least two questions: first, which element of our knowledge and at what stage of its maturity is regarded as the initial one? Second, which elements in a given discovery or theory can be confirmed or disproved by an experiment? Popper gives in fact no answer to the second question. As regards the first one, the answer is as follows: the selection of the initial, basic propositions is a conventional one. Popper does not deny the connection of basic propositions with experience. In The Logic of _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~108.
180 Scientific Discovery he writes that a decision to adopt a basic proposition is not prompted by our sense-perceptions. According to Popper, experience can only motivate a decision to adopt a proposition or reject it, but any attempt to trace basic propositions to perceptions will prove completely futile.Hence, despite Popper's resolute opposition to empiricism, his concept reveals curious likeness to logical positivism in at least two respects. First, Popper strives to confine the subjectmatter of epistemology to purely logical problems and to dismiss some problems of general significance (e.g. the problem of the source of knowledge). Second, like the representatives of the Vienna school Popper is forced to resort to conventionalism as regards the origin of basic propositions. In point of fact, he replaces the conventionalism ``from above'' (in relation to laws and theories) characteristic of logical positivism by conventionalism ``from below'' (in relation to basic propositions). His conventionalism stems from deeply rooted logicism which manifested itself already in his early works by the rejection of philosophical and sociological problems of science. Understandably, Popper's basic propositions do not relate to current individual experience, but reflect the system of established knowledge. His concept has not gone beyond a slight displacement of the border between our knowledge and the material world. All we know from Popper about our relation to this world is that our knowledge exerts active influence upon it. He sidesteps the question of the primacy in this interaction which is embarrassing to both the positivist and Popperian 181 epistemology and constitutes the key issue of the theory of knowledge.
According to Popper, the ``third world'' emerged as a result of the spontaneous activity of man and this is just what accounts for its objectivity. The unpremeditated build-up of knowledge by man is akin to the spinning of a web by a spider or to the making of honey by a bee. ``And I assert,'' writes Popper, ``that even though this third world is a human product, there are many theories in themselves and arguments in themselves and problem situations in themselves which have never been produced or understood and may never be produced or understood by = men.''^^1^^ Such theories and problem situations, according to Popper, do not appear according to plan, they are not even needed before their emergence. Once they have made their appearance, however, they may create new problems or a new system of ideas. The objectivity of a theory is understood by Popper as its independence from individual consciousness. In order to substantiate his viewpoint, he concentrates, first and foremost, on the problem of the acceptance and understanding of scientific discoveries.
It should be noted that this problem is not alien to Marxist philosophy either. It has long since been the object of serious discussions in Soviet literature relative to concrete dialectical issues. The true meaning of ideas, theories and projects is indeed often realised by scientists long after the corresponding discovery or invention is made. This fact, characteristic of one of the aspects of objectivity, is not regarded by _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~116.
182 Popper as something requiring any special attention. Actually, however, the gradual realisation and acceptance of a discovery is nothing but the result of the objectivity of knowledge understood as the reflection of objective processes, i.e. as a fact which can only be explained through the analysis of social factors influencing the development of science and its relation to the material world.Ideas, theories and other components of social consciousness are indeed relatively autonomous and independent of individual consciousness. The existence of the theory of relativity or Darwin's theory of evolution does not depend on anyone's consciousness. Moreover, we can go even so far as to assert that it was not Einstein or Darwin who had to decide on whether their theories were ``to be or not to be''. These theories were bound to appear, and not at the scientists' wish or by force of coincidence, but mainly because they reflected the objective processes of reality. Besides, to understand the inevitability of these discoveries, one ought to take into account the general laws of scientific development determined in the end by practical needs. Hence, the correct statement of the problem of objectivity is the following: what is the objective content of scientific theories and what are their subjective elements?
Frankly speaking, Popper's analysis of a scientific theory cannot boast of subtlety. Knowledge is construed as both a process of cognition and a result thereof, embodied in various theories, ideas and problems. In Popper's opinion, however, the process of thinking lies outside the concept of scientific knowledge which should be 183 mainly understood as the product of this process, i.e. as theories and their logical relations. The process of thinking is always individual and subjective, whereas its general results, i.e. problems, ideas and theories are objective. In Popper's opinion, the incompatibility of certain theories is a logical fact which is absolutely irrelevant to whether somebody is aware of it or not. These purely objective logical relations are the characteristic features of entities which are called by Popper theories or knowledge in the objective sense of the word.
Should we defy Popper's scheme, overstep the boundary set by him and consider the connection between scientific knowledge (the ``third world'') and material reality in all details, i.e. in the process, sum, tendency, origin, we shall find out that there is no sharp line of demarcation between the knowledge of an individual and the system of scientific knowledge developed by mankind. They differ, as it were, by the objective/subjective ratios. Hence, both the thinking processes and their results deserve special philosophical analysis. The electromagnetic theory as developed by James Maxwell was evidently just as much indicative of its author's subjective demerits (and, for that matter, his subjective merits), as were his mental processes, notions and ideas. To be sure, science cannot be too tolerant. The amendments made by Heinrich Hertz and Oliver Heaviside, as well as the subsequent elaboration of the electromagnetic theory in the light of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics have corrected a number of Maxwell's errors. Yet it is not criticism or mutual rational verification which guarantees, according 184 to Popper, the objectivity of the electromagnetic theory. Such criticism can at best eliminate some subjective imperfections thereby helping to reveal the objective content of the theory. It does not mean at all that a scientific theory owes its objectivity exclusively to criticism and falsification of erroneous conclusions.
Despite the proclaimed objectivity of the ``third world'', Popper fails to provide an appropriate substantiation for this thesis. His objectivity can only be defined by comparison with individual experience, and the criterion of the testability of theories is, in fact, intersubjective by nature. Popper himself makes no bones about his stand when he writes: ``Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter subjectively = tested.''^^1^^ Intersubjective testing need not go beyond a mutual rational control which is the common objective of critical discussions. Such rational control, according to Popper, 'is only possible through multiple checks and repeated comparisons with the obvious. No observations should be taken into account if they cannot be repeated and checked. Such repetitions alone can provide sufficient evidence that we deal not with accidental coincidences, but with events which are intersubjectively testable owing to their recurrence. In other words the objective world as defined in Popper's epistemological _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p.~44.
185 scheme is mainly referred to by scientists for falsification of one or another theory.According to Popper, the essence of scientific activity, its distinguishing feature consists in systematic attempts to refute ideas, hypotheses and theories which are being advanced, and in eliminating errors. The tests should result in the selection of a hypothesis which is more resistant to criticism than other hypotheses. In other words, all tests should aim at finding weak points and eliminating untenable theories by their falsification. ``But just because it is our aim to establish theories as well as we can,'' writes Popper, ``we must test them as severely as we can... This is the reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a theory means very little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover = refutations.''^^1^^ Yet Popper overlooks the fact that every experiment tests not only a theory as such, but also a host of its logical and non-logical premises. All of them participate in the interpretation of an experiment in one way or another. Therefore, if an experiment testifies against a theory, we can never be sure whether the falsification applies to the theory itself, or to the attending premises. The conclusion that an experiment falsifies a theory is purely conventional. Any theory can be saved by introducing additional premises or by modifying the basic ones. Realising the contradictory nature of the situation, Popper offers, on purely conventional grounds, to adopt a postulate prohibiting the _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 133--34.
186 introduction of hypotheses intended to protect a theory against a ``death sentence''.Consequently, in Popper's opinion, theories and ideas must become the objects of merciless falsification. The refutation of theories becomes for scientific cognition the end in itself.
In accordance with his model of scientific cognition Popper contends that not a single scientist can claim the truth of his ideas and theories. ``Scientists act,'' he writes, ``on the basis of a guess or, if you like, of a subjective belief (for we may so call the subjective basis of an action) concerning what is promising of impending growth in the third world of objective = knowledge.''^^1^^ In developing their research programmes scientists, according to Popper, are guided by their conjectures as regards which trend is likely to be the most fruitful in the ``third world''. A scientist therefore must once and for all discard the self-confident ``I know'' or ``I suppose''. Since his individual notions are inevitably subjective, he has but very modest rights which only entitle him to say: ``I am trying to understand a problem'', ``I am trying to think of alternatives to this problem'', ``I am thinking of an experimental check for the given theory'', ``I am trying to axiomise the theory'', and the like.
According to Popper, the worlds are real if they can interact with the physical world, and they are autonomous if their irreducibility to one another is postulated. The main problem of his pluralistic philosophy hinges upon the relations between the worlds. Of the three worlds, the two first and the two last ones can directly _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, op. cit., p.~111.
187 interact. The second world, the world of individual experience, subjective knowledge, can interact with the two other worlds, but the physical world and the world of knowledge cannot directly contact each other in a similar manner, they have to use the mediation of the second world. In principle, it is possible to assume the reducibility of the mental world to the physical world, but the existence of objective knowledge, its obvious influence on the physical world, on the one hand, and the no less obvious impossibility of the direct causal effect of abstract entities on physical processes, on the other, force the inevitable conclusion about the plurality of the worlds and the autonomy of the mental as the necessary mediator between the physical and the ideal.One of the important functions of the ``second world'' is to comprehend the objects of the ``third world'', i.e. the objective content of thinking. Almost all subjective knowledge depends on objective knowledge. The ``third world'' is autonomous, though we constantly act upon it and are subjected to its influence. Cognition is traditionally defined as the activity of a cognising subject. Popper holds that this definition is only applicable to subjective cognition which should better be called organic cognition as it ``consists of certain inborn dispositions to act, and of their acquired = modifications''.^^1^^
Objective cognition does not depend on the cognitive aims, opinions and actions of the cognising individual. Cognition in the objective _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, op. cit., p.~121.
188 sense is cognition without the cognising individual. Objective knowledge consists of the logical content of scientific theories, conjectures, suppositions and logical content of their genetic code. Objective knowledge can be exemplified by scientific theories expounded in journals and books, discussions of these theories, as well as by problems, problem situations, etc.From the viewpoint of traditional subjectivist epistemology, the ``third world'' can only exist as the content of some consciousness. For instance, a book only exists as a factor of culture if somebody reads it. A book remains a book even if it is a table of logarithms composed by a computer and not written by any man. A book belongs to the ``third world'' provided it can be understood and deciphered---even if such a possibility is never translated into reality. In Popper's opinion, Plato was the first philosopher who discovered the existence of the ``third world'', its influence upon us and began to use the ideas of the ``third world'' to explain the phenomena of the ``first'' and ``second'' worlds.
The history of epistemology knows a far more influential tradition than the one Popper claims to represent. Epistemological subjectivism, like its antagonist, ontological realism, are both rooted in common sense. The everyday concept of knowledge rests on the conviction that sensory data are the source of knowledge. In philosophy this concept is known as the theory of tabula rasa. It underlies Locke's, Berkeley's and Hume's empiricism, as well as many theories of modern positivists and empiricists. Traditional non-critical rationalism contrasting itself to empiricism and subjectivism has also, proved unable 189 to overstep the bounds of common sense.
The subjectivist theory of knowledge is incapable of distinguishing between subjective and objective knowledge. In its attempts to disclose the process of scientific cognition traditional (positivist) epistemology proceeded either from sense data, or from the self-consciousness of a cognising individual ``(I know'', ``I think''), remaining in both cases within the narrow confines of subjective knowledge. Naturally enough, it could not understand it either, since the comprehension of the ``second world'' is only possible from the positions of the ``third world''.
According to Popper, the theory of knowledge of common sense is almost entirely false, yet its main error consists in the search for a self-evident starting point of the process of cognition. Classical epistemology was incapable of understanding that sensory data were nothing but adaptive reactions of an organism. The organs of sense, such as the eyes, are not indiscriminate in their perception of the surrounding world; they take in only those events which are being ``expected'', and no others. Like theories (and prejudices), they must be ``indifferent'' to other events which they do not perceive and cannot interpret. Any sensuously perceived material, according to Popper, is already an interpretation based on a theory or on prejudice. There can be no ``pure'' sensory experience, just as there can be no ``pure'' language of observation: all languages are full of myths and theories.
Rejecting epistemological reductionism, Popper also comes out against ontological reductionism (physicalism). Criticising physicalism as a variety of radical materialism, Popper alleges that 190 the latter is incapable of explaining the qualitative diversity of reality. In his opinion, materialism could have had some sense before the appearance of life on the earth. After that, owing to the development of human culture and self-reflection of man, physicalist explanations lost their universality. As man has created a new objective world, the world of the products of the human mind, a world of myths, of fairy tales and scientific theories, of poetry and art and music, the emergent, creative nature of the universe becomes, in his opinion, quite = obvious.^^1^^
All the three worlds, according to Popper, are real. Speaking of the reality of ``world~1'', Popper agrees with the physicalist materialists that notions used by a physicist, such as fields, forces, quanta, etc., refer to real entities. Yet, in his opinion, traditional materialism with its paradigm of reality in the form of solid material bodies is closer to the truth. He shares the viewpoint of common sense that physical entities are just as real as consciousness understood as subjective mental process, as well as the content of consciousness embodied in culture. The central point of Popper's concept is his assertion of reality and the relative independence of ``world~3'', the world of the products of human spirit such as legends, explanatory myths, instruments of knowledge, scientific theories (both true and false), scientific problems, social institutions and works of art.
It is noteworthy that Popper links the existence of the objects of ``world~3'' with the _-_-_
^^1^^ See Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, Springer International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 15--16.
191 embodiment of the products of human intellect in books, sculptures, etc. However, the mere ``objectification'' of these phenomena in material culture and in the systems of signs does not yet testify to their independence. Popper's crucial argument in favour of the autonomy of ``world~3'' consists in that the development of theories and ideas follows their own laws and they produce consequences which cannot be foreseen by their creators. Being ideal as they are, they can also give rise to material effects: for instance, they can induce people to produce their own kind and other ideal objects thereby exercising influence on ``world~1''. All civilisation, according to Popper, can be regarded as the realisation of man's aims, ideals and plans, i.e. the objects of ``world~3''.The distinction of Popper's concept from physicalist theories stands out quite clearly here: he refuses to substitute the epistemological problems of the correlation of the ``mentalist'' and ``physicalist'' languages for ontological problems, seeks to deduce the qualitative diversity of the external world from reality and posits the problem of consciousness in the context of cosmic and cultural evolution. On the other hand, Popper reveals no less clearly the inadequacy of his understanding of the interdependence of the subjective and the objective consciousness. The concept of autonomous ``world~3'' gives grounds for a supposition that the emergence of new ideas is determined by logical possibilities which have already materialised in the objects of this world, i.e. in theories, problem situations, etc. In that case ideas and theories must have ideal existence even before they enter individual 192 consciousness and the task of the subjective spirit must consist in provoking the realisation of ideal possibilities lying dormant in human culture, i.e. in translating possibility into reality. More, if we assume that the activity of the subjective spirit is confined merely to ``grasping'' and manipulating the objects of ``world~3'', we are bound to deny the spontaneous creative activity of human consciousness and to admit that individual consciousness and new ideas are products of culture, but not of concrete individuals. Popper is evidently not completely unaware of this Platonic tendency in his concept and therefore lays special emphasis on the genetic-biological foundation of consciousness and knowledge.
Denouncing the philosophy of neopositivism, particularly its claim to the role of the methodology of modern scientific cognition, Popper in fact offers an idealistic epistemological alternative.
To substantiate his understanding of the progress of scientific cognition, Popper introduces a concept of ``verisimilitude''. In his opinion, the verisimilitude of a theory consists in the superiority of a multitude of true logical consequences of this theory over a multitude of false logical consequences. From this viewpoint, of crucial importance is the content of a theory. It includes a class of all logical consequences, both true and false. Popper intends to divide this system, evidently infinite, into two subclasses---the true and the false consequences of the given theory, and to discard successively those which themselves ensue from false consequences.
It should be noted that the very notion of logical consequence is not used by Popper with __PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__ 13--1152 193 due accuracy. Individual statements, some of which are based on or expressed in theories, evidently have no consequences at all (true or false). A consequence is only possible in situations where certain initial conditions are indicated. In that case, however, the number of consequences will be equal to the number of statements contained in the description of initial conditions. Most of them will probably turn out to be false in the strictly logical sense of the word, since the accuracy possible under experimental conditions can hardly compare with the accuracy of mathematical operations associated by Popper with the notions of truth and objectivity.
Besides, in a situation with the infinite number of consequences there will be only two degrees of verisimilitude, the maximum and the zero one, depending on whether the true content is infinite and the false content is finite, or both of them are infinite. The vulnerability of Popper's concept of verisimilitude is noted, for instance, by American philosopher G.~S. Robinson, who writes: ``If scientists were to take Popper's conception of verisimilitude and progress seriously it would have the effect of stultifying growth and progress because what he calls `verisimilitude' and 'progress' could be increased or even maximized by a policy of incurious repetition of safe = experiments.''^^1^^
Contrary to Popper, scientists do distinguish between theories and predictions ensuing from them considering some of them truer than others. For instance, planning a flight to Venus, they _-_-_
^^1^^ G.~S. Robinson, ``Popper's Verisimilitude'', Analysis (Oxford), Vol.~31, No.~6, June 1971, p.~195.
194 are sure that the theory of relativity is more reliable than the theory of Newton, Ptolemy or Aristotle and that the predictions based on the former must be more accurate than those based on the latter. Of course, scientists may err in their judgements of relative probability. Their inductive criterion of truth may sometimes fail them. Yet they do use it and rely on one theory more than upon another. If Popper refuses to admit that we can and must express judgements on comparative probability based on an inductive conclusion, his theory of verisimilitude and progress proves untenable. If the predictions of an old theory (except a small number of tested ones) have turned out false and the predictions of a new theory (except a small number of rejected ones) have turned out true, it is obvious that the new theory is closer to the truth than the old one. It stands to reason that a scientific theory owes its reputation for dependability to a successful experimental or practical test. Why, then, is its rational confirmation not possible? ``If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection,'' Thomas Kuhn justly observes, ``all theories ought to be rejected at all times. On the other hand, if only severe failure to fit justifies theory rejection, then the Popperians will require some criterion of `improbability' or of `degree of falsification'. In developing one they will almost certainly encounter the same network of difficulties that has haunted the advocates of the various probabilistic verification = theories.''^^1^^ _-_-_^^1^^ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, pp. 146--47.
__PRINTERS_P_195_COMMENT__ 13* 195Popper's concept of the development of scientific knowledge is in fact the opposite of Kuhn's concept. It leaves no room for the ``normal'' activity of scientists aimed at the consolidation and development of a newly created theory. On the other hand, Popper does not single out a revolution in science as a specific stage of its development. In point of fact, he regards every new theory, every new discovery as a revolutionary step in science.
Hence, the evolution of scientific knowledge is represented in Popper's concept as an endless chain of revolutions and can, therefore, be regarded with good reason as a concept of ``permanent revolution in science''.
This model of scientific development does not reproduce the true course of science. The lack of historicism in Popper's analysis has been noted by numerous philosophers and historians of science. For instance, according to Maurice Finnochiaro, Popper's principle is not sound. All Popper can say on the basis of historical evidence sums up in that the play of science is endless. In Finnochiaro's opinion the one who may once decide that his scientific assertions need no subsequent test and should be regarded as ultimately correct may be quite right, from his own viewpoint, that is. Yet it is likely that sooner or later a different viewpoint will prevail in science and his own one will be refuted.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. FROM PHYSICALISMThe turn from positivism to ``scientific realism'' is very characteristic of the modern 196 philosophy of science. This trend, which is only two decades old, has already managed to define its stand with sufficient clarity despite all the diversity of the individual approaches and opinions of its adherents. However, none of the current views of ``scientific realism'' as a methodological alternative to positivist philosophy is ripe enough to claim authority. Representing the materialistic viewpoint, ``scientific realism'' somehow falls out of line with the general historical trend of philosophical development and seems rather odd because of its apparent spontaneity. Indeed, in its attempt to evolve a new philosophical doctrine ``scientific realism'' has started from scratch and is denying or passing over in silence any affinity with traditional philosophical trends. This is partly attributable to the fact that many of the newly converted active exponents of materialistic ideas reflect the direct needs of science rather than some purely philosophical tradition.
It cannot be said, however, that new materialism is completely free from any philosophical links in general. The new school, for one, admits in some form or other to its inheritance of certain aspects, problems and principles from positivist philosophy. ``scientific realism'' represents an obvious attempt to smooth over the contradictions which have led to a complete break of science with positivist philosophy. This feature also accounts for the attitude of ``scientific realism'' to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. On the one hand, the new trend discards the positivist interpretation of objective knowledge, including its latest versions; on the other, it shows an obvious influence of many positivist dogmas.
197Coming out against the concept of intersubjectivity, most of the ``realists'' oppose both the positivist and Popper's doctrines. Neither do they accept the Kuhn-Lakatos concept as manifestly relativistic. Yet they do not go beyond postulating reality independent of man and sidestep the main issue---the concrete solution of the question of the nature of objectivity and relationship between the objective and the subjective in scientific knowledge. This circumstance essentially weakens the position of ``scientific realism'' exposing it to criticism on the part of its opponents. ``The realist,'' writes, for instance, Roger Trigg, ``starting from objective reality rather than man's knowledge of it, will not be surprised if some portions of it elude man's grasp for ever. He will insist that though this limits man's knowledge, it cannot affect the nature of what exists, since reality is = self-subsistent.''^^1^^
As regards the problem of intersubjectivity, the ``realists'' maintain that the presence of some common elements in different theories is accounted for by none other than reality, whether perceptible or not. Some ``realists'' go even as far as distinguishing between the ontological and the epistemological aspects of the problem, i.e. between reality as such and the reality that we know. According to Roy Bhaskar, for instance, the positivists make a typical epistemological error considering that ``statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological _-_-_
^^1^^ Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk: A Defence of Realism in Philosophy and the Sciences, The Harvester Press, Ltd., Barnes & Noble Books, Sussex, N.~J., 1980, p.~IX.
198 questions can always be transposed into epistemological = terms''.^^1^^Many adherents of the ``realistic'' trend, however, believe that ontological realism should be supplemented with ``epistemological relativism''. This opinion is based on the well-known thesis according to which we are incapable of going beyond the limits of the particular, the concrete, i.e. the knowledge available at a given moment though we are aware of the existence of being. In Bhaskar's opinion, ``whenever we speak of things or of events etc. in science we must always speak of them and know them under particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be to a greater or lesser extent theoretically determined, which are not neutral reflections of a given world. Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism and must be = accepted.''^^2^^
The confusion regarding the relationship between ontology and epistemology, the objective and the subjective sometimes leads the ``realists'' to counterposing realistic and materialistic viewpoints. A distinction between them does exist, of course, but its actual significance, in the ``realists'\thinspace'' opinion, evidently lies elsewhere. Trigg contends that realism represents a broader viewpoint than materialism, as it permits accepting the reality of what is not material. ``Even a theist,'' he writes, ``can assert a realist notion of God existing independently of men's conceptions of Him, and not espouse idealism, because he _-_-_
^^1^^ Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, The Harvester Press, Ltd., Hassocks, N.~J., 1978, p.~36.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~249.
199 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/20050704/299.tx" __SPELL_CHECK__ Basic (ispell-buffer) (2005.07.09). __CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11) __CHECKS__ end-of-line hypens checked (2005.07.11) __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ also accepts the independent reality of the material = world.''^^1^^Realism and materialism, according to Trigg, are different in the sense that realism pretends to be a neutral doctrine taking no interest in the content of reality. In Trigg's opinion, many idealistic trends insist only on the independence of reality from human consciousness or sensations and do not accept the existence of God, whereas numerous forms of empiricism could be anti-realistic and atheistic at the same time.
According to Trigg, the controversy between realists and anti-realists was of crucial importance for philosophy. Realism opposes the doctrine which accepts the dependence of the ``external world'' on man and restricts the world to what man knows about it. Is the world indeed what we take it for? asks Trigg, and answers emphatically: ``No!'' There may exist galaxies we cannot even conceive of. Besides, many of our scientific beliefs are probably wrong. ``It is exceedingly rash,'' he says, ``to equate reality with the views we happen to have at the = moment.''^^2^^ In a sense, reality is considered to be mental rather than material, as the reason which comprehends it simultaneously creates it in one way or another.
Whereas ``realism'' underscores the existence of reality independent of our notions of it, idealism considers everything to be a function of reason and regards being in terms of man's mental images or perceptions. Hence, subjective experience may be in contradiction with what is considered _-_-_
^^1^^Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.~XIX.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~2.
200 true by general consent. According to Trigg, ``\thinspace`subjective' can be the opposite of `intersubjective' rather than `objective'. To put it another way, the word `objective' can refer in a weak sense to what is agreed on, rather than in a strong sense to what is `really' the = case.''^^1^^In Trigg's opinion, the anti-realist will prefer to emphasise the necessity for intersubjective agreement. Anti-realists are inevitably forced, if they conceive the problem in terms of the opposition of mind and matter, to admit the independent reality of other minds. Idealism inevitably becomes objectivist even when ``objectivist'' is understood in its strong sense.
Epistemological realism, according to Trigg, is sometimes distinguished from the ontological sort, so that one can be an epistemological realist and an ontological idealist. ``In that case,'' he writes, ``only minds would exist, but there would be an external world beyond our judgements. What we know would be in no way dependent on our knowing it, but the reality which is the source of knowledge would be ultimately mental. This means that reality is not ultimately independent of judgement as such. It may be unconnected with what you think or what I think, but it is not unconnected with all = minds.''^^2^^ Trigg asserts that the only alternative to ``epistemological realism'' is solipsism. Epistemological realism is the inevitable consequence of accepting that the world is not one's own creation, and that as a result one may be mistaken about its nature.
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., p.~22.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~23.
201According to Trigg, the principal disagreement between the realists and their opponents springs not so much from the difference in their understanding of the relationship between reality and man in general, as from the distinction between the weak and strong objectivity, between intersubjectivity and objectivity. In Trigg's opinion, one should not identify objectivity with what one believes in here and now. The history of science shows that even the most firmly established theories can be modified or even refuted.
``Scientific realists'' generally avoid identifying their stand, even on special issues, such as the mind-body problem, with the concepts of dialectical materialism.
Expounding his views, Trigg definitely dissociates himself from materialism considering its approach too narrow. He strives to justify his prejudice against materialism by alleging that it disregards subjective reality and grants the status of being to matter only. The origin of this prejudice is not far to seek: Trigg, like many Western philosophers who cannot boast of too close an acquaintance with the materialist tradition in philosophy, particularly with the essence of dialectical materialism, equates materialism with physicalism.
As a result, Trigg identifies Lenin's views with physicalist concepts widely spread in Western literature, overlooking the fact that it is just against physicalism and its understanding of matter, space, time and causality that Lenin has directed its main philosophical work Materialism and Empiric-Criticism. The irony of the situation consists in that Trigg, coming out in defence of realism, opens a wide door for fideism and 202 actually sets it on an equal footing with science. As we see, the response of scientists to the disintegration of positivism does not always accord with the needs of scientific cognition. Despite the repeated assurances that he is opposed to idealism and anti-realism, Trigg, in fact, sees no possibility of passing beyond the bounds of experience and language.
``We cannot,'' he writes, ``talk or think about reality without talking or thinking about it... We cannot have a conception of something without employing the conceptual scheme we have at our disposal... We cannot conceptualize reality and then check the concepts we have produced against reality. It is self-defeating to attempt to think of reality as it exists beyond our thoughts. There is no way that we can somehow hold our concepts in suspense, while we compare them with = reality.''^^1^^
Trigg's realism consists in that he accepts the existence of real~ty beyond the limits of man's present knowledge, this reality including not only what is not yet known, but also, it appears, what is unknowable in principle. He writes: ``Realists leave open what is to be meant by 'the world'. We have used the term rather broadly to mean `what there is'. The realist can accept that mind, matter and even other kinds of entities might exist. His argument with the idealist is not concerned with the reality of mind. He is merely concerned to hold that the mental does not exhaust = reality.''^^2^^ Trigg draws a purely external line of demarcation between what appears to be two _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~1.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~28.
203 different worlds---the reality which is independent of man and has not yet become the object of his knowledge and the reality which has already been drawn into the sphere of man's cognitive activity and is no longer independent of his thoughts. Such an external border does not seem to be a good solution, as it makes it impossible to correlate more accurately the objective and subjective realities and investigate their relationship in the second world. As a matter of fact, the same applies to Trigg's first, ``unattainable'', world, since it exists beyond our thoughts and cannot, according to his logic, be extracted from our conceptual scheme by any means. The concept of God, for that matter, can also be regarded as one of the versions of conceptualising the uncognisable.Dialectical materialism is far from ignoring the reality of the concept of God as an element of religious systems. Moreover, it regards this false concept as a reality which should be eliminated by practical means. Marxism not only admits the reality of religious rites but also takes it in all seriousness. It is obvious to any Marxist that religion (but not God) is only one of the elements of a highly complex and heterogeneous subjective reality which includes man's entire spiritual world with all its diversity and contradictions. Trigg and other realist authors may rest assured that their intellectual stand as well as the books they publish are real to us in a no lesser degree.
Trigg's realism is a graphic illustration of the confusion resulting from the application of loose criteria of objectivity and lack of dialectical flexibility in the philosophical analysis of 204 scientific development. What is more, after such a ``cultivation'' vast areas of terra ignorationis are allowed to lie fallow, grow thick with weeds and spread pseudo-scientific seeds all over the adjacent areas of science and philosophy. These weeds often infect the still healthy field of ``scientific realism'' which, according to Trigg, is called upon to give an accurate theoretical description of reality. In Trigg's opinion, a scientist will always aspire for the true knowledge of the world though not all reality can be accessible for observation. Some theories may be true at all times, others may need modification, yet they all reflect reality to some extent, though we do not know how profoundly. ``The realist in science,'' writes Trigg, ``does not merely oppose the empiricist's view about the pivotal role of observations. He also emphasizes that science is about something and that theories attempt to capture reality as it is. It follows that only one completely correct account of the world is forthcoming. Different, competing theories will each view the world differently, but the realist will not be as content with that situation as Feyerabend seems to be and will want to ask which is the right = one.''^^1^^
Contrary to Trigg, Quine contends that competing theories of reality do not give a unique and simple picture of the world. Defending all the basic propositions of ``realism'' he writes: ``We have no reason to suppose that man's surface irritations even unto eternity admit of any one systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible others... Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in _-_-_
^^1^^ Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.~66.
205 principle no unique definition of = truth.''^^1^^ Quine also appears to be appreciably closer to positivism in his attachment to the concept of intersubjective test. In his opinion, intersubjective contact assures a single dimension deriving from the similarity of sensuous stimuli. This intersubjective contact provides a basis both for the language of learning and for the construction of a scientific theory. The relevant circumstances attending the utterance of statements are combined by Quine in the notion of ``intersubjective observability''. Intersubjective contact ``enables the child to learn when to assent to the observation sentence. And it is this also, intersubjective observability at the time, that qualifies observation sentences as check points for scientific theory. Observation sentences state the evidence, to which all witnesses must = accede.''^^2^^ According to Quine, this rules out solipsism, since the general accessibility of circumstances attending the utterance of observation statements ensures that we learn one and the same language and that a scientific theory may have a solid foundation.The leaning towards realism gets the better of Quine in his concept of self-sufficient reality, though he underscores that true judgements can only be made after the adoption of a theory. It causes him, like Feyerabend, to regard theories as being relatively true, but here Quine escapes relativism characteristic of Feyerabend. Any statements, in his opinion, can only be made _-_-_
^^1^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1960, p.~23.
^^2^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, ``The Nature of Natural Knowledge'', in: Mind and Language, Ed. by S. Guttenplan, Oxford, 1975, p.~74.
206 within the framework of a conceptual scheme and serve as its expression. As a result, no ``reality'' is conceivable except ``through'' a conceptual scheme which we ourselves adopt. Hence, the real world which does exist must be described in terms of our conceptual scheme. Quine avoids speaking of ``things-in-themselves'' or of any philosophical interpretation of scientific propositions. In his understanding, a scientific theory is something taken at its face value.``As an empiricist,'' Quine says, ``I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries---not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in = kind.''^^1^^
Quine, thus, refuses to admit that there is any difference between the ``posits'' of a theory and reality. In his opinion, reality is what we believe to be existing.
It is significant, however, that physicalism remains a characteristic feature of ``scientific realism'' and its understanding of the problem of objectivity. This circumstance complicates the _-_-_
^^1^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View. Logico-Philosophical Essays, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1963, p.~44.
207 task of distinguishing between the positivist and ``realist'' ideas of objectivity. The distinction, rather a subtle one, consists in that for ``scientific realism'' the programme of the physicalist reduction of scientific knowledge combines with the programme of constructing a scientific ontology. ``scientific realism'' not only strives to reduce the language of any science to the physical language and theoretical propositions to observation statements based, in the final analysis, on physical experience, but is bent on reducing chemical, biological, geographical, psychological and other processes as such to physical processes. In other words, it seeks to explain all objects and phenomena of reality through their physical properties and mechanisms. What is more, it regards such reductionism not as a purely scientific procedure intended for a physical explanation--- that would be quite justifiable---but defends it as a universal all-embracing scheme thus giving it a status of a philosophical or, in relation to the problem of objectivity, an ontological, principle.Understandably, the true significance of this feature can only be assessed in the context of the entire philosophical programme of ``scientific realism''. The emphasis on the objectivity of biological, physiological and other processes and the attempts to explain them on the basis of the laws of physics represent a manifestly ``realistic'' or even materialistic trend, requiring, however, further methodological development. On the other hand, the epistemological reductionism, consisting in attempts to interpret biological, physiological or mental phenomena in terms of physical notions with a view to overcoming 208 ``metaphysics'' identifies ``scientific realism'' with one or another variety of positivist physicalism. The distinction between them is often quite impalpable and reveals itself in the general tendency and orientation rather than in some tangibles. But then certain atavistic features of the new school are not to be wondered at if we bear in mind that the realistic methodology of science is still in its infancy.
The subtle difference between the positivist and realistic programmes can already be discerned in the philosophical concept of Herbert Feigl, formerly a member of the Vienna Circle, whose evolution has reflected numerous contradictions and vicissitudes of the transition from the positivist paradigm to the scientific-realist world view. The watered-down variants of the main dogmas of the logico-empiricist doctrine, the doubts regarding the distinction between the analytical and synthetic statements, the greater flexibility in the interpretation of the empirical criteria of scientific value characteristic of Feigl's early works gradually gave way to a more radical departure from the positivist tradition. Physicalism which still holds in Feigl's concept as the hangover of the early period is evidently regarded by him as the foundation of the new system.
Having outlined his general methodological views mainly with reference to physics, Feigl later devoted much attention to the mind-body problem, i.e. to the relationship between the brain and consciousness. He was at first inclined to regard statements on mental and physical phenomena as two different languages referring to the same facts, but later gave preference to the monistic theory or the ``theory of identity'' in which __PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__ 14--1152 209 the data of experience and certain deduced notions of neurophysiological structures have one and the same reference object and are regarded as two different ways of cognising one and the same thing. Such an identity of the mental and the physical is not yet tantamount to the logical identity of mind and body. Parallelism between them should be established by science, but not by philosophy. Feigl believes that such parallelism is already in evidence and the further drawing together of the two systems is inevitable. From the standpoint of common sense this eliminates any basis for the hypothesis of the existence of two different entities. This line of reasoning brings Feigl to the conclusion that the referents of mental terms are identical with those of physical terms.
Feigl's evolution from positivism to ``realism'' vividly illustrates all the most essential stages or steps of this transition: passage beyond the bounds of a purely linguistic approach to the problem, extension of the scope of semantic analysis, emphasis on objective neurophysiological processes as referents of the corresponding theoretical terms.
Feigl distinguishes two different meanings of the term ``physical'', the broader and the narrower ones. He writes: ``By `physical1 terms' I mean all (empirical) terms whose specification of meaning essentially involves logical (necessary or, more usually, probabilistic) connections with the intersubjective observation languages... By `physical2' I mean the kind of theoretical concepts (and statements) which are sufficient for the explanation, i.e. the deductive or probabilistic derivation, of the observation statements 210 regarding the inorganic (lifeless) domain of = nature.''^^1^^ According to Feigl, the ``mental'' or the so-called raw sensations are identifiable with ``physical2''.
Feigl regards the volumes of these terms to be equal if the theory of identity is true. However, in case of emergence, i.e. logical non-deducibility of organic, mental and social phenomena from physical phenomena, the sphere of ``physical2'' is obviously narrower than that of = ``physical1''.
As we see, Feigl's programme implies the reduction of all sciences to physics. One cannot but admit, however, that it is not entirely divorced from the existing practice of theoretical investigations. The peculiarity of this practice was aptly expressed by Einstein who once said that ``reason'' was commonly believed to be an unseemly word that ought to be avoided in a society of wellbred scientists. Reductionism, as we have already pointed out, is a kind of a semi-official ideology of the modern biological establishment. The practical significance of this tradition, however, is not very large as it reflects a transitory stage in the development of biological, as well as psychological sciences. As Soviet scientists I.~Frolov and B.~Yudin have justly observed, ``reductionism is evidently the natural consequence of every situation in which investigation methods and experimental facilities come to the foreground in scientific research and dictate the selection of problems. Under such conditions the issues prompted by the inner logic of scientific development are relegated to a secondary plan and preference is given to problems whose solution is made _-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, The ``Mental'' and the ``Physical'', University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1967, p.~57.
__PRINTERS_P_211_COMMENT__ 14* 211 possible owing to the application of specific research techniques or experimental = facilities.''^^1^^Feigl's concept reveals strong links not only with physicalism, but also with empiricism. According to Feigl, knowledge starts with direct sensory experience, sensory acquaintance, as it were. He notes that the meaning of scientific statements actually consists in that they state the conditions of truth. These conditions, in turn, are evidently represented in the factual content of the relation of the stated knowledge which is represented by sensations. Hence, Feigl understands the theory of truth as a ``theory of correspondence''. The meaning of a statement, in his opinion, should be identified in its factual relation, whereas the meaning of scientific terms should be adapted to the set reality. As distinct from the positivist concept of the Vienna Circle, according to which the meaning of a statement determines the method of verification, Feigl lays special emphasis on a different aspect: ``After the recovery from radical behaviorism and operationism, we need no longer hesitate to distinguish between evidence and reference, i.e., between manifestations or symptoms on the one hand, and central states on the = other.''^^2^^
As has already been noted in the first chapter, ``scientific realism'' is characterised in most cases by very arbitrary attempts to join or separate various empirical and theoretical premises of _-_-_
^^1^^ I.~T. Frolov, B.~G. Yudin, Preface to the Russian translation of M.~Ruse's book Philosophy of Biology, Moscow, 1977, p.~18.
^^2^^ Herbert Feigl, The ``Mental'' and the ``Physical'', op. cit., p.~28.
212 general philosophical nature. A similar tendency manifests itself in the solution of the mind-body problem. Underscoring the empirical status of the identity of mind and body, Feigl, Smart and other ``realists'' often resort to metaphysical principles in order to substantiate the ``theory of identity''. Moreover, the problem itself is regarded by them as metaphysical. Sometimes the metaphysical nature of the terms ``mental'' and ``physical'', as well as of the problem of their relationship is emphasised deliberately in defiance of the positivist doctrine. The term ``physical'' in this sense apparently acquires a new shade of meaning which does not fall within the framework of ``physical1'' or ``physical2''. It approximates the concept of the world as a whole and can be regarded as ``physical3'' gravitating to, though not coinciding with, the materialist concept of ``matter''.The presence of two or even three levels in the understanding of the ``physical'' complicates the mind-body problem, difficult as it is, the more so as the above ``levels'' are not defined accurately enough. As a matter of fact, the description of the ``physical'' in terms of space-time and causal relations is characteristic of any theoretical science. ``Physical1'' related by Feigl to this description can be related to any other scientific description. ``From my realistic point of view,'' writes Feigl, ``it makes perfectly good sense to explain in terms of physical, psychophysical, and psychophysiological theories how e.g. a bell by reflecting light, producing sound waves and being a solid, hard body affects our retina, cochlea, and our tactile nerve endings (under specifiable perceptual conditions) and thus produces 213 the visual, tactual, and auditory data in our direct experience. This is indeed the `causal theory of perception' so much maligned by = phenomenalists.''^^1^^
The excessively broad definition of the ``physical'' is in fact at variance with the real meaning of this term in physical science which alone gives it quite definite methodological significance. The extension of its limits leads to undesirable. methodological paradoxes. Such an expansion, as is justly noted by Soviet scientist D. Dubrovsky, is tantamount to the absolutisation of the ``physical''---either by postulating a single all-embracing ``physical substance'', or, given the epistemological emphasis, by implying the unavoidable absorption by physics of all other scientific disciplines. Physicalism is thus linked with the extension of the concept of the ``physical'' and this alone is bound to have an adverse effect on the development of physics condemning it to endless and futile wanderings. If unduly extended, the concept of the ``physical'' loses its concrete meaning and turns into an empty abstraction.
Feigl's doctrine leads to the identification of any objective reality with physical reality. The world is nothing but physical reality painted in different colours. All phenomena are essentially physical processes. This applies also to mental phenomena which are but a subclass of physical phenomena. The mental is identified with the physiological, i.e. with the processes which take place in the human brain. In turn, neurophysiological or biological processes are explained in terms of physical phenomena. This double _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., pp. 84--85.
214 reduction, given the extension of the chain, must be applied to developing neurophysiology, biochemistry, biophysics, etc. The tendencies in modern natural science are alleged to hold out much promise for such development. According to the new doctrine, materialist philosophy loses its status of a theoretical premise and turns into just another ontological hypothesis which is yet to be proved.This pretentious claim, by the way, underlies the title of ``scientific materialism'' assumed by the new school in an attempt to define its own place among the numerous trends representing the modern philosophy of science. True, physicalism has also sprouted in biology and cybernetics, but its models in these fields add but little to the basic physicalist concepts from the methodological angle. Feigl singles out a theoretical level represented by ``physical1'' or the physical in the broader sense of the word, linking it with the categories of causality, space, time, etc. As a result, one may get an impression that this level is identical with the general philosophical concept of matter. Feigl also links this level with the intersubjective perception of language, though he gives no clear indication regarding the scope of such ``intersubjectivity''. For Feigl, it is, evidently, confined within the limits of the physicalist theory. As regards his interpretation of the category of causality, it is based, as one can gather, not on a philosophical, e.g. dialectical-materialist concept of cause, but on the so-called causal theory of perception. This theory, instructive as it is and containing not a few interesting ideas (which have not received, by the way, due Coverage in Marxist literature on causality), has not yet been properly elaborated from the 215 philosophical standpoint. Thus the identity of the mental and the physical in Feigl's concept rests on the identification of cause and consequence as it is assumed that both the causes and their consequences must of necessity, possess all characteristics of matter.
Hence, Feigl's crucial concept of ``physical1'' is also implicitly based on empirical observations. This concept is unacceptable, for instance, to a theoretical physicist investigating the problems of quantum mechanics as it is quite obvious to him that a physical theory at its present level cannot be adequately translated into the language of sensory experience even if it is the intersubjective language of observations, as conceded by Feigl and other advocates of the identity of the mental and the physical. The qualitative difference between the theoretical and empirical levels in the reflection of objective reality has made it clear to many theoretical physicists that one cannot be reduced to the other in principle. The illusions that such a reduction is possible have already revealed their groundlessness in physical science. The more groundless are such illusions with regard to the reducibility of, say, the physiological to the physical.
The exponents of the identity of the mental and the physical often refer to their empirical identity, and that in spite of the fact that the empirical language proves inadequate to express the theoretical content of unobservable phenomena even in physics itself. It holds even more true of mental phenomena characterised by a higher level and greater complexity.
The vulnerability of Feigl's concept lies already in his assumption of the mental identity of 216 ``physical1'' and ``physical2'', since the former as the theoretical level in the investigation of phenomena and processes is restricted, on the strength of its definition, to the limits of intersubjectivity, i.e. the empirical level of cognition. Consequently, this assumption is untenable even from the viewpoint of physical science itself which has developed a keen insight into these problems. The controversies in quantum mechanics are in fact much more instructive in this respect than some authors are inclined to think. These questions will be discussed later when characterising the dialectical-materialist methodology of science. Of course, the problem of causality has its own gradations, and qualitative at that, in different fields of modern science. The analysis of the specificity of this problem in physics, biology, chemistry, physiology, psychology and other fields could be helpful in preparing scientists for the acceptance of perhaps even a greater specificity of mental processes and causal relations in the boundary area of psychic and neuro-physiological phenomena. Yet the works published by ``scientific materialists'' have not revealed, so far, any evidence of such a tendency, nor any sufficiently differentiated approach to processes which could be regarded as psychological, psychophysiological, neuro-psychological, neuro-physiological, biopsychological and biochemicalpsychological.
It stands to reason that the oversimplified idea of the relationship between different levels of reality falls an easy prey to all critics of ``scientific materialism'' ranging from the less orthodox adherents of physicalism (such as Mario Bunge, Roger Trigg, Joseph Margolis) to the supporters 217 of psycho physical dualism and interactionism (such as John Eccles, Erik Polten, and Karl Popper). In the context of such criticism their stand is presented as purely positivistic. In point of fact, this accusation is not entirely groundless, particularly in the case of Feigl. His present viewpoint differs from the empiricist programme of positivist philosophy by its general orientation, promises and expectations rather than by the actual content. Indeed, Feigl does not go beyond proclaiming the need for an ontology and accepting, together with the entire school of ``scientific realism'', the ontological existence of physical reality independent of man and his consciousness though he restricts their relationship to the extent of identifying the mental with the physical.
Feigl's special emphasis on the ontological aspect of the causality problem must serve as a warning against equating his stand with the paradigm of logical empiricism, i.e. positivism in its latest variants. Polten, like other Feigl's critics, disregards this warning and confuses Feigl's viewpoint now with the positivist stand, now with the dialectical materialist concept, thereby revealing a not too profound knowledge of the Marxist views. Nevertheless, he does find the weak spots in the theory of identity. ``Now,'' he writes, ``scientific materialises are committed to hold that all causes and effects have all characteristics of matter. Yet I maintain that the causes of what I distinguish as outer sense are indeed always physical, but the ultimate phenomenal effects---the data which are directly experienced---are mental without exception. I go onto claim that the pauses or grounds of what I 218 distinguish as inner sense cannot be exclusively physical, and that the ultimate effects are also mental in = nature.''^^1^^
In substantiating his viewpoint Polten reasons as follows. Some material [i.e. physical] cause Z, which is lake Ontario, produces probably identical consequences: similar perceptions on a sensory, empirical level of two different observers A and B. This does not mean at all that the same lake will be the cause of similar perceptions of lake Ontario with other observers. Should we consider not external, but internal perceptions we shall have to admit that not only the consequence, but the cause itself cannot be subjected to a material test. When our imagination is building up ``castles in the air'', they have nothing in common with material objects. They are purely mental attributes of one man and nobody else is capable of seeing these ``castles'' in his brain.
The causal theory of perception is based on the principle ``identical causes---identical consequences'' and does not identify causes if they do not produce identical consequences. Proceeding from this principle, Polten infers that physical and mental processes are independent of one another and that mind is not identical with the central nervous system. But he goes further. Without any profound and concrete analysis he postulates parallel existence and mutual independence of physical and mental processes, asserting, on the one hand, the presence of the world _-_-_
^^1^^ E.~P. Polten, Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. A Refutation of Scientific Materialism and an Establishment of Mind-Matter Dualism by Means of Philosophy and Scientific Method, Mouton, The Hague, Paris, 1973, p.~19.
219 of ``things-in-themselves'' as the external cause of material phenomena belonging to the sphere of perceptions of the external world and, on the other, the presence of the world of mental events as ``things-in-themselves'' or the world of pure ``Myself'' as the cause of mental phenomena belonging to the sphere of perceptions of man's internal state.Having thus defined his concept, Polten, as is often the case, begins to doubt the soundness of the dualistic viewpoint, since he proposes in the end to deduce the existence of the physical world from mind: ``And it ought not to be supposed that mind is anything derivative in this relationship. On the contrary, mind matters in perhaps every relevant sense: psychologically, chronologically, epistemologically, logically, normatively, and = ontologically.''^^1^^ True, he hastens to specify that this assertion is not substantiated in his work which means that he adheres for the present to a more moderate opinion seeking to prove that mind does exist and that it is different from matter. It goes without saying that matter is understood by Polten in the purely physicalist sense: ``It is perhaps of some interest to note,'' he writes, ``that Feigl's physicalist definition of existence is quite like the Marxist-Leninist account of matter. Any Marxist text will repeat the definition of Lenin that the sole property of matter is the property of being objective reality, existing outside consciousness, given to us in sensation. Of course, even consciousness is material for Marxists, as for = Feigl.''^^2^^
_-_-_^^1^^Ibid., pp. 21--22.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~113.
220We do not mean to say that Polten deliberately distorts the Marxist viewpoint. We are rather inclined to think that Polten has rather a vague idea of it and very scanty knowledge of the corresponding works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In any case, his views on the ``Marxist-Leninist account of matter'' are very far from the truth. First, the dialectical materialist concept of matter does not coincide with the notion of the physical as understood by Feigl, even if we compare it with his more general interpretation of the physical as ``physical1''. Besides objective reality, Marxism recognises subjective reality, the reality of senses, emotions, thoughts, ideas, etc. Moreover, Marxism not only recognises these realities, but demands that they be considered in their interaction. In this context it would be in place to recall Lenin's well known words: ``Of course, even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field---in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is = indubitable.''^^1^^ Second, Lenin's stand has very little in common with positivist empiricism which is characteristic of Feigl's views, since sensations to Lenin are by no means the only source of knowledge and the only means for the cognition of reality, but they are indeed the only form of man's connection _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', Collected Works, Vol.~14, 1977, p.~147 (here and hereafter Progress Publishers, Moscow).
221 with the surroundings and even with his own inner world.Every philosopher more or less familiar with Lenin's works knows perfectly well that Lenin made a clear distinction between the physical concept of matter subject to elaboration with every new significant discovery in physics and the philosophical or epistemological concept representing the sole property of the infinitely diverse objects and phenomena of the world---the property of being an objective reality. None other than Lenin, developing the ideas of Marx and Engels, came out against the identification of these different levels in the cognition of reality. Later on we shall dwell on this aspect of the problem at greater length but at present our point is to emphasise that Polten's criticism of ``scientific materialism'' in the person of Feigl, Smart, Armstrong and others distorts their viewpoints in at least three aspects: in their attitude to positivism, i.e. logical empiricism, in their attitude to dialectical materialism and in the confusion of the methodological and ontological treatment of the mind-body problem.
As we see, the viability of the programme of ``scientific realism'' depends primarily on its ability to overcome the physicalist viewpoint. It is all the more important as physicalism is in fact entirely alien to true philosophical materialism and seriously limits its theoretical and methodological possibilities. Physicalism, as well as reductionism in general, restricts the scope of scientific investigations and tends to turn them onto a beaten track paved with elaborate physical theories. Everyone knows how easy it is to tread along such tracks, yet every true scientist 222 is equally aware that the easiest way is not the shortest one. Science which represents the forefront of human thought has always followed and will follow untrodden paths. Widely known are Marx's winged words: ``There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous = summits.''^^1^^
Of course, physicalism and reductionism are not a transient phenomenon. They are not brought about by some specific concurrence of circumstances in scientific development, but make themselves manifest each time the philosophers, natural scientists or sociologists attempt to apply certain general principles and methods of scientific explanation beyond the sphere where they hold good. Reductionism can be likened to intermittent fever of scientific cognition which seizes now this, now that field of science. It is essentially connected with the passage from one level of knowledge to another and plays an important part in a scientific explanation, though it is evidently not confined to the limits of this cognitive pattern alone.
Physicalism is but one of the forms of reductionism which seeks to translate specific phenomena and processes into the language of physical mechanisms and laws. It should be noted that we do not apply the terms ``physicalism'' and ``reductionism'' to scientific explanations which reflect the laws of objective processes and fall in line with the trends of scientific cognition. With us, these terms always carry a negative meaning _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.~I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.~30.
223 denoting an attempt to squeeze certain phenomena into the Procrustean bed of known laws relating to different systems and phenomena.The modern philosophy of science is characterised by complex internal processes and sweeping reappraisal of values. No sooner had Michael Ruse published his Philosophy of Biology, advocating reductionist and patently logico-empiricist views, than the scientific community produced other works, such as David Hull's Philosophy of Biological Science which treats practically the same range of problems, but from an entirely new position claiming to represent the ``realistic'' approach. Contrary to Ruse who denies theoretical biology the status of a science, Hull proceeds from the actual status of biology in a typically ``scientific realist'' manner. For him, the existence of a highly ramified and systematised biological science featuring a high level of theoretical development needs no proof---it is selfevident. Understandably, this initial premise lays a foundation for an entirely different system of reasoning.
Defining his attitude to positivism and its methodological programme, Hull declares that the logico-empiricist analysis of reduction is at best inadequate, and at worst utterly wrong. The paradigm of physicalism proceeds from the possibility of solving all problems at the lowest level of analysis, i.e. at the level of quantum mechanics, whereas biologists use not only analysis, but also synthesis to investigate the phenomena in interest since they deal with highly organised living systems.
Between the living and the dead Hull sees not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative 224 difference. This is particularly true of man as a living being. ``It is certainly true,'' he writes, ``that nothing is more obvious in the study of nature than the existence of complexity and levels of organisation. Now here are the levels of organisation more stratified and the complexity more complex than in the organic world. But ontological levels, individuals, parts, wholes, and so forth are hardly the 'givens' of experience---rather these notions emerge as phenomena are investigated and need not coincide with common sense notions... Man is qualitatively different from other = species.''^^1^^ It is also indicative that Hull stands for the independence of biology as a science not only on the empirical, but also on the theoretical levels recognising the right of biology to have its own laws and theories which have not been formulated by physics and are not reducible to physical laws and theories. Biology, in his opinion, provides convincing evidence that the concept of life leaves no room for any metaphysical entity. The ability to create and reproduce ever more complex structures is inherent in the elements themselves which constitute living matter. The ascent from elementary particles to man includes a series of different integration levels and ``interruptions in development''. Yet it is a continuous process, both in time and space, with no ``vacuum'' to be filled with immaterial entities. The transition from inanimate nature to the world of living beings is so continuous that the analysis of molecules and organels of the cell has already got into the hands of _-_-_
^^1^^ D.~Hull, Philosophy of Biological Science, Englewood Cliffs, N.~J., 1974, p.~131.
__PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__ 15--1152 225 physicists. This does not mean, however, that biology is turning into an appendage to physics and that its field of investigations is becoming, so to speak, a subsidiary to a more complex system. Each level of organisation features new properties and new laws. Not a single separate molecule can reproduce itself. This ability is only inherent in such a formation as cell. Yet the emergence of life changes the rules of the game. Natural selection makes a greater demand on a higher level system, such as a population of cells, yet simultaneously offers it new forming possibilities. Living organisms remaining subject to the laws that govern inert systems acquire new properties which do not play any part at a lower level. Biology calls for a new theory.Of certain interest is also Hull's criticism of vitalism. In his opinion, the vitalist doctrine results from the failure to understand the connection between such key categories as things and substances, on the one hand, and properties, on the other. Life, according to Hull, is nothing but time, space, gravitation and magnetism. To this must be added the ``organisational property'' of living systems. The materialistic approach to the problem of life is quite obvious here, at least within the limits typical of ``scientific realism'': Hull offers to explain life by the specific features of the organisation of living matter itself, but not by postulating some spirit or vital force. Hull agrees with some anti-reductionists in that the successful development of biology calls for the ontology of many levels, stressing at the same time that it is far from sufficient to divide all reality into several layers and levels---the main thing is to determine the specific 226 properties and laws characteristic of each of them.
Hull's recognition of the existence of specific, qualitatively different levels, important as it is, cannot yet ensure the solution of the problems facing modern biology. His approach, though essentially materialistic, is still limited. Hull has inherited from positivism its special accent on cognitive structures and carries it onto static organic structures. Yet one of the fundamental properties of living matter at all levels consists in its ability for development and self-reproduction. Hence, one can hardly expect any essential progress in the creation of theoretical biology without a general theory of development, i.e. dialectics. Moreover, such progress cannot be ensured by mechanically ``applying'' dialectics to the analysis of living systems---it calls for a new approach which is to be worked out by biological science itself. It means that the processes of differentiation should be considered in unity with those of integration, synthesis, and that the structural approach should be combined with the historical one.
In order to study differentiation phenomena, the scientist must possess some kind of an analytical instrument. Good headway has already been made towards this goal in the field of investigation of molecular-biological mechanisms. More difficult appears to be the development of a comprehensive approach to such regulating and controlling systems as the endocrine or nervous system, as it must take into account the specificity of each system and each level of living matter. Biology could evidently greatly benefit from the principle of historicism which would help it to explain the reactions of a developing organism to __PRINTERS_P_227_COMMENT__ 15* 227 changing external conditions in terms of adaptability, i.e. to regard the interaction of the organism and the environment as a unity resulting from a prolonged adaptive evolution. Without a historical approach all reactions of an organism may look like a heap of absurdities determined exclusively by the.internal factors of development, quite fortuitous at that and in no way connected with external condition. In order to use to advantage all available analytical means of investigation, the biologists must first of all overcome their prejudice against dialectics and get down in earnest to studying its real theoretical and methodological content from classical works permeated with truly creative spirit.
The results achieved in molecular biology could not have been duly appreciated if it had not been for the intensive development of the idea of selfdevelopment and for the turn to Darwin's theory of evolution. The synthesis of genetics and the evolution theory carried out in the 1930s and expounded by S. Chetverikov, R. Fischer, S. Wright, and other scientists undoubtedly played an important part in paving the way for the ideas and methods of molecular biology. The concept of microevolution, disputable as it is, has had a beneficial influence on the development of biology if only for its role in preparing appropriate coordination between structure analysis and evolutionary research, i.e. in the integration of experimental biology and theoretical investigations. It should be remembered that though the elimination of the principles of integrity and historism in favour of analytical methods and means does produce an immediate effect and gives tangible and demonstrable results, it can 228 never be anything more than just the first, though sufficiently flexible, approximation to the truth in the process of cognition of living organisms. As A. Szentgj\"orgji has figuratively put it, with reductionism employed as a universal method, life passes, as it were, between one's fingers. The significance of each of the above methods in the development of modern biology can only be assessed from the standpoint of dialectics as a science concerned with the most general laws of development.
Numerous philosophers and biologists showing interest in the above problems note the paradoxical fact that such outstanding physicists as Schrodinger, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Wigner have sided of late with the most resolute opponents of reductionism in many fields, including biology which is far removed from their special interests and which is regarded by some physicists as a kind of their private domain. In making such observations they overlook the fact that physics has already recovered, in the main if not completely, from this intermittent fever. There are few physicists now who still hope to reduce the theory of relativity in its present ``dominion'' to the principles of classical mechanics or to translate quantum phenomena into the language of classical Laplatian = determinism^^1^^. It becomes increasingly clear to scientists that reality cannot be reduced to the totality of observable facts and that epistemological reduction as one of the _-_-_
^^1^^ Hopes for such a reduction were once expressed by Einstein, and later by David Bohm and other scientists in the hypothesis of latent parameters. Now these hopes are considered groundless.
229 dogmas of positivism is untenable. It should be noted in this context that physics with its philosophical theories appears to be again far more instructive to biology than vice versa. As regards the approach to the problem of objectivity, the solutions offered by physics and its philosophers feature a notably higher standard of both empirical and theoretical investigations.It looks as if experimental biology were only approaching the stage at which it will be confronted with the problems of the inseparable connection between the object, subject and instrument, and the relations between the object and the means of measurement. So far, we have not yet come across a philosophical work discussing these problems in the light of experimental investigations in biology. The theoretical level of biological science is evidently not yet high enough to permit a serious philosophical analysis of the means of the objective cognition of biological phenomena. By contrast, all these problems are not only given extensive coverage, but are also treated at a high theoretical level in the literature on physical problems, e.g. in the works by ``scientific realist'' Bunge. This philosophical trend occupies far more advanced positions in physics than in other fields of science.
One of the important aspects of Bunge's concept appears to be his analysis of the problem of the conceptual representation of facts in theory. In his opinion, theory can hardly be regarded as simply an image of reality, something like a picture. It is rather a conceptual reconstruction of reality. Yet conceptual representations of facts are no less objective, though they are only partial and provide at best but an 230 approximation to the truth. Not every theoretical construct represents something. For instance, logical notions are not representative at all, even if they have their referents. According to Bunge, reference and presentation are independent of each other, since non-referential constructs, such as multitudes, can be used for representation whereas non-referential constructs, e.g. a tautology, may be completely unrepresentative. The truth is that scientific theories can be both referential and representative.
The difference between the referent and the representation is of no small significance for philosophy. According to Bunge, biologists are more and more frequently engaged in controversies over which of the three biological systems is the true referent of the synthetic theory of evolution---the individual organism, the population or the species. No convincing argument has been presented so far in favour of any of the contending theses. The difference between the referents and the representations becomes clear in developed sciences, such as theoretical physics. Here a certain function probability will refer to some system or state, whereas the values of this function may represent certain dispositions of this system, like, for instance, the function of mass refers to bodies in general, whereas its particular value will represent the mass of a given body. In quantum mechanics each dynamic property of a system, such as a pulse, is represented by a certain operator in the Guilbertian space, i.e. a given operator represents a certain property of its referent. If the relationship of reference in factual sciences compares constructs with things or with aggregates of things, the relationship of 231 representation compares a construct with a certain aspect or property of a given thing or an aggregate of things. Hence, the purpose and the result of a theory is not the representation of selected aspects of alleged things. Theoretical notions are nothing but developed mathematical structures which cannot be defined in terms of empirical operations or constructed as logical functions on the basis of given observations. Empirical checks consist of operations planned in the light of subsequent theories. Besides the experience bridging the gap between theory and reality, there also exists a semantic bridge constructed with the help of the semantic propositions of the given theory.
According to Bunge, the ideal of objectivity characteristic of factual theory is preserved in quantum mechanics to no lesser degree than in classical mechanics. The object neither disappears nor merges with the subject. The only change consists in that our modern notions of microobjects are incorporated in a whole chain of connecting (mediating) links. ``The subject,'' notes Bunge, ``does not occur among the basic predicates of our version of QM [quantum mechanics]. Neither does he occur in the theory of measurement: indeed, physical theory is unconcerned with the psychical events going on inside the observer's skull: a physical theory of measurement is concerned only with the physical intersection between two or more physical entities, at least one of which must be a = macrosystem.''^^1^^
_-_-_^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.~Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p.~102.
232From Bunge's viewpoint, the standard formalism of quantum mechanics can be adequately expressed in terms of physics without any reference to the subject, i.e. psychology. In other words, quantum mechanics can be interpreted in the same way as classical mechanics on the assumption that the entities referred to by theory, such as electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. have an independent status. That does not mean, of course, that the experimentalist cannot modify them, for instance, by filtering out certain states or by providing evidence that some microsystems are purely imaginary. Yet to achieve this aim the experimentalist must use physical means without summoning the ghost of the Copenhagen school. Bunge views the observer as an entity capable of influencing physical events with the help of physical means either directly, through the agency of his body, or indirectly, through the mediation of automated devices. The physicist's mind invents formulae used for prediction of physical events and for interpretation of physical phenomena under investigation and therefore has no direct bearing on theory itself.
For objective interpretation of quantum mechanics Bunge proposes to free it, first, from the notion of observable value and, second, from subjective probability. In his opinion, it is irrelevant to speak of an ``observable value'', of the observer changing it, of obtaining the true knowledge of the observable value, etc. All of these notions relate to the subject, as well as to some of his actions and mental states. Typical quantum properties are not observable (in the epistemological sense of the word), and changeable values are nothing but approximations to values calculated 233 theoretically. The notion of certainty is no less alien to physical theory. The latter must contain the objective interpretation of probability as an ordinary physical property, but not as a degree of faith or a measure of certainty.
According to Bunge, the axiomatisation of the existing quantum theory is the radical means of its restructuring. Axiomatic substantiation should rest on such notions as the ``microsystem'' (or quanton), the ``surroundings'' (macro- or microphysical systems), the ``conventional (configurational) space'' or the ``space of states'', the ``property of the microsystem'', the ``operator representing it'' (the ``observable'' in the Copenhagen version), etc. These notions will give the quantum theory a kind of an initial basis subject to no further determination. The postulates of this ``realistic'' version of quantum mechanics determining each of the initial notions must be justified by their ability to give successful theoretical explanations of experimental facts. Hence, axioms are determined both formally and semantically. Measurements only come into play at the checking stage. As regards the properties of the microsystem and their conceptual representation, Bunge always strives to avoid the term ``observable''. He contends that, first, they cannot be perceived, though they are amenable to indirect investigation; second, there is no complete clarity about the specific methods of their measurement. In Bunge's opinion, the subject should be barred from theoretical physics if we do not wish to confuse it with psychology or epistemology. The subject's role consists in constructing and checking a theory, but not in posing as its referent. It is for these reasons, according to Bunge, that we should 234 not use the word ``observable'' with dynamic variables in quantum mechanics.
Specific parameters inherent in quantum-mechanical systems are chance variables in the sense that they are associated with a definite distribution of probabilities. It is true, in particular, of the position and momentum of a microsystem which should rather be called a quantum position (quosition) and a quantum momentum (quomentum), to emphasise their non-classical nature. Bunge points out that the function representing the quantum state meets the axioms of the calculation of probabilities. It means that quantum mechanics today contains no latent variables. According to Bunge, Bohm's prohibition of latent variables directly ensues from the conventional approach to the notions of the axiomatic system and from the proof of the chance character of all dynamic variables.
In Bunge's opinion, the fundamentalism of quantum mechanics can be understood in two different ways. One way is to assume that it refers not to an individual quanton, but to a statistical ensemble. From this assumption it logically follows that different components of a certain ensemble in a given quantum state have different values of the coordinates and of the momentum. Yet quantum mechanics is also applicable to an individual microsystem (e.g. to an electron passing through a crystal grid and getting onto a screen). The theory is not checked by means of large quantum ensembles. Thus, a calculated distribution of positions is compared with a ``diffraction'' pattern on the screen when the number of collisions increases. In other words, the function of the state (like any other chance 235 variable) refers to an individual quanton and its exact form is checked with the help of the quanton statistical totalities.
The other way referred to by Bunge consists in regarding quantum-mechanical properties as latent or potential rather than actual, i.e. as properties which reveal themselves in the interaction of the system with the measuring instrument. During this interaction the properties become dependent on the observer, since it is in his power to conduct or suspend the experiment. Yet here, too, Bunge strives to free quantummechanical properties from the subject's influence. As a rule, a quanton has neither an accurately defined position, nor a definite momentum, possessing only point distributions. These distributions change with time under the influence of the environment irrespective of whether this environment is included in the experiment or not. Specifically, a quanton can be fairly well localised in space, for which purpose it is necessary to fulfil appropriate operations in order to prepare a localised state. Such operations quite often take place under natural conditions. According to Bunge, we only repeat the experiments staged by nature itself by fixing, for instance, the position of the atoms or by producing a monochromatic electron beam.
From Bunge's viewpoint, the quantum theory does not lend itself to an empirical interpretation since none of its basic symbols has any empirical content. Moreover not a single basic symbol of quantum mechanics can be explained in empirical terms whence it follows that the quantum theory has no empirical content whatsoever. It does not mean, however, that it is not testable--- 236 it simply means, in Bunge's opinion, that its facts are quantum transitions lying above the level of sensory experience. Here Bunge somewhat exaggerates the existing gap between classical and quantum mechanics, sensory experience and theory, observability and non-observability. Though not directly observable, many quantummechanical formalisms and symbols can at any rate be visualised and therefore lend themselves, at least partially, to empirical interpretation. Besides, an empirical test involves the use of additional theories connecting microprocesses with macroprocesses, as well as theories explaining the behaviour of the macrosystems included in the process of measurement. The semantic content of the quantum theory is thus determined not only by the factual level reflected in theoretical concepts, but also by concepts which can be translated, at least partially, into the empirical language. To be sure, this circumstance makes the test of the quantum theory much more difficult and is accountable for the controversies (still going on) over the possibility of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bunge strives for the simplest and most radical solution of the problem of objectivity in quantum mechanics proposing complete separation of the empirical and theoretical levels and banishment of all observable and measurable values from theory. In point of fact, it is the reverse of ``ousting metaphysics''. This way can hardly lead to a satisfactory result. Just like an experiment cannot be freed from its theoretical canvas, so the quantum theory cannot and evidently need not be ``relieved'' of all the observables. If compared with the stand of the Copenhagen school, it is just the other 237 extreme, prompted by the desire to solve the problem of objectivity in quantum mechanics by surgical means.
One will hardly take exception to Bunge's contention that a notion cannot be defined as primary or secondary outside a definite theoretical context, that the axiomatisation of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics has made it clear that they deal with objects rather than measurements and that these theories are not directly related to the observer and his mental states. It is not quite clear, however, in which way the axiomatisation of the above theories helps to reveal their objective content or, the more so, serves as a means for making knowledge more objective. Nevertheless, Bunge's idea appears to be constructive enough, particularly if the proposed axiomatisation could be supplemented with other methods of the objective interpretation of the quantum theory. As we shall try to show later, such possibilities should evidently not be discarded.
Besides the weaknesses noted above, Bunge's concept is depreciated by the mutual isolation of classical and quantum mechanics. He draws a sharp line of demarcation between the two theories leaving just one connecting link---the instrument whose indications are described in terms of classical physics but at the same time do not yield to empirical interpretation. Here Bunge appears to be unable to fit things to one another and shape them into a streamlined philosophical-methodological system. He stops in hesitation when confronted with the need for a more flexible, i.e. dialectical, approach to the relationship of theories. What is needed, however, is 238 not only a more flexible apparatus to investigate the relations and links between theories, as well as between a theory and its empirical basis. Of crucial importance, alongside a greater determination to delimit theory and sensory experience, is an effective methodological concept of development. A concept of this kind is necessary not only for understanding the interdependence of the classical and quantum theories, but also for defining the future trends of the development of modern physics. It is very important, for instance, to envisage the prospects of the modern non-relativistic quantum theory and the theory of relativity, as well as the effect of their possible integration on the theory of elementary particles. It is quite obvious that the solution of these problems calls for a dialectical approach to the analysis of modern scientific knowledge and for abandoning the view that the quantum theory revised in accordance with Bunge's requirements is the ideal for all sciences. The materialistic substantiation of the latest physical theories cannot be complete without dialectical analysis. It is not fortuitous that the weakness of this link in the system of Bunge's views leads him to a number of idealistic conclusions. As has been shown above, Bunge's approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the general problems of the relationship of philosophy and science, as well as to the mind-body problem cannot but suffer from certain eclecticism due to his prejudice against dialectics.
Bunge's concept features rather a contradictory and even odd combination of the objective understanding of probability in quantum mechanics with the mechanistic interpretation of causality. 239 Bunge's mechanicism in this field is traceable to his earlier works and, as his latest ideas show, has not been completely cured. It must be admitted that Bunge has come out with argumentative criticism against the Machist concept of causality and opposed the attempts of Schlick, Frank and Mach himself to substitute functional dependence or the connection of states for causal relations. He repeatedly disclosed the futility of all attempts of positivism to contrast causality and quantum mechanics and to undermine the idea of causality by counterposing it to Heisenberg's correlation of uncertainties. His efforts, given a most serious attitude to dialectics, could be very fruitful in achieving a common goal---to give an objective substantiation to the microworld theory. However, Bunge has always refused to avail himself of this methodological support.
Bunge's stand is largely attributable to the fact that his concept of causality is based on the simplest form of causal relations lying on the surface in everyday experience: the action of one object on another. Expressing the principle of causality in a more strict logical form, Bunge presents it as follows: ``If C happens under the same conditions, then (and only then) E is always produced by = it.''^^1^^ According to the author, this formula includes all the obligatory components of causality, namely, the conditionality of the consequence upon the cause, the uniqueness of the connection, the unilateral dependence of the consequence on the cause, the constancy of _-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Causality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959, pp. 48--49.
240 the connection and its genetic nature (or productivity).Ascribing such features as uniqueness and necessity to causal relations, Bunge discards by his formula the possibility of one and the same consequence being brought about by different causes. In his analysis of different definitions of causality Bunge gives preference to the one identifying the cause with the necessary and sufficient condition. He includes all the accompanying conditions in the concept of the efficient cause. In his opinion, if the accompanying conditions were contingent upon the cause, the formula of causality would express more than a simple, direct causal bond and the cause would then be regarded as the unchainer or triggerer of a = process^^1^^. Bunge's formula, however, complicates the problem of the relationship of the internal and external conditions in the analysis of some complex process, particularly in a living organism or any developing system. No less difficult becomes also the analysis of the behaviour of a quantum-mechanical system which figures prominently in Bunge's works.
The solution to the internal-external dilemma in the causality problem proposed by Bunge is very, if not too, simple: he identifies both the internal and external conditions either with the necessary or with the sufficient conditions required to ensure the causal process. This brings him in obvious contradiction with his own concept of determinism. It should be noted that Bunge distinguishes between the principle of causality and the principle of determinism. The latter rests on a broader notion of ``determination'' _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_241_COMMENT__ 16--1152 241 which includes the processes of simple causality. One might infer from this stand that causality in its simplest and clearest form must underlie any kind of determination, including the statistical one. Yet Bunge, though never giving a clear-cut definition of necessity and chance, makes it quite plain that the changes contingent on the very nature of phenomena and resulting from the operation of internal factors should be regarded as the necessary ones. Chance, according to Bunge, is what results from external circumstances. Now let us see if this approach will help in any way to understand the nature of quanum-mechanical processes or throw additional light on the problem of completeness of the quantum theory.In his book on causality Bunge still regards with favour Bohm's hypothesis of the existence of ``latent parameters'' determining the statistical behaviour of microparticles and contends that, once defined, they would enable the scientists to abandon the probability interpretation of quantum mechanics and of the behaviour of microparticles. Yet in his Philosophy of Physics, written later, he changes his views and offers a different programme: to eliminate completely the subject (psychological determinations, measurements, observable values) from the quantum theory. In this way he evidently seeks to eliminate the subjective interpretation of probability as well. To this end Bunge uses the expression ``mean value'' instead of the psychological ``expectation value'' and prefers the terminology of probability of quanton's presence in a given volume to the vocabulary of the Copenhagen school and Percy Bridgeman's operationalist concept 242 ``(presence is a given volume when the measurement is practically completed''). Bunge goes even as far as substituting the terms ``scatter'' and ``spread'' for ``uncertainty'' and ``indeterminacy''.
Here, however, a tricky question suggests itself: is it to be inferred that a statistical process proceeding at a certain level of the organisation of matter is a direct effect of the cause operating at a deeper level? Schrodinger's equation is known to be in some sense mechanistic, just like Newton's. Both equations describe the changes caused by external effects, yet the latter, unlike the former, represents a simple causal relationship. The quantisation of states brings in a new qualitative element which distinguishes modern from classical mechanics. The essential difference consists in that the former equation regards matter as a wave process, whereas the latter one treats it as the totality of particles. The difference here is brought about by the inner quality and not by external forces. Yet in both situations the principle of causality is used to explain motion in terms of mechanics (wave mechanics and classical mechanics respectively). Should it be assumed, then, that simple causality rejected at one level owing to statistical interpretation must be restored at the next basic level as being better suited for the explanation and prediction of processes?
When we pass on to microprocesses, we encounter a relative increase in the role of internal factors and a corresponding decrease in the role of external factors in determining the properties of physical systems. Here again, how are we to tally necessity resulting, according to Bunge, from the operation of internal factors of physical __PRINTERS_P_243_COMMENT__ 16* 243 and all other phenomena, and chance regarded by him as a totality of external conditions with the view that any future theory explaining the mechanical displacement of microparticles in space and time will be a statistical theory?
Suppose now we still hope that one fine day it will prove possible to describe the behaviour of microparticles in terms of simple causal relations. All the same, the lessons taught by quantum mechanics have not been lost on us and we now understand that causality need not at all be rigidly and for ever linked with necessity and that necessity, for that matter, cannot be divorced from chance, except by the sheer force of abstraction from concrete conditions. Hence, any causal connection includes both necessity and chance. If that is so, as surely it is, causality can never be separated from probability unless it is viewed as a fixed relationship, something in the nature of a bronze casting, which cannot be different from what it is.
So, we are again bound to come to the conclusion that disregard for dialectics and the inapt use of its instruments let down even the most talented representatives of ``scientific realism'' and account, directly or indirectly, for their inconsistencies and concessions to idealism despite the ostensibly materialistic premises of their concepts.
[244] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER THREE __ALPHA_LVL1__ DIALECTICAL BEARINGS __ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. OVERCOMING HEGELWhile assessing the significance of various schools of the modern philosophy of science and comparing their programmes and views on fundamental methodological problems, we have never missed an opportunity to outline, if only schematically, the attitude of dialectical materialism (or materialistic dialectics) to each issue under consideration. Now, in order to characterise materialistic dialectics as an alternative to positivism, we ought to take a somewhat closer look at its basic concepts and present them in a broader perspective.
Of course, it would be presumptuous even to attempt to give an exhaustive account of Marxist philosophy within the scope of this publication. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the relationship of philosophy and special sciences, the objectivity of scientific knowledge and causality, i.e. to the main problems which we have already discussed in connection with the crisis of 245 positivism and with the programmes of alternative doctrines within the framework of the modern philosophy of science and which constitute, as we have shown, the core of any methodological programme.
From its very first steps Marxist philosophy, continuing the materialistic and dialectical traditions of all previous philosophy has been the antipode of positivism. There is no need to reproduce here the history of their struggle, the more so as its outcome is well known. The prestige of materialistic dialectics as the methodology of cognition and as the world view is steadily growing, winning over to its side the most prominent representatives of modern science. Marxist philosophy, assimilating every new achievement of social and scientific progress and constantly enriching itself, is extending its influence to ever new regions of the world, the only means of its ``expansion'' being, as before, the logic of truth. It is precisely this logic, confirmed by life itself, that underlies its high scientific repute. By contrast, positivist philosophy, represented now by a dozen or so of its champions, the living relics of the past, is undergoing a profound ideological crisis evidently marking the closing stage of its history.
The dramatic story of the struggle between Marxist philosophy and various trends of positivism suggests certain conclusions which appear to be particularly instructive in the light of the present-day debate on the methodology of scientific cognition, as they are directly related to the main controversial issues. In this connection special importance attaches to the difference between the Marxist and positivist views on the 246 relation of philosophy to special sciences, as well as on the relation of science in general to the unscientific forms of consciousness.
As we have earlier indicated, one of the key points in the programmes of all positivist schools without exception has always been the opposition to metaphysics, i.e. to everything that passes beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Indeed, the only difference between the successive stages or phases of the evolution of positivism consisted, perhaps, in the difference of the concepts of scientificity and, consequently, in different lines of demarcation between science and ``non-science''.
This circumstance, however, has nothing to do with the ill luck of positivist philosophy, since the delimitation of these two spheres of human and social consciousness is indeed absolutely necessary. No one in our time, except, perhaps, theologists (who are not averse to partaking in the fruit of science either), would raise any objections to the separation of science and religion if only for the simple reason that they represent entirely different forms of social consciousness with their own traditions, specific features and functions in society, not to speak of the religious prejudices that have always been a formidable obstacle in the way of scientific progress.
Besides religion, there exist other forms of nonscientific consciousness, such as, for instance, aesthetic consciousness and ``common sense''. They should also be distinguished from science as such, though there is no sharp line of demarcation between them. Indeed, scientific knowledge grows on the rich soil of man's everyday experience, and the artistic perception of the world 247 inspires creative scientific endeavour. It would be impossible to understand science, its origin, motive forces and the nature of scientific thinking itself if we left out of account the blood vessels connecting science with living humanity, its everyday needs and aspirations, as well as the enormous wealth of labour experience accumulated by mankind. Said Goethe: ``All theory, dear friend, is grey, but the golden tree of actual life springs ever green.''
The fact that the links between science and the arts have not yet been properly explored gives no grounds for ignoring their obvious mutually beneficial influence. On the contrary, the more complex and uncommon their relations, the greater should be the philosophers' desire to get at the root of their extraordinary alliance, since they may find there a clue to the mystery of human thinking. The discoveries that may await them on this path are being eagerly looked forward to by science, as they will essentially affect the further course of scientific and technological progress, rationalise the development of technology and raise the intellectual standards of human life.
There is no need to discuss these problems in detail, since our purpose at present is to underscore the importance of demarcating science and non-scientific knowledge. However, such a demarcation cannot be an aim in itself. The close links existing between science and everyday life, science and the arts, common sense and true knowledge, as well as between science and other fields of social life indicate that it should be but a preliminary stage for further investigations. When social life and social consciousness are 248 divided respectively into more or less independent spheres and forms, the next step will be to focus our attention on their interconnection. This stage, however, will hardly be the final one either, since the investigation of their links will lead to a more profound and concrete understanding of differences between them. This process, alas, has no end, just like the process of cognition in general.
We may sound not very optimistic, but one of the tasks of science, as distinct from religion and other forms of myths consists in giving man correct ideas of himself and of the surrounding world, the ideas that would be concrete, connected with reality and therefore testable, rather than in his illusory consolation. As to the arts and common sense, science differs from them by the precision of its statements, accuracy of calculations and forecasts, as well as by the reliability of its conclusions.
As is seen from these considerations, very general and sketchy as they are, the nature of scientific knowledge can only be understood after it is singled out of other forms of human consciousness and presented as- a historical process, i.e. with its essential links, both logical and historical. It should be noted that the rapid scientific development over the past decades and the crucial changes of many fundamental concepts of the world have exposed the links between science and other social activities and made their interdependence common knowledge. The immaturity of these links in the period of the inception of positivism, however, cannot justify this philosophy for their methodological distortion, particularly at the later stages of 249 its evolution when these links became more apparent.
As early as the beginning of the 19th century Hegel defined the basic principles underlying the approach to this question. These principles, though in idealistic attire, carried profound dialectical meaning which ensured their viability till our time. All that was needed (in Hegel's time at any rate) in order to solve in principle the problem of the relationship of science to the non-scientific forms of human consciousness was dialectics. It was to show the complexity and the contradictory nature of this relationship: on the one hand, the opposition of science and religion, of scientific and pictorial thinking, intuition and logic, practice and theory; on the other, the diversity of bonds, mediating and intermediate links, as well as the transitions from one form of consciousness to another.
The question of the scientific value of philosophy aroused Hegel's special interest. In 1802, he emphasised the importance of this question in the Critical Philosophical Journal and discussed the attitude to it on the part of Kant and Fichte. ``Philosophy,'' wrote Hegel, ``since it is to be Ordered Knowledge, cannot borrow its Method from a subordinate science, such as = Mathematics.''^^1^^ In his opinion, philosophy was capable of being an objective, conclusive science based on the immanent development of the notion and the absolute method of = knowledge.^^2^^ The content of logic as the highest type of philosophical science is its scientific method, the _-_-_
^^1^^ Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol.~1, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1929, p.~36.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 36--37.
250 notion of science itself which is its ultimate result, as well as the concept of its subject-matter, thinking in concepts which ``is engendered in the course of development of the Science, and therefore cannot precede = it''.^^1^^ According to Hegel, the one and only thing for securing scientific progress is understanding that the method of logic is spontaneous development of its content and that its essence is a dialectical, i.e. definite = negation.^^2^^Having mastered Hegel's dialectics, Marx and Engels gave a profound comparative analysis of their own and Hegel's views proceeding from the materialistic idea of the primacy of social being over social consciousness, of the determination of consciousness, its content and structure by the content and structure of the social, practical activity of man. Reuniting dialectics and materialism, Marx and Engels turned dialectics into a real science, and this in the terms that have preserved their validity till nowadays: objectivity, connection with reality and testability of its propositions in practice. Having retained the universality of logical categories and principles, materialist dialectics at the same time got rid of the speculativeness, scholasticism and abstractness which were characteristic of German classical philosophy.
Disclosing the mystified form of Hegelian dialectics in his Economic Manuscripts of 1857--1859, Marx described his own method as being the direct opposite of the Hegelian method. One of the features of Marx's method, also contrasting _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~53.
^^2^^Ibid., pp. 64--65.
251 with Hegel's idealistic dialectics, consisted, according to Marx, in that it ``leads from abstract definitions by way of reasoning to the reproduction of the concrete situation,~... as a summing-up, a result, and not as the starting = point.''^^1^^The categories and laws of materialistic dialectics are indeed universal and in this sense irrefutable. Yet their status is entirely different from the status of a priori, absolute Hegelian ideas. The universality of the categories and laws of dialectics interpreted materialistically does not mean that they can be used everywhere, at all times, in all cases and under any circumstances. They are only universal in the sense that they apply to all fields of reality, namely, to nature, society and thinking. When we say that they are universally confirmable, we mean that they are confirmed in all fields of reality. This, and only this is the meaning of ``universality'' characterising dialectical laws and categories. Of course, such an understanding of universality limits the competence of philosophy which claimed to be the science of sciences by denying it the right to explain or analyse every individual object or phenomena, every relationship or dependence. One can speak of dialectics as the science of sciences in a figurative sense only, meaning that it rises above particulars, trivial problems and petty everyday situations. If Marx and Engels had not risen above their surroundings, they would hardly have managed to discern the essence of capitalism, its basic laws and working of hidden mechanisms behind the Mont Blanc of _-_-_
^^1^^ K.~Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. ~206.
252 individual facts. Moreover, had they not risen above reality, they would not have been able to see the outlines of future human society.This ``looking from above'' has nothing in common with ``looking down'' upon something and does not by any means imply a derogatory attitude to specialised sciences, everyday human life and their specific reflection in human consciousness. It is rather an epistemological position indicative of the relative independence of philosophical knowledge and of the specific character of the subject-matter of dialectics as a science. Philosophy and dialectics should be concerned with more general problems than those which come within the scope of special sciences.
It stands to reason that the links and relationships connecting the most general properties of objects and phenomena of reality are different from those connecting specific objects and phenomena. They constitute a specific field of knowledge which cannot be covered in full measure by physics, chemistry, biology, history or any other particular sciences. On the other hand, the tree of science would hardly be able to flourish without its crown transforming the power and tenacity of philosophical ideas into the energy of scientific cognition.
Having preserved the universality of dialectical categories which reflect eternal human problems and link the wonderings of man's spirit in the depths of outer space, atom or living cell with his earthly existence, Marxism has shown at the same time the real connection of most general philosophical problems with man's social life, practical activity and problems of special sciences. In that sense Marxism revealed the specific 253 nature of philosophical categories and, consequently, showed the way to test them, i.e. to confirm true ideas and views and to refute false ones. This idea of the unity of the universality (abstractness) of philosophical knowledge and its concreteness was beyond Hegel's understanding owing to the speculativeness of his philosophy, its detachment from real (material) being rooted in the conception of the identity of being and thinking. This idea, however, is also beyond the comprehension of modern positivism with its fixation on the direct empirical testing of any scientific knowledge and obsession with the struggle against ``metaphysics'' condemned together with dialectics by the positivist court of ``verification'' or ``falsification''.
The irony consists in that dialectics which had provided the real basis for alliance between philosophy and science way back by the middle of the 19th century has become one of the main objects of positivist attacks against metaphysics and speculativeness. One of the greatest achievements of human mind was treated by the ``philosophy of science'' equally with religion and other distorted forms of social consciousness. Fighting against dialectics and striving to tear it away from science, positivism was at the same time pretending to give a correct explanation of the nature and essence of scientific cognition, distinguish science from other forms of human activity and delimit religion and mythology. It is this paradox that lies at the root of all the misfortunes of positivism.
The evolution of positivism, which is now almost one and a half century old, has not brought about any appreciable change in its attitude to 254 dialectics. Spencer and Comte underscored the empirical untestability of the categories and laws of dialectics. Mach and Avenarius opposed the dialectics of Marx and Engels even more uncompromisingly. Attempting to disprove dialectics, the logical positivists have seized upon the criterion of verification, and their arguments, if only slightly modified, are now currently used by all modern representatives of the philosophy of science. They allege, for instance, that dialectics is being substantiated by non-scientific methods and that its propositions are just illustrated by examples instead of being mathematically correlated with experience. In support of their charges they usually refer to textbooks on philosophy which sometimes do expound dialectics in an oversimplified didactic manner. Such accusations, however, cannot be taken seriously. Criticism of dialectics requires a far more profound knowledge of the subject than just superficial acquaintance with students' aids.
The real thrust of positivist criticism consists in the contention that dialectics is nothing but natural philosophy, since it concerns itself with the most general laws of being. A philosopher, according to positivism, has no right to express his views not only on reality as a whole, but even on any of its components. One of the most serious positivist arguments against dialectics is the assertion that it has no empirical content and that its propositions are nonsensical in cognitive terms. According to the positivist critics, this conclusion is borne out by the impossibility of any empirical verification of dialectical statements.
It is commonly argued in present-day positivist 255 literature that dialectics does not disprove anything and that its propositions are universally confirmable, i.e. not falsifiable. In contrast to Russell, Schlickand Wittgenstein who underscored the empirical non-testability, non-verifiability of dialectics and therefore qualified it as metaphysics, Popper and his numerous followers apply a different criterion in the assessment of dialectics. Yet one would vainly expect them to recognise it as the methodology of scientific cognition. Significantly, in Popper's system which is based on an entirely different and even, in a sense, the opposite approach to the problem of testability of scientific knowledge dialectics, nevertheless, is again classified as ``metaphysics'', this time, however, on different grounds: since the ``Occam razor'' for Popper is falsifiability, he condemns dialectics for universal confirmability or nonfalsifiability of its propositions and principles.
In Popper's opinion, no facts can be cited which would run counter to the, principles of dialectics, if only potentially. At the same time, dialectical statements are not analytical like those of logic or mathematics. Their fallacy therefore is inherent and can be neither circumvented, nor neutralised. That, according to ``critical rationalism'', means that dialectics is just another kind of metaphysics and its statements have but a semblance of empirical content. However, Popper's prolonged debate with the Vienna school was bound to effect a serious change in his views and to make him reproduce increasingly, though unconsciously, the ideas of German classical and, in particular, Hegelian dialectics. The more anti-positivistic he became, the louder sounded the Hegelian notes in his concept of 256 objective knowledge, ``inherent'' knowledge, cosmic, physical, biological and cultural evolution. Popper's militant anti-historicism was giving way to evolutionism, etc. Seeking a clue to Popper's spontaneous gravitation to Hegelian metaphysics, one should take into account the similarity of the situations in European bourgeois philosophy in the middle of the 20th and the early 19th centuries. Like Hegel's dialectics born in the midst of the struggle against the mechanical-naturalistic and empirical-phenomenological forms of philosophy, as well as against the reductionist concepts of consciousness, Popper's evolution towards the dialectical forms of thought takes place in the atmosphere of criticism of the mechanistic dogmas of neopositivism: the static-cumulativistic concept of science, the empirical and inductivist methodology, the physicalist theory of cognition, etc.
Referring to the universality of dialectical categories and laws, representatives of the modern ``philosophy of science'' speak of the triviality of its conclusions. In their opinion, dialectics applicable to all cognitive situations without exception is nothing but a set of tautological assertions which give no grounds for any differentiations and, consequently, are devoid of analytical possibilities.
They further argue that a philosopher does not base his conclusions on sensory data and does not resort to an experiment. He can only reason within the limits of his professional capability. Hence the conclusion: philosophy must not claim to be anything more than logic. Since formal logic is the development of its own postulates and not related in any way to the outer world, it must not __PRINTERS_P_257_COMMENT__ 17--1152 257 be regarded as knowledge of anything. The logician and, consequently, the philosopher must look after the scientist ensuring that his formal calculations are not nonsensical, but the calculations themselves should be based on linguistic agreements. ``For the philosopher, as an analyst,'' writes Ayer, ``is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them... Philosophy is a department of logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical = fact.''^^1^^
Whatever the viewpoints as to the scientific value of various propositions (verification or falsification), the difference between them consists in the adherence to a definite method of comparing such propositions with sensory experience. Laying aside the details, i.e. the question of the methods of checking which are in fact diametrically opposite in each of the concepts and equally one-sided, each concept centres around the problem of testability, at least in principle, of various statements and refutability of false ideas.
It stands to reason that Marxist philosophy also regards the testability of any assertion, i.e. its confirmability or refutability, as the main criterion of scientific knowledge. Marxism holds that the testability of propositions presupposes their concreteness and meaningfulness, and this is just the crux of the matter.
_-_-_^^1^^ A.~J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, op. tit., p.~76.
258If philosophy is a system of abstract knowledge, the testability of its propositions, in contrast to specialised or positive sciences, is entirely out of the question. Since the categories, laws and principles of dialectics and materialism are indeed expressed in abstract terms, positivism may seem to be justified in asserting that dialectical propositions are nonsensical, unscientific and metaphysical.
True, the categories of materialistic dialectics are the most abstract, i.e. the most general concepts which constitute the initial postulates not only in the system of special knowledge, but also in philosophy itself. ``These are the ultimate, most comprehensive concepts,'' Lenin wrote, ``which epistemology has in point of fact so far not surpassed (apart from changes in nomenclature, which are always = possible).''^^1^^ These Lenin's words characterising the concepts of matter and consciousness are fully applicable to many other categories of dialectics. They cannot be deduced in a purely logical way, \`a~la Hegel, from other concepts---they are abstracted from reality itself and raised to a level of universal philosophical generalisations on the basis of centuries-old human experience and scientific knowledge.
Indeed, if we identify the concrete with sensory experience and regard as concrete an individual object or a phenomenon given us in direct sense perceptions dialectics will inevitably appear as an abstract science, a field of abstract knowledge free from any sensory experience and concreteness since it is far removed from the sensuous world and _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', Collected Works, Vol.~14, 1977, p.~146.
__PRINTERS_P_259_COMMENT__ 17* 259 is least of all concerned with individual phenomena and objects concentrating primarily on their general properties and relations. It is just this understanding of the abstract and the concrete in which the former represents the universal properties and relations, and the latter, the sensually perceived individual objects, that is prevalent in literature and underlies the attempts to counterpose philosophy and special sciences.Before we proceed to philosophical categories, let us have a closer look at the most concrete, at first sight, knowledge, the knowledge of what is given us in everyday sensory experience, and see how concrete and, consequently, testable it is.
What can be said about sensory experience as the primary source of our knowledge? If we are to rely upon it for its critical and informative values as proposed by positivism, it must be the real standard of clarity and we should have no doubt as regards its content or possible limits. Yet the very first pages of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit show that there is nothing more obscure than sensory experience. If we want to get pure sensory experience and abstract from all rational elements, all ``structures'' of the mind, we shall find ourselves in possession not of the richest, but of the poorest content conceivable. We shall have to throw away all universal or rational forms, all categories such as ``quality'', ``contradiction'', ``necessity'', ``matter'', etc. in order to find absolutely possible pure ``this'', ``here'', ``now''.
Having arrived at this point, we shall realise that instead of a well of knowledge we have got an iridescent soap bubble ready to burst under the slightest whiff of scientific air and absolutely empty at that. What we find, writes Hegel, is in 260 itself unstable and indefinite, since even with a minor change of our view or attention we find a different ``this---here---now.'' However, even these categories must preserve some remnant of the abstract, if they are to have any sense at all. ``This'', ``here'' and ``now'' turn out to be the least definite of all categories when we attempt to define or fix them with the help of experience. They acquire their stable meaning due to the work of mind only.
Hegel's concepts of the abstract and the concrete are much more refined and promising, if only for the fact that he does not necessarily connect the concrete with sensual perception. A ``murderer'' is an abstract definition for a crowd of idlers not because it is a legal notion abstracted from man's other definitions (though it is also true), but mainly because he ceases to be anything else but a murderer for an onlooker watching the execution. ``A handsome murderer? Can one think so badly, can one call a murderer = handsome?''^^1^^ His personality with all the richness of his life, his appearance, upbringing, etc. are all squeezed into a single definition severing all other ties and relations with the world. The abstract for Hegel is the separate, isolated, alienated from the multitude of ties and relations of an object. By contrast, the concrete is the richness of the fully reproduced properties and qualities in their totality. According to Hegel, a wise judge of human heart thinking in concrete terms will consider the entire course of events shaping the criminal's character, trace the influence of bad _-_-_
^^1^^ G. W. F. Hegel, S\"amtliche Werke, Band 20, Stuttgart, 1930, S.~447--48.
261 relations between his father and mother on his life and his upbringing, reveal, perhaps, the injustice or cruelty to which he was exposed, etc.Hegel evidently intended to reconcile society with itself, the society ``which, on the one hand, disregards abstract thinking without suffering the pangs of remorse, and, on the other, feels at heart certain respect for it as for something elevated, and avoids it not because of contempt for it but because of glorification, not because it seems something commonplace but because it is taken for something notable or, on the contrary, for something = special''.^^1^^
Yet Hegel's irony which, for that matter, permeates his entire article, is too obvious to make the opponents of the abstract more tolerant. The examples of the average man's concrete thinking displayed by Hegel are too unattractive to make his eulogy of concrete thinking flattering for the champions of empirical concreteness. Here Hegel hasn't got the slightest chance to win their sympathy. It is the more regrettable as even this publicistic article is, in fact, very instructive. Hegel convincingly shows that what appears at first sight very concrete knowledge with lots of down-to-earth and juicy details turns out to be extremely incomplete, i.e. abstract.
True, Hegel hardly shows here the depth of the abstract, the concreteness of general determinations. The abstract and the concrete do not yet merge in organic synthesis. They are still held apart by the idea that knowledge can be concrete and abstract and that abstract knowledge can pass into concrete knowledge through ever more substantive determinations. We should not, _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., S.~447.
262 however, demand too much from Hegel. What he said gives grounds for further inferences and suggests, if only implicitly, new ideas. Hegel is known to be helpful in overcoming Hegel and in enabling his successors to open up new horizons, standing on his own shoulders.Hence, none other than Hegel enables us to make the first critical remark about positivism: the highest positivist criterion of meaningfulness ^nd scientificity proves itself to be extremely indefinite and badly needing clarification. Yet neither definiteness, nor clarity can be borrowed from the formal logic which is nothing but a set of conventional rules for formulating statements. Of course, sensory experience can play the part of a cognitive method, but it can only be defined and harmonised within a broader rational system, such as the one conceived by Hegel, but not within sensory experience itself or the logical syntax. Positivism strives, so to speak, to freeze arbitrarily the cognitive method at one of the levels, important though it may be.
Since the criterion of sensory experience is itself uncertain, one should not be surprised at the controversies flaring up now and again within positivist philosophy over the nature of experience. Experience was first believed to consist of fragmentary sensory data. Later it became clear that such fragments were themselves abstractions singled out by the mind from more concrete and continuous whole. What were then the pure sense data? Were they to include relations having different abstract components?
Nor was it clear which categories expected to be discovered within the sphere of pure experience were genuine, and which were purely 263 logical, i.e. verbal structures. More, was sensory experience to be regarded as the manifestation of something called ``qualities'' (if this term had any meaning at all at the given level) and wasn't even the most primitive experience mingled with our conviction surfacing, for instance, in the vagueness of assertions and statements on facts and situations? Finally, whence the assurance that sensory experience was to be placed in the foreground?
It is again Hegel who helps us reveal this important omission of positivist philosophy. The mind is denied the ability to comprehend reality, since every statement about reality must, by force of its synthetic nature, express pure chance, and the mind does not produce anything but only elaborates the conclusions obtained from clear verbal statements. For Hegel, statements of chance represent but a moment which is barren of any thought and signifies that mind has already completed its work.
Positivism, on the contrary, regards as meaningful only those statements which relate to accidental (or probable) facts. Yet to point out a fact does not mean to comprehend it. A synthetic statement a posteriori is nothing but a record of what has occurred, but it has no explaining force. Such statements cannot become explanatory through generalisation processes. They remain synthetic irrespective of whether they refer to one, some, most or all objects. A statement which is now called law remains a simple assertion that something is accidental and gives no understanding of the causes of the given occurrence.
It is obvious that the process of generalisation 264 enhances the ``force of prediction''. To speak of the object as a whole is to give a more reliable prediction of the future state of affairs. Yet the ability for prediction is something different from comprehension. Even if we eventually succeeded, through hard work, in obtaining generalisations covering the broadest possible field of events and were able to predict the course of every experiment, we would not take a single step towards understanding any of them.
The function of the mind, according to Hegel, is neither the singling out of tautological statements, nor the generalisation of synthetic statements of facts. Its function is comprehension. Rational comprehension for Hegel results from at least two factors: the ontological status of the mind and the impossibility to find something which can be completely determinable or completely comprehensible. The first factor prevents logic from being conventional and purely verbal, the second factor does not allow it to bog down at the very beginning.
One of the obvious meanings of the concept ``concreteness'' is that our knowledge reflects empirical objective reality and that every notion, judgement or scientific theory has quite definite objective content which we call empirical. The empirical concreteness of our knowledge is its conformity with sensory experience. Our everyday experience, practical activity, the experimental side of scientific cognition evidently possess the highest degree of empirical concreteness. But does it mean that empirical concreteness is not inherent in the theoretical knowledge of special sciences? Besides, can we make a categorical assertion that the knowledge resulting 265 from empirical investigation is really the most concrete knowledge? It is indeed concrete in the sense that it is close to reality and rich in detail and colour. Yet one cannot help feeling that such knowledge of details can very easily turn into a useless toy if it fails to distinguish the main, the significant, the essential, the necessary.
The empirical knowledge of separate isolated facts permits tearing out individual parts or features of a whole and turning them into an absolute, a senseless abstraction. If the concrete is understood as the direct connection with the objective world, as the exact reproduction of sensually perceived properties and sides of an object, such knowledge will be the most concrete. On the other hand, if concreteness is understood as the fullness of all determinations of an object or a phenomenon, as a unity in the diversity or a diversity in the unity, such knowledge should be regarded with good reason as abstract. Conversely, if abstract knowledge is characterised by the separation, isolation of one or another element from the totality of other determinations, empirical knowledge which does not reveal all links and relations of a given object with the multitude of other objects can also be called abstract, sometimes even in the worst sense of this word.
A purely empirical idea of a tree growing under my window and having, for instance, slightly drooping branches, a trunk reaching the height of the first floor and covered with grey-green bark, with light-green buds on its branches the size of a wheat grain, etc. will be an abstract description despite the fact that I could add to it lots of such details which are known to no one but myself, 266 since this tree was and will hardly be interesting for anyone as a possible object of an empirical description.
Hence, the concepts of the concrete and the abstract themselves need a serious analysis. A detailed description of a tree growing in front of my window and presented to me in all its sensual concreteness turns out to be quite abstract since my detailed description based entirely on the sense-perceptions of the colour of the bark, buds, the shape of the crown, the size of the trunk, etc. will hardly be helpful in determining its species. Any student of biology will find my description non-scientific and abstract as it covers millions of trees in the middle part of Russia. Hence, an empirical description can be justly regarded as abstract, arbitrarily subjective, non-scientific etc. since it does not permit distinguishing with certainty one object from a multitude of others.
As we see, even a very detailed description of the external side of objects and phenomena can .far from always be regarded as concrete knowledge without any reservations. It moans that the direct relationship between knowledge and reality, i.e. the sensual basis of knowledge, is not yet sufficient to make it concrete. Such knowledge is still incomplete and inaccurate since it reflects but partially the real links and relations between a given object and a multitude of others. As to the reflection of the internal properties,; bonds, contradictions and laws governing the development of this object, such knowledge is even less satisfactory. Consequently, the knowledge of separate observable objects and phenomena, their properties and sides can be regarded 267 both as concrete, in the sense that it is directly related to reality, and as abstract (theoretically abstract), in the sense that it does not reveal the latent processes and internal laws and does not single out the main, the essential.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. MARX AND THE PROBLEMNow we come to the problem of concreteness in theoretical knowledge. If the scientific value of knowledge, the possibility of its verification and practical use derives from its concreteness, direct relation to objective reality, then the striving of scientists for ever broader generalisations, for universal statements and conclusions must seem strange indeed, since the more general a statement, the farther it is removed from individual (empirically concrete) objects and phenomena. Again, it is evidently not without reason that theoretical notions and ideas are commonly believed to be abstract. And this would indeed be so if we identified concreteness with just one kind of it---empirical concreteness.
Of course, it would not be correct to deny concreteness to sensual perceptions. Yet in dialectical logic the concrete is by no means tantamount to the ``sensually perceptible''. The concrete in dialectics is regarded as a unity in diversity, as a full representation of different aspects and relations of objects and phenomena and, understood like this, is one of the central categories of logic, an expression of the real general, multidimensional which is inherent both in reality and in our knowledge. Another aspect of the concrete is that it represents the objective diversity of a 268 whole object, the totality of all its relations, both internal and external.
As regards the abstract as a logical or epistemological category, it expresses not only the specific distinction of thinking from reality and its sensual perception, but also represents a form of development common to both reality and cognition. In Marx, the problem of the relation of the abstract to the concrete includes not only the .relation of thought to the sensually perceptible but also the problem of the internal division of any object and its theoretical reproduction in the movement of notions. The question of the relation of the abstract to the concrete presents itself in two aspects: first, as the relation between partial and limited knowledge to fuller knowledge and, second, as the relation of the whole to its own moments standing out objectively in its = content.^^1^^
For Marx, the abstract and the concrete express internal contradictions, the movement of which is the life of the object of investigation. It is . not a pure epistemological definition of the methods of work of the human brain in which one element (the concrete) can be identified with a sense perception, and the other element (the abstract), with the theoretical generalisation of the data of sensual experience. It is not a simple definition of the different poles of cognitive activity, even if they are regarded as connected with each other, but also an expression of the internal separation of objects and links between separate sides and phenomena existing objectively outside and * _-_-_
^^1^^ For detailed analysis of this question see E.~V. Ilyenkov, The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's ``Capital'', Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982.
269 independently of human consciousness. Hence, the abstract, according to Marx, can express both the particular and the general to the extent to which these sides stand out objectively in the whole and represent internally dependent, but externally isolated formations.Engels shows the same understanding of the categories of the abstract and the concrete. For him, the formation of general concepts is the process of abstraction from the multitude of inessential properties, features, objects and phenomena and of the retention of their common, stable, essential properties and features. On the other hand, the formation of theoretical concepts is at the same time a process of concretisation, integration, enrichment and retention in thought of the real content of all relations and links embraced by the given concept. It was Engels who defined exhaustive knowledge as the transformation of the single (concrete) into the universal (abstraction, law) and maintained that the ``general law'' of change of the form of motion is much more concrete than any single ``concrete'' example of it.
According to Marx, the coordination and combination of abstractions, the ascent from the simple to the complex is not the mental reproduction of the concrete. ``... The method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete,'' he wrote, ``is simply the way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category. This is, however, by no means the process of evolution of the concrete world = itself.''^^1^^ Hence, Marx regards the concrete _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, op. cit., p.~206.
270 as the unity of diverse aspects and as diverse aspects of the unity both in reality itself and in cognition. It is true of dialectically interpreted laws and abstractions, as well as of the particular phenomena they reflect. If an investigator proceeding from a general abstract law does not lose sight of the actual circumstances conditioning the operation of this law, if he takes into account the interdependence of this law and other laws and the numerous links connecting them, his thinking is concrete. ``The concrete concept,'' wrote Marx, ``is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing-up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin, and thus also the point of origin of perception and = imagination.''^^1^^The interpretation of the concrete and the abstract by Marx and Engels was by no means playing up to the Hegelian manner of reasoning. It was a conscious and deliberate use of Hegel's language, transformed and amended, which conveyed profound dialectical ideas.
Proceeding from his concepts of the abstract and the concrete, Marx, naturally, regards the ascent from the abstract to the concrete as the only possible and therefore correct scientific method whereby the concrete can be assimilated and mentally reproduced in theoretical analysis.
It should be noted, however, that some philosophers' enthusiasm about the method of Marx's analysis carries them sometimes too far and they _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid.
271 begin to absolutise it and even counterpose the abstract and the concrete which is entirely alien to Marx's analysis. In our opinion, such absolutisation is traceable to two inaccuracies in the interpretation of Marx. First, the abstract and the concrete as such are ascribed to reality itself as is evidenced, for instance, from the commonly used and nonetheless confusing expression ``this concrete (i.e. sensually perceived) object''. Second, the abstract and the concrete as the starting and the final points of theoretical analysis are regarded as two poles in the development of scientific knowledge without taking into account their dialectical unity, mutual penetration similar to that of the magnet poles which can only exist as a single whole.It is assumed, for instance, that the abstract and the concrete exist in reality as separate, isolated objects and phenomena. Marx's ``abstract labour'', ``abstract man'', ``abstract wealth'' are sometimes regarded as objective: entities existing, so to speak, in a pure form. The analysis of these concepts, objective as they are, calls for a more subtle approach which would better accord with Marx's conception. The acceptance of the reality of such things as ``abstract labour'', ``abstract man'', etc. would be tantamount to recognising the actual existence of matter, space and other special entities alongside definite objects and phenomena of the objective world.
Speaking of such things as ``abstract labour'' and ``abstract individual'', Marx regarded them as clear-cut abstractions in a definite conceptual context and never treated them as actually existing independent separate entities.
Some literary critic may seize upon these words 272 in an attempt to substantiate his own opinion that it is only concrete things which exist in objective reality. To forestall his argument, we shall state at once that this current view which is often expressed in literature and has many persistent advocates seems to us one-sided if only for the fact that the concepts of the abstract and the concrete are correlative and, as such, are only meaningful in inseparable unity with each other. The elimination of one concept makes its counterpart nonsensical. Understandably, this only holds true if the problem is treated from the same epistemological angle and within the framework of one and the same subject.
It stands to reason that the isolation and relative independence of objects and phenomena makes it in principle impossible to form an absolutely concrete notion of an object, whereas the objectification of the concrete tends in fact to absolutising it. A given object can never possess at a given moment all the possible properties and features which may reveal themselves in a different place and at a different time. One and the same man turns out to be different or, at least, not quite the same among his friends, in the office and at home. In which surroundings, then, are we to consider him concrete? Evidently, in all, but each time differently. Concreteness is relative, but not absolute.
Now, are all these subtleties really so important that we have to accentuate them? May be it is simply a question of terminology, and the ``objectivity of concrete objects and phenomena'' is identical with the ``objective foundation of concrete analysis?''
We suppose that some philosophers accepting __PRINTERS_P_273_COMMENT__ 18--1152 273 so far our reasoning might just intervene at this point and add that objective reality has neither abstract nor concrete objects and, consequently, the concepts of the abstract and the concrete are nothing but the product of our exalted materialistic imagination inventing the absolutes of the abstract and the concrete and striving to impose them on the virgin scientific mind with its natural aversion to metaphysical concoctions. So, they may conclude, we come in the end to what they have been trying to prove all along.
As regards the real existence of abstract and concrete objects, we might perhaps accept this view, characteristic of positivist philosophy, even at the risk of being censured by those who reject any shades and halftones in a philosophical controversy and recognise but one rigid scheme. We feel obliged, however, to make one important reservation and are ready to hold on to it as a matter of principle: we are convinced that objects in reality itself stand in different relations to one another and we can speak of some objects and phenomena as being relatively abstract (or, to be more precise, isolated, limited, specific), and of others as being relatively concrete (interconnected, united, integrated). When considering the relations of the first kind we form abstract notions, categories and ideas and then set about concretising them. The unity of the abstract and the concrete, i.e. the unity in diversity, gives a complete idea of an object, an idea which Marx calls concrete-universal as distinct from just concrete.
The real links between the concrete and the abstract being established, they become correlated concepts, and not metaphysical absolutes. 274 It is through the interaction with each other that they get the measure of their truth, as well as the measure of their concreteness. Each concept turns out to be abstract to the extent to which it reflects the separateness, isolation and specificity which are objectively inherent in things. Similarly, category becomes concrete to the extent to which it reflects the integration, unity and mutual complementarity of things. ``Logical concepts,'' wrote Lenin, ``are subjective so long as they remain `abstract', in their abstract form, but at the same time they express also the Things-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, [italics supplied], both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the = tendency...''^^1^^
The objective interpretation of the categories of the concrete and the abstract not only makes the presentation of material more difficult and the language more cumbersome. It brings in new entities which do not exist as independent objects of reality, tends to absolutise them breaking the inseparable bonds, the unity of mutually penetrating sides of the material world and is, in fact, incompatible with the dialectics of the abstract and the concrete.
This interpretation can at best postulate the transition from one isolated concept to another, e.g. from the abstract to the concrete. Important as it is, such transition is but one of the aspects of the dialectical relationship between these _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic'', Collected Works, Vol.~38, 1972, p.~208.
__PRINTERS_P_275_COMMENT__ 18* 275 categories. However, to understand their relationship in a stronger, more profound sense as a a inseparable connection of two different aspects of scientific cognition, as a correlation, it is necessary to investigate the relation of these categories to objective reality and to define their counterparts in the objective world.Analysing the transition from the abstract to the concrete, Soviet scholar E.~V. Ilyenkov writes: ``Understandably, concrete knowledge (or, more precisely, the knowledge of concreteness) can only appear as a result, a sum-total, a product of special work, and the abstract, as its starting point and material.'' This is undoubtedly true in relation to some definite level of knowledge, theoretical knowledge in this particular case. In his analysis of the system of capitalist production Marx strictly adheres to the principle of ascent from the abstract to the concrete. Yet in presenting the dialectical relationship between these two categories one should also take into account the titanic work carried out by Marx in order to accumulate and screen the ``Mont Blanc of facts''.
The concreteness in the implementation of the principle of concreteness itself calls also for differentiation between different levels of scientific cognition: empirical, theoretical, applied, philosophical, etc. At each of these levels the dialectical relationship between the abstract and the concrete inevitably acquires specific features. In this relationship one thing only remains constant, invariable, something like the space-time interval in Einstein's theory of relativity: the inseparable unity of the abstract and the concrete in the process of cognition.
276There can be no absolutely abstract or absolutely concrete knowledge, just as there are no absolutely abstract and absolutely concrete notions--- certain knowledge and certain notions can be more abstract (less concrete) and more concrete (less abstract) than others. Since all our knowledge at any stage is realised through the interaction (collision) of the abstract and the concrete (more abstract and more concrete), it can be viewed as a constant process of transition from one level of concreteness to another and from one level of abstractness to another. For instance, from the sensual form of concreteness and its specific form of abstractness we pass to the empirical form of their interaction at the lower ``floor'' of scientific cognition. Science ascends from the empirical forms of the concrete and the abstract to the theoretical level of their relationship and further rises to the philosophical level. It is evidently within the limits of one level of cognition only that we can speak of the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, meaning a strictly definite form of either category.
The formation of abstractions, the deduction of the general, similar, identical has never been and will evidently never be a special aim of science. As a matter of fact, it takes no great effort to find similarity even between most different objects, such as, for instance, a shoe brush and a mammal. Science, for that matter, is notable for just the opposite tendency---the striving for mental reproduction, restoration of the concrete whole which is split in the process of abstraction.
Sensual cognition also reproduces an object in its wholeness, joining, however, only its 277 external aspects and properties in a single sensual perceptible image. Each level of cognition, be it empirical or theoretical, has its own forms of concreteness and abstractness and the knowledge at each of these levels develops from the abstract to the concrete. On the whole, however, it passes on from one form of abstractness to another, and from one form of concreteness to another.
Generally speaking, the concreteness of a notion or any other form of knowledge should be linked, in our opinion, not only with the sense perceptions of the object under investigation, but also with the degree of reflection of all its bonds and relations of mediation with other objects and phenomena, with other aspects, tendencies and changes. Knowledge is concrete not only when it gives a detailed reflection of the properties and aspects of the object or phenomena under investigation, but also when it is capable of reproducing all its links and relations with other objects and phenomena, including their internal aspects and elements. Conversely, a notion, an idea or any other element of knowledge are abstract to a degree to which they are isolated from other objects and phenomena connected with them. An abstraction is concrete if it mentally reproduces the unity, diversity and manysidedness of real objects, if it singles out and indicates those aspects of the object or objects of interest which appear to be topical or important for human activity at a given moment.
An analyst can evidently always find at least one common objective feature of any two objects or phenomena whereby they can be placed into a single category. Such generalisations have no methodological value until they acquire 278 theoretical concreteness. They are also very abstract in the sense that they do not indicate any concrete conditions under which the generalisation is of any scientific significance.
Scientific abstractions are a powerful means of cognition but they remain useless without close ties with the concrete, without practice. If an abstraction (a law, a principle) is combined with the diversity of the objective content of phenomena, and thinking concentrates on those elements of this diversity which have been placed in the foreground by life itself, such thinking is concrete, scientific and true. If scientific analysis proceeding from facts reveals underlying regularities and makes it possible to draw theoretical conclusions, we have the unity of the abstract and the concrete. Should thinking prove unable to find the unity, the order in a system, should it fail to single out the prevailing tendency in the actual diversity of phenomena, in that case a concrete approach to the problem gives way to empirical vacillations between the .concrete and the abstract and the investigator cannot see the wood for the trees.
Consequently, knowledge remains abstract, though not in the empirical sense of the word, as long as it does not distinguish between the essential, necessary and the inessential, accidental features and tendencies and does not reveal the law governing a given process. Abstract also will be the knowledge which does not show the opposite aspects and tendencies inherent in every phenomenon or process.
The number of such abstract, in the methodological sense, generalisations can be increased indefinitely, yet they would hardly add to the 279 potential of science. Generalisations of this kind do not carry any new information, they are methodologically barren. Indeed, as Engels has wittily remarked in Anti-D\"uhring, a shoe brush grouped with mammals will not grow mammary glands and, consequently, such a generalisation will hardly do any good to humanity.
True, a lot of pseudo-scientific investigations are in fact concerned with inventing ever new abstract generalisations claiming to contribute to science. Paradoxical as it is, the empirical soundness of such investigations is usually unquestionable: most of the generalisations of this kind are indeed based on the common features of real things. It should be noted that such tendencies are particularly characteristic of philosophical investigations aimed exclusively at generalising the material of special sciences. The authors of such investigations can at best claim the invention of new terms of doubtful scientific value. It hardly needs mentioning that the growing number of abstract generalisations tend to clutter up knowledge with all kinds of pseudoscientific nonsense and turn science into a depot of useless ideas that will never be applied to real scientific and life problems.
Every generalisation which is to qualify as scientific (philosophical inclusive) should be concrete not only in the empirical, but also in the theoretical sense. Giving new information, it should also have a theoretical value, i.e. indicate ways for the further progress of scientific knowledge and disclose new links and relations of a given object with other objects and phenomena.
As long as a concept has a heuristic value and opens up new ways for scientific cognition, it 280 remains scientifically valid, and not only historically significant. It should be noted, however, that the actual validity of a scientific concept, a theory or even a law is not an honorary title conferred on them in perpetuity, since methodological or heuristic value may not only be acquired, but also lost. Filling up a gap in our knowledge, scientific concepts give a fresh impetus to thought, but subsequent events may prove their empirical untenability. This problem, by the way, has given rise to continuous debates among the historians of science as to whether the concepts of ether, thermogen, phlogiston, vital force and the like should be regarded scientific. The answer to this question can never be a blunt ``yes'' or ``no''.
In order to qualify as scientific, a concept must possess at least one of the above forms of concreteness and, besides, must help towards further progress of scientific knowledge. An abstract generalisation of empirical data is at best a prerequisite for scientificity. It is concerned with the knowledge already available and gives no new information, thus providing no basis for the analysis of reality, for distinguishing between separate properties and aspects of the world. Such concepts and statements result, as a rule, from the striving for unduly broad generalisations. The concept-of control relating, for instance, to social phenomena will be quite concrete if used in the analysis of social development. It will evidently be also concrete when applied to animate nature, since here, too, it can be connected with the ideas of feedback, data transmission, etc. In this field, like in the field of social phenomena, a comparatively weak 281 information signal can actuate the feedback mechanism and bring about considerable changes, and not only in terms of power. Suppose now we comply with the insistent demands of some authors and extend the concept of control to the phenomena of inanimate nature. Of course, given the will, we should also discover here certain analogies with the feedback mechanism. Yet the character of interaction in inanimate nature (viewed independently from man's activity) is different from that in living organisms, particularly in what concerns power relationships. Hence, we cannot speak of anything more than just a formal similarity between physical interaction in inorganic nature and feedback mechanisms in the organic world and in society. Any attempt to extend the concept of control to natural physical, geological or geographical processes will result in an untenable generalisation yielding no scientific results.
Take another example. The scientific value of the concept 01 information is common knowledge. This concept which is now widely used in different branches of knowledge has played an important role in the successful development of cybernetics and in the solution of numerous problems in genetics, neuropsychology and other sciences. It has also proved very helpful in defining the essence of consciousness and in studying the nature of the ``ideal'' as opposed to the ``material'' since it provided a link between the processes of man's conscious activity and its neurophysiological mechanism. On these grounds some philosophers propose to regard the concept of information as a universal one and classify it as philosophical. Here, however, they transgress 282 the demarcation line beyond which the concept of information loses its scientific concreteness without becoming concrete in the philosophical sense. A simple generalisation on the basis of empirical analogies deprives it of the necessary heuristic value. Hooker, for instance, identifies information with consciousness, on the one hand, and with brain processes, on the other, calling both ``information concepts''. He in fact discards the problem of the relationship between consciousness and the brain by simply identifying them as equivalent ``information-processing = structures''.^^1^^
This solution, purely phenomenalistic as it is, is nevertheless regarded as sufficient grounds for proclaiming a ``new systematic ontology'' since the proposed concept endows consciousness with time-spatial and even causal characteristics without depriving it at the same time of some properties of mental activity. It is not hard to see that Hooker's way leads to an ontology in the spirit of Plato.
The current attempts to identify the concepts of consciousness, the brain and information often go even further and tend to universalise the concept of information which is alleged to characterise any existing system in general. To substantiate this viewpoint, references are made to cybernetics which has purportedly provided conclusive evidence to the effect that the concept of information expresses the property of any moving matter. Such a broad interpretation of _-_-_
^^1^^ See C.~A. Hooker, ``The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind and Its Philosophical Ramifications'', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.~XXXVI, No.~1, September 1975, p.~1.
283 the concept of information, however, deprives it of its analytical possibilities and obliterates the border between inorganic processes in nature and the processes of control which are distinguished by the transmission, reception and coding of signals rather than by a specific power relationship.As is evidenced from the above, the scientific value of a concept or other form of knowledge is directly connected with its concreteness and depends on whether it gives new information in the field where it is introduced. In modern science fruitless abstractions are still very numerous and constitute what may be called pseudoscience or metaphysics in the bad sense of the word. They are a useless ballast and science should get rid of them. In its struggle against the anti-metaphysical positivist programme dialectics definitely dissociates itself from fruitless abstractions. It should always be borne in mind, however, that the weak sprouts of new knowledge are sometimes not easy to distinguish from stunted and useless metaphysical concepts and that they can only turn into full-fledged concrete concepts of great scientific value as a result of subsequent development.
Abstract generalisations and metaphysical conclusions should by no means be regarded as just a nuisance having no serious effect on scientific cognition. In social sciences such abstractions are not infrequently connected with quite definite ideological aims. In view of their pseudo-scientific form and apparent empirical certainty they are taken for a solution to one or another problem, whereas they in fact detract science-from the true course. The seeming concreteness of 284 a proposed concept is but empirical concreteness which levels up all facts and features relevant to this concept and equates the main and the secondary, the necessary and the accidental, the external and the internal traits. Such a concept, of course, is a platitude in the first place as it gives no grounds for some differentiation and analysis in a given field of knowledge. Yet it becomes something more than just a truism, a meaningless phrase---it turns into an instrument for deliberately juggling with facts instead of conducting a concrete scientific investigation. With positivism, by the way, it was a common and rather well elaborated trick which was time and again exposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
Formally imitating the external features of the specialised language used in mathematics, linguistics, physics and biology, the positivist philosophers create an illusion that the representatives of these sciences understand the language of their philosophy. It sometimes escapes the natural scientists that the terms borrowed from their language lose their concreteness and turn into verbal dummies preserving, however, the form and the reputation of scientific certitude and clarity. It is not fortuitous that Lenin has always been intransigent to ``play with words''. The application of various terms borrowed from biology and energy physics, such as ``exchange of substances'', ``assimilation and dissimilation'', ``power balance'', ``enthropy'' and the like to such socio-economic phenomena as crises, class struggle, competition, capital, etc. is in a sense a verbal ornament which adds nothing to the understanding of these phenomena for all its seeming newness. Yet it is not a harmless play, 285 particularly when it comes to analysing the trends of social development. Such a terminological confusion tends to mislead a biologist or a physicist just as much as a sociologist or a political economist. With an indiscriminate approach to philosophical generalisations it becomes, in fact, inessential whether new scientific data are translated into the language of some special science or are given a philosophical interpretation: in both these ``metaphysical'' variants the concrete meaning of the scientific data is reduced to naught.
Modern bourgeois philosophy also abounds in the substitutions of special scientific terms for concrete concepts in sociology or political economy. It is true not only of positivism, but also of other philosophical trends which claim to offer alternative solutions.
For instance, according to Jurgen Habermas, historical materialism is a one-sided, excessively concrete doctrine badly in need of a generalisation i.e. of a broader, more general, outlook. This ``generalisation'', as proposed by Habermas, boils down to replacing Marx's concept of productive forces by a concept of labour or purpose-oriented rational actions covering both the selection of means for given purposes and the selection of purposes themselves out of a multitude of possible variants. The concept of the relations of production is to be eliminated in favour of such concepts as interaction, communicative activity, institutional framework, organisational principle, etc.
In Habermas's opinion, labour is the sphere of learning and assimilation of useful technical information, whereas interaction is characterised 286 by the processes of socialisation and moulding of personality on the basis of the generally recognised system of social norms. Hence, the first sphere corresponds to technical interest, and the second, to practical interest. The Marxist concept of superstructure becomes irrelevant. Some phenomena classified as superstructural, such as culture, social norms, and educational establishments, are to be transferred to the sphere of interaction. Other components of the superstructure, such as power and ideology are interpreted either as a deviation or a distortion and, consequently, as some secondary phenomenon in the sphere of communicative relations.
This kind of interpretation of history, its inner content cannot be accepted, first of all, from the methodological viewpoint, the more so as it claims to ``restructure'' the Marxist concept. Habermas seeks to consider classes, power and ideology from the theoretical-informative aspect, qualifying them at that as a distortion of the normal process of human relations. Being restricted to .the appearance of things, such an approach is at best superficial. But it is not so harmless as it may seem: speaking of the ``distortion'' in the communicative systems, Habermas completely ignores the real, essential differences between communicative processes in the opposite social systems--- capitalism and socialism.
Starting with a seemingly modest proposal to amend Marx's concept of the determining role of the mode of production in the historical process and to supplement it with a ``second dimension'', the communicative one, Habermas actually seeks to turn Marx's concrete definition into an empty abstraction and thus deprive it of its scientific 287 value. The interpersonal communicative factor introduced by him by way of supplementing the dialectical understanding of the nature of man immediately calls for a new sacrifice: the ``generalisation'' of the Marxist understanding of man's nature. The new way of thinking advocated by the Frankfurt School is obviously constrained by the concepts of the mode of production, social relations and the socio-economic formation, particularly when it comes to the analysis of such concepts as capitalism and socialism, the bourgeoisie and the working class. The concept of ``communicative processes'' is more congenial to this ``way of thinking'' if only for the fact that it is abstract.
Habermas goes even as far as claiming certain affinity between Marxism and positivism, alleging that they both reduce, ``restrict'' history to its one dimension---labour and production activity. According to Habermas, the dimension of communication, intersubjectivity and interpersonal relations obvious in Marx's concrete analysis completely disappears in his philosophical and historical generalisations resolving in the concept of practical actions aimed at nature.
This model, according to Habermas, had an adverse effect on Marx's understanding of anthropogenesis. The process of labour and production activity regarded by Marx as the determining factor in the evolution of man from the animal world is confined exclusively to the sphere of instrumental activity characteristic of the animal world. Contrary to Marx, Habermas maintains that the determining factor in the process of anthropogenesis was the emergence of the communicative dimension (language), i.e. the replacement of 288 the institutional control by the behavioural control effected with the help of norms and linguistic incentives. Thus mankind regarded by Marx as the object of evolution becomes, according to Habermas, its subject.
There are absolutely no grounds for regarding Marx's view on anthropogenesis as limited or lopsided. He has developed a consistent theory of man's practical activity directed to the external world as the motive force of anthropogenesis. This activity contributed to the formation of erect gait, the appearance of the first signs of the community of interests and joint labour, as well as to a considerable weakening of the instincts that determined primitive man's behaviour. It also accounted for such new phenomena as the deepening process of socialisation, the development of consciousness and language, the emergence of a new type of behavioural control, etc. The factors singled out by Habermas were operative either in the first, or in the second group of changes accompanying the process of man's evolution. Neither of them would anyway be regarded by Marx as having an independent value. Habermas's views do not supplement, but distort Marxism.
Habermas and other philosophers make a serious error believing that Marx's concept of the essence of man can be supplemented by introducing at least one more feature---the factor of personal intercourse. This insignificant, at first sight, addition turns the Marxist conception of man into an empty abstraction which gives no methodological guidelines for understanding man's nature as the concrete expression of social relations. Yet it would be even more naive to think that the introduction of this abstraction __PRINTERS_P_289_COMMENT__ 19--1152 289 does not do any harm to social sciences. The new concept of man shifts the emphasis and substitutes a secondary feature for an essential one. It can hardly be expected to provide a solid basis for a more profound understanding of social development.
What complicates the matter is that such an approach seems to be quite relevant and even necessary from the empirical viewpoint: it ostensibly concentrates on those aspects of the concepts of man and society which have not received sufficient attention and appears therefore scientifically valid. However, for all the seeming empirical soundness and even appropriateness of the proposed amendments they are basically fallacious: the fault lies with the methodology itself which presents the empirical material in an entirely wrong light.
It would probably be unnecessary to focus attention on such attempts to ``complement'' Marx if they were merely aimed at filling up gaps in our concepts of society and man and did not represent a methodology incompatible with Marxism. In point of fact, they remind one of the behaviour of a cuckoo trying to lay an egg into another bird's nest. The eggs do look very similar, yet the nestlings are quite different. Since the methodological principles of Marx (and Habermas, too) do not always lie on the surface, one might get an impression that the point at issue is a purely factual one. Let us see if it is really so.
Suppose, you allow your mind's eye to dwell on an array of well-known personalities: Pushkin and Dantes, Gandhi and Goebbels, Raskolnikov and Pyotr Zalomov, Mozart and Salieri... Nothing seems to be simpler than to define the 290 essence of man by passing from one personality to another. Similarities and differences, differences and similarities, the twists of characters, the vicissitudes of life... It may be that we shall succeed in determining the general traits and the specific features of each man's character. Having thus defined man's essence, we may turn our attention to his surroundings and project his behaviour in different circumstances in order to reproduce the make-up of every single individual and thus to understand the relations between people. After that we may go even further and try to understand the nature of society as a whole, proceeding again from the obtained definition of man.
Such an approach appears to be quite relevant by virtue of its empirical concreteness. Indeed, we are seemingly concerned with concrete individuals, concrete biographies reproducing each man's life story with all its details, both significant and otherwise. One would naturally expect it to be the only correct path that would lead us to the comprehension of a concrete living being... Yet it is precisely this path that leads nowhere. True, the real scientific value of empirical concreteness is not quick to reveal itself. We only find it out after discovering that the single standard needed for comparing the heroes of our scientific drama turns out to be nothing better than just their general biological characteristic. The only catch that the empirical net thus brings us is a lean and meagre abstraction indicating that each of our heroes belongs to the species of Homo sapiens. And that is all that remains of the living, thinking, feeling and acting individual.
After the empiricist has thus stripped his Man of every possible garment, he desperately starts __PRINTERS_P_291_COMMENT__ 19* 291 covering him up with interpersonal intercourse, thinking ability, and what not...
Then comes the turn of logic. Following its strict rules and proceeding from the obtained definition of Man, the empiricist sets about reconstructing society at large.
David Hilbert once noted that every man has a definite horizon and when it narrows down to a point, the man starts talking about his viewpoint. We do not think Hilbert's statement is applicable to the whole of mankind, but in the situation we are dealing with his joke evidently hits the nail on the head. What can the empiricist see from his viewpoint? Evidently, what appears to Marcuse (or Adorno, or Habermas) and what he is horrified by.
The biological nature of man---once we decide to start with it in accordance with Marcuse's logic---is, first and foremost, the sphere of instincts and attractions which have always been kept in check, at least till nowadays. Repression, in Marcuse's opinion, marks the entire history of man. Speaking of repression, Marcuse distinguishes ``basic repression'' connected with the general conditions of human existence, i.e. with the environmental influences, and the ``additional repression'', resulting from the system of class domination and state power. According to Marcuse, it was the mind .or human intellect alone that succeeded in escaping the effect of this omnipotent press. However, representing a pure cognitive ability and being free from the bodily functions of physical enjoyment and satisfaction of natural needs, intellect can be put to the task of practical and technical conquest of the world. The mind, alas, betrayed the pleasure-oriented body. 292 Human sensuality was also seriously affected, though the senses are suppression-resistant too. Their power of resistance derives from the dual nature of the senses: they are the source of knowledge, on the one hand, and the instrument of pleasure and physical satisfaction, on the other. The system of suppression is therefore unable to cope with the senses and keep them in check by restricting their sphere to investigation activities only. As a result of the general distortion of man's sensuality, the cognitive function of the organs of perception was separated from the pleasure-seeking function. The senses were generally distrusted as a source of information, the data provided by them had a limited cognitive value, and they were suppressed by the mind. Above all, the senses could not serve as a basis for technical activity.
This withering influence was exercised by civilisation on practically all sides of the individual. Suppression was in fact the only, or at least the main feature of ``socialisation''.
Labour is treated by Marcuse in a similar vein. One of the results of the total suppression of the individual in all extant ``industrial'' civilisations was the transformation of man from an ``instrument of pleasure'' into an ``instrument of labour''. It was just to prepare man for productive activity that history remoulded both his biology and his psyche. The concept of production is brought in by Marcuse for the sole purpose of putting a finishing touch to the sombre picture of the suppression of the individual by industrial civilisation which adds yet another set of restrictions to the natural repressive forces. Marcuse's Conclusions are based on a conviction that 293 man as a biopsychical system is predestined to live exclusively for pleasure. Later, however, the author has substantially modified this view. Pleasure as understood by Marcuse cannot be derived from productive labour, nor from the extension of man's domination over matter. It must be, first and foremost, a result of the complete satisfaction of man's natural needs and of the free play of the natural forces inherent in the human body.
In Marcuse's opinion, dialectics must free itself from the abstract universal forms of objectivity, as well as from the abstract universal forms of thinking. To this end, it should ``conceive its world as a definite historical whole in which present reality is a result of the historical practice of = man''.^^1^^ Yet practice is understood by Marcuse in accordance with his productivity principle, i.e. as activity detrimental to man. History thus turns into a continuous process of man's own enslavement, the restructuring of his whole organism aimed at suppressing to a maximum his biological pleasure centres. This process goes side by side with the expansion of the possibilities of using man as an instrument of labour, a working machine and a means for conquering nature.
Marcuse comes out with great fervour against industrial civilisation, the technological mode of thinking, scientism, etc., and also criticises positivism, linking it with modern trends toward rationalisation. Yet it needs no special insight to perceive that Marcuse's own methodology _-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1967, S.~156.
294 underlying his criticism is a typical expression of the very rationalisation he speaks about with such disfavour. Indeed, his empirical approach, the denial of objective laws in nature and society, the atomised picture of social life (cf. the atomisation of the world by Hume, Ayer and the Vienna Circle), etc. are nothing but the characteristic features of the positivist method. Ironically, despite the premises which are not typically positivist, Marcuse's methodology reflecting the standard patterns of the ``technical'' style of thinking, is indeed eloquent proof of the existence of a powerful ideological press acting on such different people as Ayer and himself.Marcuse's reasoning, like that of all positivists, is traceable to the old empiricist tradition. Roughly speaking, its logic boils down to the following. To form a concept of society, a philosopher takes the features common to every individual and supplements them with other features conditioned by the environment, thus obtaining ``human nature''. Proceeding from this basis, he constructs the ``ideal'' model of relations among people fitting it as close as possible to his abstract concept of man. Then he compares this ideal model with the actual relations interpreted in the light of his theoretical premises and proposes to restructure the actual relations, i.e. society, bringing it in conformity with ``human nature''. The starting point in such ``concrete'' analysis is nothing but the abstract inherent in each single individual, i.e. the features common to all people. This approach, seemingly very ``concrete'', is in fact extremely abstract if only for the fact that the analysis concentrates on the personal qualities of a single individual taken at that 295 outside the process of their formation and development and regarded as something static, immutable, accomplished.
If the abstraction of man is to be scientifically valid, it must represent him not as an ``atom'', but as a social being, and take into account both his place in society and the system of social relations. Another essential, though subordinate, characteristic of this abstraction is that it must reflect man's relation to nature. Speaking of man as an individual, we have no right to ignore the general factors determining his personal qualities. This is just a paraphrase in terms of methodology of what Marx wrote almost a century and a half ago: ``... the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social = relations.''^^1^^
Taking typical ``atomised'' individuals, outstanding or otherwise, for the starting point in the analysis of man's essence is attempting to revive obsolete methodological standards, long since discredited. To be sure, it is not easy to carry out the investigation in such a way as to start from the concept of the system of social relations and, using it then as a premise, proceed to the analysis of man's essence, nor is it easier to start analysing social relations abstracting them from an individual. To arrive at this starting point in theoretical analysis, this elementary cell of the ``socium'', Marx and Engels had to study all the history and prehistory of human society. It was titanic work indeed.
_-_-_^^1^^ Karl Marx, ``Theses on Feuerbach'', in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol.~5, Progress Publishers. Moscow, 1976. p.~4.
296The essential characteristic of Marx's analysis is that it permits revealing not only the general qualities inherent in every individual, but also the necessary features and relationships reflecting the laws of man's historical development. It is the analysis of the sum total, the ensemble of the socio-historical forms of social relations which reveals the real trend of this development in its concreteness from the theoretical, and not empirical point of view. The universal is not equivalent to the similar represented in each individual object and regarded as their common feature. It is, first and foremost, a law-governed relationship of two or more individuals in which they pose as the moments of one and the same concrete and real, and not only formal, unity. According to Hegel, whose view was also shared by Marx, the form of universality as a law or the principle of connection of details within a whole which is totality. The universal can only be obtained through analysis, and not through abstraction.
A single individual is essentially a ``man'' only because his unique make-up embodies historical necessity, and not because he possesses certain features, sometimes of secondary importance, common to other individuals. This viewpoint makes it possible to regard an individual as a personality not in the abstract sense, but as an embodiment (more or less adequate) of the entire history of mankind, of human civilisation as a whole. This viewpoint alone provides a basis for understanding every single individual as a human being since it reveals a core in the totality of his personal traits. This viewpoint, too, will undoubtedly prevent us from placing in the same category Mozart and Salieri, Gandhi and 297 Goebbels who may appear to be absolutely similar from the viewpoint of abstract logic.
The concreteness understood dialectically has nothing to do with the establishment of such ``similarity'' of individuals. It represents the unity of all features and qualities of a man in their real connection with one another, in their dependence both on the biological nature of man and on the totality of all social conditions which play the dominant role. This approach alone can give us a theoretically concrete, and not an abstract concept of man. In other words, the theoretical definition of the ``universal in man'' is called upon to correct all the fallacies, contradictions and errors of empirical analysis without denying its role in principle. Attempting in our times to construct a philosophical system or even a concept of man on an empirical basis is very much like starting to advocate the idea of the earth's flatness. The concrete concept of man can only be developed if we proceed from the dialectical unity and interaction of the diverse forms, of specifically human activity, man's social abilities and social needs.
According to the materialistic concept of the essense of man, the universal form of man's existence is represented in labour, in social man's direct transformation of nature (his own nature inclusive) with the help of instruments which he himself makes. It is not accidental that Marx was of such a high opinion of Benjamin Franklin's famous definition: ``Man is a tool-making animal.'' In making tools man does not simply accept nature's demands, but creates a new system of relations; however, these relations on which he depends are out of his control. Such is Marx's 298 viewpoint. The definition of man as a tool-making animal is a characteristic example providing a vivid illustration to the Marxist understanding of the universal as concrete and as related to necessity.
The universal understood as concrete is opposed to the multitude of individuals not as an abstraction, but as their own substance, as a concrete form of their interaction. It is only in this capacity that the universal as concrete determination embodies all the richness of the particular and the individual, and this not only as possibility, but also as necessity. The universal therefore cannot be understood as the abstract identity of a multitude of events which serves as a basis for their classification under a single category. It implies additionally the singling out of essential links and relations and becomes, as it were, the ``substance of law''. The universal is thus conceived as divided internally, as the identity of contradictions, i.e. as a living, concrete unity.
The universal, as we see, turns out to be concrete only if it reflects the essential features of the objects and phenomena of reality and does not take into account the inessential, accidental features and properties. Thus, we can speak of theoretical concreteness which consists not in direct connection with objective reality, not in the detailed representation of individual aspects and properties, not in direct sensual perception, but in the singling out of the main, the essential, the necessary, the regular. From the empirical viewpoint, theoretical knowledge is indeed abstract in the sense that it is removed from sensual perceptions and its links with the external 299 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/20050704/399.tx" __SPELL_CHECK__ Basic (ispell-buffer) (2005.07.09). __CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11) __CHECKS__ end-of-line hypens checked (2005.07.11) __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ world are mediated. Yet it is concrete in the sense that it reveals those links and relations which are outside the sphere of empirical knowledge. In point of fact, theoretical concreteness includes empirical concreteness which is preserved in the body of a deeper and more concrete conception--- not in the sense that theory is specific and demonstrative in accordance with the requirement of empirical concreteness, but only in the sense that it preserves in most cases more or less direct links with experience, experiment, practice. Without revealing the main, the essential, the necessary, i.e. the substance of scientific law, knowledge would remain quite abstract from the theoretical viewpoint.
Lenin wrote: ``Essentially, Hegel is completely
right as opposed to Kant. Thought proceeding
from the concrete to the abstract---provided it is
correct (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers,
speaks of correct thought)---does not get away
Indeed, without the knowledge of law individual facts, even a multitude of them, remain abstract. They may be snatched out of the context and their significance may be arbitrarily overemphasised, they may be opposed to all other facts and events. It stands to reason that such knowledge would not be truly scientific. Moreover, one and the same fact or a totality of facts may be _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic'', Collected Works, Vol.~38, p.~171.
300 interpreted in entirely different ways in the context of different theories. Hence, one and the same empirical basis may be used to construct very different scientific (not to speak of speculative and pseudo-scientific) theories. It should also be borne in mind that the significance of various facts, their real scientific value cannot be established if we ignore laws.The thing is that facts characterising one or another object or event prove, as a rule, contradictory. If we see an apple falling and trust our own eyes, we should expect it to fly upward or sideways on the other side of the planet. Standing on the shore, we can see the ocean retreating and then advancing again, we can observe a bird soaring up or falling or evenly descending. Examples of this kind can be cited ad infinitum, and in any of them the correctness of our observation, the scientific value of our knowledge can only be proved if we reveal the operation of laws behind them: the law of gravitation in the first example, the law of tidal motion in the second, the aerostation law in the third, etc. In other words, in each of the phenomena we observe we must define the internal links which do not lie on the surface. The knowledge of laws, undoubtedly, makes our cognition more concrete, though it is quite obvious that laws are abstract statements.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. CONCRETENESSWe have been concerned so far with special sciences or, more precisely, with those forms of concreteness which are characteristic of empirical 301 and theoretical investigations in physics, biology, psychology, etc. What about the concreteness of philosophical categories themselves? This is, in fact, the essence of the matter, the more so as the very idea of concreteness of such laws and categories of dialectics as the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, the unity and struggle of opposites, the negation of negation, necessity and chance, cause and effect seem to be quite paradoxical at first sight.
The question of the concreteness of philosophical knowledge (laws, categories, principles) evidently calls for special investigation which goes beyond the scope of this work. Since our object is to compare the basic principles of the philosophy of science and dialectical materialism, we feel justified in confining our analysis to just a few laws and categories.
It is not at all accidental that Lenin has taken special note of this idea in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: ``If the truth is abstract it must be untrue. Healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete... Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, it leads back to the = concrete...''^^1^^ To Lenin, this statement has evidently carried profound meaning, as is evidenced not only from his philosophical ideas, but also from numerous economic and political works. As regards Lenin's philosophical works proper, he has always placed special emphasis on the principle of concreteness and pursued it with remarkable consistency. This particular aspect of his philosophical heritage deserves _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book Lectures on the History of Philosophy'', op. cit., p.~245.
302 special attention. Do we always realise, for instance, the profoundness of his well-known statement that the contrast between matter and mind is meaningful within the framework of the fundamental question of philosophy only?The assertion of positivist philosophy that the concepts of matter and consciousness are metaphysical and can be replaced by more ``concrete'' notions of special sciences, such as physics, mechanics, biology, psychophysiology, neuropsychology and others results, in the final analysis, from its inability to understand the philosophical concreteness of the concepts of matter and consciousness. At all stages of the evolution of positivism its adherents have persisted in declaring the concept of matter to be a fruitless abstraction, an absolute and useless symbol, on the grounds that all materials needed for scientific investigation are given to man in the senses, in individual experience. Hence, there is no need, according to positivism, to project something transcendental, something that extends beyond the limits of sensual perceptions. It is significant that the concept of matter or of the physical world proves to be a useless abstraction within the framework of positivist philosophy only. Recognising formally the existence of this world, none of the adherents of this philosophy goes beyond the abstract, metaphysical understanding of matter. Setting up an impassable barrier between matter and the cognising subject, positivism, naturally, is unable to provide a concrete solution to the problem of the relationship between the material world and the world of human consciousness. In this field positivism did not go beyond Kant, and Hegel's assessment of Kant's philosophy 303 is fully applicable to positivist views: "The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thingin-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination.''^^1^^
No one denies that matter is given man in his sensations and that we should resort to a very high degree of abstraction in order to oppose mentally matter to consciousness, sensations, perception. Yet such abstraction is inevitable if we want to have a more concrete understanding of their relationship. Positivism makes a stand for the inseparable connection between matter and consciousness knowing, in fact, nothing about what is connected with what. By contrast, Marxist scientific analysis is aimed at creating abstractions in order to obtain a concrete understanding of the real, specific forms of the interconnection of matter, the objective world, with consciousness.
As is evidenced from the above, the concepts of matter and consciousness are only valid within the framework of the fundamental question of philosophy. In order to get a profound understanding of the relationship between matter and _-_-_
^^1^^ Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol. II, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929, p. 118.
304 consciousness, it is necessary to reveal all the forms of their interaction which is not confined to the reflection of objective reality in our consciousness, but also includes the influence of consciousness on the outer world (to the extent to which the reflection of reality is correct). "Of course,'' Lenin writes, "even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field— in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is = indubitable."^^1^^The concept of matter is not correlated with the individual forms of the cognition of reality, nor with the concepts of information, code or something else of this kind. It is correlated with the concept of consciousness only. What is more, this correlation has any sense in connection with the problem of the dependence of consciousness on matter and the historical formation of matter and consciousness. The concept of matter which is seemingly extremely abstract as it takes no account of all aspects and properties of things except just one—their existence outside and independent of our mind—is in fact epistemologically concrete as it is meaningful in the context of the fundamental question of philosophy only. Outside these bounds the concept of matter has no independent philosophical meaning though it can be iused as a stylistic substitude for some other, special terms (for instance, physicists speak of the _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 147.
__PRINTERS_P_305_COMMENT__ 20--1152 305 density of matter in the Universe). At the same time, no knowledge in general can be concrete without the abstractions of matter and consciousness as the opposite sides of reality if only for the fact that without the solution of this fundamental problem it would be impossible to decide which elements of our knowledge can be regarded as true, objective and independent of man no matter how far our science may advance, and which elements are connected with consciousness in one way or another, and, hence, are subject to testing and verification in the general context of human experience and available scientific data. As we shall try to show later, distinguishing between the objective and the subjective in our knowledge is absolutely essential for making our knowledge concrete.Consequently, no particular experiment aimed at testing the materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy will be of any use if it fails to take into account the epistemological concreteness of the concepts of matter and consciousness. This question can only be solved if we abstract from the interconnection of matter and consciousness. Not many experiments can meet this requirement. Yet if science can provide evidence that consciousness appears as a result of the activity of the brain, that certain functions of consciousness can be exercised by a computer and that nature existed prior to man, this scientific evidence is sufficient to confirm the soundness of the materialist viewpoint. Conversely, should the reasonable beings who assumed the title of Homo sapience choose to destroy the abode of their reason, this act, alas, will evidently be the last argument for materialism.
306Throughout its entire history positivism has been denouncing, in one or another form and more or less resolutely, the principle of causality as typically metaphysical. Significantly, Machism and logical positivism rejected this principle and the meaningfulness of the categories ``cause'' and ``effect'' on the grounds that they could not be tested empirically, i.e. verified or confirmed. The new generation of positivist philosophers armed with Popper's principle of falsification hold the same view yet on different grounds, namely, that this principle cannot be falsified. Since, they reason, it is confirmed by all human experience, without any exception, the categories of causality are applicable always and everywhere and therefore turn into commonplace devoid of any analytical, i.e. scientific significance.
Popper does not deny the real scientific value of causal explanations, but presents their logical schema as follows: there is some universal judgement, i.e. a law, and a proposition characterising the ``initial conditions'' in terms of individual events. From these two premises we infer a supposition regarding another individual event. The concepts of cause and effect are eliminated as unnecessary. Popper rejects completely the ``principle of causality'' in the general, philosophical sense. For him causality rather has an instrumental meaning as an assertion that any event can be explained in terms of causality, i.e. predicted through deduction, which is the same thing.
Depending on the interpretation of the words ``can be'' in this assertion, it may prove either an analytical statement (tautology) or a synthetic __PRINTERS_P_307_COMMENT__ 20* 307 statement (a statement of reality). If we interpret these words as a logical possibility to construct a causal explanation, this statement is tautological, since for any prediction we can always find a universal proposition and initial conditions so. that it can be easily deduced from them. In some situations, however, the words ``can be'' are regarded as an indication that the world is governed by strict laws and that every phenomenon is an example of universal regularity or law., In that case the above statement should be regarded as a synthetic one, which is not, however, verifiable. Proceeding from this consideration, Popper concludes: ``I shall, therefore, neither adopt nor reject the `principle of causality'; I shall be content simply to exclude it, as `metaphysical', from the sphere of science. I shall, however, propose a methodological rule which corresponds so closely to the 'principle of causality' that the latter might be regarded as its metaphysical version. It is the simple rule that we are not to abandon the search for universal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever give up our attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can = describe.''^^1^^
Thus causality as something elusive is metaphysically identified with the concept of universal law. The principle of causality is understood in a very trivial manner: it is quite sufficient to know that the phenomenon in interest belongs to a certain class of phenomena in order to draw a conclusion that the effect or, more precisely, the predictable event belongs to just another definite _-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p.~61.
308 class. Any violation of this necessary relationship indicates that one of the classes has been determined incorrectly and should be either broadened or narrowed. Such a concept of causality is indeed trivial from the methodological viewpoint as it is aimed primarily at bringing every phenomenon in accord with the universal law or, more precisely, with a universal empirical generalisation. As to its objective content, this concept does not postulate anything but the regular sequence or regular concomitance of events belonging to different classes. Oddly enough, such an understanding of causality underlies the entire ``logic of scientific discovery'', though it is quite obvious that this methodological scheme rules out in principle the possibility of any discovery of new phenomena which go beyond the limits of the universal law or, at any rate, sets them in opposition to it. The universal law understood as regularity of events is incompatible with any new phenomenon in principle. Inversely, any new phenomenon, i.e. what Kuhn calls an ``anomaly'' in relation to the existing theory is incompatible with the universal law. Consequently, it is not the principle of causality as such which is metaphysical, but its narrow, instrumentalist interpretation by Popper. His interpretation in fact eliminates causality from real science and reflects the ideal of Laplatian determinism, since Popper identifies causality with logical dependence, logical necessity. It is only natural, therefore, that such a canonised concept of causality and law has practically no appeal to science, particularly modern science. As we see, Popper's own errors lead him to the conclusion that the principle of causality 309 is trivial, unscientific and metaphysical. The truth is that his interpretation of the concepts of cause and effect are indeed alien to the spirit of real science.The scientists, particularly the natural scientists, never understand causality in such a narrow way as to throw doubt upon it each time an exact prediction proves impossible. Such a prediction requires the knowledge not only of the causal dependence, but also of the specific conditions of cognition. The strictly Laplatian ideal of prediction identified by positivists with causality is generally attainable in such sciences as the mechanics of macroscopic objects, astronomy, and loses its sense when we pass to such fields as hydrodynamics and the theory of elasticity.
Despite the universality of the principle of causality, it is by no means simple to establish the true, objective causal relationship separating it from a multitude of intertwined and overlapping events and phenomena. The singling out of causal dependence from other kinds of relations is in itself a difficult problem from the methodological viewpoint. Even if an observer or an experimentalist have good reasons to expect a causal relationship, they have to display sometimes a high degree of ingenuity in order to create appropriate conditions for the identification of causal dependence. Even in those cases when the signs of causality seem to lie on the surface, it proves to be extremely important methodologically to define those abstractions and assumptions which have to be adopted each time the concept of causality is used in scientific cognition. The need for abstractions in cognising causal relationships has been stressed by Lenin: ``Hence, the 310 human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world = process.''^^1^^
For instance, the kinetic theory of gases explained the chaotic motion of molecules, the distribution of the concentration of molecules in the field of terrestrial attraction, the emission of electrons from heated metal, the viscosity and heat conductivity of gases and other phenomena on the basis of the principle of causality. All these explanations proceeded from the assumption that gas consists of absolutely resilient minute spherical particles, that these particles possess kinetic energy only, that the magnitude of this kinetic energy depends on the absolute temperature of gas only and that such molecules do not collide with one another.
Though such assumptions somewhat distort the objective processes as there are no gases in nature with the above ideal properties, they nevertheless reflect the conditions under which these processes actually take place. Indeed, under the conditions of moderate temperatures and relatively low pressures the distortions allowed for numerous gases do not have any appreciable effect either on their qualitative or quantitative characteristics.
Hence, the explanations and predictions are based not only on the recognition of causal relations, but also on certain assumptions presupposing the exact knowledge of conditions under _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', op. cit., p.~156.
311 which the process in interest takes place. These aspects of scientific investigation are closely connected with one another: explanations and predictions are impossible without objectively grounded assumptions, whereas the assumptions themselves have any sense only in the context of the above explanations or predictions. Yet in the philosophical analysis of the principle of causality it is advisable to distinguish these aspects as more or less independent objects of investigation which could be called an explanation, a prediction and a substantiation of assumptions.The problem of the subtantiation of assumptions in the context of an explanation or a prediction is not infrequently left out of account in philosophical investigations so that the analysis is often confined to the concept of causality and to the solution of various methodological problems arising in natural sciences in connection with explanation and prediction. The study of initial conditions seems a secondary task which is always subordinated to explanation and prediction proper. Yet it is not difficult to show that the exact knowledge of these conditions sometimes turns out to be problem No.~1 which has to be solved before any explanation or prediction is ever attempted. Besides, if an existing law or theory suggests the existence of a certain causal relationship, the search for conditions under which this relationship can materialise becomes quite an independent research problem and calls for serious creative efforts which may lead to important scientific discoveries. Such investigations often give a powerful impetus to the development of experimental facilities, computers, conceptual and mathematical bodies.
312An experiment staged by the outstanding Russian physicist, Pyotr Lebedev, was intended, for instance, to prove the existence of light pressure by demonstrating the effect of a light beam on a metal blade, and also to compare the obtained value of this pressure with the value predicted on the basis of Maxwell's theory. The most difficult part of the experiment (like of the experiment staged later by E.F. Nickols and Philip Hall) consisted in creating the necessary conditions to ensure the fulfilment of the rules of abstraction. There was no special difficulty in observing the rotation of the experimental blade after switching on the source of light. Yet it was just here that an error might slip in, since the blade could be caused to rotate by other factors as well, such as radiometric forces, the forces of gas convection, etc., the more so as they exceeded many times the weak force of light pressure. It took not only the experimentalist's resourcefulness in developing the appropriate apparatus, but also called for a profound analysis of the nature of convection and radiometric forces. Hence, attempts to prove the existence of causal relations may lead to the discovery of new phenomena, to new interesting and unexpected explanations pertaining to the conditions under which the main investigation is carried out, and, finally, to the improvement of experimental equipment, as the scientist always tries to envisage its response to various side effects.
It may so happen that the forecast of a causal relationship does not come true under the given set of circumstances. Does it mean that we should question the principle of causality in general? Of course, not. In that case we are faced with 313 this alternative: either our prediction of a causal relationship is not correct and the existing correlation is the result of other indirect links (and we must study them), or the causal relationship does exist, but the experiment or the observations give wrong results due to the presence of unknown interfering factors. In both cases the principle of causality leads to new problem and stimulates new discoveries, often quite unexpected.
Hence, the principle of causality not only fulfils the functions of explanation and prediction, but is also of great heuristic importance. To assess correctly the heuristic role of the principle of causality, one should take into account the fact that the scientific discoveries resulting from the evaluation of specific conditions, the revelation of hitherto unheeded factors, the rejection of ungrounded assumptions, etc. are of ten more important than those sought by scientists in their attempts to explain or predict one or another event. It may seem all the more paradoxical as conditions, according to our own assertion, are inessential for the causal dependence to the extent making it possible to disregard them altogether. Yet the dialectics of these two aspects of objective reality consists in that the conditions inessential for a given causal relationship may prove highly essential for another relationship.
One of the main objects of criticism levelled against dialectics by its present-day opponents is the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. According to an ancient and at the same time the latest argument against dialectics, an objective contradiction is incompatible with the logical principle or law of contradiction whereby two opposite statements cannot be true if they relate 314 to the same time and to the same content. Accordingly, an object of reality cannot possess two mutually excluding properties or be in two mutually excluding states in one and the same respect.
It should be noted first of all that the term ``dialectical'' is by no means applicable to any opposites or any contradictions. We can only speak of contradictions within the framework of a concrete relationship in which two phenomena, two aspects of one and the same object can be regarded as opposite and mutually contradictory. Accusing dialectics of speculativeness, scholasticism and absence of any scientific value, positivist philosophers and other modern opponents and interpreters of dialectics refer to a vice which is absolutely alien to Marxist dialectics.
The concreteness of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is violated each time its critics tear apart the two inseparable aspects: the unity and the mutual exclusion of opposites. One cannot speak of the opposition of certain aspects of an object or a phenomenon until after their unity has been established, the degree of their opposition corresponding to the degree of their unity. It was senseless, for instance, to speak of the opposition of the Sun and the Earth before it was found out that both of them are two celestial bodies belonging to one and the same planetary system. Likewise, it is senseless to speak of the opposition of science and, for instance, art till we establish that both of them have the same nature as two forms of social consciousness. Hence, there are no and cannot be any objects or phenomena which are absolute opposites, opposites ``in general'', in the abstract sense. 315 Conversely, there are no and cannot be any two absolutely identical phenomena---such identity from the dialectical viewpoint is also abstract.
Any knowledge will be abstract, partial,
incomplete, if it does not properly reflect the
contradictions inherent in the object under
investigation, if it is presented as something immutable,
frozen, lifeless. Lenin has closely linked the
question of the concreteness of knowledge with the
question of the mutability and contradictoriness
of the objects and phenomena of reality as is seen
from his following emphatic remark: ``Cognition
is the eternal, endless approximation of thought
to the object. The reflection of nature in man's
thought must be understood not `lifelessly', not
`abstractly',
From the positivist viewpoint this statement is nonsensical. Limiting the subject-matter of philosophy to the analysis of existing scientific knowledge, and this mainly in terms of its correspondence with the standards of formal logic, positivism has once and for all defined its stand in relation to contradictions. Contradictions are only possible in thinking and therefore must be removed from our knowledge as their very presence testifies, according to formal logic, to the falsity of at least one of the opposing statements.
Dialectical contradictions in nature and society differ from the so-called logical contradictions. _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic'', op, cit., p.~195.
316 In contrast to formal logic, which understands contradiction as incompatibility of statements, dialectics regards it as conflict of opposing forces or tendencies. Such dialectical contradictions can be exemplified by the phenomenon of class struggle, the relationship between nature and society, etc.In thinking and cognition, the concepts of dialectical and logical contradictions coincide, i.e. the dialectical contradiction assumes the form of the logical one. It is important, however, that one should distinguish between the role of contradiction in the development of cognition as empirical phenomenon, on the one hand, and the consequences of contradiction for concrete knowledge, i.e. for cognition in the logical sense, on the other. As regards the former, the revelation and resolution of contradictions is the motive force of cognition (this applies, of course, to essential contradictions inherent in the very nature of cognition, but not to the ones resulting from the subjective inability to think correctly). As to the latter, a contradiction in the logical structure of knowledge is always objectionable as either one of the two contradicting propositions within a given system can be used for deducing logically correct statements. Hence, it is not logical contradiction, but the search for the ways to eliminate it that constitutes the source of the development of scientific knowledge.
The logical principle of concrete identity, the identity of opposites was for Marx (and Hegel) the main logical criterion of concreteness in the approach to the objects and phenomena of the objective world. It was this approach, according to Marx, that made the difference between the 317 trivial, uncritical description of phenomena as they appeared to everyone and their theoretical comprehension.
The dual nature of the commodity was by no means Marx's discovery. Even before Ricardo and Smith, any man in the street knew quite well that a commodity had use value and exchange value or, in other words, that it could satisfy some human need, or be exchanged for another commodity, more necessary at the moment for a given owner (though both commodities were equivalent in terms of money, i.e. their prices were equal). The assertion that the commodity is a carrier of use and exchange values has nothing in common with the theoretical proposition disclosing the nature of value in general. The former is a mere statement of two isolated abstractions in no way connected with each other, whereas the latter proceeds from the understanding of the use value of a commodity as a method or form of the manifestation of its own opposite---the exchange value or, more precisely, simply ``value''. This concept represents a transition from the abstract (from two equally abstract notions) to the concrete (the unity of the notions of use value and exchange value).
Consequently, knowledge cannot be sufficiently concrete unless it reveals some general aspects and properties of the objects and phenomena of the objective world: their essence, main contradictions, content, necessity, etc. Yet it is precisely these aspects and properties which constitute the subject-matter of philosophical investigation proper. Therefore, philosophical concreteness is not a contradictio in adjecto, but a profound theoretical concept. As it turns out, the knowledge 318 given us by physics, chemistry, biology, geography and other special sciences should also be concrete from the philosophical viewpoint. Without such ``abstract'' (in the traditional sense) categories as quantity and quality, chance and necessity, essence and appearance, etc. the concepts of atom and elementary particle, organism and living cell, man and society turn out to be insufficiently concrete.
There is yet another important side to this problem. If we leave out of account the above categories, any scientific knowledge will only be testable within the scope of the links and relations that have already been revealed. In other words, the test will be confined to examining the empirical content of our knowledge, the object or phenomenon in interest being isolated from other objects and phenomena, and to establishing logical links between this empirical content and the theoretical knowledge already available. Hence, the possibility of a comprehensive test of any knowledge for scientific value and authenticity will be ruled out altogether and, consciously or unconsciously, new concepts or theories will be left exposed to eventual criticism. Knowledge which has not passed through the crucible of a philosophical trial is not only vulnerable to critical attacks, but also liable to various distortions and misinterpretations.
Here is an example. Before the establishment of the contradictory nature of light, its complex quantum-mechanical properties, it would have been impossible, as we are fully aware now, to adopt either the wave or the corpuscular theory. Each of these theories could have been tested by corresponding experiments, yet these 319 experiments contradicting one another would only have been regarded by the adherents of the rival theory as a temporary misunderstanding.
The way of abstract identities leads away from, but not towards dialectics. Dialectics unfolds the analysis of concrete, living objective contradictions, whereas eclecticism, being in fact a counterfeit of dialectics, is engaged in the arbitrary combination of any opposites and identities.
No better appears to be the alternative solution to the problem of contradiction offered by the representatives of the Frankfurt School. This solution, in contrast to the one proposed by positivism, is based on the absolutisation of contradiction and negation and on the rejection of any identity whatsoever. The approach of the Frankfurt School which is distinguished by utter disregard for the concreteness of the categories of identity and opposition can be well illustrated by Theodor Adorno's proposition concerning ``non-identity''. According to him, identity is the enemy of all that is factual, single, particular and, strange as it may seem, concrete. Concreteness, as it turns out, can only be saved through = ``non-identity''^^1^^. The trouble, however, is that identity itself in Adorno's interpretation loses concreteness and turns into something lifeless, static and absolute. Yet the identical, as has been pointed out by Hegel, includes the necessary seed of distinction, discord (Unterschied). Already in his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel came out _-_-_
^^1^^ See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, S.~138.
320 against the understanding of negation as activity consisting only in refuting, nullifying the attained result. In the preface to that book Hegel calls true that thinking which emerges in the process of development as a definite negative and therefore as some positive content. Adorno's ``negative'', by contrast, remains abstract and lopsided, pathetically inferior to Hegel's profound concept--- though, according to good Adorno, Hegel has failed to rise to the required level of thinking. Adorno interprets Marx in a similar manner, making special effort to find in his works everything related to the ``negative'' or ``negation'' and counterpose it to the ``positive'' or ``negation of the negation''. In point of fact, the only difference between Marx and Hegel in the interpretation of ``identity'' and ``distinction'', ``positive'' and ``negative'', ``assertion'' and ``negation'' is that Marx had placed all these categories on a materialistic basis. Freed from speculativeness and abstractness, they have acquired new forms of concreteness and preserved at the same time their interdependence disclosed by Hegel who has correlated each pair and regarded it as an indissoluble unity. ``The creator of negativist logic which is full of contradictions,'' writes Soviet scientist I.S. Narsky about Adorno, ``manipulates, like Proudhon, static antitheses, such as society and nature, democracy and technocracy, history and theory, criticism and apology, process and system, action and cognition, practice and reflection, humanism and scientism, discarding, though, almost any one of these alternatives just as easily or turning them into arbitrarily interpreted symbols... His method is anti-dialectical, dialectics with Adorno ceases to be dialectics and turns into the __PRINTERS_P_321_COMMENT__ 21--1152 321 metaphysics of the rigid models of = non-identity.''^^1^^It stands to reason that the exposure of trivial contradictions can little contribute to scientific investigation except by bringing in a few odd empirical details. Yet even these meagre scraps of knowledge reveal their utter uselessness when it comes to moulding them into a single concept. Just imagine for a moment a toy factory run by an eclectic in accordance with his theoretical notions. The toyshops would be cram-full of little monsters having an ear instead of an eye and an eye instead of an ear, a kneecap on the shoulder, a frying-pan instead of a hat, gloves instead of shoes, trousers instead of a shirt, etc. This comparison, though, perhaps, a little too blunt, is by no means far-fetched.
Of course, from the viewpoint of logic an ear and an eye, a shoulder and a knee-cap are opposites in a way, just like the right and the left eye, the right and the left foot, hand, etc. Each object is the opposite of another object in some abstract sense. It would be absurd to engage in studying such contradictions without specifying the concrete relationship within which such contradictions are considered.
In his critical analysis of D\"uhring's book, Engels wrote that his opponent's views on the question of contradiction ``can be summed up in the statement that contradiction=absurdity, and therefore cannot occur in the real world. People who _-_-_
^^1^^ I.~S. Narsky, ``The Problem of Negation and the Negative Dialectics of T. Adorno'', Filosofskiye nauki, No.~3, 1973, p.~77.
322 in other respects show a fair degree of common sense may regard this statement as having the same self-evident validity as the statement that a straight line cannot be a curve and a curve cannot be straight. But, regardless of all protests made by common sense, the differential calculus under certain circumstances [italics supplied] nevertheless equates straight lines and curves, and thus obtains results which common sense, insisting on the absurdity of straight lines being identical with curves, can never = attain.''^^1^^Referring to the universality of the laws of dialectics, its opponents allege that dialectics can prove or confirm anything in the world, it can be used to justify any political act. Since the laws of dialectics are applicable everywhere and at all times, they cannot be of any help in discovering something new.
Herbert Feigl who honestly confesses to having not read a single Soviet publication in philosophy over the past few years, regards the laws of dialectics as hackneyed banalities. ``The vague .principles of dialectics'', according to Feigl, are handicapped by Hegelian logic consisting, in fact, of illogicalities. They are scientifically useless both in terms of ontology and methodology. Dialectics, in Feigl's opinion, adds nothing new to the special solution of the mind-body problem or the problem of the corpuscular-wave dualism. All that is needed to solve such problems is ``the good old two-valued logic'' plus the required natural scientific data. ``The slogan about the transition of quantity into quality,'' writes Feigl, _-_-_
^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Anti-D\"uhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.~144.
__PRINTERS_P_323_COMMENT__ 21* 323 ``is just as vague as the triad, or the `negation of the = negation'.''^^1^^No Marxist philosopher would deny the universality of the categories of dialectics. The crucial point is the understanding of this universality. From the Marxist viewpoint, the universality of categories and laws consists in that they reflect the processes and phenomena in nature, society and cognition. It does not mean, however, that the laws of dialectics are applicable to any situation regardless of conditions and that they exist outside and independent of the corresponding phenomena and processes to which they relate. The law of the interdependence of quantitative and qualitative changes is very concrete for all its universality and abstractness (in the empirical sense). It does not apply to any quantity or quality, but only to the quantity of a given quality.
It means that not any, but only strictly definite quantitative and qualitative changes can be linked in a scientific context.
The concrete unity of the quantity and quality of a given object is known to be reflected in the dialectical category of measure which lays special emphasis on the concreteness of this unity. The quantitative changes of a given quality are restricted within the limits of a given measure beyond which the unity under consideration breaks up and is replaced by another unity having its own measure.
The concreteness of quantity and quality accounts for the relativeness of the distinction _-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, ``Critique of Dialectical Materialism'', in: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Marxism, Ed. by J. Somerville and H. L. Parsons, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1974, p.~114.
324 between quantitative and qualitative changes. It is only in relation to a given quality that one can speak of certain quantitative changes. Outside the bounds of the measure such a counterposition becomes senseless. The number of the electrons on the outermost shell of the atom is directly related to its qualitative characteristics, to the quality as a whole. Yet this number does not affect the aggregate state of the matter which includes the electrons under consideration. We do not mention here the trivial approach to this dialectical category exemplified, for instance, by an attempt to link daylight illumination with the number of stars in the sky.Proceeding from the abstract logical pattern advocated by the opponents of dialectics, we might say that any quantitative change in general involves one or another qualitative alteration. Take, for instance, the budding of leaves on a tree. The appearance of a new leaf on a branch is in itself a qualitative change---it involves the emergence of a bud, the concentration of chlorophyll, the absorption of light, etc. One might even speak of many qualitative changes. Similarly, the evaporation of several molecules of water from its surface which brings about but a minor quantitative change in the volume of liquid in a vessel is connected with such a qualitative change as the process of evaporation. The same quantity of molecules could have been removed from the same volume by means of, for instance, a sprayer.
Can we indeed speak of quantitative and qualitative changes in this latter case? If we do, we shall make a common, even a typical mistake which leads sometimes to serious misunderstandings. Of course, if we speak in an abstract 325 manner, the elimination of a certain amount of molecules is a quantitative process. But in relation to what? This is just the point, since the principle of concreteness calls for a very definite ``reference system'' without which any scientific analysis turns into nonsense. Whereas the aggregate state of liquid in a vessel does not change (the qualitative state of water remains invariable), molecules pass into a new state, acquire a new quality, the humidity of ambient air increases, etc., i.e. qualitative changes do take place ---but in a different system of relations. The law of the interdependence of quantitative and qualitative changes would indeed turn into commonplace if we did not define in each particular case the relationship between a certain quantity and a certain quality, i.e. did not determine the system the development of which is the object of our analysis.
Taking exception to the law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, Herman Wetter writes that if the new quality were of a higher order, it would be bound to have something which cannot be explained in terms of the laws of the lower order. That means that the effect would be bigger in some respect than the cause or, to put it another way, it would have no corresponding cause, at least with regard to the increment. Consequently, according to Wetter, the law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes does not explain anything, it merely describes the transition from the old quality to a new one.
As has been pointed out above, the laws of dialectics, though universal by nature, are not confirmable under any arbitrary set of conditions. They are operative within quite definite 326 epistemological limits and become senseless beyond them. In other words, they can be falsified in principle, if we come across a sufficiently large body of contradicting facts. The absurd contentions that the categories and laws of materialist dialectics are trivial and unscientific derive from sheer ignorance. Such contentions are based on the subjective interpretation of dialectics and have nothing to do with its true nature. In most contemporary concepts of Western philosophers claiming to carry on the dialectical tradition, dialectics is replaced by eclecticism, the semblance of dialectics.
To sum up. Philosophical knowledge represents all forms of scientific concreteness: empirical, theoretical and epistemological. It can be confirmed experimentally, given conditions for appropriate abstraction, and it can be falsified outside the limits of the objective field. Philosophical knowledge is theoretically concrete in the sense that it rests on the theoretical foundation of modern science, formulates its laws and provides answers to philosophical questions prompted by the development of science itself. Finally, philosophical knowledge is concrete from the epistemological viewpoint in the sense that each dialectical category and law is based on and relevant to the entire system of philosophical knowledge in terms of its logic and history.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. MATERIALISTIC DIALECTICSThe nihilistic attitude towards philosophy and towards broad theoretical concepts in the 327 period of the inception of positivism is closely connected with (though cannot be fully excused by) the stormy growth of empirical sciences in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries. The universal enthusiasm about their remarkable successes created an illusion that all mankind's problems without exception could and ought to be solved exclusively by the methods of natural sciences which not only provided the exhaustive explanation of phenomena, but also predicted the existence of unknown phenomena and thus opened the way for new discoveries. Of special interest to us, however, is the connection between this philosophical nihilism and the boom of empirical investigations. This question is the more topical as in our time, too, the extensive development of empirical methods of investigation in one or another scientific field brings about a very similar phenomenon---a certain estrangement, if not downright victimisation of philosophy.
As is commonly known, empirical investigations usually aim at studying individual, sensually perceptible objects and phenomena of reality. Besides, the sphere of empirical investigation includes inductive generalisations and even the formulation of empirical laws. Most researchers associate theoretical knowledge with a higher level of abstraction, with the explanation of empirical laws, revelation of their links with other laws and existing theories, i.e. with their theoretical substantiation, as well as with the discovery of new laws which do not always lend themselves to empirical interpretation.
The very nature of empirical knowledge, like that of applied knowledge in general, accounts 328 for the fact that the scientist engaged in concrete empirical investigations is seldom forced by the specific problems he studies to concern himself with philosophical generalisations. At any rate, the logic of his research does not lead him to philosophical concepts of universal significance.
It does not mean, however, that a natural scientist does not concern himself with philosophical problems and is in general far removed from philosophy. Even in a purely empirical investigation a scientist cannot make a step without adhering, for instance, to the principle of objectivity. His task consists in excluding the effect of the subjective factor, i.e. the influence of his own manipulations, particularly of his personal perception and his individual experience from the conditions of his experiment or observation. Every experimentalist knows only too well the difficulties involved in the fulfilment of this task, as well as the severity of the requirement for the ``purity of the experiment''. Not every scientist, however, is fully aware of the fact that this requirement does not stem from the nature of his specific investigation but is of general methodological significance, i.e. that it is a philosophical principle. Similarly, a scientist cannot disregard the principle of causality or determinism from the viewpoint of methodology. The experimentalist's work largely consists in a search for the causes of the event or phenomenon under observation, or in defining its possible effects. Here, too, the patterns of his thinking and experimental activities are predetermined methodologically so that he proceeds from events to their causes, then to their consequences, conditions, etc, In such 329 standard situations a scientist relies on the available philosophical knowledge and seldom questions its validity. Moreover, not infrequently he is not even aware of the philosophical basis which provides, as it were, the methodological framework for his research. The problems he is concerned with cannot be qualified either as purely philosophical or as specifically scientific. The solution of his problems calls for bridging the gap between philosophical and specialised knowledge so as to permit philosophical ideas to fertilise his practical work and give it a new meaning and new dimensions. Such problems can be called philosophico-methodological since they are philosophically oriented and their solution is guided by general philosophical principles. Yet they are not regarded as philosophical, since their emergence does not cast doubt on the content of philosophical categories, nor does it question the role of philosophical laws. It is not surprising therefore that a scientist may delude himself into thinking that he is completely free of any philosophical propositions or principles.
It should be noted that empirical investigations in one or another specific field are not likely to add much to the arguments for or against some philosophical trend, even if the facts the scientist deals with are quite extraordinary. Numerous evidences regarding flying saucers and the abundance of documentary reports about catastrophes in the area of the Bermuda triangle give rather impressive data and stir up imagination. On the basis of such information a layman may come to most fantastic conclusions. Generally speaking, the thinking of a man in the street is apt to overcome very easily the compatibility 330 barriers which often make a tremendous problem for a serious scientist.
A layman's imagination can easily carry him from the rumours of flying saucers to a very plausible image of a visitor from outer space described sometimes in great detail (down to the number of fingers on his hand) and further to fantastic pictures of the arrival of reasonable beings on the Earth. Then he may plunge into speculations on the nature of reason, on the origin of the solar system, etc. Strange as it may seem, what is easily accessible to the layman's fanciful imagination proves to be beyond the power of thinking of a scientist who cannot resort either to Pegasus' wings or to Hermes' sandals but has to follow his thorny path with a heavy tread of an experimentalist. His every step must be thought out and well measured. To be sure, science has also learned to build ``castles in the air'' now called orbital stations... Yet how very careful and arduous its every step forward, how modest its achievements in comparison with the ages of hard work and relentless struggle against the unknown and therefore terrifying forces of nature---and how very different the sober and restrained approach of true scientists from the unfounded conceit of dilettantes relishing man's would-be power over nature! Alas, the position of an empirically-minded natural scientist differs but little from the thinking of a dilettante venturing to expound his views on the philosophical doctrines he knows only by hearsay... He is doomed to vacillate from the extreme exaggeration of the significance of his own achievements and the derogation of the role of theory, particularly philosophy, to the concoction of 331 astounding theories and ``original'' philosophical doctrines...
It is the empiricist style of scientific thinking and investigation, the empiricist standard of scientific progress that lies at the root of metaphysical ideas and speculative propositions which fill in the gaps between individual isolated facts torn out of the context and viewed outside and independent of their links and relationships. It is narrow empiricism in science that often takes a disdainful and intransigent stand against consistent materialist approach to reality and tends to replace serious scientific investigation by pretentious, extravagant ideas without bothering to trace them to the corresponding historical or historical-scientific anticedents in the age-old history of science and philosophy. This unwillingness to study philosophical traditions and historical links accounts, above all, for uncritical attitude toward general theoretical and philosophical ideas which are unavoidable in any scientific investigation.
Every researcher seeks to transgress the bounds of his immediate investigation and take a broader view of the problem he is concerned with. Yet such transgressions need not necessarily testify to the expansion of his scientific horizons and broadening of his interests---they may also result from scientific adventurism which goes hand in hand with the condemnation of ``primitive materialism'', ``theoretical dogmatism'', etc. This militant empiricism which has always chafed under the so-called harshness of dialectics and complained about the pedestrian style of Marx's thinking and the intransigence of Leninist materialism proves to be capable of 332 getting on quite well with those theories and philosophical concepts which suit it in one way or another in a given situation, gratify its weaknesses. This attitude is usually expressed in overall hostility to any methodology, in anarchical opposition to any world outlook and results from the absence of a solid theoretical foundation.
The uncritical attitude to the philosophical environment leads to a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, ostensible independence, the absence of any philosophical commitments and freedom to choose any philosophical concept that is suitable from the practical, utilitarian viewpoint and justifies all sorts of wild digressions into the history of science or depth of the Universe; on the other hand, actual bondage to current philosophical tastes and intellectual fashion. The illusion of freedom from philosophical systems turns out to be overall dependence on obsolete philosophical theories. The champions of the ``freedom of intellect'' find themselves in the position of those natural scientists who were so aptly ridiculed by Engels: ``Natural scientists believe that they free themselves from philosophy by ignoring it or abusing it. They cannot, however, make any headway without thought, and for thought they need thought determinations. But they take these categories unreflectingly from the common consciousness of so-called educated persons, which is dominated by the relics of long obsolete philosophies, or from the little bit of philosophy compulsorily listened to at the University (which is not only fragmentary, but also a medley of views of people belonging to the most varied and usually the worst schools), or from uncritical and unsystematic reading of 333 philosophical writings of all kinds. Hence they are no less in bondage to philosophy, but unfortunately in most cases to the worst philosophy, and those who abuse philosophy most are slaves to precisely the worst vulgarised relics of the worst = philosophies.''^^1^^
Among such slaves found itself not only positivism, but also other philosophical schools which undertook to express the empiricist's curtailed world view and carried to excess all the demerits (and merits, for that matter) of empirical investigation. The empiricist's stand is in fact hypocritical in that his abuse of philosophy and ``metaphysics'' often serves as a smokescreen for his own philosophical system intended to espouse his views.
It would be wrong to think that the tendency to exaggerate the role of sensory experience characteristic of earlier empirical science will die away by itself in the age of the maturity of science with its high level of abstractions and complex mathematical formalisation of whole branches. The empirical investigation of individual objects and phenomena will always remain an important task of science however attractive and promising theoretical research may be. It is essential, therefore, that alongside the encouragement of young scientists in fundamental investigations due attention be paid to experimental work and that appropriate incentives be constantly sought to improve and stimulate it. Sometimes an individual fact discovered by mere chance may lead to the emergence of a new _-_-_
^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 209--10.
334 scientific trend or to the reappraisal of current scientific theories.On the other hand, as long as scientific investigations in certain fields are based on empirical data, there exists a nutrient medium for empiricism as a philosophical trend.
There is yet another paradoxical aspect of the evolution of positivism. The dominance of empirical methods in natural science and the universal enthusiasm about its achievements had come to an end or at least considerably subsided by the mid-19th century. At the turn of the 20th century the prestige of empiricism was completely undermined by the rapid development of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. Yet it is precisely this period that reanimated the influence of positivist philosophy.
The development of theoretical natural science and elaboration of fundamental theories did not change the attitude of positivism to general philosophical problems. Logical positivism that came to the foreground in that period with renewed determination to eliminate ``metaphysics'' from science was nurtured by the hopes that all theoretical propositions could be reduced to empirical knowledge. This stand was well illustrated by Russell's attitude to the principle of causality in scientific cognition. Characterising this principle as purely metaphysical, as a relic of the pre-scientific stage of knowledge, he pointed out that theoretically developed sciences had already got rid of all remnants of causality. Alongside the principle of causality, positivism threw overboard all other philosophical principles and laws, first and foremost those of dialectics and materialism, on the grounds that the 335 categories of quality, matter, necessity, essence and the like are alien to theoretical knowledge.
Modern philosophers of science in their works devoted to the concept of law and to the principle of determinism in fact identify law with universal assertions on the grounds that the language of science does not express any necessity except the logical one. Necessity itself is identified with universality which, in their opinion, is all that is demanded of scientific statements, theoretical generalisations and even the most advanced modern theories. Similar is their attitude to the categories of contradiction, essence and practically all other main categories and laws of dialectics.
Such oversimplified understanding of the structure of scientific knowledge revealing itself in present-day positivist literature is a natural consequence of the main premises of the philosophy of science limiting the philosophy and methodology of science exclusively to the logic and language of scientific cognition. Regarding the available knowledge as reality itself embodied in language, the positivists cannot but overlook the infrastructure of science, i.e. its abstractions, premises and assumptions.
True, the latest variants of positivist philosophy, e.g. critical rationalism and other ``postpositivist'' trends, go as far as recognising the methodological, instrumental role of some principles of dialectics, such as causality and determinism. Yet they also stop short of recognising the theoretical significance of philosophical categories and laws pointing out that they do not reveal themselves openly either in theoretical or in empirical knowledge.
336The view that philosophical substratum does not lie on the surface of scientific theories and empirical investigations is on the whole not objectionable. The question, however, consists in whether the principles and laws of dialectics are indeed devoid of any scientific significance and play no part in theoretical investigations.
To answer this question, it is necessary first of all to take into account some specific features of theoretical knowledge. Understandably, the formulation of philosophical propositions and principles goes beyond the limits of a special scientific investigation. Philosophical principles seldom come to the forefront in a scientific system and their cognitive value is seldom conspicuous. As long as any philosophical principle or, for that matter, any theoretical premise in general serves the purposes of scientific investigation the scientist is not confronted with the task of its further elaboration or improvement. And it is quite natural. His immediate aim is to solve a specific problem within a more or less narrow field of his interests. He achieves this aim directly, using the means of his particular science--- physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc. Philosophical principles for the scientist are something like air which he does not think of as long as his breathing is not difficult.
What is more, this approach is evidently suggested by the very object under investigation since it appears to be the most promising and likely to yield the best results. As a matter of fact, the object of investigation often proves, so to speak, more dialectical and more materialistic than the theoretical views of the investigator himself, particularly if his philosophical __PRINTERS_P_337_COMMENT__ 22--1152 337 baggage consists of meagre positivist abstractions.
In any case, the scientist does not pose any philosophical problems in his field of investigations as long as the concepts he relies upon in his practical work perform the function of the foundation of science. The theoretical significance of philosophical principles and laws would, perhaps, never come to light if they always remained but implicit. Yet sooner or later the time comes when philosophical concepts do reveal themselves to celebrate their victory and claim universal recognition. Unlike experimental data and theoretical principles which lie at the root of specific theories, philosophical principles and laws should be regarded as their premises since it is impossible to deduce from them any particular scientific doctrine. At the same time, no scientific theory is conceivable without the corresponding philosophical basis. Hence, philosophical premises are essential, but not sufficient conditions for theoretical and empirical cognition.
As distinct from theoretical concepts which serve as a basis for a nascent theory so that it is largely deducible from them, philosophical concepts constituting its foundation cannot be used for deducing one or another variant of this theory. As a matter of fact, there may be several ways of solving a problem which would meet the requirements of materialism and dialectics, i.e. scientific philosophy, under given conditions.
Speaking, for instance, of the philosophical foundation of classical physics, we can single out at least four philosophical ideas deeply rooted in all the theories of 19th-century natural scientists. They are: (1) the idea of materiality of the world, the identity of matter and substance, 338 impenetrability of matter, etc.; (2) the idea of the absoluteness of space and time regarded as receptacles of matter and as having properties not connected with one another' and independent of the movement of material bodies; (3) the idea of absolute determinateness of all changes and events in nature owing to universal interaction governed by the dynamic laws of mechanics and expressed in the concept of Laplatian determinism; (4) the idea of the independence of the object from the subject of investigation, i.e. the concept of the objectivity of knowledge.
Since these ideas were linked with the theoretical foundation of contemporary science, they assumed even more concrete forms. For instance, materiality was identified with several material properties such as constant mass, atomic structure, impenetrability, etc.; space was assumed to be filled up with hypothetical material medium called ether (hence the corpuscular and wave theories of light); interaction was believed to spread instantaneously (hence the idea of remote action); matter and motion were regarded to be indestructible (hence the law of conservation of energy).
The existing philosophical premises allowed of several alternative solutions to theoretical problems making equally plausible the corpuscular and the wave theories, the theory of ether and the theory denying the existence of any mechanical elastic medium, Laplatian determinism and statistical physics, etc. Metaphysical materialism with its one-sided mechanistic conceptions of motion and matter brought natural science to a crisis which was not confined to just one or several fields but affected the very foundation __PRINTERS_P_339_COMMENT__ 22* 339 of science---its instinctively materialistic world view. ``Radium, the great revolutionary'', according to Henri Poincare, cast doubt on the law of conservation of energy and, consequently, on the idea of the indestructibility of matter. The electron shook the concepts of the indivisibility of atoms and the immutability of the mass of a body thus undermining the idea of materiality. Albert Michelson's experiments (1881) called in question the existence of ether and absolute space in which the velocity of light should have been higher in the direction of the movement of the source of light, but proved to be variable and independent of the speed of the source of light. In 1901, Pyotr Lebedev's experiments revealed the pressure of light. The discovery of X-rays in 1895 followed by the discovery of the electron as the atom's main component (in 1897) and of radioactivity refuted the idea of the indivisibility of atoms. Other philosophical foundations of classical physics were undermined too: the concept of the immutability of nature's primary substances and attributes, of the universality and absolute identity of the operation of mechanical laws both on the infinite and infinitesimal scales.
It became obvious that the philosophical doctrines inherited from the mechanistic materialism of the 17th-18th centuries could not provide a reliable theoretical foundation for the solution of the pressing problems of physics and natural science in general. ``The essence of the crisis in modern physics'', wrote Lenin, ``consists in the break-down of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the 340 replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism. `Matter has disappeared'---one may thus express the fundamental and characteristic difficulty in relation to many particular questions which has created this = crisis.''^^1^^
Turning to the philosophical premises of 19th-century physics, the physicists unfamiliar with dialectics could not but identify metaphysical materialism with materialism in general. We need not enlarge on this subject, as it has received extensive coverage in relevant Marxist literature and is not, in fact, directly connected with the main point we want to make here, namely, that the philosophical premises of science have no independent significance as long as they do not come in a more or less sharp conflict with the results of scientific investigations and the latest theoretical views.
However, an impending crisis in science causes scientists to start revising its theoretical and experimental principles.
Yet a crisis may sometimes go deeper and involve also the philosophical foundation of science if it fails to meet the latest requirements. Hence, crises in the development of science can only be avoided if scientists are fully aware of the philosophical principles which underlie the fundamental theories in their fields of investigation. Of special importance here is not only a profound theoretical background of scientific personnel and a thorough knowledge of the history of science, but also sufficient philosophical culture and good acquaintance with the historical _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', op. cit., p.~258.
341 sources of philosophical problems. Most serious attitude to the philosophical foundation of a given science is extremely important.It is no secret that the philosophical principles of modern physics were formulated in a general form by Marx and Engels way back in the middle of the 19th century. The definition of matter as a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which exists independently of consciousness provided the necessary guideline for scientific investigations in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Progress in physics could only be attained if the electron was regarded not as a purely theoretical construct, not as an object with ``free will'', but as a component part of the atom with a complex structure of its own. The dialectical solution of the problem of the relationship between necessity and chance constituting a single whole laid or was to lay the foundation for the probability approach to the interpretation of quantum-mechanical processes, for the correct understanding of probability and the relationship between indeterminacies, i.e. the discoveries made in the first half of the 20th century. The concept of the unity of space, time and motion advanced by Marx and Engels also gave a clue to the special and general theories of relativity.
It stands to reason that the implementation of these philosophical concepts required of natural scientists conscious assimilation and further development of the philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels providing a theoretical basis for dialectical interpretation of concrete physical, biological, chemical and other data. Of great importance for the accomplishment of this task 342 was close cooperation between philosophers and natural scientists. However, conditions at that time were not yet ripe for such cooperation.
Even this short historical survey shows that philosophical knowledge is not doomed to remain forever behind the scenes. Sooner or later it is bound to come to the forefront of scientific progress.
An essential distinction of fundamental theoretical investigations from empirical cognition consists in that theory is capable of setting and solving a number of philosophical, tasks on its own. This feature, naturally, is largely accountable for the difference in the attitude of scientists representing the two tendencies in the development of science to the significance and value of philosophical problems and to philosophy in general. The task of fundamental investigations consists in explaining the established laws, revealing the links between them, predicting and foreseeing new facts and new trends in the development of science. Theoretical laws and concepts .therefore express necessity and are of a general nature. Theory no less than empirical sciences rests on a philosophical basis in the form of adopted and tested philosophical doctrines and principles, instrumental methodologically in the formulation and explanation of new laws and relationships.
Hence, theoretical investigations also involve problems which we call philosophico-methodological and which are mainly connected with the use of the available philosophical propositions, principles and laws in the solution of methodological problems and in the fulfilment of concrete theoretical tasks. To be sure, the 343 philosophico-methodological approach to the problems dealt with in a theoretical investigation is essentially different from the approach to the same problems in an empirical investigation aimed at revealing and explaining individual facts of scientific importance. For instance, the problem of the objectivity of knowledge viewed from the philosophico-methodological angle at the theoretical level of cognition may boil down to deciding on whether the theoretical analysis of a quantummechanical ensemble should be carried out with the help of a certain apparatus or whether a basically new means of investigation should be sought in order to make the process under observation independent of the observer. Of course, the effect of an apparatus on the micro-object is an objective phenomenon, but the nature of the apparatus and the form of its influence cannot but tell, in one way or another, on the subjective perception of the processes in interest. It would be wrong, therefore, to deny the fact that object-subject problems do arise in such investigations. Moreover, it can be asserted that no effective solution has been found to this problem so far. The problem of causality regarded from the philosophico-methodological viewpoint at the level of theoretical cognition may consist, for instance, in the theoretical explanation of discovered laws, in the logical deduction of a certain proposition from several premises, in the forecasting scientific and technological progress, etc. Here, too, the content of the principle of causality, the meaning of the categories are not subject to any special analysis.
Hence, the problems which we call philosophico-methodological have to be solved both by a 344 theorist and an empirical scientist. Just like in the case of empirical investigations, they are not regarded as philosophical problems mainly due to the fact that the solutions sought are expected to help in the fulfilment of a specific scientific task rather than in the formulation of a philosophical conclusion. The solution of the specific problem in question is subordinated to the- principal aim---the solution of a definite puzzle, a special theoretical problem.
Similarly to empirical knowledge, theoretical knowledge also has its limits. A theorist takes over where the empiricist leaves off. He formulates empirical laws, explains them, links to other laws having the same degree of universality or to even more general laws, gives them a theoretical substantiation. Scientific conclusions have different degrees of universality expressing the necessary links and relationships at different levels of generalisation. Some theories, e.g. the lever theory, differ but little from empirical generalisations as they describe the properties of concrete objects and phenomena. Other theories, such as the general systems theory, the set theory, the games theory, the modern cosmological theories, and others come very close to philosophical concepts and conclusions.
As is known, a scientific principle can only be refuted by another one if they represent similar or at least comparable degrees of generalisation. Consequently, critical attitude to existing philosophical concepts, as well as real interest in the development of philosophical knowledge which is indicative of the growing understanding of its role and significance in modern science can only appear at the theoretical level of scientific 345 cognition. It does not mean, of course, that the responsibility for developing philosophical knowledge rests exclusively with the natural scientists. The point is that the revision of philosophical principles, however partial, calls for their reassessment and creative development, since the problem is not confined to the concrete expression or application of current philosophical laws. It is laws themselves, their content, that become the object of scrutiny. The problems which arise in such situations can be called theoretico-philosophical or world-view problems.
The very nature of these problems makes it impossible for the natural scientists to tackle them on their own, though their solution may predetermine the results of investigations in the specific fields they are concerned with. The professional philosophers, for their part, need profound theoretical knowledge in highly specialised fields of positive science in order to undertake this task. They must have a clear understanding of the conflicting theoretical views in the given branch, know its history and traditions. History knows many examples when the natural scientists set themselves the task of solving philosophico-theoretical problems arising in their fields in order to help overcome the crisis. Among prominent natural scientists who made invaluable contribution to the theory and philosophy of science are such famous names as Albert Einstein, Wolfgang Pauli, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Vladimir Bekhterev, Ivan Pavlov, Nikolai Vavilov, Ernst Bauer, Vladimir Fock, Dmitri Blokhintsev, and others.
In this context utterly absurd appear to be the repealed attempts of the positivists to lay 346 the blame for unsolved philosophico-theoretical problems and deadlocks in science on none other than philosophy, Marxist philosophy in the first place. Positivism has always been trying to make Marxist philosophy the scapegoat for the difficulties encountered in the process of scientific cognition. Be it the comprehension of the philosophical problems of the theory of relativity or the painful process of consolidation of the quantum theory, the guilt for the protracted debates and controversies was invariably laid at the door of materialist dialectics and the Marxist philosophers who were allegedly opposed to the adoption of new ideas in physics. The development of genetics, too, purports to have been hampered by ill-intentioned dialectics which, according to the positivist ``historians'' of science did not serve as a guide for scientific thought but acted as a brake on its progress.
The history of science shows that theoretico-philosophical problems emerge as an expression of contradictions between the available theoretical basis of science and its philosophical foundation. Philosophical arguments are only resorted to when a theoretical problem cannot be solved by purely theoretical means and when it becomes necessary, on the one hand, to analyse its scientific roots and, on the other, to formulate its essence in philosophical terms and to indicate the possible ways for its solution. This, in turn, calls for a sufficiently high philosophical culture. The history of science knows a great many examples when the natural scientists proved incapable of solving important philosophical problems only because they allowed themselves to be enslaved by obsolete or basically false philosophical 347 doctrines. On the other hand, cases are on record when even prominent philosophers adhering to an advanced philosophical teaching were unable to understand the significance of pressing theoretico-philosophical problems as they lacked sufficient scientific background or specific knowledge in the particular field of science.
Neither physics, biology, nor any other special science can be blamed for the inability of individual scientists to provide correct answers to topical problems of world-view significance. Physics cannot be held responsible for the inability of such scientists as Mach and Poincar\'e to interpret materialistically the results of their own scientific investigations. Similarly, it is not the fault of Marxist philosophy that some of its ill-starred representatives abused and denounced cybernetics as a bourgeois pseudo-science because they were unable to distinguish between its real scientific content and the misrepresentation of its discoveries in Western philosophical literature.
Hence, neither side alone can be held responsible for inability to understand and overcome one or another crisis in the theoretico-philosophical field: the fault lies both with natural scientists and philosophers. Once physicists misjudge a certain discovery, their error is seized upon by philosophers and becomes a source of groundless philosophical illusions and absolutisations leading, as a rule, to idealism and priestcraft. Should a slip be made by philosophers, their delusion will immediately tell on the relations between the rival schools in the corresponding field of positive science. Any controversy over methodological or philosophico-theoretical problems is 348 equally sensitive to both philosophical and specifically scientific arguments.
Of course, it always takes scientists some time to realise that they are faced with a theoretico-philosophical problem. If any symptom of an impending crisis in science becomes evident, philosophical concepts and principles are always the last to be called in question. A wrong prediction or explanation in some specific field of science leads first of all to the revision of theoretical principles and corresponding scientific theories. Such a revision takes several years of scrupulous and wearisome work even in our age of the scientific and technological revolution. The turn of the philosophical concepts constituting the foundation of a given theory comes only after scientists complete a most exacting test of the empirical basis and axiomatic premises of the theory in question. There are many hot areas in modern science where philosophical concepts and ideas are tested for strength by new scientific discoveries. As in Engels's time, nature remains the touchstone of dialectics and gives ever new evidence that it is governed by the laws of dialectics, and not metaphysics.
The intensive development of modern science characterised by the ever increasing complexity of its structure and growing sophistication of its theoretical framework expands further the sphere of man's knowledge. Scientific investigations extend to ever new fields, new objects, phenomena and properties of the material world. This statement may seem quite trivial, yet it is not always realised that the expansion of scientific horizons is a transgression not only of the bounds of available knowledge, but also of the 349 bounds of the current theories and adopted paradigms. This latter circumstance is of special significance since the current view tending towards some kind of pantheorism maintains that practically all new facts discovered by modern science do not go outside the framework of commonly professed theories, at least the fundamental ones, such as the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, the theory of the atomic structure of matter, and the Darwin theory.
True, so far as the modern means of scientific investigation are concerned, there are no grounds to question the validity of at least one of the above fundamental theories both in the macro- and microworlds. Nonetheless, it is rather a weak argument in favour of pantheorism. First of all, science has already received certain empirical data and theoretical conclusions which are not quite compatible with current theories, even with such a comprehensive one as the general theory of relativity. The explanation of these facts calls for a special scientific investigation. It is quite likely that a more thorough analysis will bring these facts in full conformity with the theory in question. Yet a possibility cannot be excluded altogether that it will have to be modified, generalised or even replaced by a basically new theory.
Besides, it is never to be forgotten that all current theories, however broad they may be, cannot claim to account for all the properties and aspects of the objective world. In other words, science can still reveal vast areas, explored but partially or unexplored at all, even in those fields where one or another fundamental theory appears to be indisputable. Take, for instance, 350 the complex ecological processes or meteorological phenomena we are still trying to find a clue to and sometimes get the badly needed answers when they are already useless. The earth's bowels, too, are full of mysteries, not to speak of our nearest neighbours, the Moon and Mars, which are to be explored in the near future--- here we have no proven theoretical concepts whatsoever to rely upon.
One can hardly expect to get the right perspective of the relationship between philosophy and science if he ignores the present trends of scientific development, however inconspicuous and insignificant they may seem. One should take into account the fact that the relations between philosophy and some natural sciences or their departments concerned with these latest trends tend to become ever more direct and unmediated.
The point is that, in the absence of a developed theory providing a direct and specific explanation of a given phenomenon and predicting its consequences, the functions of such a theory largely pass to general philosophical concepts and principles. To be sure, an essential role in the development of specific scientific theories giving an exhaustive and concrete interpretation of facts belongs also to theoretical or general scientific categories and principles. Yet philosophy plays an independent theoretical part, too, and advances problems which may be called philosophico-theoretical.
What are, for instance, those basic scientific principles which constitute now the theoretical core of ecological knowledge, the embryo of the future special theory? They are nothing but 351 a set of philosophical categories concretised to meet specific conditions.
In geography, these basic categories represent the concepts of structure, dynamics, development and others. Thus, the landscape axiom is formulated as follows: ``In each point of the earth's surface individual elements, components and factors of geographic substance are interconnected within a system of diverse and law-regulated orderly ties.'' The chorological axiom postulating spatial interdependence reads thus: ``All geographical phenomena are related to some geographical places which are identified by their location and particularly by the connection of this location with neighbouring places and areas.'' Here is the distinguishing feature of geographical objects: ``In geographic reality there are no objects which do not possess such geographical properties as location and spatial ties.''
As one can see, all these initial theoretical propositions are essentially concretised basic methodological and world-view principles. Alongside the world view and methodological functions dialectico-materialist philosophy performs an important theoretical role.
Such an understanding of the functions of philosophical knowledge may at first seem to be a revival of the concept of natural philosophy discarded by Marxism way back in the 19th century. Yet the emphasis on the theoretical significance of philosophy has nothing in common with old natural philosophy if only for the fact that materialist dialectics providing the initial theoretical basis for natural science does not by any means claim to substitute philosophical principles and speculative hypotheses for the 352 subsequent detailed investigation of the object and for the specific laws governing its functioning and development. The absolutisation of philosophical knowledge, the speculativeness characterristic of the natural philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries are ruled out by dialectical materialist methodology itself. Marxist-Leninist philosophy points the way for science to a more profound knowledge of the world, stressing the need to pass from general philosophical principles to concrete objects, and proves the necessity of discovering ever new aspects and empirical laws of reality. According to dialectical materialism, philosophy should not keep aloof from this process letting science stew in its own juice and expecting it to ripen all by itself, evolve true philosophical principles or provide yet another proof of dialectics.
``Bad'' natural philosophy cannot spring from the methodology of dialectical materialism. It flourishes where the theoretical progress of science is made contingent on pseudo-philosophical generalisations and ontological interpretations of physical, chemical, biological and other specific data. Such generalisations and interpretations claiming the role of philosophical categories actually tend to replace true philosophical knowledge by speculative, natural-philosophical concepts.
It would be a mistake to presume that the appearance of natural-philosophical concepts can be effectively prevented in our time by the spontaneous development of science and by Marxist criticism. That is not so. When propounding the Marxist-Leninist understanding of philosophy, it is necessary to analyse not only the positivist __PRINTERS_P_353_COMMENT__ 23--01152 353 views, but also the natural philosophical concepts, e.g. within the framework of so-called scientific realism, even if they spring up from a seemingly materialistic soil. This circumstance deserves special attention, since the present crisis of positivist philosophy tends to stimulate the ``revival of metaphysics'' as one of the alternatives to the positivist methodological programme. It is precisely this alternative offered by Western specialists in the methodology of science that leads to the reanimation of natural philosophy in its modern form. Numerous publications by American and British authors confirm it with utmost clarity.
It has already been pointed out in philosophical literature that the mere process of the generalisation of scientific data resulting in the creation of universal theories and concepts does not yet produce any ``increment in philosophical knowledge''. In point of fact, such an ``increment'' gives grounds for various speculative, scholastic concepts and hypotheses.
This approach is untenable for several reasons. First, the conclusions based on the simple generalisation of concrete scientific data cannot but be trivial as they do not solve any real philosophical or special scientific problems. In fact, any generalisation can only be regarded as scientifically valid if it ensues from the solution of a real philosophical problem. Hence, to qualify as philosophical categories or principles, any notions and generalisations should be interpreted in the light of the basic principles of dialectical materialism, tested for relevance and consistence with other philosophical categories and laws.
354Second, such conclusions are scientifically barren as they do not lead to any new problems.
Third, such conclusions tend to distort the philosophical picture of reality, and this is perhaps the most serious defect of the method under consideration. Not a single notion can gain circulation and be used in a philosophical context, in debates or discussions, unless it is assessed from the viewpoint of the main question of philosophy. Why is it so important? First and foremost, because philosophical analysis is based, at least in relation to the world view and methodology, on the already existing concepts and theories which, understandably, possess both the objective content and subjective elements. One should clearly understand the dialectics of these two aspects of scientific knowledge and distinguish one from the other in order to avoid errors in manipulating the new notion and trying to solve philosophical problems.
Suppose, we discuss the cause-effect problem in the light of the feedback concept. Its solution can only be obtained if we present the above categories as abstractions. For a physicist, biologist, a specialist in cybernetics or, for that matter, in any other field of natural science this problem simply does not exist. Specialists do not deal with the categories of ``causality'' and ``feedback'', but with objective processes themselves. In this context the above categories are not regarded as abstractions with corresponding approximations, assumptions, etc. In objective reality feedback links are inseparable from causal links. Besides, analysing the processes of control in terms of feedback relations, a scientist practically does not resort to the concept of __PRINTERS_P_355_COMMENT__ 23* 355 causality. It means that these concepts have quite definite epistemological limits which also determine the sphere of their application. Hence, the applicability of one or another concept---and we are speaking here about scientific concepts of a very general nature---depends not only on the specific field of objective reality, but also on the epistemological bounds. The transgression of such bounds, as well as the use of theoretical categories in an alien field renders them nonsensical.
The solution of one or another question from the philosophical angle requires special attention to the epistemological bounds of notions and concepts. In this respect the philosophical approach making a sharp distinction between the objective and subjective aspects of scientific facts and ideas is essentially different from the approach of the natural scientists, just like philosophy in general is different from the knowledge accumulated in physics, biology, chemistry and other particular sciences.
Of course, the basic question of philosophy is not the only ``filter'' for scientific generalisations which are to qualify as truly philosophical categories of world-view significance. No less important in this respect are the fundamental laws and categories of materialistic dialectics.
It should never be forgotten that the transition from the special knowledge obtained within the framework of some positive science to the philosophical level of thinking, like the process of scientific cognition in general, has very little in common with a linear and unidimensional process of successive generalisations, something in the nature of epigenesis. This transition is 356 a qualitative change, a swing to a different level of universality and, accordingly, to a different level of comprehension of the necessary links and relations of the objective world.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. DIALECTICS ANDThe contemporary development of scientific knowledge is characterised by certain peculiar trends very important for understanding the relationship between philosophy and science. These trends testify to the fact that dialectics is a replica of objective reality and therefore provides the best method for its cognition. For one, dialectics highlights the objective character of such a profound intrinsic contradiction of scientific and technical progress as the unity of integration and differentiation of science. These two processes account to a considerable extent for the growing complexity of the structure of scientific knowledge and cannot but affect the progress of philosophy itself. Their objective and veracious presentation and assessment can only be undertaken by a philosophy which is fully cognizant of its own dependence on the general trend of scientific development yet is not susceptible to particular influences within each special science. It is only this kind of philosophy that is capable of viewing the development of science ``from the inside'' by virtue of its being its integral part and, as it were, its ``spokesman'', and ``from the outside'', as the exponent of its most general laws, principles and categories.
From the viewpoint of dialectical materialism 357 which is the only philosophy capable of the above approach, the main and most essential trend in the development of modern science consists in the growing interdependence of natural, social and technical sciences. This trend does not fall in with either positivist or any of the ``post-positivist'' models of the development of science. It is highly significant that this fruitful cooperation is based on modern production and its achievements, on the one hand, and unsolved problems, on the other. Marx's prediction that science will eventually turn into a direct productive force of society is coming true and this fact is gaining ever wider recognition. Understandably, this applies primarily to natural and technical sciences. Their increasingly close interaction stems not only from the needs of production and from social tasks, but also from the inner logic of scientific development, from the vital tasks of fundamental and applied research. The very links between science and production, the effectiveness of scientific investigations and fundamental research depend to a considerable extent on the depth of integration of scientific knowledge.
An important feature of scientific progress in our time which is overlooked or deliberately ignored by all modern ``philosophy of science'' is the rapidly increasing significance and theoretical independence of social sciences. Their growing prestige is connected with spectacular achievements of Marxist thought in transforming social relations and in the successful management of society in the socialist countries, with the consolidation of the principles of socialist ethics and social humanism. Yet the immediate 358 objective cause of this process is the increasing role of social sciences in the sphere of social production.
Under the conditions of modern scientific and technical progress profound knowledge of the achievements and problems of social sciences becomes a prerequisite for the successful development of natural science and should be regarded as an important element in the general scientific and cultural background of a modern scientist. The role of social sciences should not be confined to giving a specialist in natural or technical sciences a certain minimum of knowledge just to broaden his outlook. They should also provide him with relevant social information to permit solving complex problems he may encounter in his more or less narrow field of activity, let alone the tasks of preparing him for socially useful activity, solving organisational problems, broadening his philosophical horizon and improving ideological education. The very logic of scientific progress, the law of the development of modern science calls for a broad humanitarian education of the so-called narrow specialists.
Under the impact of the current scientific and technological revolution social sciences, particularly some of their applied disciplines, penetrate into the very core of production processes revealing new possibilities for the solution of important theoretical and practical problems and for enhancing the efficiency of production. The revolution gives a powerful impetus to the development of new forms of interaction between theoretical and experimental investigations within the framework of natural, social and technical sciences.
The current scientific and technological 359 revolution is connected primarily with the discovery and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, with the development of automation and computers, breathtaking achievements of chemistry, rapid progress of biology and space flights. Natural science plays today a crucial role in developing qualitatively new instruments of labour and new materials, in introducing basically new technological systems, designing automatic machine lines, introducing on a wide scale automated control systems and in solving many other important problems. Tremendous achievements of modern science and technology have made it possible to start fundamental investigations of the structure of matter in micro- and macrocosm, to design and develop complex technical systems, investigate and reproduce the most intricate systems of living nature, including the human organism.
The current scientific and technological revolution is also characterised by the essential enhancement of the human factor in production, i.e. of the role of man as the subject of the production process, by a radical change in the man-science-technology system and by the growing complexity of organisation and management. A crucial role in the investigation of all these phenomena belongs to social sciences whose representatives take an active part in the development of the theoretical principles of scientific control over socio-economic processes, in the study of numerous factors stimulating creative activity and in improving industrial engineering and production schemes. The influence of social sciences in the sphere of production is constantly growing and its cooperation with natural and 360 technical sciences is becoming ever closer and more fruitful.
The penetration of social sciences into the sphere of production affects not only the systems of control and organisation. Changes in the man-science-technology complex go side by side with the revolution in the very foundation of production processes. The growing complexity of the design and operation of modern machines, their increasing role in the automation and management of production make ever more exacting demands not only on natural, but also on social sciences which have to supply the necessary data for engineering solutions. The present level of integration of social, natural and technical sciences makes it incumbent on engineers, designers and specialists in cybernetics to take accurate account of social, psychological and other ``human factors'' in production, in the service industry and in other fields.
The development of new technology and the extensive use of automation, data-processing equipment and computers are primarily the result of the labour of mathematicians and specialists in cybernetics and electronics, yet the achievements in these fields are also creditable to the creative endeavour of logicians, linguists, psychologists, specialists in mathematical economy and economic cybernetics. It is common knowledge that computers which are indispensable in modern production systems cannot be constructed and operated without the solution of economic, psychological, logical and linguistic problems. As a result, new sciences come into being, such as applied linguistics, human engineering, and economic cybernetics, The computerisation of 361 industrial processes is impossible without the modelling of numerous thinking operations, so far comparatively simple, and without solving the problems connected with translation from human language into machine language. The highly accurate operation of automatons is known to be controlled by algorithm-base programmes representing the models of production and social processes. The creation of artificial languages, the systematisation of terms and symbols, the development of modelling systems have expanded the scope of application of linguistics which was originally confined to the problems of teaching the native or foreign languages and translating from one language into another, and had very little to do with direct production processes.
The extreme complexity of systems which include man as their component, calls for new research methods essentially different from the traditional physico-mathematical analysis. Linguistics, for instance, holds out much promise in the field of modelling such systems as it permits using not only digits, but also words and even whole sentences of the natural language. Profound investigations into the structure of the natural language, the analysis of the laws governing its formation and functioning are also helpful in the solution of certain technical problems, such as the improvement of the quality standards and responsiveness of the press, automation of some editing and publishing processes, etc.
The acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the development of effective control systems result in the rapid increase of information flows which have to be processed at an ever growing rate. The participation of linguists in 362 the improvement of production and social processes with the use of computers finds its expression today in a new linguistic method of investigation---the modelling of the linguistic system and speech processes. The results of this modelling are materialised in special artificial languages and various linguistic algorithms. Particularly accurate should be the modelling of speech processes when developing dialogue-type systems and other advanced methods of man-machine interaction.
Applied linguistics is called upon to make its contribution to the essential improvement of all systems using the natural language and to the enhancement of their effectiveness. Specifically, it should enable computers to receive information in its natural forms, without any preliminary preparation by man. Computers should manipulate semantic units instead of textual elements, sharply expand the volume of information required for the automatic solution of intellectual problems and open up new possibilities for its complex logical processing. To achieve these aims, it is necessary to develop machine languages approximating to the natural one, create identification devices capable of recognising human voice or its optical images, and improve the general standard of self-control and self-perfection of machines within the man-machine system. The solution of this latter task is now becoming quite feasible owing to the fact that the substance of man's creative activity yields ever more readily to mathematical description. An important role in this process belongs, for one, to human engineering which describes man's mental characteristics and functions in terms of 363 mathematical language. This can be easily translated into a machine language to fit in human and machine characteristics. A similar function is performed by bionics, particularly psychological bionics.
The investigation into the role of the human factor in modern technology throws a new light on such philosophical problems as the man-machine relationship, the specific features of man-machine languages, substantive and formal moments in reproductive and creative thinking, artificial intellect and self-organisation, the unity of the algorithmic and heuristic principles of thinking.
Social sciences play an increasingly important role in the solution of questions pertaining to the development of a single classification system for various items and terms, to the unification and standardisation of documents with a view to producing uniform information for various control systems in production and other fields of social life. In this connection a need arises to start a more profound investigation into the theoretical problems of terminology, the language of science, and to join the efforts of scientists studying these problems. The creation of such classifiers, as well as the development and introduction of uniform documents, single systems of technical, economic, financial and other indices should not only reflect the growing information unity of social, natural and technical sciences, but also take into account new trends in the improvement of the organisational structure of the economy, the new level of the development of democratic centralism in the sphere of management and control. Classifiers not only record essential balance links between the 364 economy and control systems, but also serve as the source material for economic and mathematical modelling in all spheres of the national economy.
Automation of production and many other problems of social, scientific and technical progress provide yet another channel for the penetration of social sciences into the sphere of production and for their drawing closer to natural sciences. The more difficult the tasks and the more complex the processes subject to automation, the more imperative the need for studying man and the full diversity of his individual qualities, the social ones inclusive. The focus of attention is shifted on man's activity, and the results achieved in these studies determine to a considerable extent the solution of many crucial problems, both practical and theoretical.
From the viewpoint of theory, the investigation of human activity acquires special importance in modelling man's actions and thinking processes. Computers can only simulate the operational and technical functions of human thinking. The procedures characteristic of the actions of machine and man are entirely different, let alone the difference of the mechanisms themselves. The extremely complex nature of human activity cannot be reduced to logico-mathematical algorithms. Attempts at formalising certain elements of thinking processes, extremely useful as they are, do not yet give grounds for excessive optimism about the possibility of all-round modelling of man's mental activities, developing a full-scale artificial or hybrid intellect, etc. Computers can essentially facilitate, speed up and improve the accuracy of the decision-making 365 process, yet they can also accelerate the implementation of an incorrect decision.
The experience gained in the operation of computers has provided convincing evidence that, in contrast to the solution of simple and similar type problems when man's role in automated control systems is limited to setting a task, inserting initial data into the computer and interpreting the formal decision, the attainment of substantive solutions is only possible on the condition that man intervenes in the decision-making process at each stage of the machine operation. It has turned out that the elements of creative approach to the solution of complex problems, particularly in unforeseen circumstances and in cases when logical and mathematical formalisation proves difficult, are needed much more often than in the case of simpler problems. Such operations as the identification of new targets in research, the breaking up of the general task into subtasks, the development of new criteria for a new situation, the selection of the classification base and methods of equivalent transformations and many others include numerous elements which do not yet lend themselves to formal and algorithmic presentation. Therefore the need for direct interaction between man and machine, i.e. for the man-machine dialogue becomes more and more imperative.
As a result, social and technical sciences find themselves confronted with the extremely interesting problems of the organisation and design of human activity in its unity with automation facilities ranging from elementary means to most complex and sophisticated equipment.
The difficulties and miscalculations in the 366 development of automatic control systems and automatic devices are not infrequently traceable to the underestimation of the data provided by social sciences. The specificity of economic processes characteristic of a given industry, industrial amalgamation or enterprise is not always taken into account by automation development engineers who tend to concentrate on secondary problems, mainly related to accounting, rather than to tackle the key issues of control such as scientific prognostication, scientific and technical progress, etc.
New technical means not only make work easier, they change essentially the very nature of labour and shift the emphasis onto man's intellectual abilities by complicating the process of data apprehension and analysis and increasing demands on his ingenuity, creative powers and ability to make quick decisions in a changing situation. These features of modern production account for the need to extend scientific investigations beyond the traditional field of physical and chemical characteristics of the instruments of labour, quality of materials and energy problems, and to enlist the services of social sciences. Scientific investigations in the field of labour activity should not be confined to technical facilities as such and to man as the subject of production. They should concentrate more and more on the correspondence between man's physical and mental possibilities, aesthetic tastes and other social qualities, on the one hand, and the properties of modern technical systems, on the other.
The problem of man, his concrete role in the transformation of nature and society is becoming 367 one of the key issues stimulating the most profound integration of social, natural and technical sciences. Therefore, in considering the task of optimising human activity as part of the general problem of the rationalisation of labour, philosophers jointly with sociologists, psychologists and engineers ought to think of how to avoid the restriction of man's creative activity by the further automation of production. Non-automated and semi-automated production processes not only limit the worker's freedom of action, but also make it difficult to change from one occupation to another. While projecting new trades and professions in connection with the deepening processes of automation, special measures should be taken to neutralise these negative trends. Seeking to make work easier and more interesting, the development engineers engaged in the rationalisation of production processes and technical means and in the improvement of environmental conditions at industrial enterprises are already confronted with the need for designing specific labour operations. These should relate both to individual elements of production (a concrete working place, a specific man-machine system), and to technical complexes (a production line, a shop, etc). The designing of new kinds of labour activity, of more rational forms of interaction between man and nature, man and machine, etc. is still behind practical needs. However, this trend represents yet another important field where natural, social and technical sciences join their efforts to achieve a common goal.
Modern science regards man, machine and the production environment as a complex dynamic system, with man playing the leading part. A 368 comparatively new branch of science known as ergonomics or human engineering studies the role of human factors in modern production and other spheres of activity and analyses the integral characteristics of the man-machine system. Investigations in this field cannot be reduced to the analysis of the characteristic features of man, machine and production environment separately from one another, even if they are viewed in the aggregate. Ergonomics as a science is evidently confronted with the task of developing its own theory and devising its specific methods of investigation into the man-technology-production environment system.
A comprehensive approach to the problem of man's labour activity based on the achievements of social, natural and technical sciences throws a new light on many theoretical and practical problems. It makes it possible to correctly assess not only the role of the instruments of labour, technical means and the real significance of the factors of production environment, but also the place of man in modern social production. Such an important category as the quality of labour, for instance, acquires a new meaning. Economists are at present mainly concerned with such characteristics of labour as its complexity (calling for the workers' appropriate qualification), intensity, physical hardness, importance for society, etc. All these characteristics are taken into account in wage rating practices at state enterprises. However, they cannot reveal in full scope the social effectiveness of labour. The analysis of its quality only from the viewpoint of narrow practical criteria does not fully reflect the specificity of labour under the __PRINTERS_P_369_COMMENT__ 24--01152 369 conditions of developed socialism. Yet the quality of labour is an integral characteristic which represents the product quality and quantity indicators referred to the indicators of man's health and intellectual level.
At the present stage of industrial development it becomes technically possible to realise projects on the basis of a comprehensive approach to man's activity. Under the conventional pattern, design work on a system generally starts from its estimated technical characteristics which determine the place and the functions of the man-operator, the latter's role being mainly assessed in terms of limitations (a relatively small amount of information the operator is capable of processing within a unit of time, a relatively slow response, a comparatively weak resistance to noise, etc.).
Time has evidently come to reverse this order and try the alternative method. Specifically, in developing a technical assignment the designers should proceed from the idea of the secondary, auxiliary function of machines and, consequently, take into account, first and foremost, the positive qualities of man as the real subject of labour, i.e. his advantages over the machine, but not his demerits. This approach opens up basically new possibilities for enhancing the efficiency of labour and will eventually make it possible to shift the focus of attention from the solution of the pressing problems of industrial engineering, the improvement of available technical means and the adaptation of man to the existing technological norms onto the design of new forms of human activity based on comprehensive theoretical investigations into man's physical, mental 370 and intellectual potentialities now being studied by ergonomics. As has been pointed out in the recommendations of the Second International Conference of Scientists and Specialists of CMEA Countries and Yugoslavia on Ergonomics (Bulgaria, 1975), the trends in the development of modern production will evidently bring about a situation in which the main design problems will .be connected not with the investigation of equipment characteristics, but with the search for ways and means ensuring optimal interaction between man and technical means. The main criteria for such optimisation must be the provision of the most rational equipment (depending on the concrete achievements of scientific and technical progress) and the maximum satisfaction of man's need for creative work.
Besides the mutual influence of their ideas and methods, the growing interdependence of social, natural and technical sciences finds its expression in the emergence of new branches of knowledge on the borderlines between them. Ergonomics, engineering aesthetics, applied linguistics, economic cybernetics, etc. can hardly be classified among purely natural or purely social sciences. They do not study man as such or objective relations between people, or the technical aspect of production. The subjectmatter of these disciplines which constitutes the basis for the synthesis of social and natural sciences is the interaction of man and technical systems, production and natural environments, etc.
In this context special importance attaches to the analysis of complex methodological problems underlying the synthesis of social, natural __PRINTERS_P_371_COMMENT__ 24* 371 and technical knowledge. It is the diversity of possible approaches to man's labour activity in modern production that presents the main difficulty in developing a single language for different specialists concerned with ergonomical problems. Understanding among economists, designers and psychologists can only be achieved on condition that the synthesis of social and natural sciences is not reduced to a mechanical combination in some aggregate system or conglomeration of knowledge, or even to the establishment of some kind of ``subordination'' between them, but is based on the general theory of labour activity.
This task deserves most serious attention and calls for extensive investigations (alongside the solution of applied problems) into the general principles of human activity. Such investigations should be aimed at revealing the laws governing the perception of data, the shaping of combined pictorial-conceptual models, visual thinking and decision-making processes. Much has already been done in this direction, yet the development of a comprehensive theory of labour activity is still a matter of the future. As a result of the weakness of the general theoretical basis technical systems are often designed without due regard for the human factor. For instance, man is viewed merely as an auxiliary technical element, and very ``inconvenient'' at that, of a control system, and the system is understood as some kind of a computerised complex differing from the conventional one only by the number of technical means employed and by the method of its operation. Such an approach is absolutely untenable from the methodological viewpoint 372 and leads in practice to serious technical and economic miscalculations.
Ergonomic investigations are mainly aimed so far at attaining specific aims, rather narrow by nature: the improvement of technical means to meet the requirements of modern production, the optimisation of machine-tool configurations, the rational arrangement of instruments or control desks and auxiliary equipment, the improvement of controls, etc. True, the scope of these investigations is gradually expanding: besides the equipment improvement and layout optimisation problems, specialists in ergonomics jointly with designers study the possibilities of ``domesticating'' the territory of industrial enterprises so that it may merge naturally with the city or suburban complex. They concern themselves more and more often not only with the quality and external appearance of one or another industrial product, but also with the conditions, both natural and social, under which it is to be used.
It stands to reason that the scientific solution of the problem of optimal interaction between man and machine in the socialist countries is directed not only towards enhancing the efficiency and economic effect of new technology in connection with the new role of man in the system of modern production. Even a more important aim of this investigation consists in creating the best possible conditions for the development of man and for freeing him from the strain of tedious and monotonous work. The new technology, the extensive use of electronic computers and the overall improvement of production conditions testifies, first and foremost, to the humanitarian mission of science opening up new 373 possibilities for improving man's welfare and ensuring his all-round harmonious development.
An important factor in the strengthening of links between social, natural and technical sciences is the tendency towards the integration of their cognitive potentialities, both theoretical and experimental, as regards the rational use of nature, environmental protection and the solution of other global problems.
The synthesis of social, natural and technical sciences in the process of the comprehensive solution of various problems leads to the emergence of numerous ``gravitation centres'' where specialists in most diverse fields of science join their efforts to achieve a common goal, and accounts for different levels of analysis, including the highest level of the integration of social and natural sciences on the basis of materialist dialectics which becomes in this case the theoretical and methodological basis for complex scientific investigations. This tendency results in a considerable enhancement of the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the most general theory of the development of nature, society, thinking and the methodology of science. Lenin's idea of the alliance between Marxist philosophers and representatives of special sciences is demonstrating its increasing viability. Under the conditions of socialism, this alliance derives its strength from the principles of dialectical materialism---the objectivity of knowledge, development, causality, existence of objective laws, etc.---which provide a solid methodological basis for natural, social and technical sciences. From its inception, Marxist philosophy has been absorbing the outstanding achievements of 374 natural and social sciences and developing as the methodology of natural knowledge, social knowledge and the world-transforming revolutionary practice.
At the turn of the 20th century Lenin wrote: ``It is common knowledge that a powerful current flowed from natural to social science not only in Petty's time, but in Marx's time as well. And this current remains just as powerful, if not more so, in the twentieth century = too.''^^1^^ The truth of Lenin's words is once again confirmed by the large-scale penetration of the mathematical methods of analysis into social sciences which use them as an important instrument of sociological, economic and psychological investigations, and by the application of computers and data processing equipment in the sphere of public opinion studies (opinion polls). The development of science is characterised today by powerful currents of ideas not only from natural to social sciences but also in the opposite direction---the problems, ideas and methods of social sciences exercise an ever increasing influence on natural and technical sciences. An important role in their integration belongs to cybernetics, the probability theory, the games theory and the theory of information. For instance, cybernetics has not only made a valuable contribution to the development of the methodology of some social sciences and to the very style of scientific thinking, but has itself benefited from the alliance with social sciences. As a matter of fact, its very first steps could not but be _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Socialism Demolished Again'', Collected Works, Vol.~20, 1972, p.~196.
375 influenced by such general concepts of progressive social and philosophical thought as target setting, control, systems analysis, etc. The concepts of memory, teaching (in relation to automatons), game, collective behaviour and others made their way into cybernetics together with the new problems and specific methods of psychology, sociology and linguistics. The investigation into the so-called artificial intellect problems also testifies to the influence of humanitarian sciences on the orientation of cybernetics. The development of data converters and machine programmes in line with cybernetic concepts emphasises the imperative need for studying the nature of man's creative activity and heuristic art and highlights the importance of the knowledge of man and society.The growing interdependence of social, natural and technical sciences and their methods of investigation, the emergence and rapid development of the marginal branches of knowledge, the tendency towards comprehensive investigations of major economic and fundamental scientific problems by joint efforts of sociologists and natural scientists---all this tends to enhance the role of dialectical-materialist methodology. The new conditions causing social, natural and technical sciences to draw ever closer together pose a number of complex problems of world outlook and methodology before Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Most serious attention, for one, should be given to such problems as the main directions and concrete forms of the integration and differentiation of sciences, the use of methods employed by natural science in sociological investigations, the mathematisation of knowledge.
376The analysis of dialectical transitions between the abstract and the concrete, the general and the particular, the empirical and the theoretical, the substantive and the formal in scientific cognition is a necessary condition for the effective implementation of the ideas of mathematics, mathematical logic and cybernetics in other sciences. Of special importance is the dialectics of the abstract and the concrete, the general and the particular in the analysis of social relations carried out with the use of abstract mathematical and cybernetic notions. In this field the correct ``subordination'' of notions, methods and techniques plays a decisive role. Any formalism and eclectic ``dovetailing'' of social, natural and technical concepts is absolutely inadmissible.
All this shows that the increasing differentiation and deepening integration of scientific knowledge pose extremely important tasks before dialectical materialism as the philosophical and methodological foundation of the cooperation of sciences. The philosophic interpretation of the latest achievements of social, natural and technical sciences is one of the important prerequisites for the further development of scientific world outlook and methodology. Yet the task of philosophy cannot be confined either to the passive registration of these achievements or to their so-called generalisation consisting essentially in attaching the tags of philosophical categories to some general concepts worked out by science. The philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism cannot and must not be just a ``pedlar'' of new ideas and data obtained by other sciences. This philosophy is indeed 377 ``open'' for all new and fruitful ideas, yet it does not mean that it is a mere vessel for accumulating general scientific information. Its function is to give a creative interpretation and a dialectical synthesis of new data. This, in turn, presupposes the creative development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy itself, its enrichment with new ideas, the further concretisation of its categories representing the sum total of the entire history of man's cognition and transformation of the world.
The complexity of integration processes accounts for considerable difficulties in the solution of these problems. The rapprochement and close cooperation of some sciences, such as psychology and physiology, tend -to gradually obliterate the borderlines between them and lead some scientists to an erroneous conclusion that their objects coincide. This view is fraught with the danger of overlooking qualitative distinctions between the objects of investigation by these sciences and this, in turn, may result in the absolutisation of certain methods and concepts at the expense of others. In fact, such sciences as psychology and physiology of higher nervous activity study different aspects of the activity of the brain and, consequently, the objects of their interest must not be confused. The psychologists' task evidently consists in studying the socio-historical origin of the most complex forms of consciousness regarded as an independent object of investigation which cannot receive an exhaustive explanation in terms of physiological processes alone, though the latter constitute the basis of the complex forms of man's conscious actions. It is this task which 378 determines the basic methodological principle of the interaction between psychology and physiology. The identification of the subject-matters of the physiology of higher nervous activity and psychology bars the way for understanding the socio-historical laws that govern the formation and development of the higher forms of psychic activity and is in fact tantamount to denying psychology as a separate science. Similar difficulties arise in the realisation of comprehensive research programmes, since their effectiveness largely depends on the assignment of the field of activity for each specialist and on the understanding of his possibilities and advantages in a given investigation.
Such synthesis, however, should not be regarded as the simple summation of knowledge obtained by individual sciences. The purpose of a comprehensive analysis is not to obtain data characterising different aspects of an object and to present them in a summarised form. It consists, first and foremost, in defining the main factor which constitutes the system under investigation and accounts for its specificity and integrity. It is therefore very important to assess correctly the significance of the problems of theory, methodology and world view arising in the process of the integration and interaction of individual sciences in a complex investigation. The adequate idea of the basic integrated properties of a complex studied by different sciences can only be provided by a more general theory. Indeed, the experience gained in the development of comprehensive programmes of cooperation of natural, technical and social sciences attests to the fact that such programmes, born 379 out of the needs to solve certain practical, applied problems, tend to advance new theoretical questions and actualise philosophical problems pertaining to the activity of man in general, his interaction with machine, the relations between production and the environment, nature and society, etc.
Complex methodological problems of the interaction of social, natural and technical sciences arise not only in connection with the definition of their objects of investigation, but also as a result of the mutual penetration of their concepts and methods. Laying aside the question of the possible forms of such interaction, we shall merely emphasise here that each attempt to apply the methods and concepts of one science in the field of another science should be preceded by a dialectico-materialist analysis of the possibilities of such extrapolation and, consequently, should be viewed as a philosophical problem. Nothing but harm will result from the oversimplified understanding of this process and from the underestimation of those philosophical and methodological principles which underlie the development of social, natural and technical sciences and their creative possibilities. The uncritical, mechanistic transfer of the concepts and methods of one science, ungrounded extrapolations and formal generalisations can only mislead a scientist. The borrowing of the ideas and methods by one science from another presupposes their creative assimilation and reassessment in accordance with the specific object and tasks of the former. Under such conditions special importance attaches to the analysis of dialectical ``transitions'' from one field of knowledge to another. Any 380 underestimation of the importance of the methodological, philosophical analysis of the borrowed ideas and methods leads either to negativism regarding the possibility of the integration of the methods of social, natural and technical sciences, or to a kind of euphoria, ungrounded enthusiasm about the cybernetisation, mathematisation, formalisation and ecologisation of science often prompted by nothing more than the desire to keep up with vogue.
Though the positivist concepts of the relationship between philosophy and special sciences, as well as between social and natural sciences have gone never to return, the reductionist illusions regarding the relationship between the social and the biological, the social and the psychological prove to be very tenacious. For instance, striving to trace the roots of crime, some authors are inclined to see them in genetic, i.e. essentially molecular-biological mechanisms. Similar tendencies are also in evidence in the interpretation of the so-called biosocial nature of man. This formula looks attractive enough due to its laconicism, yet it tends to oversimplify the mediated relationship between the social and the biological, camouflaging a number of essential intermediate links between them. It is precisely owing to the complexity of this relationship, its mediate character, that social phenomena do not yield either to direct biological explanations or to an interpretation in terms of the so-called parallelism of social and biological factors. To be sure, the dialectico-materialist analysis of high-level psychological processes or social phenomena with all their links and relations of mediation should not ignore the 381 natural determinants of human behaviour. Such determinants, however, must be taken into account in unity with all other factors revealing the definitive role of social motives in the activity of man.
It stands to reason that the integration and differentiation of science alongside the increasing importance of theory tend to complicate the structure of modern scientific knowledge and its further development. The emergence of such sciences as cybernetics, the games theory, the information theory, and others which study very general laws applicable to entirely different objects and phenomena of reality partly accounts for an illusion that positive sciences no longer need a philosophy and that philosophical knowledge can be at last replaced by general scientific concepts capable of providing the necessary methodological and scientific basis for more concrete sciences. Some contemporary Western philosophers go even as far as asserting that the prophecy of positivism has at last come true and that science assumes the methodological prerogatives which hitherto belonged to philosophy.
True, modern science can no longer content itself with the means of the ``local'' synthesis of knowledge. A need arises to synthesise the knowledge of interdisciplinary character and to develop additional means for such a synthesis: special integration theories, new branches of knowledge and new scientific trends, such as cybernetics, semiotics, system investigations, a general theory of modelling, a theory of similarity and dimensions, investigation of operations, etc. The additional means for such a 382 synthesis also include new hardware---automatic data processors, such as cybernetic modelling machines and computers which essentially enhance the efficiency of brain work by mechanising and automating mental operations, particularly in the bibliographic information service, which is thus enabled to solve new complex problems. This ``intellectual industry'' permits improving the accuracy of weather forecasts, developing many branches of the national economy, accelerating technical progress, etc. Without its aid it would be impossible to carry out extremely complex calculations, exercise control over space flights and solve many other problems.
The peculiar position of general scientific disciplines which serve as intermediaries between philosophy and natural sciences results from the two main functions they perform. First, they provide a theoretical and methodological basis for a number of positive sciences. Characteristic in this respect is the connection of these sciences with mathematical methods of investigation which enable them to carry out more general qualitative and quantitative analyses and to apply the general rules of calculation in a given concrete field of investigation. Second, they serve as an intermediate methodological link between certain positive sciences and materialist dialectics as a whole.
For instance, the specific methodological function of the theory of similarity which covers physical and physico-chemical processes manifests itself in processing and generalising experimental data and in modelling physical processes. The conceptual body of the theory of investigation of operations is not limited to 383 mathematics. Its categories and the general principle of investigation provide a particular methodological approach in the investigation of any complex goal-oriented activity, its elements being individual operations. This theory is used in the investigation of many different kinds of human activity, as well as in the analysis of man-machine complexes representing automated control systems. The main principles and categories of cybernetics provide particular methodological guidelines for sciences concerned with living nature and social life, as well as for technical sciences investigating control processes in terms of data-processing operations. These include the questions of automatic regulation, self-adjustment, instruction and self-instruction, self-organisation, self-reproduction and the development of natural and artificial systems. Hence, from the theoretical and methodological viewpoint integrative sciences provide, as it were, a kind of a bridge to the highest theoretical generalisations and methodological principles, i.e. to philosophy.
As we see, the growing complexity of scientific knowledge and the emergence of general theoretical disciplines make the question of the role, of philosophy even more topical. Scientific progress in our time leads not to the ``witheringaway'' of philosophical methodology, but to the further enhancement of its role. The interpenetration of social, natural and technical sciences and their methods, the appearance and rapid development of boundary scientific disciplines, the trend towards comprehensive scientific investigations of major socio-economic problems which call for joint efforts of social and natural 384 scientists---all these processes attest to the growing significance of philosophical methodology. Such is the viewpoint of materialist dialectics and such is the trend of scientific development.
Within the province of professional philosophers remain, as before, the investigation into general trends in the development of science, the study of interaction between new scientific trends, their relative independence, the applicability of the methods of certain scientific disciplines in the fields of other disciplines, the extrapolation of theoretical concepts to new fields of investigation, reduction problems (criticism of reductionism) in their numerous aspects, the unity of scientific knowledge alongside the extreme diversity and dissociation of individual scientific schools, etc., not to speak of the ``eternal'' problems arising with new force under the present-day conditions: the objectivity of scientific knowledge, causality, determinism, the dialectics of scientific cognition, and others. The solution of these problems not only calls for excellent knowledge of the latest scientific achievements and of the history of science in general, but also presupposes profound philosophical background and good acquaintance with the history of philosophy.
The acquaintance with the basic principles of materialist dialectics is far from sufficient to guarantee success in scientific investigation---no less important is the ability to use them. The successful solution of scientific problems under modern conditions, in the face of highly complex and widely ramified scientific disciplines, depends on the ability to assess available knowledge in __PRINTERS_P_385_COMMENT__ 25--1152 385 the light of general scientific concepts which is impossible without good knowledge of modern theoretical ideas and the history of science. Philosophical knowledge, owing to its special relations of mediation with concrete empirical and applied scientific investigations never reveals itself in its pure forms. It is represented in current theoretical ideas and concepts, in the theoretical knowledge related to a given specific field.
The influence of philosophy on the character and results of scientific investigation is in fact much more subtle than is purported by some popular scientific and philosophical publications intended to demonstrate with maximum possible clarity the role of methodology and world outlook in scientific knowledge. To be really successful and fruitful, scientific activity must rest on the entire system of dialectical materialist philosophy understood as a single harmonious, integrated world outlook, but not on dissociated scraps of philosophical knowledge, interpreted at that in a very primitive manner.
It would be naive to expect that universal theoretical problems can be solved by a specialist in cybernetics, the general systems theory or by a representative of some other scientific discipline, however broad its field. No less groundless would be a hope that such a task could be successfully accomplished by a philosopher who would be capable of digesting the enormous amount of information obtained by positive sciences. There is no alternative to the alliance between philosophers and representatives of natural and social sciences. The problem, 386 if there is any, can only be over the selection and development of the most effective and adequate form of this alliance.
A modern scientist specialising in boundary problems and investigating the crossroads of traditional scientific trends can hardly expect to gain any success in his work even if he is well versed in one of the special fields. It becomes more and more obvious that the more important discoveries in modern science await not a narrow specialist, but a scientist of broad theoretical outlook, a thinker, an intellectual. We may be now returning to the epoch of the Encyclopaedists, but on a new level of scientific knowledge. At any rate, such a return to the seemingly old appears to us quite possible and certain symptoms of the advent of a new age of Leonardo da Vinci and French Enlighteners are already in evidence.
In our time, when much of the tedious work required to accumulate and classify facts can be handed over to machines with their constantly expanding possibilities, the value of experience in some special field of knowledge stands as high as ever, yet the importance of philosophical, methodological knowledge increases immeasurably since it is precisely this knowledge that can bridge the age-old gaps between physics and biology, biology and physiology, psychology and mathematics, economy and mathematics, etc. The new disciplines emerging on the borderlines between these sciences are notable for practically direct scientific application of philosophical knowledge. In contrast to 18th-19th-century natural philosophy, it plays the role of general theoretical, philosophical principles and concepts and __PRINTERS_P_387_COMMENT__ 25* 387 does not claim to provide final solutions to concrete scientific problems.
Present-day scientific knowledge is highly dynamic. The current scientific and technological revolution is notable not only for rapid changes in the content of knowledge itself, but also for abrupt shifts in the value approach to different branches of knowledge. It was only quite recently that physics was the idol of the youth. The changing tide then lifted up cybernetics and the representatives of this promising branch of science enjoyed universal attention. The recent breakthrough in genetics and the acuteness of the ecological problem have sharply increased the prestige of biology. The value and prestige of one or another science and, consequently, its impact on social life and on the style of thinking constantly fluctuate. It is no secret that the current period is marked by a steadily growing interest among the youth in social, humanitarian sciences. Yet it is not only the young that turn up in increasing numbers at these sciences' ``enlistment centres''. Far more significant is the fact that humanitarian problems attract more and more full-fledged natural scientists engaged in their specific investigations. Understandably, the natural scientists' attention to humanitarian issues results, first and foremost, from their social, civic interests. A modern scientist cannot conceive of activity removed from social problems and the tasks of scientific, technical and ethical progress.
Under contemporary conditions philosophy alone can provide scientists with an effective means to cope with the increasing flow of information and expand their theoretical horizon and 388 world outlook. First, it gives them the necessary methodological instruments for safe navigation in the boundless sea of scientific theories and concepts and guards against unfounded hypotheses and unrestrained imagination. Second, it provides guidelines for the investigation of social problems giving the necessary information on their character and disclosing the basic principles underlying the development of social, humanitarian knowledge. Such information is essential for scientists in all fields irrespective of the particular questions they are concerned with. If we view the progress of science from a broad perspective and take full account of the modern tendencies in its development, we cannot but come to the conclusion that success in research and the advance of science as a whole depends as much on the scientists' special knowledge, as on their theoretical background. The latter implies that a scientist should not only be well versed in the adjacent fields directly related to his sphere of interest, but also be familiar with the entire complex of social, natural and technical sciences. The development of science in the 20th century has convincingly shown that the concepts of the ``flank'' and ``rear'' in the overall scientific offensive have become completely antiquated, just as the title of the ``leading science'' which now reminds one of a challenge prize kept by the winner as long as he is in the heyday of popularity. The prize will inevitably pass on to another science as soon as it draws the public's eye.
The concepts of ``adjacent fields'' and ``boundary problems'' are becoming anachronistic, too. The unidimensional structure of scientific 389 knowledge is giving way to a multidimensional one. Not long ago physics or, more accurately, mechanics, was considered to be the only science adjacent to engineering disciplines. Now they have got other ``neighbours'' as well, such as engineering psychology born of the engineering and psychology borderline problems. The study of the ``architecture'' of living organisms carried out within the framework of bionics has brought closer together engineering and biological disciplines. Such examples are numerous. The shoots of new scientific knowledge, new scientific trends are appearing and will appear in most unexpected nodal points of this crystal lattice. The boundary problems holding out the greatest promise for scientists should therefore be visualised now in terms of solid rather than plane geometry, i.e. as being disposed in some imaginary multidimensional space where each science can find points of contact with any of its counterparts.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 6. DIALECTICS OF THE OBJECTIVEThe above critical analysis of the positivist attitude to the problem of the objectivity of scientific knowledge, as well as the comparison of positivist views with some of the alternative concepts surfacing in the modern philosophy of science was to highlight, among other things, the inseparable unity of modern materialism and dialectics. One cannot pursue the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge without 390 concessions to idealism and metaphysics if the materialistic approach is not integrated, merged from the outset with the dialectical methodology of science. It is highly essential that this integration is not a mechanical combination of dialectical and materialistic concepts which supplement one another but that they are blended in the analysis of the real problems of scientific cognition.
The task of blending materialism and dialectics is the more topical at present as not many investigations can boast integrated dialectical materialist approach to the analysis of concrete scientific problems. Regrettably, the study of special problems is not infrequently guided by the principles of didactics rather than by the dialectics of scientific cognition, and the division of scientific material convenient for its presentation to students often predetermines the principles of scientific analysis. However, methodical schemes invaluable in the classroom sometimes turn out to be too rigid to reveal all the aspects of the interdependence of materialism and dialectics.
The importance of this problem is also highlighted by the analysis of the main philosophical trends of our time. As has been shown above, modern bourgeois philosophy reveals an obvious tendency toward materialism. The crisis of the positivist methodology of science gives rise to new philosophical schools, such as critical realism and scientific materialism, which proclaim materialism to be their credo.
However, this materialistic trend in Western philosophy does not merge with materialistic dialectics and remains indifferent to its achievements, Moreover, it is often openly biased against 391 dialectics. The fact that many representatives of critical realism recognise the objective reality not only of individual physical objects, but also of general properties and entities, and speak of scientific metaphysics, the development of scientific knowledge, etc. is very indicative of a profound crisis of the positivist philosophy of science. Yet it is but the first stage in the search for new methodological guidelines since the principles of objectivity and testability of scientific knowledge, correct in general, must be supplemented or, to be more exact, integrated with the dialectical approach to scientific problems.
The obvious fact that modern materialism is inconceivable without dialectics is again and again confirmed by concrete investigations. Take, for instance, the old problem of consciousness whose different aspects are now highly topical. Sociology, pedagogics and social psychology view this problem mainly from the social angle, i.e. in terms of the determining influence of social conditions on the genesis of consciousness. Cybernetics studies the same problem from the viewpoint of the possibility of reproducing the functions of consciousness by cybernetic machines, psychology and neuropsychology, in terms of the relationship between consciousness and the brain, etc.
One can declare himself a convinced materialist professing the primacy of social being in relation to consciousness, indicating that consciousness is a function of the brain, highly organised matter, or pointing out the possibility of modelling the brain processes with the help of computers. Yet none of these statements 392 attests to a consistent materialistic stand unless they represent a dialectical approach to the problem. Once we separate one from the other, which is sometimes the case in scientific publications, we automatically undermine the very foundation of the professed materialistic views. It is common knowledge, for instance, that the content of human consciousness is determined by social factors. One should bear in mind, however, that the prerequisites for the formation of concepts, mental images reside in neurodynamic processes. Hence, a consistent materialistic analysis of the nature of consciousness is only possible if both sides are taken into account in their interdependence. Should we for a moment lose sight of one of them and rashly state, for instance, that we owe consciousness to social factors only, the ghost of idealism will present itself right here and then. Indeed, since individual knowledge is passed on from generation to generation, our statement would imply the existence of some kind of primordial knowledge which might well assume the form of ``absolute'' or ``innate'' ideas.
Furthermore, this is not the only loophole which would be opened for idealism by our unwary statement. If consciousness is determined by social factors only, how should we account for such phenomena as talent, good inclinations, natural gifts? How should we explain Mozart's musical endowments and Lenin's genius? We should have either to leave these questions unanswered, or appeal for help to Providence. In a word, without dialectics we should not make a step toward materialism.
Materialism has now reached a stage when its 393 further development as the world view and as the methodology of scientific knowledge is only possible on the dialectical foundation. Conversely, dialectics cannot be a coherent system of philosophical views unless it rests on the materialistic foundation.
The merger of materialism and dialectics is embodied in Marxism-Leninism which opened a new epoch in the development of philosophy. After the emergence of Marxism-Leninism any deviation from either dialectics or materialism, any concession to idealism, eclecticism and metaphysics is bound to undermine the unity of philosophy and should be regarded as essentially regressive.
The entire history of materialism shows that it could not be consistent unless it was interpreted dialectically. This was particularly obvious when materialist principles were applied to the explanation of social phenomena---suffice it to recall Feuerbach. In our time, non-dialectical materialism is simply inconceivable; it cannot but stumble at every step. Modern science and social processes are so complex and dynamic that any inconsistency in world outlook and in the philosophical interpretation of one or another phenomenon is fraught with grave ideological consequences. Each philosophical problem, therefore, should be treated from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, i.e. from the materialistic and dialectical angles. The materialistic principles themselves will turn into an inadmissible philosophical abstraction if they are divorsed from dialectics. In our time dialectics is opposed not only to metaphysics, but also to idealism, Conversely, materialism 394 claiming consistency is incompatible with metaphysics and all sorts of eclecticism.
The positivist concept of objectivity, the Popperian interpretation of ``objective knowledge'' and the stand of ``scientific realism'' are notable, first and foremost, for a narrow understanding of the principle of objectivity. Nevertheless, each of the above trends has certain rational elements and their comparison will help understand more clearly the essence of the problem and define the guidelines for its modern solution. The obvious difficulties encountered by positivism and other trends of the modern philosophy of science in the interpretation of objectivity show that there are but two methodological alternatives open before a philosopher: either to give up the search for objectivity altogether and agree that objective knowledge is unattainable, or to hold on to the materialistic tradition at the risk of earning the reputation of an outdated and even retrograde thinker attempting to draw philosophy back to the ideals .of classical natural science. The first alternative appears to be rather attractive: it seemingly complies with the spirit of modern science which continues blasting one bastion of classical science after another, and relieves the scientists of the need to rack their brains over ``metaphysical'' problems enjoying but little popularity with most of them. At a closer look, however, it does not help to avoid difficulties, since any attempt to carry on investigations with the legalised handicap of the ``subjective'' brings the investigator back to the problem of distinguishing between the objective and the subjective which he tried to escape. This was clearly demonstrated 395 by the fate of the hypothesis of ``latent parameters'' in quantum mechanics which postulated the inevitable presence of the observer in the quantum-mechanical theory. As regards the second alternative, i.e. the adherence to the principle of objectivity, it turns out to be a thorny path just as well and calls for a serious philosophical analysis of the concept of objectivity. What is more, this analysis appears to be the more difficult as it is to provide a basis for mutual understanding between the philosophers and the representatives of special sciences.
What was the main weakness in the positivist concept of the objective? In one of the previous sections devoted to this problem we have shown that positivism identified the objective with the observable. It was through observation and combination of various sensations and perceptions that one could form an intersubjective idea of any object. An individual observation or perception could not, of course, give knowledge independent of the subject, but a series of observations, the perception of recurrent processes were evidently sufficient to provide the necessary material for separating the subjective from the intersubjective.
A similar understanding of the objective underlies also the concept of ``critical rationalism''. In his theory, Popper only eliminates the most obvious weaknesses in the positivist interpretation of the objective, but sides with the concept of intersubjectivity. According to Popper, the difference between the objective and the subjective consists only in that the former has passed through the purgatory of intersubjective criticism which separates the elements of 396 knowledge immune to falsification from those disproved by constantly changing experience. The objective is thus identified with the conventional, the immutable, with what is not questioned by experience at a given moment. The narrowness of such criteria of objectivity reveals itself, in fact, each time science transgresses the bounds of habitual, stereotyped phenomena and events. As regards unobservable processes, relationships and properties, the positivist criterion of objectivity proves to be completely unsatisfactory. Popper's criterion reveals its untenability and inner subjectivism when one fundamental theory gives place to another, since the breakdown of a theory signifies the dissolution of the stable nucleus which cannot be falsified and is, according to Popper, the refuge of objectivity.
In its search for objective knowledge me modern ``philosophy of biology'' strives to reduce biological knowledge to physical phenomena. Why is it so? Because phenomenalistic theories proceed from the assumption that the stable nucleus of knowledge immune against subjective influence or interpretation can only be defined through the analysis of physical structures on the molecular, atomic or subatomic levels. This mirage still entices scientists who stake on physicalism and are fascinated by the seemingly clear and tangible outlines of new theories---though this path, as we have shown, is actually a blind alley, and the scientist who takes it in quest of objective knowledge is soon bound to discover it. True, the physicalism of ``scientific materialism'' is more constructive if only for the fact that it is oriented on the recognition of 397 objective reality, creation of scientific ontology and its subsequent verification. In our opinion, it is far less damaging to scientific progress than positivist physicalism which in fact seeks to pass off the present reduction of scientific knowledge to physico-chemical concepts as the last word of science.
As we see, the problem of objectivity in the philosophy of science is split, so to speak, among the existing levels of scientific knowledge, if not among different sciences. We shall not attempt here to investigate into the general causes of this phenomenon in the development of science; we shall merely take it for granted as a fact. In each doctrine, the concept of objectivity is confined within more or less narrow bounds which have a more or less definite location in the ``space'' of modern scientific knowledge and conform to its existing structure. The concreteness of philosophical categories, as we have shown above, has nothing to do with this location reflecting the limitations of each doctrine and, in the end, its subjectivism. The dialectico-materialist interpretation of the objective which is inseparably linked with the definition of matter as a philosophical category denoting objective reality independent of human consciousness in general, sets but the epistemological framework for this concept and has no meaning beyond the limits of the basic question of philosophy---the one concerning the relation of matter and consciousness. It is not connected with the boundaries of individual sciences or fields or levels of knowledge. It contrasts everything that is subjective to everything that is independent of consciousness. It points out the asymmetry 398 (in the epistemological sense) of the relationship between them.
The contrast between the objective and the subjective has a purely philosophical meaning. Perhaps like no other conceptual distinction, it sets a clear demarcation line between philosophy and positive sciences which are in fact indifferent to such a universal division. The independence of philosophical knowledge, its irreducibility to any special science stands out here with particular clarity, though the specificity of philosophy can also be demonstrated on the example of a number of other problems.
The philosophical understanding of the objective as essentially independent of consciousness in general is evidently much broader than its interpretation in the positivist, Popperian, physicalist and scientific-realist concepts, which connect objectivity with observability, intersubjectivity, reducibility to physical notions, etc. It should be noted, however, that different versions in the interpretation of objectivity are not always groundless and senseless. The positivist understanding of objectivity, for one, has a certain value within the framework of empirical investigations, whereas the Popperian interpretation of objectivity must be given credit for its attempt to view the positivist solution from a broader socio-cultural perspective and to emphasise the existing demarcation (tending, however, to absolutise it) between the individual and general consciousness, etc. It would not be correct to regard them as completely wrong; rather, they are narrow and deformed.
To view the problem of objectivity from the philosophical angle, one has to universalise the 399 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/20050704/470.tx" __SPELL_CHECK__ Basic (ispell-buffer) (2005.07.09). __CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11) __CHECKS__ end-of-line hypens checked (2005.07.11) __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2005.07.04) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ methods or ideas of special sciences or branches of knowledge and rise above their level, since this problem assumes one form in physics, another in biology, still others in history, theoretical sciences, empirical sciences, etc. Each of these disciplines concentrates on its own specific, topical aspects of the problem and has its own means and ways for its solution.
Hence, the first aspect of the problem of objectivity, as it is posed in contemporary philosophy, calls for a dialectical analysis and consists in distinguishing, first and foremost, between its empirical and theoretical levels. Obviously, objectivity cannot be reduced to observability, coherence, one or another degree of the generalisation of concepts, etc. Any of the above criteria leads to an unwarranted restriction of the concept of objectivity as it implies independence of the object of investigation from some special kind, form or level of consciousness, but not from consciousness in general. Yet the concept of the objectivity of knowledge in its philosophical sense presupposes the independence of knowledge from consciousness in general, be it individual or collective. The numerous difficulties involved in the implementation of this criterion do not by any means attest to its uselessness, they merely confirm the well-known truth that the path of true science is not a royal road. The theories asserting the objective character of knowledge but regarding it to be independent of certain forms of consciousness only imply, willy-nilly, its dependence on other forms of consciousness, thus leaving a loophole for idealism.
No less untenable are the attempts of some other philosophers proclaiming themselves 400 adherents of materialism to identify matter and, consequently, objectivity with one or several properties of material objects except the sole ``property'' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up---the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside the = mind.^^1^^
The history of philosophy shows that the single problem of the objectivity of knowledge can and must be solved differently at different levels of scientific cognition. The recognition of this fact is perhaps the starting point of the process of fusion of materialism and dialectics which reveals the complex and contradictory character of scientific cognition and shows that it cannot be confined to the sensuous, empirical stage. Scientific cognition goes into the depth of processes and phenomena, penetrates the realm of laws and reveals laws of different orders and different degrees of generalisation. The criterion of objectivity which may appear simple and explicit to any investigator in his specialised field is bound to turn into a complex problem when he enters upon the theoretical level of cognition and finds himself in the jungle of philosophy after the prairie of the macroworld.
It should be stressed, however, that the observance of the principle of objectivity was and remains the primary objective of modern science. Without the elimination of the subject, however difficult it may be for the investigator, scientific research will lose all meaning. Therefore recognising distinctions in the approach to the problem _-_-_
^^1^^ See V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', op. cit., pp. 260--61.
__PRINTERS_P_401_COMMENT__ 26--1152 401 of objectivity at philosophical, theoretical, empirical and other levels is making but one, though important, step forward. The next step, which is, evidently, the most difficult one, consists in revealing their relationship and defining a method for changing over from a philosophico-theoretical to philosophico-methodological aspect and further to the theoretical and empirical levels of the problem of objectivity. In point of fact, we need some kind of a bridge to pass from the philosophical principle of objectivity to its concrete embodiment in the context of a scientific theory.We believe that the function of such a ``bridge'' leading from one level of knowledge to the other in the formulation and solution-of the problem of objectivity can be performed primarily (but only partly) by the idea of invariance.
The principle of objectivity implies, in essence, the ``elimination of the subject'' from the object of investigation. What is the actual meaning of this requirement in the context of a concrete scientific investigation? Should we understand this phrase literally?
Significantly, dialectical materialism has never maintained that the requirement of the objectivity of knowledge is equivalent to setting up some kind of an insurmountable barrier between the subject and the object of investigation. Insurmountable in the sense that it prevents any influence of man on the object of cognition and only permits the ``mirror'' reflection of reality in his consciousness. ``Knowledge,'' wrote Lenin, ``is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of 402 abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = ``the logical Idea'') embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing = nature.''^^1^^
Thus the dialectics of cognition presupposes man's active penetration, intrusion into reality, his, so to speak, aggressive attitude to it. Here one may ask: how can such an attitude agree with the principle of objectivity?
To ``eliminate the subject'' does not mean to fence him off from the object of his investigation, though sometimes a specific kind of a barrier, e.g. an aquarium wall, can indeed make for objectivity, like in the case of an observer studying the behaviour of fish or sea plants. Nor does it mean to dig a ditch which can sometimes separate an investigator watching wild life. ``Eliminating the subject'' means creating conditions which would not so much prevent him from interfering with objective processes as from distorting them and causing to deuiate from their normal course. In terms of epistemology the subject is a very complex notion accounting for the possibility of human errors, inaccuracies and prejudices, inadequacy of technical and natural means at man's disposal, as well as of the store of knowledge available to him, the specific features of his perceptions, mentality, etc. It would evidently take several pages to enumerate the elements which make up the notion ``subject'' and should be excluded from the notion _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic'', op. cit., p.~182.
__PRINTERS_P_403_COMMENT__ 26* 403 ``scientific knowledge''. What really matters, however, is not this enumeration, but the obvious fact that man's centuries-old experience must have already developed reliable mechanisms compensating for the subjective aspects of the process of cognition. The ``elimination of the subject'' is always aimed, in one form or another, at this compensation and correction of the defects which are inevitably introduced by man in his exploration of the Universe.Far from denying the ``subjectification'' of reality by man, dialectics considers it inevitable and shows that man transforms reality through his practical, experimental and even mental activity, since the world, of course, can never be adequately represented in man's concepts. Man is unable to embrace the world in all its inexhaustibility; he is bound to limit the sphere of his investigations to the phenomena which are within his reach. At present, for instance, man is still unable to penetrate the structure of micro particles and has to be content to study their ``external'' interaction or to split them in a powerful accelerater.
So, insisting on the objectivity of scientific knowledge, dialectics proceeds from the fact that the subject alters the object in the process of its investigation. Yet the objective can only be revealed in the surrounding world if the investigator concentrates primarily on the stable, the recurrent. It is this search for immutable, invariant properties and values that represents the transition from the general idea of objectivity to the theoretical analysis of objective processes and phenomena. While revealing the immutable, the stable in the objects and phenomena under 404 investigation, the natural scientist may not even be aware of the fact that he attains objective knowledge.
The above does not mean, of course, that changing properties cannot be objective. If we speak of dynamic processes, the only requirement they should meet from the viewpoint of the principle of objectivity is the constancy of change. Not the change of constancy, but vice versa. Just so! The language of objectivity is translated into the language of invariance. Naturally, a physicist, a biologist or a sociologist cannot divorce the object of investigation from his consciousness. What he can and what he really does and must do is to distinguish between the mutable and the immutable properties of the object during his studies. This bridge from the general philosophical to a particular scientific idea of objectivity has been operable for centuries though its strength has been frequently subjected to testing. None of the tests, however, destroyed it, nor could do so completely. As a result, the bridge had only gained in strength, simplicity and elegance. Why, for instance, was its usability called in question at the turn of the 20th century? Because the philosophers erroneously identified matter with the concrete properties of things, but not with their only ``property of being an objective reality, of existing outside the mind'', whereas the physicists were bewildered by the collapse of their habitual concepts: the mass of the electron turned out to be variable, the stationary and impenetrable ``ether'' movable, the spatial and time intervals changeable. The world, once stable and reliable, was falling to pieces, matter ``had disappeared'',
405How did philosophy and physics overcome this crisis? Lenin formulated a philosophical definition of matter in which the criterion of objectivity was connected with the property of existing independently of man's consciousness. Physics found new invariants giving a new meaning to this philosophical idea. ``Invariants,'' wrote Max Born, ``are the concepts of which science speaks in the same way as ordinary language speaks of `things', and which it provides with names as if they were ordinary = things.''^^1^^
Invariance is the property of immutability in relation to a definite set of physical or mathematical conditions, specifically, to a group of transformations. This property is inherent in individual physical and mathematical values and physical characteristics, as well as in equations and laws of physics. An invariant value can be exemplified, for instance, by the distance between two points in geometry, or by value = E2---H2 in regard to Lorentz's transformations in electrodynamics, though the values of the intensity of electrical fields (E) and magnetic fields (H) prove to be invariant when changing from one inertial reference system to another. Group invariance (or group symmetry) is a kind of symmetry which is widely used in modern physics: the invariance of equations in relation to groups of Galilean, Lorentz's and Poincar\'e's transformations, the symmetry of Schrodinger's operator in relation to the rotational group of three-dimensional space, the symmetry of crystals, the unitary symmetry, etc.
_-_-_^^1^^ Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Pergamon Press, London, 1956, p.~163.
406A more general case of in variance is co-variance, i.e. the property of transformation of a number of physical and mathematical values in accordance with a definite linear law when passing from one reference system to another. Co-variance reveals itself in relation to different groups of transformations. It may be inherent both in different values, e.g. vectors, tensors of relative rotations, and in different equations and functions. A co-variant value is a value transforming in relation to one of the representations of a group of coordinate transformations being studied. Go-variant equations are those which, on being recorded in a co-variant form, do not change their appearance in any system of coordinates, though individual physical values incorporated in such equations may be different in different reference systems. The wide use of the notion of transformation group is accounted for by the immutability of a number of physical objects within one or another group, which circumstance makes it possible to define the law of their change during such transformations.
A transformation group can be exemplified, for instance, by a finite set of projections of a certain object on other objects known sufficiently well by their properties, e.g. on measuring instruments, experimental facilities, etc. Thus, if we are interested in a geometrical form, i.e. in the spatial structure of an object, we can regard its projections on different surfaces arranged at different angles relative to one another as geometrical transformations of the form of this object. The selection of a set or series of such ``projections'' making up a certain group of transformations in the mathematical sense 407 depends on the conditions of the existence of a given system, on its limits or measure, as well as on the concrete cognitive situation and the nature of the task the investigator is confronted with. It is the analysis of invariance and structure carried out with due regard for the objective and subjective aspects of the process of cognition (i.e. for its specificity) that makes it possible to use the principle of invariance in the solution of such a fundamental epistemological problem as the problem of the objectivity of knowledge.
To be sure, it would not be correct to identify the invariant with the objective. Both invariant and variant physical values, as well as their relationships can be objective in equal measure. Both of them, as has already been emphasised by Einstein, reflect to a degree objective reality. According to Einstein, the difference between invariants and variants does not lie in the same plane as the difference between the objective and the real, on the one hand, and the subjective and the seeming, on the other. If that were not the case, the concept of objectivity would apparently become superfluous. The revelation of invariants and variants is not yet equivalent to the establishment of the epistemological nature of each of these classes of phenomena. The question of the invariant or variant character of different quantities and of their relationships can only be solved within the framework of each individual theory and under the strictly defined conditions of investigation.
Invariant values and relationships are direct characteristics of the laws governing the behaviour and properties of the objects of a given 408 theory which are freed (in the obtained knowledge) from the characteristics relating to the specific conditions of investigation. This also applies to those conditions of investigation which are connected in one way or another with the subject in a given relationship. Hence, the conditions to be additionally eliminated are only those characterising the subjective aspect of the process of cognition. The object under investigation should be considered theoretically in all possible transformation groups so that its objective presentation in theory may be as full as possible. For instance, in the classical method of description the absolute length characterises the property of a body in absolute space regardless of the selected reference system. Recognition of the absolute nature of space and time presupposes the indifference of objects to the subject and to the reference system. Conversely, the relativist description of the space-time interval characterises the property of a physical object in relation to the selected system of reference (provided, of course, it is inertial). The theory of relativity treats simultaneity as a variant (relative) concept. It means that the simultaneity of two events is not regarded as absolute, since it represents not only the relation between the events themselves, but also depends to an essential degree on the selected system of coordinates. It is even more so if the events are separated spatially. In that case the objectivity of simultaneity (and, to a certain extent, of space and time themselves) can only be attested to by the invariance of space and time in one or another relationship.
As we see, variant values characterise relations 409 between the objects of a given physical theory, on the one hand, and the conditions of investigations (including the observer himself), on the other. A variant value can have any meaning only within the framework of a given theory and only in relation to definite conditions of investigation (cognition). Invariant and variant values represent different aspects of objective reality. Yet for a concrete physical theory the relationship between them is of paramount importance, as it determines the concrete measure of objectivity attained by this theory. It is not fortuitous that the search for invariants constitutes one of the main tasks of every physical and mathematical theory, and the replacement of old invariants by new ones is indicative of a transition from the old theory to a new, more general one. As a matter of fact, a transition from one theory to another covering essentially the same sphere of phenomena is only possible as a result of transformations revealing new invariants. This mechanism of transformations ensuring the birth of objective knowledge has long been one of the chief secrets of science, the veritable philosophical stone so badly needed by the ``alchemy'' of scientific cognition. It is in the process of search for invariants that the system of knowledge is purged of subjective elements and old scientific theories are replaced by new, more objective ones.
The change in the relationship between invariant and variant values in favour of the former testifies to the elimination of subjective elements from physical knowledge and is indicative of a transition to a higher level of objectivity, to the expansion of the sphere of objectivity of 410 physical knowledge. The preservation of immutability, invariance of certain values against the background of the mutability, variance of others is a sure sign of the objectivity of immutable values. It appears that invariance is always connected, in one way or another, with objectivity. It does not mean, of course, that invariance always represents the objective content of a theory, but the probability of their coincidence is very high. Being always oriented towards the future; the process of cognition must of necessity have a considerable ``margin of safety'', therefore every invariant in a theory must be regarded as potentially variable. On the other hand, the variable aspects of a theory are to be studied more closely with a view to determining the degree of objectivity they may represent, for which purpose attempts should be made to identify a group of transformations under which certain values in the equation in interest may prove to be invariant. The presence of invariants and variant relationships in a given theory determines the degree of its ``objectivity'', i.e. testifies to the presence of structural characteristics and properties of physical objects whose specific forms of symmetry are disclosed by the given theory under the specified conditions of investigation.
If some values or their relationships prove to be variable relative to given transformations, this cannot yet be regarded as attesting to the non-objectivity of the corresponding properties or relationships. It simply means that the question remains open and the investigation should continue. What is variant in relation to one group of transformations may prove to be invariant in relation to another group. Besides, 411 account is also taken of the fact that the very process of change can also be expressed in the language of invariants with the help of its isomorphic (or homomorphic) transformations. For instance, the melody of a song can be represented by changes in a continuously modulated signal. During the transmission of the signal from the sensors to the central processing units its form changes with the change of the physical carriers, methods of modulation and coding. Yet the content of the signal, the information carried by it, i.e. the orderliness of the pulses representing the melody of the song remains invariant, independent of these transformations.
It should be specially noted, even in this cursory survey of the problem, that the principle of invariance underlying macroworld theories in a latent form plays even a more important role in the investigation of the microworld. Though the classical theories (mechanics and electrodynamics) can be restructured in such a way as to place this principle in the limelight, they are nevertheless based on dynamic principles expressed in the equations of motion or field. We may assume, without going deep into this subject, that the objectivity of knowledge in the investigation of the macroworld is best represented by the equations of classical mechanics. It is not accidental, therefore, that the decisive role in ensuring the objectivity of knowledge at the macrolevel belongs to experiment. By contrast, theoretical science has developed its own, specific methods and principles of obtaining objective knowledge attaching, it appears, special importance, to the principle of invariance.
As is known, invariance or group symmetry 412 originally played but a secondary role in quantum mechanics, making it possible to obtain only auxiliary data on a quantum system. With the integration of Schrodinger's and Dirac's ``dynamic'' equations, however, the situation changed. Soviet scholars Yu. B. Rumer and A.~I. Fet write: ``The development of physics over the past few years has reversed, as it were, the relationship between the equations of motion and symmetry groups. Now the symmetry group of a physical system has come to the foreground; the representations of this group and its subgroups carry the most important data on the system. Hence, groups turn out to be the primary, the most profound elements in a physical description of nature. As to the concepts of space and time, they play the role of 'material' for the construction of the representations of groups and owe the place they occupy in physics to historical factors only. The 'equations of motion' are assigned the role of conditions superimposed on the vectors of some functional space for singling out irreducible representations of a group or equations of the infinitesimal representation of the same group. This shift of basic concepts does not seem to encourage the idea that each kind of particles and fields should be represented by some equation of motion. What is more, the very universality of the scheme known as the 'theory of field' is called in = question.''^^1^^
The principle of invariance is also largely accountable for the considerable degree of _-_-_
^^1^^ Yu.~B. Rumer, A.~I. Fet, Theory of Unitary Symmetry, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1970, p.~8 (in Russian), p.~424.
413 subjectivism in scientific concepts of space and time.The concept of absolute space and time was used by Newton in two different, though interrelated, senses. First, by absolute space Newton understood the empty and motionless (in relation to matter) space of the Universe, and by absolute time, pure duration corresponding to absolute space. Second, he used the term ``absolute'' to characterise the invariance of lengths and time intervals. It is precisely this latter aspect of the absolute nature of space and time which we are interested in here, since it is directly connected with the question of their objectivity.
The development of physics showed that the hypothesis of the absolute nature of space and time was narrow and contradicted a number of important scientific facts. For instance, it was not compatible with the principles of electrodynamics. The equations of electrodynamics were not invariant in relation to the Galilean transformations expressing the absoluteness of time and space. When applied to the electromagnetic field, Galilean transformations led to a conclusion that magnetic disturbance was transmitted at different velocities in two opposite directions from a moving source whereas the equations themselves excluded such a possibility. Subsequently the narrowness of the Galilean principle of relativity as applied to electromagnetic phenomena was proved experimentally. Michelson's experiments in determining the velocity of light in different directions relative to the moving Earth showed that the classical law of the summation of the velocities ensuing from the Galilean principle of relativity did riot hold true in 414 relation to the velocity of light. The contradiction between electrodynamics and the results of Michelson's experiment, on the one. hand, and classical mechanics based on the Galilean principle of relativity, on the other, was resolved by the theory of relativity. Proceeding from the postulate of the constancy of light velocity and using it as the basis of his theory, Einstein universalised the principle of relativity calling for the invariance of physical laws for inertial systems and extended it to all physical processes, including electromagnetic ones. In classical mechanics the concept of absolute time found its expression in the recognition of absolute simultaneity: if any two events occurred simultaneously in one inertial system of reference, they were also bound to occur simultaneously in another. The conclusion ensuing from the principle of the constancy of light velocity was entirely different: two events which took place simultaneously in one system of reference could not be simultaneous in another. In other words, simultaneity according to this principle was relative. The relativeness, non-invariance of simultaneity signified the non-invariance of the laws of physics in relation to Galilean transformations. According to Einstein's principle of relativity, the laws of physics are invariant not in relation to the Galilean, but to Lorenz's transformations, these providing direct substantiation for the concept of relativity of space and time viewed separately. Thus the length of a rod turns out to be different in the rest system and in the body axes system of coordinates.
Various authors not infrequently see the philosophical significance of the theory of relativity 415 in that it showed the variant character of space and time. It is correct in the sense that this theory indeed revealed new links and relations which had not been taken into account by classical physics and thus gave a broader and more profound picture of the dialectics of time-space relations. Such a general appraisal, however, needs to be somewhat specified.
First, it would not be correct to regard the concept of absolute space and time (if by the ``absolute'' we understand their invariance) as an erroneous, metaphysical picture of the world. This concept stands in the same relation to the objective world as do all classical physics and its laws. It is a permissible idealisation of reality, its approximate reflection in relation to speeds which are practically negligible as compared with the velocity of light. It is applicable to situations in which the velocity of light can be regarded as practically infinite.
Second, the significance of the theory of relativity cannot be reduced to establishing the relativity of space and time. From it ensues not only the invariance of space and time separated from each other, but also the existence of a new invariant: the time-spatial interval. Einstein and Infeld write: ``The world of events forms a four-dimensional continuum. There is nothing mysterious about this, and the last sentence is equally true for classical physics and the relativity theory. Again a difference is revealed when two CS [coordinate systems] moving relatively to each other are considered. The room is moving, and the observers inside and outside determine the time-space coordinates of the same events. Again the classical physicist splits the 416 four-dimensional continua into the three-dimensional spaces and the one-dimensional time-continuum... The old physicist bothers only about space transformation, as time is absolute for him. He finds the splitting of the four-dimensional world-continua into space and time natural and convenient. But from the point of view of the relativity theory, time as well as space is changed by passing from one CS to another, and the Lorentz transformation considers the transformation properties of the four-dimensional time-space continuum of our four-dimensional world of = events.''^^1^^
The qualitative distinction between the space-time relationship in classical physics and the four-dimensional continuum in the relativity theory is that in the first case space and time are treated as existing independently of matter and motion and separately from each other, their connection being entirely external, whereas in the second case they penetrate each other and make a single whole. On the one hand, the concept of time is incorporated in the definition of the spatial interval which is the distance between two points localised simultaneously. The relativity of simultaneity makes the spatial interval dependent on time. On the other hand, spatial components are incorporated in the definition of time. The time of two inertial systems is expressed through an equation incorporating a spatial coordinate. Since this coordinate is different for different systems of reference, time _-_-_
^^1^^ Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1961, pp.~219, 208.
__PRINTERS_P_417_COMMENT__ 27--1152 417 turns out to be dependent on space. Hence, the space-time continuum in the theory of relativity is not a mechanical combination of space and time connected with each other through external links, but an integral whole. Fused in a single continuum, space and time do not lose all of their independence. However, from absolute this independence turns into relative. Space and time become, as it were, sections of a four-dimensional continuum. The exposition of the invariance of the space-time interval was simultaneously a substantiation of the idea of the objectivity of space and time in the context of a new physical theory. A similar function was subsequently performed by the general theory of relativity.The second aspect of the problem of objectivity, as distinct from the first, considered above, calls for special dialectical analysis and pertains to the development of scientific knowledge.
After the crisis in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the current, scientific and technological revolution has once again demonstrated the relativity of scientific knowledge, its concepts and theories. Centuries-old and seemingly inviolable fundamental concepts and ideas of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, psychology and other sciences are undergoing a process of thorough revision. The relativity of fundamental concepts testifies to the historical character of the process of cognition. As we have seen, the present-day breakdown of scientific concepts, like in Lenin's time, arouses the feelings of uncertainty among natural scientists and philosophers, particularly those under the influence of positivist traditions, and makes them question the very 418 foundation of science, the objectivity, stability and value of scientific knowledge in general.
In this context the relation of the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge to the principle of its historical development acquires special significance.
Analysing the crisis in natural science at the turn of the 20th century, Lenin showed that the relativity of scientific knowledge was a manifestation of its dialectical development. Yet it is only one aspect of scientific knowledge which must not be torn out of the broad historical context of the development of science; on the contrary, it should be considered in connection with other aspects and features, particularly with relativity's opposite, viz., the absoluteness of scientific knowledge. Should we assume relativism, an objective and necessary aspect of scientific development that it is, as a foundation of the theory of knowledge and regard it outside and independent of absoluteness, we shall arrive, as was pointed out by Lenin, at absolute relativism which sees in the history of cognition a process of endless change of concepts none of which can give a true reflection of objective reality.
In fact, the recognition of the relativity of knowledge is not equivalent to the denial of its objectivity. One should not, as Lenin pointed out, confuse the question of the objectivity of scientific knowledge with the question of its fullness and identify objective knowledge with exhaustive and absolute knowledge. Absolute and relative truths do not oppose each other as mutually exclusive, incompatible characteristics, they mutually complement each other: ``... for dialectical materialism there is no impassable __PRINTERS_P_419_COMMENT__ 27* 419 boundary between relative and absolute = truth''.^^1^^ Any knowledge contains objective truth to the extent to which it gives an adequate reflection of objective reality, and ``to acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute = truth''^^2^^. From this viewpoint, relative truth is also objective truth and only differs from absolute truth in that it is but a particle, a ``grain'' of the latter in the sense that it represents the content of absolute truth incompletely, partially. Absolute truth, in turn, is the sum total of relative truths and each stage in the development of science ``adds'' new grains of knowledge to this sum.
Speaking of the dialectics of the relative and the absolute in cognition, one should bear in mind yet another important feature of their relationship, namely, that it represents continuity in the process of scientific cognition. In the course of its historical development science forms a more and more complete and adequate picture of natural and social reality. The growth of scientific knowledge consists therefore in a steady expansion of the sphere of truth represented by a succession of theories replacing one another.
Summing up his analysis of the dialectics of the relative and the absolute in the process of cognition, Lenin wrote: ``Dialectics---as Hegel in his time explained---contains an element of relativism~... but is not reducible to relativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', op. cit., p.~136.
^^2^^Ibid., p.~133.
420 truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth are historically = conditional.''^^1^^The ideas expounded by Lenin over 70~years ago are not less, if not more, topical today. Absolute relativism, reanimated in a number of the latest bourgeois concepts of the philosophy of science, including critical realism and the works of some representatives of the ``historical trend'', has now acquired some new aspects. As distinct from the earlier period, when absolute relativism was mainly traceable to gaps in scientific knowledge (this cause is still operative, though to a lesser degree), the present-day relativists more and more frequently involve the cultural-historical determinism of theoretical thinking. Justly emphasising the dependence of scientific knowledge on universal socio-historical factors, representatives of the above-mentioned and other ``postpositivist'' doctrines seek to prove that theories relating to one and the same sphere of knowledge but developed in different cultural and philosophical contexts are incommensurate with one another. In their opinion, scientific revolutions represent so profound a turn in scientists' views that there can be no question of any continuity of old and new theories.
Yet the history of science points to the opposite and demonstrates various forms of such continuity. The methods whereby a new theory assimilates and deepens the objective content of its predecessor can be roughly classified under two categories.
In the first category, the continuity of the new _-_-_
^^1^^Ibid., p.~137.
421 and old theories is realised through the transfer of certain elements of the old theory into the structure of the new one. These elements may include not only empirical data, but also certain theoretical concepts. For instance, the general theory of relativity borrows the variation principles, the principle of the equivalence of inert and gravitational masses from the classical gravitation theory. In the second category, which is of a more fundamental and general character, the continuity of the laws formulated in the old and new theories assumes the form of a limit transition, i.e. the laws of the new theory pass into the laws of the old one regarded at their limiting case. Thus, if we assume Planck's constant to equal zero, the Schrodinger equation, the basic one in quantum mechanics, transforms into Hamilton-Jacobi's canonical equation of motion.Scientifically grounded laws and theories have deep roots and exercise lasting influences; otherwise theoretical knowledge would be simply inconceivable. In this connection a question naturally arises: what is the source of the tenacity of a scientific theory in general, why does it preserve its explanatory and forecasting powers over a prolonged historical period?
The mechanisms pointed out by the well-known American philosopher and historian of science Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions are psychological, rather than epistemological by nature. Kuhn atributes the stability of a paradigm as a model for the theoretical explanation of facts to the specific psychology of the scientific community which shows a guarded attitude to a new theory and is never too fast to support it, as well as to the 422 unwillingness of some quarters in this community to part with the habitual stereotype of causal explanations and predictions. Such an explanation appears to have certain grounds, though the scientists' psychological motives need a more careful examination in each particular case. Yet far more important, in our opinion, is the methodological aspect of this problem. From the epistemological viewpoint, the stability of theories derives largely from the fact that each of them participating in causal explanations and predictions rests on definite premises. Unlike the theory itself which is thoroughly elaborated, its premises are found with comparative ease and, as a rule, are hypothetical by nature. Therefore, if the predictions or explanations made on the basis of a given theory prove to be erroneous, the premises are rejected with comparative ease. Newton's gravitation theory, for instance, was considered to be irrefutable for over two centuries. When it sometimes failed to come up to expectations, it was not the theory itself but its premises that were called to account. Thus the discovery of an error in the calculations of Uranus' orbit based on the theory of gravitation did no harm to the theory; it was shielded by the premises which performed their function of a lightning rod. As is known, John Adams and Urbain Leverrier traced the error to the influence of the hitherto unknown planet (Neptune) which had not been taken into account by the then existing system of assumptions.
Should a theory happen to lose its ability to predict and explain events, its prerogatives can be subsequently restored if a new set of conditions is found (and corresponding assumptions 423 formulated) under which the theory regains its powers. In many theoretical disciplines scientists prefer to preserve the theory's right to predict and explain events and put off the question of its incompatibility with certain facts. Hence, theories retain their explanatory powers (if only potential) even when some explanations prove to be patently erroneous.
Such theories are later modified in accordance with new data which appeared at first discordant, and new assumptions are made to support them. The fruitfulness of the ``backing hypothesis'' method can be exemplified by Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes. The analysis of the structure of this theory shows that it is sufficiently resistant to some contradicting facts. For instance, an animal trained to respond in a definite way to a certain stimulant far from always follows the exact pattern of behaviour required of it. Its response is usually slow or even incorrect. That does not mean, however, that the very first deviation from the forecast made on the basis of the theory of conditioned reflexes should be seized upon as a pretext for refuting this theory. In such cases the usual tactics of a scientist consists in shielding the adopted theory with an auxiliary hypothesis and alleging interference with the required conditions of an experiment rather than in discarding the theory itself.
A supposition can be made, for instance, that the animal's nervous system fails for some reason or other to pass through the excitation caused by a corresponding stimulant or even exerts upon it a certain suppressing effect. Indeed, numerous experiments carried out by neurophysiologists showed that excitation can really be suppressed 424 in the nervous system owing to feedback via various nervous circuits with their numerous bends and loops. The hypothesis of the suppression of excitation in nervous circuits serves, on the one hand, as an additional assumption backing up the idea of conditioned reflexes, and, on the other, turns out to be an independent theory subject to additional testing (like all assumptions ensuing from the principle of causality). This hypothesis preserves the validity of the conditioned reflex theory, making it a durable and effective instrument of causal explanations and predictions in the physiology of higher nervous activity.
Hence, owing to various assumptions, scientific theories provide a high degree of stability for explanations and predictions based upon them and cover a broad field of various phenomena and processes.
As we see, a transition from one scientific theory to another is a much more complex process than a simple negation of the old theory by a new one; some elements of the old theory are revised or even altogether excluded from the content of a more developed theory, other elements are carried over from the old to the new theory without any change or in the form of a limit transition, ensuring the necessary continuity and comparability of different stages in the development of science.
The third important aspect of the problem of objectivity or, more accurately, of the dialectics of the objective and subjective which is ignored both by the ``critical rationalists'' and ``scientific realists'' is the relation of the objective content of our knowledge to the abstractions instrumental |n the development of scientific concepts and 425 theories, i.e. the dialectics of the objective and the subjective in the very content of scientific knowledge. As we have seen, positivism regarded sensations, sensory data as the only reality, i.e. identified them with reality independent of our consciousness and thus discarded altogether the question of the approximateness, incompleteness of human knowledge. As to ``critical rationalism'', it defends the thesis of the complete arbitrariness of the abstractions and assumptions needed to construct a scientific theory. Both these schools, undialectical as they are, proved unable to solve the problem of objectivity.
The substantiation of the objectivity of scientific knowledge cannot be limited to the analysis of the relation of the content of this knowledge to the objective world, though it is, undoubtedly, the major part of the task. As is known, cognition is not a mirror image of reality, but, using Lenin's words, a process of the formation of abstractions, laws, etc. In the process of cognition, particularly scientific cognition, the investigator sets himself an aim, defines the object of investigation, disengages himself from all that is inessential and likely to hamper his reasoning and experimenting, etc. Besides these operations, cognition presupposes the breaking away of thought from reality, the flight of fancy, the image-bearing thinking. It might seem that all this mental activity is bound to reduce to zero any objectivity of knowledge since it represents nothing but the subjective factor in the process of cognition. Moreover, many of the above operations consisting essentially in the creation of abstractions must lead of necessity to the distortion of reality, to obvious errors and miscalculations. 426 The objectivity of knowledge might seem incompatible with the constructive activity of thought, with its active interference in the course of events.
Yet it would be unwarrantable pedantry to disparage scientific knowledge because of its subjective component which does involve the possibility of errors and distortion of reality. In point of fact, scientific knowledge would be simply impossible without this component. Abstractions which are prerequisites for scientific knowledge deserve therefore special attention, the more so as many difficulties connected with the problem of objectivity derive from the incorrect understanding of their character and role.
Coincidence of a notion and its object, theory
and reality is a complex, dialectically
contradictory process. Between the object and the
knowledge of the object lies the sphere of man's
activity, his goal-oriented actions aimed at
transforming and cognising the surrounding world.
Lenin wrote: ``Here there are actually, objectively,
three members: 1) nature; 2) human cognition =
the human
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic'', op. cit., p.~182.
427 complex process mediated by the collective material and spiritual activity of mankind and by the existing system of relations between the individual subjects of cognition.The elaboration of the concepts of reflection was thus connected with the development of much more flexible and profound views on the cognitive activity of man. Cognition is indeed reflection, yet it is the reflection of a special kind which could only be explained after a radical revision of the epistemological concepts of pre-Marxian materialism. The revised concept, far from breaking off with the basic principles of the materialist approach to the process of cognition, was to make materialism even more flexible and consistent. The new, more profound understanding of the process of cognition was to be based on the idea of unity of reflection and activity which implied the dependence of human knowledge on socio-historical conditions. This new concept threw entirely new light on many traditional problems of the theory of knowledge and made it possible to explain the mechanism of the reflection of objective reality.
Despite the broad variety of views on the origin of scientific knowledge in pre-Marxian materialist philosophy, common to all of them was the conviction that the solution was to be achieved through investigating the direct action of objects on passive individual consciousness. The formation and growth of knowledge were only attributed to the operation of those factors which manifested themselves in the influence of objects on the sensuousness of the individual, and no account was taken of all other determinants of the process of cognition---the dependence of the 428 cognitive image on links with other branches of knowledge, on the existing historical substantive generalisations and schematic ties and relationships revealing themselves in man's practical experience, on the forms and methods of investigations, etc. In point of fact, it was not understood that any object could only become a source of knowledge after being mediated by the practical activity of social man and by the previous history of cognition with its objectifications, schematisations and idealisations.
The new ideas constantly emerging in the course of the development of science are always conditioned, in one way or another, by the cognitive situation in the entire system of scientific knowledge. The progress of science is based primarily on the available knowledge, on the existing collective forms of cognitive activity objectified in the language, in scientific systems, etc. It is the active character of specifically human perceptions, their unity with social practice, the need for a dialectical integration of individual sensory data in a single system of perceptions that was referred to by Lenin when he characterised sensation as ``a subjective image of the objective = world''.^^1^^
The social norms and prerequisites for cognitive activity play even a more important role in the formation of an objective epistemological image at the theoretical level of investigation. Theoretical thinking is known to be based on a complex system of idealisations, including a special layer of mental structures, the so-called ideal objects _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', op. cit., p.~119.
429 which have no analogues among empirical objects, properties or relationships and which function and develop in accordance with their own laws operative in the field of theoretical knowledge only.As long as a layman inexperienced in philosophical intricacies remains within the sphere of conventional ideas, his attempts to see through a tangle of events and find a clue to his current problems can hardly induce him to take a conscious stand on either side of the barricade between materialism and idealism. Things begin to clear up when he passes beyond the limits of his experience and finds himself confronted with unusual phenomena and processes or encounters violations of habitual causal relationships. Under such conditions, an individual who is not prone to religious prejudices begins to realise the complete groundlessness of the illusion that his consciousness dictates laws to nature or forms a chain of events by determining the order of causes and consequences at his own will.
It is perhaps after being within a hairbreadth of death in an earthquake or after suffering a heavy shock from a flood as a result of an unexpected torrential rain that an individual keenly realises the objectivity of the surrounding world. A scientist, however, attaches far greater importance, of course, to those ``arguments'' which are adduced by Nature for or against his ideas and theories. Isn't, for instance, the refutation of the once popular theory of the existence of water canals on Mars, maintained till quite recently, yet another argument in support of the objectivity of our knowledge? Aren't the discoveries of quantum mechanics and of the physics of elementary 430 particles which shattered the foundation of classical science convincing proof of the objective nature of scientific cognition? The very unexpectedness, ``bizarreness'' of the most important discoveries of modern science, as well as the apparent intangibility of many scientific ideas testify to the fact that our knowledge of nature does not shut itself up in its own shell, but reflects with an ever increasing degree of accuracy the real, objective properties of reality. As is known, the graphic representation of the surrounding world is connected with the specific features and conditions of man's cognitive process. Yet the phenomena under investigation exist independently of human consciousness and therefore need not necessarily assume the graphic, tangible form as understood by man.
The objectivity of the existing connections and relationships in the world is also demonstrated by the fact that man often begins to realise their significance for his life and practical activity too late and, being unaware of the existence of certain links of extensive causal chains in nature and society, proves incapable of foreseeing all the consequences of his interference with natural processes. This aspect of the objectivity problem, for one, gives mankind no little trouble at present on account of the irrational use of natural resources by previous generations, the upsetting of the natural balance of water and energy reserves, and environmental pollution. The very fact 4hat people often find themselves unable even to formulate a problem before it thrusts itself upon them clearly demonstrates the objective nature of causal relations, social and natural laws which do not depend on when and how man becomes aware of their operation.
431Scientific knowledge is but a more or less adequate reflection of objective relations between phenomena which is shaped and mediated by the no less objective needs of society. Special importance, in our opinion, attaches to the recognition of the objectivity of links and relations. The existence of objects outside man's mind is seldom negated even by inveterate agnostics adhering to Hume's tradition. Nor is it denied by positivism and modern ``philosophical science''. What they do not accept is the objectivity of links and relations, particularly causal relations. This necessitates considering in somewhat greater detail the objective character of causal explanations, forecasts and laws in the general context of the problem of objectivity.
The concept of causality represents in the most general form various relations in nature and society between phenomena one of which (called cause) determines or produces the other (called effect). Objective in such relations are not only cause and effect as definite objects, events or phenomena, but also the relations themselves which are independent of consciousness whatever their nature: material, energetic, informative, etc.
It may look strange to the uninitiated that this brief statement could have caused and is still causing sharp debates which involve not only the methodology of scientific cognition, but also extend to the problems of social development and even ideological struggle. Yet universality is characteristic of all philosophical categories if they are truly scientific and represent objective reality. Viewed in terms of ``problem-intensity'', they may be likened to an iceberg with a huge submerged portion: the problems they contain in 432 embryo reveal ever new facets in each successive historical period.
There is apparently nothing ambiguous about the word ``produce'', particularly when we use it in the context of our everyday experience or in relation to macroscopic processes. In its conventional applications it conveys the ideas of the real direction of a process as a result of which one phenomenon produces another, of the succession of cause and effect in time, of their real similarity and unity of their nature. Yet each of these aspects of a causal relationship turns into a complex and difficult problem when we turn to objects studied by modern science. How can we single out cause and effect from a multitude of other objects and phenomena accompanying the process under investigation, and this in such a way as to express correctly the real relation between them? What is the meaning of the word ``to produce'' in a scientific context if there is no possibility to trace the entire process from cause to consequence? Is this process continuous or intermittent, necessary or accidental, transitive or intransitive, and so on and so forth? Most of these problems do not even arise in our everyday consciousness, nor are they implicated in the philosophical investigations of the positivist and realist schools.
For positivism, which regards sensations or complexes of sensations as the only reality a scientist is concerned with, causality is a purely psychological problem limited to the formation of associations in the process of observation of a regular sequence of events. Hence, from the positivist viewpoint the problem of causality is devoid of any philosophical meaning and comes __PRINTERS_P_433_COMMENT__ 38--1152 433 within the scope of concrete psychological investigations.
``Critical rationalism'' regards causality in terms of the deduction of explanations and predictions from more general knowledge. It therefore does not recognise the problem of the correctness, accuracy of these causal explanations and predictions of the effect of one or another cause, since effect is a logical sequence of cause, provided there is a more general law. The problem of the relationship between discontinuity and continuity is discarded by this school in a similar manner: the causal relationship being the result of a logical inference must be continuous and transitive by virtue of its definition. Popper, for one, rejects also the problem of the relation of causality to chance and necessity, since the very concept of causality implies necessity as its logical component.
By contrast, ``scientific realism'' recognises the objective existence of causal relations supposing them to be directly mirrored in scientific knowledge. The philosopher's task is thus restricted to the generalisation of the available knowledge of the physical, biological, chemical forms of causal relations and to the classification of these numerous forms, whereas the establishment and investigation of their specificity is left to natural scientists themselves. The difference between the philosophical and natural scientific knowledge of causality thus lies in the degree of its generalisation only. Paradoxical though it may seem, both ``scientific realism'' and positivism discard the same philosophical problems. This coincidence, as we have shown earlier, springs from the identification of knowledge and reality which is 434 characteristic of both positivism and ``scientific realism'' despite the latter's obviously materialistic platform. The only difference between them consists, perhaps, in that positivism deduces reality directly from knowledge, whereas ``realism'' deduces knowledge from objective reality.
Both philosophical trends, as we see, arrive at the same conclusion, though their paths are different: positivism ``eliminates'' materialism as a principle of scientific investigation, whereas realism ``eliminates'' dialectics. One lays the stress on the subjective, the other denies its role in the process of scientific cognition. Here we can see once again that materialism and dialectics are inseparable and that one cannot exist without the other.
To be sure, the physicists or biologists are only interested in the objective content of a process and seek to establish causes and effects, pursuing their immediate practical aims. As to the philosophers, they have a different problem to solve: they should separate the objective content of knowledge from those subjective elements which are inevitably introduced by the scientists in causal explanations and predictions. Assuming the physicist's or biologist's attitude, the philosopher not only abandons his field, but attempts to pass for a philosophical truth something which has absolutely no right to claim this title. Willy-nilly, this stand is tantamount to the distortion of reality in a philosophical sense.
Of course, in dealing with causality the philosopher should not close his eyes to the objective content of the knowledge gained within the framework of special sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, otherwise he would open __PRINTERS_P_435_COMMENT__ 28* 435 the door for idealism and subjectivism in science. Yet his real task which has already been considered earlier (see section 3 of this Chapter) consists in specifying the subjective aspects of causal explanations and predictions. In the context of the basic question of philosophy, i.e. the relationship of matter and consciousness, the mind and nature, the philosopher ought to disclose all subjective prerequisites for scientific investigation, since this task lies outside the scope of the problems tackled by the scientists themselves. From the philosophico-theoretical viewpoint, the problem of objectivity consists in revealing the subjective elements of causal explanations and predictions in special scientific investigations and in disclosing after that the interdependence of the objective and the subjective, their dialectics in the process of cognition.
Hence, the development of knowledge is characterised by a trend towards comprehending the real object of cognition as a unity of all its aspects and toward integrating all the cognised fragments of reality (different systems of relations) in a single objective system revealing its different aspects before the cognising subject. The realisation of this trend calls for the investigation of the forms of interaction of each object with other objects (the latter being regarded in this case as the conditions of the former), as well as with the cognising subject himself. The objectivity of knowledge is therefore made contingent on the understanding of the role of the subject in the process of cognition, particularly the role of measuring operations, the instruments used by the investigator, his system of reference and methods of coding the attained knowledge.
436In his everyday work a physicist, a chemist or a biologist usually encounters this problem in its philosophico-methodological aspect while seeking for concrete, specific means to single out the objective content of causal relations in reality itself, in actual processes taking place under natural conditions. It is the more important as the real problems and difficulties facing science in the field of methodology often stem not only from the erroneous understanding of causality, but also from the disregard or underestimation of the abstractions and assumptions forming the framework of the concept of causal relations. From the methodological viewpoint, i.e. from the viewpoint of the effective solution of modern scientific problems pertaining to the principle of causality, it is important to take account not only of the objective content of the concept of causality, but also of its subjective aspect or, more specifically, of all the intricacies in the causal relationship represented by the dialectics of the objective and the subjective.
Indeed, to establish a causal relationship between events A and B = and to explain event B by pointing out its cause A or to predict possible consequences = B1, B2, etc. = of known cause A one must not only indicate the corresponding signs of causality, but also disengage himself from all other events except A and B in the given space-time continuum. ``In order to understand ... details,'' wrote Engels, ``we must detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately, its nature, special causes, effects, = etc.''^^1^^ An abstraction of this kind _-_-_
^^1^^ F.~Engels, Anti-D\"uhring, op. cit., p.~30.
437 resorted to in the establishment of a causal relationship is in fact a routine mental operation often performed in everyday life. For instance, watching the collision of billiard balls we have no difficulty in identifying the impact of one ball as the cause of the movement of another. In doing so, we discard mentally such factors as the friction of the balls against the surface of the table, the convection airflows, and others, since we know from experience that they cannot have any essential influence on the position of massive billiard balls.Similarly, we say with certainty that on a summer day a stone is heated with sunbeams, but not with the light of distant stars, though we know that their light also reaches the earth's surface. Yet its effect is negligible as compared with the radiant energy of the Sun, therefore we simply disregard it in our explanation.
In dealing with causal relationships such abstractions are used so often that they become habitual and seem quite natural. The ease with which they are created and their practical value produce an illusion that, being quite justifiable in one or several cases, they must be quite relevant in all other similar situations. It is only after we are confronted with a complex situation that we begin to realise the full extent of the difficulties that have to be overcome if we want to establish the cause or effect of a given event in the tangle of a multitude of other objects and phenomena.
What is the cause, for instance, of the appearance of deserts in the once flourishing regions of Central Asia? No doubt the cause does exist, though it is evidently represented by a complex system of different factors. To answer this 438 question, we must study a tremendous amount of natural-history material and use a great many different experimental means and methods. We must carry out, for one, a geomorphological analysis of water reservoirs, register the climatic changes in the region in interest, study the structure of the topsoil, and so on and so forth. It is only after we complete such research that we shall be able to discard inessential factors and construct a more or less adequate explanation. Why should the task be so complex in this particular case? Is it because the investigator is required to exercise special care in order to reveal the signs of a causal relationship? Rather on the contrary, such signs are too numerous and the problem consists in selecting' those of them (after the assessment of their comparative significance) which are characteristic of the given concrete situation.
The abstractions used in identifying cause and effect play an essential role in the explanation and prediction of various phenomena. Should such abstractions prove impossible for some experimental or theoretical reasons, no correct explanation or prediction of events on the basis of causal dependence can be provided. In other words, the establishment of a cause-effect relation is conditional on the accomplishment of all necessary abstractions.
The abstractions connected with the concept of causality will only be valid if the investigator observes certain general rules (rules of abstraction) of which we shall indicate at least three.
First, invariable conditions should always be fenced off, since cause and effect should be variable factors by definition (their emergence or 439 disappearance may be regarded as a special case).
Second, if all or many conditions are variable in one or another respect (which is quite probable), the changes regarded as signs of a causal relationship must be different by their quality from all other changes in the given space-time continuum.
Third, the influence of attending factors must be far less pronounced than the influence of the cause on the effect, the difference in their intensity being such that the attending factors could be disregarded without any appreciable effect on the results of the investigation.
The above rules of abstraction impose certain limitations on the objective (boundary) conditions of the investigation of relationships in interest and, if observed, warrant the qualification of such relationships as ``causal''. The observance of these rules takes the form of various assumptions which relate to the conditions of cognition and are stated in relevant scientific texts.
The strict observance of these rules when identifying cause-effect relations guarantees the success of any causal explanation or prediction. A change of B that follows a change of A cannot yet be regarded as proof of the causal dependence of B on A unless the above rules are observed.
To be sure, the fulfilment of abstraction rules is often made impossible by objective reality itself. In many cases the scientists would probably prefer experiments to the conditions provided by nature for investigation. What is an advantage in one cognitive situation may turn into an obstacle in others. Noting this specific feature of the process of cognition, the Soviet scholar, V.~A. 440 Ambartsumyan, writes: ``A physicist confronted with an unknown phenomenon usually repeats his experiment to establish the dependence of the phenomena in interest on those conditions under which the experiment is staged. He has a possibility .not only of studying these conditions in every detail, but also of changing them. Things are quite different in astrophysics. Having chanced to observe an unusual phenomenon only once, we .can neither control the external conditions under which it took place, nor repeat it at will. Sometimes we do not even have any idea of the condition and circumstances attending the phenomenon we have = observed.''^^1^^
In most other fields scientists are usually capable of creating artificial conditions which meet the abstraction rules. The aim of an experiment in this case is to show that a change of one object or phenomenon (which does not affect the natural processes under the artificial conditions of the experiment) causes a corresponding change (or emergence) of the other object with other conditions being invariable. It is precisely the preservation of the constancy of all other conditions that ensures the observance of the abstraction rules. If the experimental check of a causal dependence is impossible for some reason or other, the investigator can meet the requirements of the abstraction rules by resorting, for instance, to appropriate mathematical means.
Suppose, we want to prove a causal relation between the uniform expansion of a rubber ball during an increase of its internal pressure and _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~A. Ambartsumyan, Philosophical Questions of the Science of the Universe, Yerevan, 1973, p.~116 (in Russian).
441 the behaviour of a molecule in a closed vessel. A uniform expansion of the spherical walls testifies to the equality of gas pressure on the vessel walls. Now, how shall we account for this equality if it is known that gas consists of individual molecules moving chaotically within the given volume? In our explanation of the uniform expansion of the vessel we in fact abstract ourselves from the details of the trajectory of an individual molecule and from the results of the molecule collisions. Do we have the right to make such an assumption? It turns out we do. When we deal with a large number of molecules, we may take it for granted that each molecule stays in any point of the given volume during equal periods of time, since there are equal probabilities that any molecule can get to any concrete region irrespective of its location. As a result of a great number of chaotic collisions not a single molecule can stay next to another one. Consequently, each molecule acquires a high degree of independence in its movements relative to other molecules. Since accidental collisions tend towards complete compensation, conditions are realised for the application of the concept of causality to the given relationship in full compliance with abstraction rules.Now, what happens when these rules are not observed? Should the researcher fail to take them very seriously, the results of his investigation are bound to be distorted and he may not even be aware of it. Suppose, we want to apply Hook's law to the relationship between the strain in a steel bar and the pressure applied to it, disregarding the fact that this causal relationship obtains within definite pressure limits only, which 442 are different for different metals. It stands to reason that the explanation itself and the predictions of a concrete strain as a function of the corresponding pressure value will prove erroneous.
A similar problem arises in defining the wing configuration in an airplane design. As long as the airplane speed was not high, the designer was justified in regarding air as incompressible liquid. Of, course, this assumption was but a crude approximation to real processes, but it could be tolerated as the resulting error was practically negligible. However, when it became necessary to define probable airplane characteristics at high speeds, the hitherto justifiable assumption lost its validity. Account had also to be taken of many other forces arising due to friction, air vortices, vibration, etc. The task of accurate prediction and calculation became much more complex. Consequently, the rules of abstraction (the accuracy of assumptions given in quantitative terms) have acquired special importance and failure to observe them is likely to result in serious errors.
The assumptions which relate to the conditions of investigation and are used in the analysis of any causal relationship constitute a subjective element in the concept of causality. The admission of this fact calls for a very thorough philosophical analysis of the dialectics of the objective and the subjective in causal explanations and predictions. It is important to understand, first, that the share of subjectivity in such explanations and predictions is so negligible that it cannot jeopardise their objectivity. Second, the introduction of certain subjectivity in such cases is 443 quite justifiable, since the use of abstractions in scientific explanations and predictions is necessitated in each particular case by quite definite objective conditions. It means that the concept of causality calls for at least a twofold substantiation: first, it is necessary to prove the validity of the very idea of causal relationship which underlies its definition; second, it is necessary to prove the soundness of the abstractions and approximations resorted to. Significantly, from the methodological viewpoint, this latter set of arguments is not less important than the identification of the causal dependence itself and should be presented independently of the former set of arguments.
Here the study of causal relationships reveals one of the most curious manifestations of the dialectics of the subjective and the objective. On the one hand, the singling out of the signs of a causal relationship is a subjective act aimed at investigating and analysing the objective world. Any denial of the subjective character, goal-orientation and selectivity of the scientific investigation into the cause-effect relationship would be untenable. On the other hand, this subjective act is by no means arbitrary, it is prompted by objective conditions. As regards its motives, they are rooted, in the final analysis, in the practical activity of man.
The active role of the subject in the processes of investigation (the subjective aspect) which manifests itself in experiments, hypotheses, suppositions, assumptions, use of various theoretical and mathematical means is an indispensable condition of scientific cognition. The tremendous successes achieved by science in the cognition of 444 the world would have been impossible without man's selective approach to reality, without his conscious use of appropriate means and methods in the process of cognition. However inaccurate the approximations, it should never be forgotten that the final result of the investigator's activity is the creation of a scientific picture of the world which helps man to reflect and transform reality through his practical activity. All this is fully applicable to the investigation of objective causal relations.
At the same time one should bear in mind that the singling out of a causal dependence from the entire system of complex objective relations and the disregard of all other conditions cannot but distort the integral picture of the world, since there are no absolutely isolated systems implicitly postulated by the concept of causality. Noting the complex, dialectical character of the cognition of the universal connection of phenomena, Lenin wrote: ``The human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world = process.''^^1^^
Being an abstraction, every concept, causality including, tends to distort reality. The attitude to this indisputable fact is different on the part of pessimists and optimists in science. The former say that our knowledge is an endless chain of errors and delusions, whereas the latter (and we include ourselves in their number) do not view the situation as tragic, though they do recognise _-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'', op. cit., p.~156.
445 it to be contradictory, sometimes even dramatic.Indeed, there is no ground for mistrusting science only because its results are not ideal. The history of science provides numerous examples when such difficulties were successfully overcome. In view of the extreme epistemological complexity of the concept of causality we should reconcile ourselves to the inevitable inaccuracies in any causal explanation and prediction. The scientist's task is to reduce such inaccuracies to a minimum and take full advantage of the effective means (both technical and conceptual) now available to him in order to ``neutralise'' his errors. It should be noted in this connection that inaccuracies can sometimes be disregarded altogether without any detriment to the validity of causal explanations. For instance, in everyday life we readily accept the explanation that water freezes as a result of the ambient temperature decrease to --4°C, though more accurate measurements made under different conditions will undoubtedly reveal a certain scatter in thermometer readings even if measurements are made in one and the same place but at different times, or at one and the same time but with different water samples. Why do we tolerate such an inaccuracy? Only because all other factors we close our eyes to are not essential in the given situation. We may disregard, for instance, the influence of admixtures in water and the probable variation of atmospheric pressure which is also known to affect liquid freezing processes.
In the example under consideration we only single out what we are interested in at the moment, namely, only two most essential events and neglect all other factors and accompanying 446 conditions. If the quantity of admixtures in water remains within normal limits and the ambient pressure is not very much different from normal, the error in the explanation of water freezing by a decrease of ambient temperature to --4°G will not be essential. Generally speaking, the scientist has every right to change the conditions of his investigation in accordance with the situation and use to this end any conceptual or mathematical means at his disposal, provided, of course, that he strictly observes the rules of abstraction, avoids any arbitrariness in his causal explanations and predictions and takes care not to distort living reality.
The objectivity of the principle of causality, however, consists not only in that it reflects certain aspects of reality and that the selection of certain events as causes and effects is prompted by the objective conditions of cognition. The very motives of this selection are always rooted in the material, practical activity of people and, in the end, in the entire system of social production. Moreover, it is none other than this practical activity that passes the final judgement on the objectivity of causal relations.
This idea has been very clearly expressed by Engels. ``The first thing that strikes us in considering matter in motion,'' he wrote, ``is the interconnection of the individual motions of separate bodies, their being determined by one another. But not only do we find that a particular motion is followed by another, we find also that we can evoke a particular motion by setting up the conditions in which it takes place in nature... In this way, by the activity of human beings, the idea of causality becomes established, the idea 447 that one motion is the cause of = another.''^^1^^ It is precisely the activity of human beings, their social practice, that frees our knowledge from subjectivity, gives our abstractions flesh and blood and integrates them into its great concreteness. It is only through practice, by including the cognised link of a causal relationship, as we understand it, into the objective, universal system of relations that we test the truth of our knowledge. Should it fit into the system without disturbing the course of natural processes, we shall have every right to regard our mental operations and abstractions, even the most daring ones, as completely justifiable.
_-_-_^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, op. cit., 230.
[448] __ALPHA_LVL1__ CONCLUSIONThe scientific and technological revolution has proved to be a serious test not only for some general and special scientific theories, but also for many philosophical schools and trends concerned in one way or another with the scientific explanation of the world. Positivist philosophy which pulled through many difficult periods in the course of its long history has evidently entered a new critical stage in its evolution. The general crisis of positivism started, in effect, with the emergence of Marxist philosophy, its first real alternative, and has been aggravating ever since. It became particularly acute at the turn of the 20th century in connection with major discoveries in physics, mathematics and philosophy, summed up by Lenin. New trials awaited positivism in the 1920s as a result of the emergence of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. No less troublesome were the subsequent periods of its evolution. All the storms positivism had to __PRINTERS_P_449_COMMENT__ 1/2 29-1152 449 weather resulted, as a rule, in partial modifications of its philosophical programme which took into account the criticism of its opponents, including Marxist philosophy.
It is noteworthy that the representatives of positivism attributed all these misfortunes of their philosophy not to its intrinsic weaknesses or to their own fallacies, but regarded them as symptoms of a crisis of science in general. Moreover, all blame for setbacks and difficulties in scientific cognition they usually laid at the door of either materialism or dialectics. The strategy and the tactics of positivism fighting for its prestige in the scientific community evidently deserves special analysis which goes beyond the scope of our investigation. What we do need to emphasise here is the fact that it is not some particulars of the programme of positivism that are called in question by the current scientific and technological revolution, but the very foundation of positivist philosophy. In point of fact, the revolution has completely undermined the scientists' confidence in the basic methodological principles of positivism---empiricism, conventionalism, indeterminism, the reduction of philosophy to the logic of science and to linguistic analysis, etc.
The crisis of positivist philosophy manifests itself not only in the disagreement with science and its main tendencies but also in the emergence of new schools and trends within the philosophy of science coming out with sharp criticism of some positivist dogmas and proposing methodological alternatives to its traditions.
The Western philosophy of science does not know a more radical critic of empiricism than Karl Popper. ``Critical rationalism'' as the 450 methodological platform of Popper and his adherents does appear to be rather a formidable opponent of positivism. Its model of scientific cognition is essentially different from the positivist model, particularly if we take into account the views expounded in the latest works of the English philosopher: the recognition of theory as the most essential component of scientific knowledge, the deductive system of reasoning (from a problem to a surmise, from the surmise as a tentative solution of the problem to consequences, from the consequences implied by a hypothesis to their purpose-oriented refutation, from this to a new formulation of the problem, and so on). Nevertheless, despite the apparent distinctions from the inductivist model defended by positivism there is striking resemblance between the two models: both of them postulate direct and simple connection between empirical knowledge and theory and assert .the conventional character of basic empirical statements, if not laws themselves.
Another characteristic feature of Popper's stand which seemingly distinguishes it from the positivist views is the recognition of the so-called World 3 or the world of objective knowledge. It is very significant, however, that Popper does not relate this world to objective reality, relying, like the positivists, on the intersubjective criterion of scientificity. His idea of ``objective knowledge'' borders on the idealism of the Platonic, if not Berkeleian, type.
``Critical rationalism'' also differs from positivism in that it revives the principle of causality and shows special interest in the explanatory role of scientific theories. Yet even this difference is watered down by interpreting necessity __PRINTERS_P_451_COMMENT__ 29* 451 implied by causal explanations in the purely logical sense a la Wittgenstein. The ``theory of regularity'' adhered to by Wittgenstein in relation to the problems of causality and determinism is obviously rooted in the philosophy of Hume and Kant and shows close affinity to the Machist concept of causality as probability of the expectation of consequences, as well as to the interpretation of law as functional dependence expressed by a mathematical formula.
Besides the highly critical attitude to empiricism in the modern philosophy of science, the opposition to positivism also manifests itself in the understanding of the subject-matter of philosophy. In this field the debates are mainly centred on the status of the so-called metaphysical problems. ``Critical rationalism'' does not go beyond the general legalisation of such problems though they were implicitly recognised in positivist dogmata, whereas ``scientific realism'', ``new ontology'' and ``new metaphysics'', which have formed within the framework of the modern philosophy of science as alternatives to positivism, place special emphasis on the need for the restoration of metaphysics reduced to ashes during the anti-metaphysical crusade of positivism and make this issue one of the key points of their programmes.
As a matter of fact, the programme of ``scientific realism'' boils down to the rebuilding of the scientific structure of the real world---the task considered to be worthy of philosophy. Very characteristic in this respect are the general scientific concepts and metatheoretical problems which receive extensive coverage in the works of this school's representatives. They indeed regard their task in terms of resurrection. One gets an 452 impression that scientific realism is completely unaware of the age-old traditions in the investigation of these problems and ignorant of the dialectics of nature and social development expounded in Marxist-Leninist philosophy which has never lost interest in such problems as being, the structure of matter, the interconnection of space and time, the forms of motion, the laws of the development of material systems, including society, and carried out fruitful investigations into the philosophical problems of natural science, social progress, etc. The attitude of the Western philosophy of science to these and many other problems is indicative of its confinement within the narrow limits of positivist traditions.
Of course, attempts to start from scratch ought to meet with sympathy and it would be hardly fair to demand of ``scientific realism'', ``scientific materialism'', ``new ontology'', etc. that they consider these problems within the framework of more general philosophical issues and substantiate the new ontology with dialectical and epistemological analysis. However, any attempt to develop a sound ontology today without fulfilling this requirement is inevitably doomed to failure. Moreover, an ontology constructed on a tabula rasa basis tends to reproduce in a crude manner some ideas and concepts of old natural philosophy gravitating towards mechanicism, speculativeness, the Laplatian ideal of determinism, etc. It would fail to rise to the level of universal, truly philosophical generalisations and only strive to replace them by a more or less coherent system of general scientific statements. Such statements based either on biological and cybernetic ideas, or on the set theory and the latest achievements of 453 physics would inevitably lose their concreteness and degenerate into truisms leaving at the same time a lot of loopholes for idealism---the more so as they are intended to deduce the world from current scientific concepts and tend on the whole to petrify the present-day knowledge rather than to give a dynamic picture of living reality on the basis of a truly philosophical approach. Consciousness, too, with all its specificity and richness of content is deduced from (or reduced to) the interaction of molecules and atoms, whereas the mechanism of heredity in living organisms is viewed in terms of quantum transitions. The tabula rasa approach of new metaphysics to the problem of ontology will hardly enable the philosophy of science to raise the edifice of new methodology above ground level in the place of the ruins left by positivism. All attempts to revive ontology as a doctrine of the objective world and its most general properties and laws will at best remind one of a recapitulation course of history unless their authors turn in earnest to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to the achievements of modern materialism that has assimilated all that was best and most progressive in the history of science and culture.
It is for this reason that we set ourselves the task of familiarising the reader with some principles of Marxist philosophy, showing the essence of dialectical materialism as an alternative to positivism and considering possible solutions to the present-day pivotal problems of methodology. It would be presumptuous to claim a more or less complete exposition of the views of the classics and modern Soviet philosophers in this book, not to speak of the elucidation of all the problems 454 that have been touched upon in its polemical sections. The author has only singled out a few most acute problems which have become of late the object of particularly heated controversies and which have not yet been subjected to a sufficiently detailed analysis in Marxist literature with due regard for the nuances brought in the limelight.
As regards the positive content of this book, we attach special importance to the problems of the scientific value of philosophy and of the concreteness of philosophical knowledge which are closely connected with each other. In Marxist philosophy concrete knowledge has always been associated with the completeness of the reflection of objects and their diverse relations and links with one another. Conversely, the abstract has been regarded as an equivalent of isolation, particularisation. Any statement represents a dialectical unity of both opposites, therefore there are no and cannot be any absolutely abstract or absolutely concrete scientific statements. Any scientific knowledge can only be more abstract or less abstract. Regarding scientific cognition as a living process unfolding in time and space we maintain that this completeness of the reflection of links and relations is different at different stages of scientific investigation. Hence, we distinguish three different levels or forms of concreteness: -empirical, representing direct, sensual perception of objects and phenomena; theoretical, concerned with inner laws, essential links, relations and necessary features; and philosophical, relating to the most general properties and phenomena of reality, the contradictoriness of development, the diversity and the unity of quality and quantity, 455 the material and the ideal, etc., as they are reflected in the human mind.
Real philosophical knowledge reflects certain universal properties of the sensually perceived world and is in this sense empirically concrete. It reveals the most general laws and relationships of the surrounding world and is therefore theoretically concrete. As distinct from the knowledge provided by special sciences it also defines the epistemological limits for the solution of one or another problem, i.e. the concrete form of the relation between the objective and the subjective in scientific cognition and, consequently, is epistemologically concrete. In point of fact, philosophical knowledge can only be concrete if it takes into account the place of a given phenomenon or the property it reflects in the general system of categories and laws of dialectics and materialism. Concreteness is demanded by Marxist philosophy of itself in the first place. The concepts of matter and consciousness are only regarded as concrete (and therefore really scientific) within the framework of the basic question of philosophy. The category of contradiction can only be concrete if it is viewed in the context of the unity of the phenomena under consideration. Dialectics rejects such notions as the opposition in general, quality in general, essence in general, necessity in general, etc. regarded as absolute entities. It demands that the opposites be only considered within the framework of unity, quality in relation to a given quantity, matter in relation to consciousness as its derivative, necessity in relation to chance, etc. Outside this philosophical concreteness the categories of dialectics and materialism become nonsensical. The concreteness of these 456 categories is the main proof of their scientificity.
The specific form of concreteness of philosophical knowledge determines also its relation to the knowledge provided by special sciences. Philosophy does not stand aloof from them, it merges with the entire system of human knowledge and actively penetrates all the cells of this living intellectual organism. Conversely, no special scientific knowledge could be fully concrete without the support of philosophy, as positive sciences do not concern themselves with quantity and quality, matter and consciousness, the opposites in objects and phenomena, etc. It hardly needs mentioning that no truly scientific analysis would be possible under such conditions.
Possessing its own form of concreteness, philosophical knowledge performs not only the methodological, but also the theoretical function in the development of science. It is not something alien to special scientific knowledge, but makes part and parcel of its system. It stands to reason that philosophical knowledge integrated in the structure of human thought usually loses its independent meaning or, at any rate, remains in the background---it serves the purposes of a special scientific investigation or some practical action and is entirely subordinated to it. This inconspicuousness of philosophical knowledge sometimes gives grounds for erroneous assertions that a well-developed theory has no place for philosophy at all.
The history of science shows how philosophical principles and laws rise up in all their magnitude and reveal their power and viability in critical periods, at the crossroads of scientific cognition, __PRINTERS_P_457_COMMENT__ 30 -- 1152 457 when it becomes necessary to solve crucial problems of social and scientific development. Fundamental, theoretical sciences find themselves much more often confronted with such large-scale problems than do empirical or applied sciences, and it is usually fundamental theories that throw a new light on conventional, generally recognised philosophical principles. Hence, the cooperation between philosophy and special sciences is particularly fruitful in the sphere of theory. The attitude of theorists to philosophy is reverent and critical at the same time. T-heir relations based on mutual confidence leave no room for parochialism and, consequently, for petty squabbles over their share in the success of a scientific investigation or, conversely, their measure of responsibility in case of its failure. Here we have a single science whose only aim untarnished by any prestige considerations is to serve mankind.
The question of the objectivity of knowledge assumes different forms and requires different solutions depending on the context. Philosophy provides the most general solution: everything that exists outside the mind (be it individual or collective) is objective. Special sciences view the problem from a different angle striving to ``eliminate the subject'' from the results of a scientific investigation. Empirical investigation does not know a more reliable means for obtaining objective knowledge than an experiment ensuring the investigator's ``neutrality''. Theoretical investigation, in our opinion, pivots on the principle of invariance. In the theorist's language the objective ``in the first approximation'' is equivalent to what is invariant in different systems of 458 transformation. A natural scientist (a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, etc.) shows but little interest in the problem of objectivity in its ``pure'', philosophical form, considering it even too trivial (as is evidenced from numerous publications and verbal statements). His attitude changes when the problem comes to the foreground, e.g. when the former criteria of invariance fail, generally recognised theories collapse and the scientists need a reliable bridge to a new theory.
Dialectics does not regard objective knowledge as a challenge prize which passes on from one generation to another. Objective knowledge must be gained by and for each generation of scientists separately and may only come as a result of their own labour. It should be extracted from the rock of subjective assessments, suppositions and delusions just like precious metal is extracted from ore. It is procured in arduous toil---only to be rejected there and then and give way to more profound concepts and theories.
In its approach to the problem of objective knowledge dialectical methodology is characterised, first and foremost, by its constant striving to reflect all the complexity and dynamism of scientific cognition avoiding any one-sidedness and absolutisation of some particular methods or levels of cognition. At the same time it firmly adheres to the principle of objectivity in its most general, philosophical sense, since the disregard of this principle leads to the erosion and devaluation of the entire system of scientific knowledge.
To be sure, the concrete embodiment of the principles of dialectics offered by one or another scientist in his works may lack the necessary flexibility, completeness or consistency. The __PRINTERS_P_459_COMMENT__ 30* 459 blame for subjective weaknesses should not be laid at the door of dialectics itself. It provides a sound basis for the solution of problems facing modern science, the more so as it calls for creative approach to its own development.
[460] __ALPHA_LVL1__ NAME INDEXAdams, J.--- 423 Adorno, Th.---292, 320, 321 Agassi, J.---86--93 Ambartsumyan, V. A.--- 440, 441 Aristophanes---85 Avenarius, P.---29, 255 Ayala, F.---166 Ayer, A.---29, 30, 37--39, 54, 56, 57, 127, 258 B Bauer, E.---198, 199 Bekhterev, V. P.---346 Bergman, G.---49 Bergson, H.---142 Berkeley, J.-53, 55, 58, 154 Bhaskar, R.---198, 199 Blokhintsev, D. I.---346 Bohm, D.---229. 235, 242 Bohr, N.--- 42. 43, 142, 150, 151, 239 [col2] Born, M.---155--59, 406 Braithwaite, R. B.---171 Brecht, B.---85 Bridgeman, P. W.---171, 242 Brodbeck, M.---171 Bunge, M.---108, 115--25, 134, 136, 217, 230--43 C Carnap, R.-24, 25, 31-- 35, 40, 46, 53, 66, 109, 114, 127, 142, 160--63, 167, 171 Chetverikov, S.---228 Comte, A.---27--29, 44, 49 Copernicus, N.---61, 73 Crick, F.---168--70 D Darwin, Ch.---176 Dirac, P.---85 Dubois-Reymond, E.--- 165 Dubrpvsky, D.---214 461 E Eccles, J.---218 Einstein, A.---42, 65, 73, 150, 211, 346, 408, 415--17 Engels, F.-62, 221, 222, 251, 252, 255, 270, 271, 280, 285, 333, 334, 342, 349, 437, 447, 448 F Feigl, H.-108, 130, 131, 208--16, 323, 324 Fet, A. I.---413 Feyerabend, P.---81--87, 93, 94, 109, 113, 206 Fichte, I. G.---142 Finnochiaro, M.---196 Fischer, R.---228 Fock, V. A. ---142, 346 Fodor, J.---131, 132 Frank, Ph.---154 Franklin, B.-298 Frolov, I. T.---211, 212 G Galilei, G.---85, 406, 414, 415 Goethe, J. W.---248 H Habermas, J. --- 286--89, 292 Hawking, S. W.---150 Heaviside, 0.---184 Hegel, G.---51, 84, 142, 245, 250, 251, 254, 257,259--65,300,302, 320, 321 Heidegger, M,---143 [col2] Heisenberg, W.---42, 43, 147, 229, 346 Hempel, C. ---128, 171 Herz, H.-184 Hilbert, D.-292 Homer -207 Hull, D.-224--27 Hume, D.-53, 55, 57, 63, 155 Husserl, E.---39 I Ilyenkov, E. V.---269, 276 Infeld, L.-416, 417 K Kant, I.---30, 39, 119, 155, 159, 250, 300, 303, 452 Kepler, I.---79 Kierkegaard, S.--- 85 Kuhn, T.---71--84, 195-- 97, 309, 422 L Lakatos, I.---75--80, 87, 91, 93, 198 Lavoisier, A. L.---73 Lebedev, P. H.--- 313, 340 Lenin, V. I.-85, 220--22, 275, 285, 300, 310, 311, 316, 332, 340, 341, 353, 374, 375, 401, 403, 406, 418-- 21, 427, 429, 445, 449 Lesevich, V. V.---45 Leverrier, U.---423 Lightfoot, E. N.---168 Locke, J.---57 462 Lorentz, H.---406, 415, 416 Lorenz, K.-165, 166 Luther, M.-85 M Mach, E.-29, 45, 46, 55, 142, 155, 255 Marcuse, H.---292--95 Margolis, J.---217 Marx, K.---85, 221--23, 251, 252, 255, 268-- 72, 274, 276, 285--90, 298, 317, 318, 321, 332, 342, 353, 358, 374, 375 Maxwell, J. ---184 McKeon, R.---107 Michelson, A.---340 Mill, J. S.---24, 29, 47 Mises, R.-37, 39, 41 Monod, J.---42, 169, 170 N Nagel, E.-163--65 Narsky, I. S.-321 Neurath, 0.---171 Newton, L---65, 73, 74, 79, 85, 413 Nickols, E. F.---313 P Pauli, W.---346 Pavlov, I. P.---346, 424 Plato---39, 189 Poincare, H.---42, 340, 406 Polten, E. ---218--21 Popper, K. R.--59--71, 74, 75, 77, 86--104, 109, 116, 117, 119, 123,177--94,196,218, [col2] 256,257,307--09,450, 451 Ptolemy---194 Q Quine, W. V. O.---108, 111--14,136,137,205-- 07 R Reichenbach, H.---109, 142, 143 Robinson, G. S.---194 Rorty, R.---134, 135 Rumer, Yu. B.---413 Ruse, M.---171, 172, 224 Russell, B.---25, 36, 39, 42, 155, 256, 335 S Schaffner, K. ---170 Schelling, F. W. J.--- 142 Schlick, M.---29, 46, 48, 61, 109, 127, 256 Schrodinger, E. ---100, 151, 229, 406, 413 Sellars, W.-108, 126, 135 Seve, L.---58 Smart, J. J.---132, 213 Spencer, H.---26, 49 Spinoza, B.---39 Szentgjorgji, A,-228 T Trigg, R.---198--205, 217 463 V Vavilov, N. I.---346 Volkmann, P.---43 W Watson, J.---168, 170 Wetter, H.---326 Wheeler, J. A.-148 [col2] Whitehead, A. N.---47 Wigner, E.---148--50, 229 Wittgenstein, L.---25, 29, 36, 46, 47, 55, 61, 256, 452 Wright, S.---228 Y Yudin, B. G.---211, 212[464] __ALPHA_LVL1__ SUBJECT INDEX
A Abstraction, abstract--- 136,261--63, 266--327, 425,426,437--41,443, 447, 448, 455 Analytical statement---30, 31, 34 Anomaly in cognition--- 309 Apriorism---39, 103 Assumption, premise--- 30, 63, 110, 121, 122, 134, 136, 142, 186, 232, 310--13, 338, 341,393,423--26,442-- 44 Axiomatisation---234/238, 349 B Basic propositions---69, 180 Biology---45, 46, 89, 99, 123, 160, 166--69, 176, 214, 225--28, 253, 292, 294, 302, 303, 335, [col2] 337, 342, 348, 360, 397 C Causality, cause---50, 56, 57, 100, 140, 215, 218, 219, 239--44, 307-- 14, 329, 335, 344, 355, 374, 423--48, 452 Chemistry---120,160, 215, 253, 337, 342, 356, 359 Classical science---51,118, 142, 229, 233, 338-- 40, 412--15, 422 Common sense notions, everyday experiences --- 26, 126, 225, 248, 249, Communicative process--- 38, 156, 286--88 Conception of ``Third World''-96, 102--04, 180, 182, 185, 187-- 94, 451 Concrete--261--63, 265-- 465 327, 455, 456 Confirmation---31, 32, 61, 62, 66, 68, 121, 164, 195, 307 Contradiction---318--20, 347 Convention, conventionism---69, 107, 126, 181, 186, 234, 450, 451 Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen school of physicists--- 145, 147, 148, 158, 237, 242 Crises in science---42, 70, 77, 144, 340, 341 Criterion of genuineness of knowledge---29, 120, 185, 195, 317, 319 ``Critical rationalism''--- 59,71, 75,81,93,94, 104, 177, 256, 426, 434, 450--52 Cumulative growth of knowledge---173, 257 Cybernetics---42, 348, 355, 361, 375, 376, 382 D Deduction, deductionism ---117, 277, 317, 338, 344 Delusions, errors in cognition---66, 67, 90, 91, 100, 185, 191, 193, 195, 258, 355, 437 Demarcation between science and metaphysics-68, 77, 89, 118, 209, 247, 399 Determinism---J40, J6|, [col2] 229, 239--44, 329, 336, 339, 450, 452 Development of science--- 70, 71, 81, 85, 94, 187, 335, 339--41, 357-- 90, 418--27 Dialectical categories and laws---257, 318, 326, 327, 337, 349, 356, 456 Dialectical materialism --- 51, 136, 137, 144, 204, 218, 245--448, 454 Dialectics---27, 125, 137, 138, 176, 228, 238, 245, 252, 254, 256, 259, 449--53 Dogmas, dogmatism---50, 67, 71, 85, 86, 114, 177, 209, 332 Dualism-50, 127, 129. 132 E Eclecticism---58,288, 292, 296, 327 Elimination of errors --- 67 ---of metaphysics---67, 142 ---of problem---127 ---of subject--184, 401, 403 Empirical data---31, 57, 95, 164, 265, 266, 334 Empiricism---31, 34, 36, 56, 57, 63, 64, 95, 164, 189, 291, 334, 335, 450 Epistemology---43, 46, 69 97, 103, 113--14, 124, 176, 181, 189, 199, 201, 221, 222, 234, 259, 398, 399, 453 Evolutionary theory of 466 cognition---67, 97, 109 Experience---37, 39, 101, 113, 114, 130, 131 Experiment---78, 152--54, 180, 194, 236, 300, 306, 313, 319--20, 327, 340, 359, 440, 441 Explanation---77, 78, 82, 91, 100, 141, 161, 170, 172, 210, 254, 264, 307, 308, 311-- 14, 342, 378, 422--48, 451 F Fact---54--57, 116, 164, 253, 258, 276, 300, 334, 337 Falsification, falsificationism---63, 64, 67, 68, 77, 88, 90, 91, 110, 116, 117, 177, 186, 187, 195, 254 Frankfurt School---288--96, 320 G Generalisation---34, 56, 122, 124, 264, 278-- 80, 284, 288, 309, 355, 356, 378, 401 Genetics---42, 97, 99, 168, 176, 228 German classical philosophy---25, 51, 245-- 65 H Heuristics, heuristic value---70, 84, 91, 123, 280, 314 Historical materialism--- 286, 287, 29Q [col2] History of science---66, 79, 80, 86, 87, 347, 457 Human values---41, 135, 191 Hypothesis---33, 67, 86, 117, 154, 186 I Idealism---27, 44, 50, 51, 58, 99, 127, 166, 193, 348, 394, 400, 451 Idealistic dialectics---5l, 104, 251, 256, 271 Identity and contradiction---260, 302, 316-- 19, 336, 455 Inborn knowledge --- 98, 257 Incommensurability of theories---81, 82, 84, 93 Information --- 30, 281, 283, 284, 286, 287, 330, 359, 375, 389 Integration of knowledge ---68, 85, 357--90 Interactionism---286 Intersubjective knowledge---112, 113, 154-- 62, 173, 185, 198, 201, 206, 215, 288, 396, 397 Intuition---35, 250 Invariance---405--18 K Knowledge, cognition--- 39, 53, 56, 67, 75, 76, 81, 135, 139, 159, 179, 180, 250, 265, 278, 317, 397, 398, 467 402, 403, 418, 419, 431, 432 L Language,linguistics---37, 42, 49, 111, 112, 133, 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, 169, 174, 206, 210, 258, 285, 288, 289, 336, 361--64, 372, 405, 406 Laws of science, laws of nature, laws of society---32, 56, 57, 79, 84, 103, 161, 163, 167, 255, 270, 297, 300, 301, 308, 309, 324, 326, 328, 336, 339, 342, 374, 379, 401, 431, 456 Logical empiricism---35, 42, 209 Logicism---70, 71, 74, 95, 96, 103, 105 M Machism, empirio-criticism---45, 46, 53, 142, 202, 240, 307, 452 Man-53, 272, 289--99,306, 361--74,381,384,428. 429 Materialism, matter---27, 50, 51, 96, 99, 101, 108, 125, 137--38, 140, 199, 200, 213, 220, 221, 258, 259, 290, 303--05,332,338,341, 391--448, 450, 454 Mathematical logic---30, 47, 122, 377 Matter and consciousness ---50, 96, 98, 176, 201, 304, 305, 406, [col2] 436, 457 Mechanistic materialism-51, 52, 58, 167 Mental and physical processes---96, 127, 128, 175, 192, 209, 213, 219, 220 Metaphysics---27, 29, 31, 32, 35--38, 41, 44, 67, 71, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95, 104--08, 142, 256, 257, 274, 284, 310, 335, 394, 395, 452 Methodological anarchism ---81--85 ``Methodology of research programmes''---76--80 Methodology of science--- 33, 59, 94, 209, 246, 312 Mind and brain---98, 100, 130--35, 306 N Natural philosophy---58, 104, 387 Natural sciences---26, 36, 38, 44, 328, 338, 339, 351,357--90, 395, 453 Natural selection---102, 226 Necessity and chance--- 260, 297, 300, 301, 318, 320, 434, 450 Neurophysiology---42, 130, 133, 176, 215, 217 O Object---54,101,115,144, 151, 265, 266, 315, 468 328, 345, 356, 396, 409, 410 Objectivity, objective knowledge --- 96--104, 106, 112, 139--94, 197, 201, 270, 338, 340, 342, 374, 390--448, 451, 458 Observation, observability---28, 30, 39, 56, 63, 112, 139, 144, 146, 153, 177, 205, 233--35 Ontology---56, 57, 104-- 38, 198, 199, 201, 218, 220, 283, 323, 328, 353, 453 P Paradigm---72, 73, 80, 350 Phenomenalism, phenomenology---135, 160, 214, 283 Pluralism---83, 84, 127, 175 Prediction---65, 123, 265, 307, 310, 313, 314, 358, 422--48 Probability---31--33, 150-- 52, 195, 210, 234, 235, 342, 375 Protocol statements---31, 62, 69 Psychology---43, 45, 46, 160, 167, 214, 302, 335, 337, 378, 379 Psychophysiology --- 42, 130, 217 Q Quality and quantity--- 260, 319, 323--26, 369, [col2] 370, 455--57 Quantum mechanics---36. 42, 118, 142, 145-- 53, 216, 217, 232--40. 396, 449 R Reality---37, 39, 53, 54, 113, 128, 134, 154, 166, 200, 220--22, 230, 340, 342, 355, 419, 420 Reduction, reductionism ---99, 110, 114, 128, 129, 160--64, 170--72, 174, 385 Refutation---64, 68, 70, 96, 121 S Scepticism---26, 43, 87, 135 Science and practice---26, 183, 300 Science and theology--- 27, 63, 154, 204, 247, 254 Scientific and technological revolution---357-- 90 Scientific community--- 71--73, 106 Scientific criticism---67, 116 ``Scientific materialism'' ---99, 131--34,178, 196, 197, 397 Scientific problem ---70, 88, 89, 102, 120, 183, 191, 344, 346--48, 350 -57 Scientific progress---48, 70, 75, 94, 247, 281, 469 358--90 ``Scientific realism''---99, 104--38, 178, 196--244, 353, 391, 395, 434, 435, 452 Scientific revolution---74, 80, 84, 143--44, 169, 196, 360, 361, 422--48 Selection ---of fact-159, 232 ---of hypothesis---72, 73, 80 ---of problem---88, 211--12 ---of theory---113 Sensual perception, sensory experience---37, 141, 144, 156, 2C9, 272 ``Situation logic,'' --- 76 Social progress---43, 98, 281, 388 Social sciences---89, 123, 167,285--88,290,291, 297--99, 357--90, 392 Solipsism---154, 201 Space-50, 126, 140, 339, 342, 414--18 Subject, subjective---35, 91, 92, 101, 141, 151, 179, 180, 184, 185, 282, 303, 355, 390-- 448, 458, 459 Synthetic statement---30, 31, 34, 264 System investigations--- 382, 453 T Tacit knowledge---338, 423--26, 442--44 Tautology---30, 37, 66, 231, 265 Theory---38, 64--67, 81, 82, 85, 86, 92, 102, [col2] 112, 116, 120, 136, 183, 184, 191, 192, 265, 299, 322, 334, 338, 350, 449 ---of atom-molecular structure of matter---36, 61, 157, 233, 350 ---of identity of the mental and the physical---130, 209, 210, 216, 217 ---``of regularity''--- 161, 302, 452 ---of relativity---36, 42, 45, 118, 142, 183, 195, 276, 408, 415--17, 449 ---tentative---66, 67 Time---50, 126, 339, 342, 413--18 Trade---288, 289, 293, 360-- 74 Transcendental reality--- 38 39 53 Truth---39,' 90, 91, 97, 191,193--95,212,224, 280, 419, 420 U Universality---32, 252, 297--99, 324, 329, 345 V Verification, verificationism---29--31, 56, 61, 63, 66, 67, 88, 95, 102, 110, 195, 254, 307 Vienna Circle---46, 59--61, 69, 119, 123, 209, 212 W World view---39, 40470 __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. 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